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Abstract 
Sebastiano Molinelli 
Dissoi Logoi: A New Commented Edition 
What in 1897 Ernst Weber first called ‘Dissoi Logoi’ is an untitled work written by an 
anonymous author in a peculiar kind of Doric dialect and which was handed down at 
the end of a few manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus. Since Thomas Robinson’s 
authoritative edition in 1979, most scholars have regarded Dissoi Logoi as a collection 
of lecture notes by a sophist lived between the 5th and 4th century BCE. In this thesis, 
articulated in five chapters, I will analyse and, where necessary, rethink the standard 
view about the most salient historical, philological and philosophical matters 
concerning Dissoi Logoi.  
After briefing the reader on the theoretical and methodological framework of my 
research (Preface), I will devote the first chapter (Introduction) to the transmission, 
language, literary influences, date, place, and nature of the work.  
In the second chapter (Critical Text and Translation), I will offer my critical Greek 
text of Dissoi Logoi and a parallel English translation of it. 
In the third chapter (Commentary), I will closely analyse the most relevant lemmas, 
from a linguistic, rhetorical and philosophical viewpoint.  
In the fourth chapter (The Author’s Message), firstly, I will investigate the work as 
a whole, thus tackling the highly debated problem of its unity; then, I will draw an 
overall outline of the author’s sophistic thought; finally, I will assess the possible 
theoretical connections between this work and the later Pyrrhonean tradition.  
At the end of this journey, I will summarize the various conclusions which I have 
reached throughout the thesis and which delineate a new portrait of Dissoi Logoi, 
alternative to that of the standard view (Conclusion). 
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Preface 
 
Thomas M. Robinson’s full-length edition of Dissoi Logoi (with critical text, English 
translation and commentary), first published in 1979, marked a watershed in the 
history of the scholarship on this work.1 The interpretation of Dissoi Logoi as a sophistic 
text had already been hinted by Lodewijk C. Valckenaer in 1802, was firstly defended 
with adequate detail by Theodor Bergk in 1883, and consensus grew around it in the 
20th century, among scholars such as Heinrich Gomperz, Max Pohlenz, Walter Kranz, 
Adolfo Levi, and Mario Untersteiner, just to name few.2 However, only with Robinson 
the sophistic attribution proved at once likely and preferable to the other alternatives 
which had been suggested over the centuries and which he first scrupulously analysed 
and refuted. Before quickly passing in review over these former attributions, we must 
recall how this text was handed down to us at the end of Sextus Empiricus’ 
manuscripts, and how in 1570 it was initially printed within an appendix to Henricus 
Stephanus’ edition of Diogenes Laertius’ De vitis philosophorum devoted to Pythagorean 
fragments.3 From then, it was attributed, in the chronological order of the scholars, to 
the Stoic Sextus of Chaeronea (Johann A. Fabricius), to the writer who forged the 
fragments of Archytas (Otto F. Gruppe), to the Socratic Simmias of Thebes (Friedrich 
Blass), to Simon the shoemaker, friend of Socrates (Gustav Teichmüller), to Miltas of 
Thebes, former rhetor and then Platonic philosopher (Theodor Bergk), and to a semi-
Eleatic thinker of the Socratic circle (Alfred E. Taylor).4 
As always, the value of a study is measured not just in how much it breaks with 
the past, but also in the duration of its acceptance within the scholarly community. 
From this perspective too, Robinson’s edition proves outstanding, because although a 
lot of ink has been spilled on Dissoi Logoi since its publication, its answers to some 
                                                 
1 Robinson (1979). 
2 Gomperz (1912), Pohlenz (1913), Kranz (1937), Levi (1940), Untersteiner (1954), Untersteiner (1967). 
3 Stephanus (1570).  
4 Fabricius (1724), Gruppe (1840), Blass (1881), Teichmüller (1884), Bergk (1883), Taylor (1911). 
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fundamental questions concerning the work’s composition — namely ‘by whom?’, 
‘when?’, ‘where?’, ‘with what goal?’, ‘under whose influence?’ —  are still held as 
correct by the vast majority of scholars, and they still represent the standard view on 
these matters. The sole exception is Thomas M. Conley’s supposition, in 1985, that the 
work is actually a forgery from a Byzantine school, and to which Robinson replied in 
2003.5 One may also want to recall that in 1998 Myles Burnyeat gave the idea for 
exploring the possibility of a reception of Dissoi Logoi by Pyrrhoneans;6 a suggestion 
which, too, albeit new, did not contrast with Robinson’s views in any way, the two 
being compatible.  
When four years ago I started this project, my main goals were two. Firstly, 
having read Carl J. Classen’s two articles of 2001 and 2004 — where he reviewed all the 
known Dissoi Logoi manuscripts and editions and where he offered a few new 
revisionary philological conjectures — and having personally inspected codices 
Laurentiani 85.19 and 85.24, I saw room for improvement in Robinson’s Greek text, and 
hence for establishing a new one.7 The same inputs from Classen’s studies had already 
motivated Alexander Becker and Peter Scholz to produce their own edition of the text 
in 2004.8 Their work, too, was accompanied by a translation, in German, and a 
commentary, which treated only the chapters as wholes, though, without entering the 
arguments of the single paragraphs. As one may imagine from what has been said 
above, Becker and Scholz subscribed to the standard view on Dissoi Logoi, and so did I 
initially, being persuaded by Robinson’s reconstruction. In fact, as a second goal of this 
thesis, I originally planned my commentary to cast light on the kind of teaching that 
the author delivered to his students through his text, under the hypothesis of a didactic 
goal, which Robinson started to defend later on.9 
                                                 
5 Conley (1985), Robinson (2003). 
6 Burnyeat (1998). 
7 Classen (2001), Classen (2004). 
8 Becker/Scholz (2004). 
9 Robinson (2003). 
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However, in execution, I realised that my two objectives did not correspond to 
each other very well. For producing a commented edition of an ancient text is a wide-
scale operation —  historical, philological and philosophical at the same time — and 
one which entails personal assessment of every salient aspect of the work. To my 
surprise, the sophistic nature of Dissoi Logoi excepted, from its dating to its dialect, from 
its connection with Sextus Empiricus’ works to its didactic aim, which underpinned 
my very plan of digging out the author’s teaching, my re-examination did not leave 
any one of the points which made up the standard view unchanged, and new 
conclusions have followed from it. The result is a thesis consisting in five parts which 
I lay out in the same logical order in which I proceeded during my research, namely 
moving from the material data of the textual transmission — because more certain —  
to the increasingly theoretical questions of language, literary influences, date and place 
of composition, nature, and message of the work — because less decidable and more 
subject to interpretation.  
As a preliminary methodological indication, I must highlight that the Greek text 
which I here propose repeats Robinson’s in most cases, except when I opt for a different 
manuscript variant or scholarly conjecture, or, rarely, for my own conjecture. I will 
signal these cases in the critical apparatus at the bottom of the Greek page, where I will 
compare the reading I select with Robinson’s one. Each of these choices will be also 
justified within the third chapter (Commentary), where I will recall all the other 
available readings too. Likewise, in this section I will also account for the points where 
my translation diverges significantly from Robinson’s, while other lemmas will be 
devoted to passages, or words, which are salient from a philosophical or rhetorical 
viewpoint.  
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1. Introduction 
 
§ 1. Textual transmission 
The text which nowadays goes under the name of ‘Dissoi Logoi’ has actually been 
handed down without any indication as to its title, author, or date of composition. The 
manuscripts which transmit it just generically introduce it, in their superscription, as a 
writing (σύγγραμμα) in Doric dialect (δωρικὴ διάλεκτος), or, as in the case of codices 
Parisiensis 1964, Parisiensis 1967, and Vaticanus Ottobonianus 21, in Ionic (ἰωνικὴ 
διάλεκτος), this difference giving a first hint of the heterogeneous and peculiar 
language of the text. To that, the copyists immediately add their uncertainty as to 
whether or not the work belongs to Sextus Empiricus, as the material immediately 
before does (ζητεῖται δὲ εἰ καὶ τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα Σέξτειόν ἐστιν).  
Dissoi Logoi, in fact, survives at the end of 22 manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus, 
dated between the 14th and the 16th centuries. We also know that it survived at the end 
of a lost 15th century codex of Sextus, the so-called Vaticanus Perditus,10 and, finally, it 
features, exceptionally, all by itself in the 16th century codex Leidensis Vossianus misc. 
1 no. 4.11 A relevant step towards the ‘better and fuller knowledge of the MSS’12 which 
Classen hoped for in 1982 when reviewing Robinson’s edition of this work, was 
achieved between 1995 and 2002, when Luciano Floridi investigated the ‘transmission 
and recovery’ of Sextus Empiricus in Renaissance.13 Based on the latter contributions, I 
have mapped out the following synopsis, which for each of the 24 codices indicates the 
                                                 
10 Floridi (2002), 29. 
11 ‘This seems to have escaped Robinson’ (Classen (1982), 84). It will not be my custom to linger on 
scholars’ slips, yet here I must make another, and last, exception, as it is indicative of the scarce attention 
which has been so far paid for the yet obviously tight connection between the transmission of Sextus 
Empiricus and that of Dissoi Logoi. One can still read that Dissoi Logoi ‘has reached us in extenso by direct 
transmission via medieval manuscripts’ (Laks/Most (2016), 165), which clearly indicates the confusion 
of those Sextus codices transmitting Dissoi Logoi, the earliest one of which is dated 14th/16th century, with 
all the Sextus codices, some few of which are indeed medieval.  
12 Classen (1982), 84. 
13 Floridi (1995), Floridi (2002). 
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abbreviation I will adopt in this dissertation (identical to Robinson’s, except in the case 
of Vaticanus Perditus, which he ignores), its full name, its revised date, and the specific 
work of Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (‘P’) and/or Against the Mathematicians (‘M’), 
which comes before Dissoi Logoi in that codex: 
B 
C 
E 
F1 
F2 
H 
L 
M 
P1 
Berolinensis Philippicus 1518 
Cizensis 70 
Escorialensis T-1-16 
Laurentianus 85.19 
Laurentianus 85.24 
Vesontinus 409 
Leidensis Vossianus misc. 1 no. 4 
Mertonensis 304 
Parisiensis 1964 
1542 
1556 
16th c. 
14th /16th c. 
15th c. 
16th c. 
16th c. 
16th c. 
15th c. 
P M 
M 
M 
P M 
P M 
P M 
 
M 
P M 
P2 
P3   
P4 
P5 
P6 
Q 
R 
S 
T 
Y1 
Y2 
YP 
V1 
V2 
Z 
Parisiensis 1967 
Parisiensis 1963 
Parisiensis 2081 
Parisiensis Supplementum 133 
Parisiensis 1965 
Vaticanus Ottobonianus gr. 21 
Regimontanus S. 35 
Savillianus Graecus 1 
Taurinensis Athenaei gr. 81 
Vaticanus 1338 
Vaticanus 217 
Vaticanus Perditus 
Marcianus 4.26 
Marcianus 262 
Monacensis 79 
16th c. 
1534 
16th c. 
16th c. 
16th c. 
1541 
15th c. 
1589    
15th/16th c. 
16th c. 
16th c. 
15th c.? 
1494-1495 
15th c., ante 1468 
16th c.    
P M 
P M 
M 
P M 
M 
P M 
M 
M 
P M 
P M 
P M 
M 
P M 
M 
P M 
The new dating of some of the manuscripts does not pose problems to Robinson’s 
stemma codicum, which is still the latest available and the one on which I have relied in 
my research, along with his evaluation of the codices’ quality.14 At the same time, a 
minor modification in the branches of Y1, P4, P6, V2, and C, has been suggested by 
Classen.15 Hence, I have deemed it not idle to update Robinson’s stemma to this change. 
                                                 
14 The most valuable codices are P1, P2, P3, R, F1, F2, P6, V2, P4, B (Robinson (1979), 22). 
15 Classen (1982), 84. 
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Unlike Robinson, in this new version of the stemma, I shall also leave aside Q, Y2, P5, 
and T, because they are apographs respectively of P1, Y1, R, and Z.16 The abbreviation 
‘St’ stands for Stephanus’ first printed edition of the work, whose presence both in this 
and in Robinson’s stemma is due to its relevance in the work transmission, as it will 
result later. Hence, the graph goes as follows: 
 
Comparing this stemma with the list above, one can easily notice how YP does not have 
a place, just as it did not in Robinson’s stemma either. Nonetheless, Paul Canart, 
inferring from the little philological information available about this codex, suggested 
that V1, F2, and R may be copies of YP, which has found Floridi’s agreement as far as 
V1 and R are concerned.17 Yet, I observe that if we assume, with Floridi, that YP may 
also be the manuscript registered ‘in a Greek Inventory compiled between 1517 and 1518 
under Leone X (Vat Gr 1483 f. 68v)’,18 where it is referred to as Σέξτου Ἐμπειρικοῦ πρὸς 
ματηματικούς – περὶ κριτερίου τῶν κατὰ Σέξτον σκεπτικῶν δέκα ὑπομνήματα, 
                                                 
16 Robinson (1979), 22. 
17 Canart (1977-79), Floridi (1995), 78, n. 59, Floridi (2002), 34. 
18 Floridi (1995), 78, n. 59. 
 10 
 
λόγος περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, then none of the other 23 manuscripts known to us can 
be connected to it. For 20 of them transmit a portion of text which, scattered minor 
omissions excepted, is equivalent to what nowadays we recognize as the nine chapters 
of the work, whereas P1, P2, and Q have the first three chapters only.19 Neither of these 
cases fits the phrase λόγος περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, which one would rather associate 
just with chapter 1. And this sounds even more suspicious as we observe that in that 
same Greek description, Sextus’ Against the Mathematicians is described as the ‘ten 
treatises on the criterion of the sceptics according to Sextus’ (περὶ κριτερίου τῶν κατὰ 
Σέξτον σκεπτικῶν δέκα ὑπομνήματα) with great accuracy and completeness.20    
Ultimately, we do not have good enough information to place YP anywhere in the 
stemma. Yet, whatever the reason for its handing down just Against the Mathematicians 
and the first chapter of Dissoi Logoi, this fact betrays a closeness between that Sextan 
work and the start of ours, which goes beyond this mere manuscript juxtaposition. For 
a glance at the codices list above reveals that except in L, which does not bear any Sextus 
Empiricus, Dissoi Logoi is always preceded by Against the Mathematicians, but not always 
by Outlines of Pyrrhonism, as YP itself testifies. Furthermore, as far as contents are 
concerned, a special similarity stands out between the second part of Against the 
Mathematicians, namely books VII-XI, and Dissoi Logoi 1-6, both dealing with logic, 
physics, and ethics. Some scholars have variously shown how that is particularly true 
of M. XI, i.e. Against the Ethicists, on one side, and Dissoi Logoi 1-3, on the other.21 These 
three chapters are also the only ones which the two valuable codices P1 and P2 bear. I 
suggest this may be due to their copyists deliberately excluding the rest of the work, 
                                                 
19 Mutschmann (1909), 245-250, De Meyier (1955), 222-223, Floridi (2002), 91-93.   
20 Both in and outside Sextus, one finds references to this work in similar terms, such as σκεπτικὰ 
ὑπομνήματα (S.E. M. I.29, II.106, VI.52), or τὰ δέκα τῶν Σκεπτικῶν (D.L. IX.116) (cf. Floridi (2002), 10, 
Janáček (1964)), or Σέξτου Ἐμπειρικοῦ ὑπομνήματα, which is the title of Against Mathematicians in the 
manuscripts of Dissoi Logoi. One may perceive a discrepancy with the 11 books now known as Against the 
Mathematicians, but Against the Geometers (M. III) and Against the Arithmeticians (M. IV) originally made 
up one sole book (Floridi (2002), 10, Janáček (1964), 120).  
21 Robinson (1979), 208, Conley (1985), 63, Bett (2002), 239. 
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precisely because it is not equally reminiscent of Against the Mathematicians. 
Contrariwise, Thomas M. Conley supposed that they were the only ones originally 
attached to Sextus Empiricus, whereas the rest of the text was added later.22 This 
hypothesis, along with his more general one that Dissoi Logoi appeared just at a later 
stage in the tradition of Sextus Empiricus,23 still ignores what emerges in Mutschmann’s 
still authoritative studies of the manuscripts, namely that the opposite is the case: 
originally, the archetype of Sextus contained also the whole Dissoi Logoi, which then 
progressively faded away.24 From this perspective, the fact that the codices preserving 
all the nine chapters do not feature the end of chapter 9 would be a sign that when those 
manuscripts came out, this process of erosion had already started.25 
Support for this explanation comes from the fact that out of the 31 Greek codices 
containing exclusively Sextus Empiricus, a good 21 are dated from the 16th century 
onwards. Meanwhile, Sextus’ works were printed for the first time, and never in 
conjunction with Dissoi Logoi.26 We can hence safely locate in the 16th century the end of 
a symbiosis between our text and the Sextan corpus, which started, if we refer to the 
composition of the archetype, at an imprecise moment between the second half of the 
2nd century CE — namely Sextus Empiricus’ approximate historical time — and the 9th-
10th centuries, the time to which his oldest, and fragmentary, manuscript in our 
possession dates.27 But this is just one side of the coin, because as our work was 
departing from Sextus’ corpus, it also started being copied and edited in other forms, 
which proves that scholars of that time attributed some value to it.  
                                                 
22 Conley (1985), 62. 
23 Ibid., 60. 
24 Mutschmann (1909), 277-278, Mutschmann/Mau (1958), VI, VIII.  
25 Mutschmann (1909), 277. 
26 Floridi (2002), 38-39. 
27 Ibid., 92, where we read that this manuscript is actually made of three fragments preserved in three 
distinct codices, namely Parisiensis, Supplementum 1156, Vaticanus Graecus 738, and Vindobonensis 
Theologicus Graecus 179.  
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This is especially true of Henricus Stephanus and Melchior Goldast. The former, 
in 1562, printed a translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism alone, and in 1570 placed 
Dissoi Logoi in an appendix devoted to Pythagoreans at the end of his edition of 
Diogenes Laertius’ Philosophers’ Lives.28 We are ignorant of his codicological source, but 
Robinson’s suggestion that this is the same subarchetype (ι) as the contemporaneous 
codex L — which was redacted by Goldast — can be strengthened by the fact that L is 
the only surviving codex which carries Dissoi Logoi but not Sextus Empiricus, just as 
Stephanus does, and that in the margins of its folia 3-6 one finds annotations by the 
same Stephanus.29  
Besides being the first to appear, and being given the same consideration as a 
valuable codex by editors of the following two centuries, Stephanus’ edition is also 
worth recalling for its new division of the chapters. In the manuscripts, in fact, there are 
four, the first three of which corresponding to the current Dissoi Logoi 1-3, and the fourth 
comprising all of the other six chapters (4-9) under the only heading περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ 
ψεύδους. Stephanus reduced this long, final section to just the current chapters 4 and 5, 
distinguishing a new, fifth one which covers the rest of the text and which he entitled 
περὶ τᾶς σοφίας καὶ τᾶς ἀρετᾶς, αἰ διδακτόν. He, thus, replaced the above codices’ 
superscription with the prefatory line Ἀνωνύμου τινὸς Διαλέξεις Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ, 
περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, περὶ τοῦ δικαίου 
καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου, περὶ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, 
εἰ διδακτόν. Particularly interesting here is the definition of the previously generic 
σύγγραμμα as Διαλέξεις, which Stephanus did not translate, but which we can assume 
means ‘discourses’, in the wake of the following Latin translations ‘dissertationes’ by 
North, and ‘disputationes’ by Fabricius.30 Incidentally, ‘Dialexeis’ is the title by which 
this work is still referenced in LSJ and TLG. 
                                                 
28 Stephanus (1570). 
29 De Meyier (1955), 223. 
30 North (1671), 47, Fabricius (1724), 617. 
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Dissoi Logoi’s first Latin translation appeared after only one century, in 1671, when 
Thomas Gale included it in his Opuscula, again within the Pythagorean section.31 At this 
stage, Gale appointed the editorship of text, translation, and commentary to John North, 
whereas in the second edition, printed in 1688, the latter’s work underwent a revision 
by Marcus Meibom.32 A noteworthy change which occurred between the two editions 
is in the Latin title, conceived of as a summarizing translation of Stephanus’ Greek one. 
For it turned from ‘Incerti cujusdam dissertationes quinque Dorico sermone 
conscriptae’33 into ‘Incerti cujusdam Dissertationes Morales, Dorico sermone 
conscriptae’,34 where the supplement of ‘morales’ reveals that the initial and ethical part 
of Dissoi Logoi was still felt as the most representative, even when the work no longer 
adjoined Sextus’ Against the Ethicists. 
Two centuries passed, and in 1884 Gustav Teichmüller edited the first modern-
language translation of the work, which was in German.35 He also identified the author 
as the scarcely known figure of Simon the shoemaker, and regarded Dissoi Logoi as part 
of the lost 33 Socratic dialogues attributed to Simon and whose titles are listed at D.L. 
II.122.36 This led Teichmüller to subdivide the text further, into eight chapters: he broke 
Stephanus’ chapter 4 into the current fourth and fifth ones,37 and he was the first to 
separate the current sixth and seventh, but not the eighth and the ninth. This division 
had its rationale in Diogenes Laertius’ list, as Teichmüller recognized each chapter in 
one of Simon’s dialogues.38  
                                                 
31 North (1671). 
32 Meibom (1688). 
33 North (1671), 47. 
34 Meibom (1688), 704. 
35 Teichmüller (1884), 205-224. 
36 Ibid., 105-129. 
37 A move which in the past had been simply proposed by North (North (1671), 67). 
38 Chapter 1 would correspond to περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, chapter 2 to περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, chapter 3 to περὶ 
δικαίου, chapter 4 to περὶ κρίσεως, chapter 5 to περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, chapter 6 to περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι οὐ 
διδακτόν, chapter 7 to περὶ δημαγωγίας, and chapter 8 to περὶ ἐπιστήμης (Teichmüller (1884), 113). 
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With Ernst Weber’s subsequent edition of 1897, for the first time ‘Dissoi Logoi’ 
replaced Stephanus’ ‘Dialexeis’ as the work title.39 Following Martin Schanz, Weber 
explained the work’s association with Sextus in the manuscripts by its sceptic 
character.40 In particular, he stressed how the very phrase δισσοὶ λόγοι, which opens 
the work and characterizes the beginnings of the first four chapters, has some bearing 
on the sceptic tradition.41 For he recalled that Diogenes Laertius had attributed a work 
Περὶ διττῶν λόγων to the sceptic Zeuxis (D.L. IX.106), and that the Δικτυακά of the 
sceptic and empirical physician Dionysius Aegeus consisted in a form of δισσοὶ λόγοι 
applied to medicine (Phot. Bibl. 185, 211).42  
The adoption of this new title, however, did not immediately satisfy everyone, as 
shown by Walther Kranz who highlighted its unfitness to represent the second part of 
the text, where the phrase does not even feature.43 In that time, a good compromise was 
reached by Hermann Diels, who from the second edition of his Fragmente der 
Vorsokratiker in 1907, published both the titles, with the old ‘Dialexeis’ following, 
between brackets, the new ΔΙΣΣΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ.44 Within this collection the work’s position 
changes again, as it is included in the old sophistic section. For the first time, it also 
displays nine chapters, obtained by singling out the final part of Teichmüller’s eighth, 
devoted to mnemonics. 
 
§ 2. Language of the work 
A component of Dissoi Logoi which at once strikes the reader and interests the scholar is 
its language, a kind of Doric dialect mingled with a few Ionic and Attic forms. Various 
suggestions have been tentatively made about its nature, and, by accompanying them 
with the names of their first proposers only, I recall them as follows: (a) a peripheral 
                                                 
39 Weber (1897), 33. 
40 Schanz (1884), 372. 
41 Weber (1897), 34.  
42 Ibid., 34, n. 1. 
43 Kranz (1937), 225. See also Nestle who continues to prefer ‘Dialexeis’ (Nestle (1966), 437). 
44 Diels (1907), 635. 
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Doric, such as that of Southern Italy or Sicily (North),45 or Megara (Taylor);46 (b) a non-
genuine standard Doric: either the product of a non-native Doric speaker 
(Teichmüller),47 or the artificial language of a later forger (Conley).48 At the same time, 
almost all commentators agree that nothing definitive about the Dissoi Logoi dialect can 
be said, nor can anything about the work be concluded on this basis. Although this is 
surely true, it is worth noting that the only two scholars who have conducted close 
inspections of this language ended up with clearer results than those of the others. Due 
to their more thorough inquiries, discussion of their two studies will be the starting 
point of this section, to lay the foundation for my final assessment of the matter. 
The earlier contribution was Weber’s extended article of 1898, ‘über den Dialect 
der sogenannten Dialexeis’,49 where he goes beyond Theodor Bergk’s judgement of 
Dissoi Logoi as one ‘der ältesten Denkmäler der dorischen Prosa’,50 enhancing its value 
to the extent ‘der ältesten Denkmäler des dorischen Dialekts’.51 This opinion reflects the 
principle which he abided by one year earlier when reconstructing the text in his critical 
edition of the work: to Doricize all the non-Doric manuscript readings, as Johan L. 
Heiberg had already done with the contaminations of Archimedes’ similar Doric.52 
However, the rationale behind this course of action, which inevitably led to an 
admittedly ‘energische Durchführung des Dorischen’,53 does not seem particularly 
robust, as Robinson remarked,54 and no subsequent editor acted in the same way. For 
Weber regarded the sophistic nature of the text, which he deduced from its contents, as 
                                                 
45 North (1671), 47. 
46 Taylor (1911), 128. 
47 Teichmüller (1884), 129-134. 
48 Conley (1985), 65. 
49 Weber (1898). 
50 Bergk (1883), 125-126. 
51 Weber (1898), 64. 
52 Heiberg (1884). On the similarity between the two philologists’ methods, see Weber (1897), 33-34, 
Thesleff (1961), 83-84, Robinson (1979), 14. On the linguistic similarity between the two works see 
Magnien (1920), 136, Thumb/Kieckers (1932), 102, where their non-Doric forms are also explained as the 
result of Hellenistic influences.   
53 Weber (1898), 70. 
54 Robinson (1979), 14. 
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an unequivocal sign that the author wrote in a time, such as the sophistic age of the 5th 
and 4th centuries BCE, when Doric was not yet contaminated. The frequency of certain 
Dorisms, which he meticulously recorded and discussed, would hence be proof that 
Doric is the exclusive dialect in which this work was originally composed, as opposed 
to the non-Doric forms, which he explained were due to later scribal emendations which 
were made especially during the production of the archetype.55 
In 1922, then, Carsten Høeg returned to this topic, but with a different result.56 He 
nonetheless made use of Weber’s study when drawing a list of the distinctive features 
of this idiom, the most significant of which are these:57 
1. In most, but not all cases, Doric ᾱ replaces Attic-Ionic η (e.g., νίκα, § 1.6, but 
σωφροσύνης, § 5.7); 
2. In the first two chapters, the plural dative of the active present participle mostly, 
but not always ends in -οντι58 rather than in -ουσι (μισθαρνέοντι, but ἀποθανοῦσι, § 
1.3); 
3. κατά undergoes apocope, which is common in Doric,59 only when it is part of 
recurring expressions (καττωὐτό, § 1.7), and in some occurrences of compound verbs 
(κατθέμεν, but καταθέσθαι, § 9.4);  
4. In most, but not all cases, Doric ω is preferred over Attic-Ionic ου (τῶ ἀγαθῶ, §. 
1.1, but τοῦ Ἰλίου, § 1.9); 
5. Forms in -εο (μισθαρνέοντι, § 1.3) are attested throughout the text, but in the 
first two chapters they alternate with contracted ones, both -in ευ (διαιρεῦμαι, § 1.11), 
as in Ionic, and in -ου (ἀσθενοῦντι, § 1.2), as in Attic; in chapters 3-9 they alternate only 
with forms contracted in -ου (πειρασοῦμαι, § 3.1).  
                                                 
55 Weber (1898), 69-70. 
56 Høeg (1922). 
57 Ibid., 107-110. 
58 An extremely rare trait even in Doric dialects, attested only in inscriptions from Messenia and Crete, 
and one ‘which gives an idiomatic touch to the language’ (Thesleff (1961), 94).  
59 Buck (1973), 81. 
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Based on these points, Høeg discarded the possibility that this dialect could be an 
artificial product of a non-native Doric speaker, as it strays too much from the rules of 
standard Doric to which such a person would have been likely to stick.60 Furthermore, 
he thought that the specific conditions under which (2), (3), and (5) occur denote a 
precise intention on the writer’s part, which ‘ne peut être dû au hasard’:61 namely, it 
would not tally with such casual phenomena as corruptions appearing, and then being 
emended over a text. Rather, he suggested that we search the Greek linguistic map for 
a place in which the specific Doric of this work is most likely to have been spoken; and 
by so doing he pointed to Cos.62   
Høeg was surely too point-blank in his conclusions, as he did not have ‘la preuve 
que ce n’est pas un dorien artificiel que nous avons sous les yeux’, or that ‘la tradition 
est bonne’, as he claimed.63 The textual evidence he brought forward is not sufficient to 
conclude that Dissoi Logoi’s language is such-and-such a dialect; at best, it could guide 
us towards the most likely candidate. At the same time, there may be some truth in his 
regarding the departures from standard Doric in (1)-(5) as out of place in an artificial 
language. As far as forgeries are concerned, these features do not have a parallel in other 
Doric forged texts like Archytas’ letters, Timaios Locros’ Περὶ φύσιος κόσμω καὶ 
ψυχᾶς, or in Aristippus’ 16th epistle (Hercher, Epistolog. Graec. 16). Only to a lesser extent 
do they appear in other pseudo-Pythagorean texts such as Okkelos’ Περὶ τῆς τοῦ 
παντὸς φύσεως, Philolaos’ Περὶ ψυχῆς, and Aristaios’ Περὶ ἀρμονίας, as well as in 
three other Aristippus epistles (Hercher, Epistolog. Graec. 9, 11, 13).64 Moreover, unlike 
all these parallels, Dissoi Logoi does not provide clear indication as to its own purported 
                                                 
60 Høeg (1922), 107. 
61 Ibid., 108. 
62 Ibid., 111. 
63 Ibid., 107. 
64 Contra Orelli, who pushed the similarity with Aristippus’ letters further without even making 
distinctions among them, to argue for the artificiality of Dissoi Logoi (Von Orelli (1821), 633). 
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author or provenance;65 hence, if we are to presuppose a forger, then it would have been 
in his interest to at least connote his writing with an easily identifiable language to make 
it more credible.66  
Another case of artificiality could be that of a non-Doric author who wrote in this 
dialect just to reach a Doric audience. This corresponds with Thesleff’s67 (and then 
Robinson’s)68 hypothesis that Dissoi Logoi was firstly composed in Ionic and then 
translated into Doric. Teichmüller too, had made a similar proposal, supposing that in 
writing our work, the Attic speaker, Simon, chose Doric to be read by the tyrant 
Dionysius of Syracuse. The result was a linguistically uneven writing, with a 
contemporary presence of Attic and Doric forms, in a way reminiscent of the 25 
dialogues, some in Attic some in Doric, which Aristippus too is said to have sent to 
Dionysius, according to D.L. II.83.69 Once again, in all these interpretations non-Doric 
forms count as involuntary imperfections due to the author’s insufficient familiarity 
with the language. However, not only would that not square with the elements Høeg 
pointed out as denoting intentionality, but also with the following, noted not by him, 
but by Weber:70 
6.   Sometimes a Doric trait and a non-Doric equivalent of it are at a very short 
distance from one another (μανία σωφροσύνης, § 5.7). 
                                                 
65 Cf., by contrast, the apocryphal ‘Definitions, attributed to Plato, or the De decentia, attributed to 
Hippocrates’, both in Attic κοινή (Adrados (2005), 179).  
66 Such a point was already made by Robinson against Conley’s suggestion of Dissoi Logoi as a Byzantine 
school exercise, staged in Greece around 400 BCE. Robinson observed that ‘for it to have any plausibility 
as a hypothesis, we have to imagine our author, whoever he is, doing a very strange thing. That is, he 
composes a piece that tries, on the face of it, to be in Doric, but succeeds in large part in being in Ionic and 
Attic, while on occasion evincing dialectal forms that suggest quite specific locations, like the island of 
Kos […] But why do any such strange thing, rather than simply write a piece in passable Attic if the text 
was meant to stem from Athens, or in passable Ionic if from some island location, or in passable Doric if 
from some Doric-language location?’ (Robinson (2003), 240-241). 
67 Thesleff (1961), 93. 
68 Robinson (1979), 51. 
69 Teichmüller (1884), 129-132. 
70 Weber (1898), 70. 
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How could the author write in correct Doric only one of these words? By the same line 
of thought, one can also sympathize with Høeg’s disbelief in the copyists’ responsibility 
of these contaminations. They too would be unlikely to have corrected the text in a 
dialect which is not Doric, contrary to what they recognize in most codices’ 
superscription, and, moreover, with such an easily detectable inconsistency. Finally, 
since the dialect is so deeply mixed-up throughout the work, one also finds it difficult 
to agree also with the hypothesis of a plurality of authors in action at different times, as 
no portion of the text can be distinguished from the rest on the basis of a specific 
dialectal or stylistic thumb mark, as one would expect in a similar scenario.71 
Moving now to the specific of the non-Doric variations, one notices that: 
7. Peculiarly Ionic forms outnumber those more generally Attic-Ionic, and, just to 
mention some of them, one can recall σοφίη (§ 5.7), ἀμαθίης (§ 5.7), κάρτα (§§ 6.7, 7.5), 
εἶπαι (§ 2.20), οἶδας (§ 9.4), διαιρεῦμαι (§ 1.11), ποτιτιθεῖ (§ 5.13). 72  
These words, assessed as genuine by Thesleff and Robinson on palaeographic grounds, 
constitute another blow for Teichmüller’s attribution of the text to the Athenian Simon, 
and their considerable number makes the hypothesis of a mistake on the copyists’ part 
even more unlikely. Furthermore, they lead us back to what was touched on above 
about two of the best manuscripts, P1 and P2, introducing Dissoi Logoi as a text in Ionic 
dialect (ἰωνικὴ διάλεκτος).73 As Weber pointed out, that looks like a mere corruption in 
the transmission of the original δωρική.74 Yet, what may have tricked the otherwise 
valuable copyist of their common source, the subarchetype δ, into this mistake could be 
precisely the large number of Ionicisms which the archetype α itself contained. 
                                                 
71 Robinson suggested it in later times, in connection with the possibility that the work is a manual of 
sophistic arguments (see infra, 46-48). 
72 Thesleff (1961), 93, Robinson (1979), 51, 86, n. 46, 89, n 63.  
73 See supra, 7. 
74 Weber (1898), 69.  
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In sum, albeit without his same certainty, one is keen to share Høeg’s disbelief both 
of the artificiality of the dialect of Dissoi Logoi, and of the possibility that this language, 
originally consisting in a pure Doric, then got contaminated by non-Doric influences 
during the handwritten transmission. Hence, the alternative hypothesis of an idiom 
actually used at some point and time in Greece gains plausibility, although Høeg’s 
preference for Cos’ Doric over other dialects does not seem very convincing. Granted, 
Coan would have the advantage of satisfying (5),75 as well as these points: 
8. The replacement of the active infinitive ending -ειν (contract verbs in -εω 
included) with -εν, which is attested in many Doric dialects, occurs most of the time but 
not always (ἐσθίεν, § 1.16, ἱεροσυλέν, § 3.7, but διδάσκειν, § 1.17, ἐπιορκεῖν, § 3.7).76 
9. The singular dative of -ευς nouns ends in ῃ (χαλκῇ, § 1.5).77 
10. The singular genitive of -ις nouns ends in -ιος, as common in Doric (φύσιος, § 
8.1).78 
On the other hand, as Høeg himself noticed, Coan too diverges from our dialect, as it 
does not have -ω in place of -ου, nor does the plural accusative of -ος nouns end in -ως, 
but, rather, remains, -ος (cf. (4)). Hence, albeit to a lesser degree than that of the other 
suggested dialects, Coan too fails to meet the requirements of this language, and Høeg 
was left to acknowledge that, properly speaking, ‘le dialecte des Dialexeis n’est identique 
à aucun des dialects que nous connaissons’.79  
However, there is a family of later dialects, which neither he nor any other scholar 
has adequately considered so far, and that is Doric κοινή. Quoting Buck, that ‘is 
substantially Doric, retaining a majority of the general West Greek characteristics, but 
                                                 
75 Høeg (1922), 111. 
76 Ibid., 111, Buck (1973), 122. 
77 Høeg (1922), 112, Buck (1973), 92. 
78 Ibid., 91. 
79 Høeg (1922), 111. 
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with a tendency to eliminate local peculiarities and with a strong admixture of form 
from the Attic κοινή’.80 To our knowledge, Doric κοινή can be subdivided in the 
Achaean, Aegean and North-Western variants,81 but ‘conspicuously local characteristics 
are on the whole absent’.82 Hence, we cannot list the distinctive traits of a city’s own 
κοινή in the same way that we do with its traditional dialect. Dissoi Logoi‘s dialect has a 
few points of contact with Doric κοινή in general, and with the Achaean and Aegean 
sub-groups more than with the North-Western one, in particular. These two levels of 
kinship can be seen back in (10),83 and in these other points: 
11. The plural nominative of -ις nouns ends in the Doric -ιες (πόλιες, § 2.9), but 
the plural dative in the Attic -εσι (ἀποδείξεσι, § 6.1).84 
12. In most, but not all cases, the 1st plural active ending is the East Greek -μεν, and 
not the West Greek -μες (μανθάνομεν, but ἴσαμες, § 6.12).85 
13. Both the Attic πρῶτος (§ 3.1) and πρός (§ 6.7), and the Doric πρᾶτος (§ 5.2) and 
ποτί (§ 2.28) appear.86 
14. Doric future is generally more frequent in the active, and it is hybridized both 
with the Ionic/Aegean -ευ (πειρασεῦμαι, § 2.2) and the Attic -ου (παρεξοῦμαι, § 2.19).87 
                                                 
80 Buck (1973), 176. Attic κοινή is, in its turn, a form of Attic contaminated by Ionic, which progressively 
imposed itself as the first ‘medium of communication’ (ibid., 175) and ‘standard language’ (ibid., 176) in 
the history of Greece. It came as the result of a process of universal diffusion of Attic whose start can be 
traced back to the creation of the Athenian Maritime League (477 BCE), and whose ‘principal landmark’ 
(ibid., 176) was the Macedonian period, as that kingdom was the first to spread it. It finally led to Modern 
Greek. (see also Adrados (2005), 176). 
81 Bubenik (1989), 193-197. 
82 Thesleff (1961), 82.   
83 Buck (1973), 177. 
84 Høeg (1922), 109, Buck (1973), 91, 177. 
85 Ibid., 177. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Høeg (1922), 109, Buck (1973), 177, Bubenik (1989), 194. 
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15. Two hyperdorisms pop up, namely διάδαλος (§ 1.11) and ἀσυχία (§ 2.4).88 
At the same time, Høeg emphasised the endings -οντι in (2) and -ῃ in (9) as too markedly 
Doric for this dialect to be just a κοινή.89 We hence get back to a ‘swings and 
roundabouts’ situation about the likelihood of some suggested dialect, but this time 
with something more in our hands. And I am not referring just to the questionably 
consolatory fact that now the reasons against are fewer and maybe due just to the fact 
that our knowledge of this dialect family is imperfect and not as developed as that 
which we have of the traditional dialects;90 the substantial point is that Doric κοινή can 
finally account for the Ionic and Attic contaminations, the inconsistencies, and the 
peculiarities of the work’s Doric, as was apparent in (1)-(15). It is also the dialect family 
to which Archimedes’ language is thought to belong;91 therefore, under the assumption 
that the same is true of Dissoi Logoi’s dialect too, we can also better account for the 
aforementioned similarity between the two authors’ languages.92   
In conclusion, although no certainty can be reached about Dissoi Logoi’s dialect, its 
features seem to suggest that it is not artificial, but rather a form of Doric κοινή, 
probably Achaean or Aegean. If this is so, then some chronological observations become 
necessary. For Doric κοινή is known ‘to have been employed all over the Doric world 
from the late 4th century right down to the 2nd and sometimes even the 1st century B.C., 
with occasional archaistic instances later’.93 That opens two possible scenarios about the 
                                                 
88 See also Høeg (1922), 109, Buck (1973), 179, and Adrados (2005), 183, where hypercorrections such as 
these are explained by the speaker being no longer perfectly familiar with the original laws of the dialect.  
89 Høeg (1922), 110. He also mentioned forms contracted in -ευ, mentioned in (5), and those in -η (<εα) 
such as ἀλαθῆ in § 4.3, but both cases are actually attested in Doric κοινή (Buck (1973), 179, Bubenik 
(1989), 194). 
90 The most we know of it is the above subdivision in three kinds of Doric κοιναί, which has much room 
for improvement, if one just thinks that, for example, in the same Aegean Doric κοινή, the singular 
genitive of -ις nouns is attested to end in -ιος ‘in the central part of the South Aegean Sea (Thera, Anaphe, 
Astypalaea), whereas the eastern parts (Rhode, Calymna, Cos) already show some advancing Hellenistic 
forms (πόλεως)’ (ibid.). 
91 Thumb/Kieckers (1932), 200, Adrados (2005), 124-125, Mimbrera (2012), 248. 
92 See supra, 15.  
93 Thesleff (1961), 82. It ‘ended up being displaced by the Ionic-Attic koine after a period of diglossia’ 
Adrados (2005), 176. An exceptionally early case is that of Syracusan κοινή, which ‘dominated in Sicily 
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origin of the text as we have it. In the first one, what has been handed down to us is the 
later rewrite of a work composed decades, or maybe centuries, earlier: the writer turned 
the work from its original and traditional dialect (whatever it was) into the Doric κοινή 
used in his time. This hypothesis would hence be compatible with a date of composition 
as early as 403-395 BCE, which is the one usually maintained. Alternatively, we must 
suppose that the text was created in Doric κοινή, and therefore at least fifty years after 
that time period, which obviously causes troubles to the usual dating.  
But to tackle the work’s dating more thouroughly than through any reasoning 
about language, other aspects of Dissoi Logoi need to be explored first, which I shall do 
in the next few paragraphs. As a marginal note, it is worth taking a look at how the 
author employs the language described thus far. His plain and short-sentenced prose is 
unchanged during the work, and is typified by the two stock-phrases καὶ τἆλλα 
καττωὐτό (§§ 3.16, 5.5, 5.14, 7.2, 7.6) and ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα (§§ 
1.11, 2.1, 3.13, 4.6).94 The unity of Dissoi Logoi, which can be questioned in some respects, 
is hence enhanced by an individual style which the author never abandons, even when 
he seems to be reworking materials from other sources.95 Exemplary are the long 
ethnological excursus and the connected thought experiment following it in §§ 2.9-18, 
where he appears to borrow ideas, but not language, from Herodotus.96 From this point 
of view, Robinson’s interpretation of the κάρτα of § 6.7 as a homage paid to Protagoras 
in a chapter strongly reminiscent of Plato’s Protagoras discussion on the teachability of 
excellence, not only relies shakily on the authenticity of Protagoras’ speech as reported 
by Pseudo-Plutarch in Consol. ad Apoll. 33.118e, but clashes with the same word 
appearing in § 7.5 too.97   
                                                 
[…] from the start of the fourth century BC until it was gradually displaced by the Ionic-Attic koine and 
subsequendy by Latin’ (ibid., 176). 
94 See also αἴπερ τωὐτόν ἐστι.... in both §§ 1.12,14,16 and §§ 2.21,22,24.  
95 On the stylistic consistency throughout the work see also Schanz (1884), 374.  
96 Cf. ταῖς χερσί and τοῖς ποσί (§ 2.17) with Herodotus’ Ionian τᾖσι χερσί, and τοῖσι ποσί (Hdt. 2.63.3); 
αἰ (§ 2.18) with εἰ (Hdt. 3.38.1, 7.152.2); νομίζοντι and κα (§ 2.18) with νομίζουσι and ἄν (Hdt. 3.38.1). 
97 Robinson (1979), 213. 
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The author’s command of the use of non-Doric forms emerges also from the way 
he deals with names of famous figures, both historical and fictional, which he puts in 
the dialects of their geographical, or literary origin, as can be seen in Ὀρέστας (§3.9, in 
Mycenaean), Κλεοβουλίνης (§ 3.11, Rhodian), Αἰσχύλου (§ 3.12, Attic), and Ἀχιλλῆα 
(§ 9.6, Epic).98 That is not enough to infer some literary quality in Dissoi Logoi’s dialect, 
as Høeg and Thesleff were ready to do.99 Nonetheless, it proves an informed and 
thought-out use of language, which goes hand in hand with the knowledge of Greek 
literature occasionally displayed. 
 
§ 3. Defining Dissoi Logoi  
§ 3.1 The Standard View  
Over the centuries, a plethora of suggestions have been made in response to the question 
of when this text was conceived, by whom, with what intent, and under the influence 
of which other authors. Yet, since the first publication of his edition in 1979, most 
scholars have agreed on Robinson’s assessment, which I shall call the ‘standard view’ 
(abbr. ‘SV’) from now on. It goes as follows:  
 
SV: Dissoi Logoi was ‘written some time around 403-395’,100 and represents the collection 
of ‘fairly full but unpolished “lecture-notes” (not really planned for publication)’101 of a 
sophist ‘of a Ionian provenance’102 before a Doric speaking audience, possibly from 
Megara, Sicily, or Southern Italy. His thought appears ‘largely influenced by Protagoras 
and in some smaller measure by Hippias, Gorgias, perhaps Socrates himself, and a 
number of ethnographers’.103       
 
                                                 
98 See also Høeg (1922), 108. Thesleff (1961), 80, 81, 83. 
99 Ibid., 110. 
100 Robinson (1979), 41. 
101 Ibid., 54. 
102 Ibid., 51. 
103 Ibid., 51. 
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However, there is room to reconsider the validity of this description, by means of a new 
examination of the text, and through the aid of some scholarly contributions appeared 
both before and after Robinson’s work. In order to respect the methodological principle 
which I stated in the Preface and have been observing so far,104 I shall first examine an 
issue likely to cross the mind of a reader of ancient Greek literature, when first presented 
with Dissoi Logoi, namely its points of contact with other known works in the same field 
(§ 3.2). I will then proceed to the chronological and geographical coordinates which one 
can gather precisely from the literary influences, as well as from the contents of the text 
(§ 3.3). Having clarified from whose works the author is more likely to have taken 
inspiration, and when and where the work composition might have been, I will thus be 
in a better position to finally draw plausible conclusions about the nature of both Dissoi 
Logoi and its anonymous author (§ 3.4).    
 
§ 3.2 Literary influences 
The past participle ‘influenced’ in SV calls for some clarification, as it captures the 
connection between Dissoi Logoi and the works of major classical Greek thinkers in a too 
generic way, and in some respects, also too weakly. To be sure, some passages of Dissoi 
Logoi merely call to mind other texts; but some suggest direct influence, one way or the 
other. Similarities of the first kind include the authors SV mentions, and, actually, some 
more. Here I shall give a brief overview of them, from the most to the least relevant, 
whereas for their full analysis, I refer the reader to the commentary.  
I hence start from the three main sophists of the 5th century BCE. Protagoras stands 
out as the first to say that two opposing speeches can be delivered about every subject 
matter (DK80 A1),105 and he is known to have written some lost antilogies (Ἀντιλογίαι, 
ibid.), a literary form to which chapters 1-6 belong. The relativism expressed by his homo 
                                                 
104 Namely to move from the known, or, at least, from what is easier to find out, to the unknown, or what 
is more difficult, so as to avoid question-begging (see supra, 6). 
105 καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις.  
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mensura doctrine (DK80 B1) perfectly tallies with the speeches in defence of the identity 
theses in chapters 1-5, whereas at Tht. 171a-b Plato has Protagoras deploy a self-
contradiction argument which is reminiscent of part of a larger one in § 4.6.106 Chapter 
6 similarly recalls the genre of excellence which in Plato’s Protagoras the sophist 
promises to teach to the young Hippocrates, and which can be broken down into a series 
of skills, then listed throughout chapter 8, among which correctness of speech (ὀρθῶς 
διαλέγεσθαι, § 8.1) has as a specially Protagorean flavour (cf. ὀρθοέπεια: DK80 A24, 
Pl. Phdr. 267c), as Gomperz noticed.107  
Finding myself in agreement with the order in which SV lists the most influential 
sophists, I then cite Hippias who echoes in the last two chapters of this work. Dupréel 
rightly observes how chapter 8 gathers all the most popular disciplines in the late 5th 
century (physics, politics, eloquence, law, dialectics) in the true spirit of Hippias’ 
polymathia (DK86 A8).108 Hippias was also known to resort to mnemonics — which is 
the subject of chapter 9 — to store such vast knowledge in his mind, and he would 
publicly perform before Doric speaking audiences such as Olimpia, Sparta, and Sicily, 
he himself coming from the Dorian city of Elis (DK86 A2, Pl. Hp.Ma. 281a-286c). Finally, 
at Hp.Ma. 285d (=DK86 A11), Plato recalls his unrivalled expertise in discussing ‘the 
value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies’,109 which mirrors our author’s 
morphological examples of §§ 5.11-12.110 
Gorgias, as third, can be spotted in the author’s personal and varied use of the 
notion of καιρός in §§ 2.19, 3.1, 4.2, and 5.9 (cf. DK82 A1a, B13), and in the thesis of 
ἀπάτη δικαία defended in §§ 3.9-12 (cf. DK82 B23) and which is characteristic of 
Simonides too (Plu. Aud. poet. 15c). Traces of the latter may also be in §§ 1.12-13 (Pl. R. I 
                                                 
106 See also Solana Dueso (1996), 156, 177. 
107 Gomperz (1912), 162-167.   
108 Dupréel (1948), 195. 
109 Translation from Fowler (1926), 353. 
110 See also Gomperz (1912), 71, n. 148. 
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331b-332d), in the unattributed verses of § 2.19 (Fr. PMG 36, Fr. 53 Diehl), and again in 
the mnemonics of chapter 9 (Marm.Par. 55, et alibi).  
 The ideas of some other authors make rarer appearances in the work. Socrates’ 
thesis on the impossibility of teaching excellence (Pl. Prt. 319a-b, et alibi) is put forward 
in the first speech of chapter 6, and his arguing against the appointment of public 
officers by lot because not meritocratic (X. Mem. I.2.9, Arist. Rh. II 20.4) appears in 
chapter 7 too. Three other sophists, Prodicus (DK84 A20, et alibi), Antiphon (DK87 B15, 
et alibi), and Alcidamas (Alcid. Soph. 3,8,23,31) might come to mind in chapter 8, and so 
does Hippocrates (Hp. Nat. hom. 1).111 The indiscernibility of all things, defended in § 
5.3, is a position attributed to Pyrrho too (D.L. IX.61), along with that of ontological 
indeterminateness at § 5.5 (Aristocles in Eus. PE 14.18.4), firstly ascribed to Heraclitus 
(Arist. Metaph. Γ 1005b24-25).  
As for the similarities of the second kind, they are more numerous and we can 
further divide them into a first class made of passages likely to inspire, or to be inspired 
by, pages of ancient Greek authorities, and a second one comprised of others very likely 
to do so; the watershed between the two groups is again the degree of similarity in 
words and ideas between what is said in Dissoi Logoi and in those classics. Following 
are these classes, each item of which is accompanied by its relevant passage from major 
works:  
 
First class 
§§ 1.2-3 and Pl. Prt. 334b-c 
§ 2.2 and Pl. Smp. 184c-e 
§ 2.5 and S.E. P. I.152, III.209 
§§ 2.9-17 and S.E. P. III.199-234 
§ 2.27 and Pl. Alc. I 111c 
                                                 
111 See also Becker/Scholz (2004), 30-31.  
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§ 2.28 and Pl. Grg. 501e-502a, R. X 607c, S.E. M. I.280-281, 297 
καὶ πρῶτον…οὔ (§ 3.2) and Pl. R. II 382c, [Pl.] Just. 374c 
αὐτίκα…ἐνῆμεν; (§ 3.2) and [Pl.] Just. 374d 
§ 3.4 and Pl. R. I 331c-d, II 382c 
§ 4.2 and Pl. Sph. 263b, S.E. M. VIII.323-324 
§ 4.5 and Pl. Phd. 100d, Ly. 217b-e 
ὥσπερ…ἐστίν (§ 4.5) and Pl. Smp. 207d-e 
§ 4.9 and Pl. Sph. 259a 
Chapter 5 and Pl. Cra. 386c-e 
§ 5.4 and Pl. Tht. 154c 
§ 5.8 and Pl. Alc. 2 138d-139c 
Chapter 6 and S.E. P. III.252, M. XI.216-257 
§ 6.3 and Pl. Prt. 319b-d, Men. 89d-e, 90b-e, 96a-d, [Pl.] Virt. 376b-c, 378c 
§ 6.4 and Pl. Prt. 319e-320b, Men. 93a-94e, La. 179a-d, Alc. I 118c-119a, [Pl.] Virt. 377a-
378c 
§ 6.6 and Pl. La. 185e 
§ 6.7 and Pl. Euthd. 278d, 283a, Prt. 312b, 325d-326c, Men. 91a-e, Alc. I 118c-d 
§ 6.11 and Pl. Prt. 320a, 327b-c  
§ 6.12 and Pl. Prt. 327e-328a 
§ 7.2 and Isoc. Areopagiticus 22, Arist. Rh. II 20.4.1393b 4-9 
τῶ…τέχνας (§ 8.1) and Pl. Euthd. 274e, Phdr. 261d-e 
κατὰ…ἦμεν (§ 8.1) and Pl Grg. 449b-c 
δικάσασθαι…δαμαγορεῖν (§ 8.1) and Pl. Grg. 452e 
περὶ…διδάσκεν (§ 8.1) and Pl. Sph. 232c 
§ 8.2 and Pl. Prt. 337d 
§ 8.3 and Pl. Grg. 457a 
περὶ πάντων…ἐπιστασεῖται (§ 8.4) and Pl. Euthd. 271c 
§ 8.9 and Pl. Grg. 454b 
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§ 8.10 and Pl. Grg. 484d 
§ 9.1 and S.E. M. I.52 
 
Second class 
§ 2.13 and Hdt. 5.6 
τοί…θεοῖς (§ 2.13) and Hdt. 4.64-66 
Μασσαγέται...τέθαφθαι (§ 2.14) and Hdt. 1.216 
Λυδοῖς…ἦμεν (§ 2.16) and Hdt. 1.93 
Αἰγύπτιοί…καλόν (§ 2.17) and Hdt. 2.35-36 
§ 2.18 and Hdt. 3.38, 7.152 
καὶ πρῶτον… οὔ (§ 3.2) and X. Mem. IV.2.16 
αὐτίκα…ἐνῆμεν; (§ 3.2) and X. Mem. IV.2.17 
§ 3.4 and X. Mem. IV.2.17 
ἀνδραποδίξασθαι…ἀποδόσθαι; (§ 3.5) and X. Mem. IV.2.15 
Chapter 5 and S.E. M. XI.197-209 
καὶ πρᾶτον…πάντα (§ 5.2) and Pl. Cra. 392c 
§§ 5.3-5 and Pl. R. V 479b-d 
§§ 5.11-14 and Pl. Cra. 431e-432b 
§ 5.14 and S.E. P. II.215, III.109, M. IV.25, X.323 
§ 6.5 and Isoc. Against the Sophists 14 
τό...ποιεῖν (§ 6.8) and Pl Prt. 328c 
§ 6.12 and Hdt. 2.2 
§ 7.2 and X. Mem. I.2.9 
§ 7.5 and Isoc. Areopagiticus 23 
 
Based on the second class, it is reasonable to conclude that the works which are most 
likely to have influenced Dissoi Logoi, or to have been influenced by it, are, in 
chronological order, Herodotus’ Histories, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Plato’s Cratylus, 
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Republic, and Protagoras, Isocrates’ Against the Sophists and Aeropagiticus, and Sextus 
Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians. At the same time, a 
special case can be made for Plato’s Gorgias, which features in the first class, but whose 
points of contact with our text, although less strong, are as many as six.   
While it is understood that the resemblance between our work and many others 
could be simply coincidental, and that both our author and those aforementioned could 
have conceived their respective texts independently from one another, the high number 
of parallels listed above makes this less plausible than considering a dependence 
between them. The question then arises about who drew upon whom. First and 
foremost, the fact that over the centuries preceding its manuscript appearance, Dissoi 
Logoi has left practically no mark of itself112 seems to clash with its possible 
characterization as a source of inspiration for many other, much more renowned works. 
Not by chance, the latter hypothesis has never been taken into serious consideration by 
scholars, except for Trieber’s far-fetched attempt to present § 3.4 as the source of X. Mem. 
IV.2.2-18, and Robinson’s sporadic and unargued supposition that § 4.5 may have 
inspired Plato’s παρουσία.113 SV’s reading of this influence as reversed is hence more 
plausible, although maybe too flat, as we will see later.  
Another option could be that both Dissoi Logoi and those texts drew upon a third, 
common source, as some scholars, in fact, have suggested concerning three of the 
parallels listed above. However, besides these alleged common sources being works of 
which we know little, and whose very existence is sometimes object of contention, this 
interpretation has the unlikely corollary that an author who seems to be used to lifting 
passages from well diffused texts would look at more remote sources in those three 
cases. This objection gains substance if one inspects these parallels more closely.  
                                                 
112 The only potential case could be the elliptical reference to it in Diogenes Laertius’ account of Zeuxis 
(see supra, 14, infra 289). 
113 Trieber (1892), 218, Robinson (1979), 193.  
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First comes the similarity between the ethnographic descriptions in §§ 2.9-17 and 
some of those we read in Herodotus. That the latter may have been the source of our 
work is something Robinson and some of his predecessors have found difficult to 
accept, arguing that ‘on a number of occasions’ our author ‘offers details not found in 
Herodotus; and a fair number of the more general points he makes are not to be found 
in Herodotus at all’.114 Yet, Robinson dismissed as ‘pure speculation’ Gomperz and 
Kranz’s hypotheses about Protagoras and his followers being the real source, in the 
belief these had collected ethnographical material ‘for the purpose of demonstrating the 
relativity of moral concepts’;115 a valid criticism, as we indeed do not possess any 
substantial piece of evidence for that. Contrariwise, he welcomed the possibility that 
‘the author is drawing upon earlier sources, some or all of which were also tapped by 
Herodotus (e.g. Hecataeus and Hellanicus)’.116 However, this idea relies on an old-
fashioned view about Herodotus’ sources, and it is no wonder that Robinson’s authority 
for that was Aly.117 For later studies, with Detlev Fehling’s monograph first in the line, 
got rid of the idea that Herodotus was heavily dependent on the geographic and 
historical lore of earlier logographers such as Hecataeus, Acusilaus, and Pherecydes, as 
well as on contemporaries like Xanthus and Hellanicus; the very existence of such 
extensive literature from which Herodotus could lift is contested.118 If that was not 
enough to abandon the common source track for this case, one must notice how 
Herodotus continues to echo in chapter 2 even once the ethnographic section is over, 
that is in the mental experiment of § 2.18, whose literary parallels are Hdt. 3.38 and 
7.152. 
The second case where a common source has been adduced concerns the likeness 
between §§ 3.2-5 and X. Mem. IV.2.15-17. Here Robinson, on the one hand, 
                                                 
114 Robinson (1979), 165. 
115 Ibid., 166. See also Gomperz (1912), 163-164, Kranz (1937), 228. 
116 Robinson (1979), 165-166.    
117 Aly (1929).  
118 Fehling (1971), 2-3. 
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acknowledged that ‘the structure of the two passages is remarkably similar, and verbal 
affinities (often the very same examples) abound’.119 On the other hand, he fell into what 
Classen considered the ‘main fault’ of his edition, namely the fact that ‘Robinson 
discusses and determines the date of the treatise in the introduction and, on that basis, 
considers and judges a number of passages in the commentary which should be viewed 
without prejudice as regards the date, as they might contribute to determining it’.120 He, 
in fact, did not even take into account the possibility that Xenophon’s Memorabilia, 
completed not earlier than 371 BCE, was the original of our text, and so he explained 
the above similarity by putting forth the three following possibilities. The first posits 
that our author is the source of Xenophon; the second speculates that the two authors 
personally heard Socrates’ arguments about justice; the third conjectures that both 
authors drew on an earlier thinker.121 At a closer look, though, all hypotheses pose 
problems. The first one entails that Xenophon put arguments into Socrates’ mouth 
which he had read in Dissoi Logoi, and that would seem at the very least bizarre for a 
Socratic like him. The second hypothesis assumes that our author lived in a time which 
allowed him to encounter Socrates, which itself needs to be proven. The third option 
necessitates specification either of the possible identity of this ‘earlier thinker’ or of what 
his arguments could have been like, if it does not want to sound just like a strained 
attempt to oppose the direct dependence between two texts which, as seen, Robinson 
himself viewed as strongly similar. Things do not improve even if we supplement it 
with other scholars’ proposals. Nestle’s attempt to base his claim about an unspecified 
sophistic source for both Xenophon and our author on X. Mem. IV.2.1, where it is simply 
said that Euthydemus collected works of famous poets and sophists, was fanciful, to say 
the least.122 Dupréel’s identification of such a source with Hippias had no better 
grounds, as it was based on elements unrelated to the texts at issue, namely Hippias’ 
                                                 
119 Robinson (1979), 179. 
120 Classen (1982), 86-87. 
121 Robinson (1979), 180. 
122 Nestle (1908), 580. 
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said presence in Dissoi Logoi 8 and 9, and Socrates and Hippias’ conversation on justice 
at X. Mem. IV.4.123 
 Third, and last, is the case of chapter 6 and its striking similarity with Plato’s 
Protagoras, both in content and in the form of six pairs of passages, falling within either 
of the classes of the second-kind influences. Trieber124 and Taylor125 extended the 
similarity also to Plato’s Meno, pointing out how the arguments in favour of and against 
the teachability of excellence of all the three works could be traced back to ‘the common-
places of fifth-century rhetoric’.126 Granted, these claims are less weak than the common 
source hypotheses seen so far. For there indeed might be room to include Meno, and 
also, I would add, the pseudo-Platonic De Virtute in this relationship, judging by their 
very similar arguments. Furthermore, for the first time, we have a hint as to which the 
common source could have been, because the teachability of excellence may well have 
been the subject of Protagoras’ Μέγας Λόγος too (DK80 B3), as Heinrich Gomperz 
suggested.127 However, the special kinship of chapter 6 with Plato’s Protagoras can be 
inferred not only from its higher number of parallels, but particularly from the reference 
to Polyclitus teaching his art to his child at § 6.8, which has a parallel in Pl. Prt. 328c 
only. Finally, since we have no certainty about the actual contents of Μέγας Λόγος, the 
hypothesis of our author reading Plato, or vice versa, is at least slightly ahead of that 
about a common Protagorean source for the two. As an upshot of the analysis of these 
three cases, the hypothesis of a common source proves less likely than the more intuitive 
one of one author directly drawing on the other.  
In conclusion, SV seems right in maintaining that the many points of contact of 
Dissoi Logoi with ancient Greek authorities should be explained in most cases by our 
author’s drawing upon the latter. Yet, its list of these influences should be reconsidered 
                                                 
123 Dupréel (1948), 208, 310. 
124 Trieber (1892), 235.  
125 Taylor (1911), 117-119. 
126 Ibid., 119. Similarly, Guthrie (1971), 319. 
127 H. Gomperz (1912), 175. 
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and enlarged so as to also include a series of parallels in which the closeness of the texts 
is so strong as to suggest our author’s direct reading of those classics. As seen before, 
among the latter eleven stand out as the most likely sources of Dissoi Logoi and out of 
them now I would like to highlight nine in particular, as their date is later than the one 
SV attributes to our work. These are Plato’s Protagoras, Gorgias (both before 387 BCE), 
Cratylus (387-380), and Republic (390-360), Isocrates’ Against the Sophists (ca 390) and 
Areopagiticus (355), and, finally, Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the 
Mathematicians (around 200 CE).  
By advancing the possibility that our author was a reader of Plato’s dialogues, this 
interpretation somehow takes up the route started by Kathleen Freeman, who first 
commented that ‘it is hard to believe that the work was not written after the publication 
of Protagoras, Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Theaetetus’.128 Yet, the main difference between 
our hypotheses lies not so much in the selection of the dialogues to refer to, but, rather, 
in our views about the use which our author makes of what he reads elsewhere. For in 
recognizing these and other debts (Heraclitus’ and Protagoras’ too), Freeman then 
concluded that ‘the author shows no originality […] repeating arguments and examples 
used by others’, which makes the final product ‘superficial’.129 On the same wavelength, 
few years later, Maria Timpanaro Cardini and Josef L. Fischer denied the intellectual 
value of Dissoi Logoi, considering it as a mere compilation of ideas of Protagoras and 
Hippias.130 On the contrary, what I will endeavour to show in the commentary is that 
the author’s use of the classics is original, and subordinate to his own philosophical and 
rhetorical necessities. To anticipate some examples of that, theses which Plato and 
Xenophon put in Socrates’ mouth are absorbed in a weave of sophistic and anti-Socratic 
lines of thought in Dissoi Logoi, like the argument against the appointment of public 
                                                 
128 Freeman (1946), 417, n. a1. 
129 Ibid., 417. 
130 Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 213, n.1, Fischer (1969), 33,36. 
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offices by lot in § 7.2, or those of philosophical temper in §§ 8.9-11, within a chapter 
devoted to sophistic polymathy.  
A different and more radical way to oppose the intellectual originality of the work 
in light of the many sources spotted has been the one (already introduced earlier) in 
which some have denied the historical authenticity of Dissoi Logoi, arguing that the work 
was a forgery put up with heterogeneous material from some relevant authors by 
someone lived a long time after what he describes. This interpretation would enable the 
inclusion of the latest of the classics I mentioned above, namely Sextus Empiricus, 
within our author’s sources. It is no wonder that Conley, the most recent and incisive 
upholder of the forgery view, stresses the already discussed similarity between the first 
chapters of Dissoi Logoi and Against Ethicists to this end.131 Yet, clearly debates on ‘good 
and bad, seemly and disgraceful’132 did not start with Sextus, having a long-lasting 
history in ancient Greek philosophy, which starts, among the others, with some 5th-4th 
century BCE works I quoted among the second-kind influences. From this point of view, 
§ 5.14, the paragraph very close to some passages from Sextus, is as much so with the 
earlier Plato’s Cratylus. Furthermore, as already touched on, one should refrain from 
thinking, as done by SV, that only Dissoi Logoi can draw upon other texts, and never the 
other way around. That applies especially to our work, as a similar limitation would 
clash with what emerges about its most likely date at various levels, and which we will 
see in the following paragraph. An alternative explanation of the points of contacts 
between Dissoi logoi and Sextus, which hence is still called for, will be given in the final 
section of the dissertation.  
 
§ 3.3 Date and place 
SV dates Dissoi Logoi ‘some time around 403-395’ and places it in one city among 
‘Megara, Sicily, or Southern Italy’. Similarly to what has been done with the influences, 
                                                 
131 Conley (1985), 62-63. On the similarity between the two texts, see also supra, 10. 
132 Ibid., 63. 
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let us now test the value of these coordinates, both in their adhesion to the text and 
history, and as for their logical consistency.  
The first scholar who contributed to these opinions was North, who spotted in § 
1.8 the proof that the work was written shortly after Sparta’s victory in the naval battle 
at the mouth of the Aegospotami river (ἁ…συμμάχως) in 404 BCE.133 This is due to his 
conjecture τὰ νεωστί (‘what is just occurred’) to correct the codices’ τὰ νεότατι which 
since Gisbertus Koen editors have been rightly revising as τὰ νεώτατα (‘the most recent 
events’) instead.134 North also saw Sicily and Southern Italy as the most likely locations 
of our author, considering him to be a Pythagorean, and his reference to Hellas in 
λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων (§ 1.1) as oddly detached, if made by 
a person coming from that same place.135  
Centuries passed, and in 1913 Pohlenz not only identified τὰ νεώτατα with the 
final act of the Peloponnesian War, and hence made it the terminus post quem of the work, 
but he also suggested that this association compels us to take 394 BCE as terminus ante 
quem.136 For in that year the Corinthian War started, and it hence should have had a 
place in the author’s list of historical conflicts, if only it had already occurred.137  
Finally, the hypothesis of Megara as the author’s city, was firstly suggested in 1961 
by Edwin S. Ramage, but without any specific supporting reason except for Megara 
being a Doric-speaking city.138 Unlike him, one year later, Martha Kneale grounded this 
same judgement on Dissoi Logoi’s marked interest in notions such as truth, falsehood 
and contradiction which are distinctive of the Megarian school, and which characterize 
the first part of our work too, especially chapter 4.139 
                                                 
133 North (1671), 47, n.1. 
134 Koen in Schaefer (1811), 234, n. 26. 
135 North (1671), 47, n.1. 
136 Pohlenz (1913), 72. 
137 Ibid., 72. 
138 Ramage (1961), 423-424. 
139 Kneale/Kneale (1962), 16. 
 37 
 
These are the grounds on which SV argues about date and place of the work, the 
latter of which are the shakier. Starting from Sicily and Southern-Italy as possible 
geographical provenances, Pythagoreanism was certainly present in these cities, but not 
in Dissoi Logoi which only gratuitous interpretations of § 4.4, and § 7.5 can connect with 
it.140 It is no wonder that neither North nor Stephanus before him ever offered a reason 
for their insertion of Dissoi Logoi among Pythagorean fragments, which hence seems to 
be there simply due to its Doric dialect. But even granting the rather impressionistic 
idea that every philosophical writing in Doric has to do with Pythagoreanism, one must 
recall that the Doric of this work is a peculiar one, and different from the varieties 
attested in Sicily and Southern-Italy. Judging by its Ionic contaminations, it actually 
seems eastwardly rather than westwardly oriented.141 Even less persuasive is North’s 
argument based on the reference to Hellas, which would seem to lead to the absurdity 
that every time somebody names their own country in a discourse, they also need to 
specify that they belong to it. As for Megara, Kneale was right in presenting it as a place 
which would have satisfied our author’s dialectical interests, but wrong in singling it 
out as the only possible one, from this point of view. So much so that one cannot rule 
out the possibility that, whatever the reason of the peculiar Doric dialect of the work, 
the author actually got his philosophical and literary education in Athens.142  
In the search for a more suitable place where this work was composed, an 
obligatory stop is at Cyprus, an island recalled in a controversial passage of § 5.5, which 
says that ‘what is here, is not in Libya, and what is in Libya is not in Cyprus’. Bergk was 
the first to defend the coincidence of ‘here’ with ‘Cyprus’, and, then, around it he built 
a broader interpretation of the work as the writing of a 4th century sophist from that 
island.143 He, in fact, focussed on the barbarian menace to contrast which Hellas had to 
                                                 
140 See infra, 154, 221. 
141 See supra, 22-23 for my conclusion for Achaean or Aegean Doric κοινή. 
142 This idea has been defended a few times, the most recent of which can be found in Becker/Scholz (2004), 
13-40. 
143 Bergk (1883), 126-133. 
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take the extraordinary measure of sacrificing the temples of Delphi and Olympia, as 
recalled in § 3.8. This episode he recognized in the last phase of the Corinthian war, 
immediately before the peace of Antalcidas (387 BCE), when Evagoras, the king of 
Salamis on Cyprus, was engaged in promoting Greek culture in the island and securing 
it from the Persian aims, with the help of Athens. In his Olympic Oration of 388, Lysias 
exhorts the Hellenic cities to a national unity against the Persians, and Bergk believed 
that this oration arrived to Cyprus, that there it got translated and soon read by our 
author who was writing Dissoi Logoi, and who must have thus been inspired by Lysias’ 
words when composing § 3.8. According to Bergk, that a sophist could operate in a 
remote place like Cyprus should not come as a surprise; rather it was also proven by the 
fact that Polycrates (436/5 – after 380 BCE) came to this island from Athens, to spend his 
retirement. And that was thanks to the material development and cultural flourishing 
which Cyprus has experienced since Evagoras took power in 411, as magnified in 
Isocrates’ Evagoras. Finally, Bergk quoted the mental experiment of § 6.12 about a 
Hellenic child learning Persian simply by being raised there, and a Persian child doing 
the same the other way around, as a sign that the place from which the author wrote 
was close to Persia, and hence more likely to be Cyprus than other suggested places 
such as Southern Italy.144  
I begin from the end, as the last argument speaks for itself in oddly constraining 
our ability to figure out mental scenarios in some requirement of spatial proximity. As 
for § 5.5, then, Taylor wisely observed that the conflation of ‘here’ with ‘Cyprus’ would 
make the whole statement redundant, as the second part, ‘what is in Libya is not in 
Cyprus’, is the simple converse of the first one, ‘what is in Cyprus is not in Libya’.145 
This rejoinder, yet, implies a commitment to exactness and conciseness about which we 
                                                 
144 ‘Dies setzt enge Verbindung und Nachbarschaft voraus; in Kypern lag dieses Beispiel sehr nahe, für 
Unteritalien wäre es sehr ungeschickt gewählt’ (ibid.,132). 
145 Taylor (1911), 94, n. 1. 
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cannot know whether it was among our author’s priorities. Hence, I would not go so far 
as to say that the writer ‘would hardly express himself thus’, as Taylor did.146  
At any rate, the most difficult points to Bergk’s solution are the following three. 
First is the fact that the historical circumstances in which he argued that Dissoi Logoi had 
been composed do not feature any episode reminiscent of the Hellenes’ use of their own 
temples for military reasons, as described in § 3.8, and from which Bergk seemed to 
draw only what he needed, namely the outline of a moment critical for Hellas’ safety, 
and in which the cities’ cooperation was vital.  
Secondly, notwithstanding the cultural development of 4th century Cyprus, to our 
knowledge, philosophy seems to have been marginally involved in it. For if we except 
Zeno of Citium (c. 334-262/1 BCE), the founder of the Stoic school in Athens, where he 
also spent most of his life, the list of Cypriote ancient philosophers consists just in few 
‘second- or third-rate authors’,147 such as Aristotle’s friend Eudemus (?- ca. 353 BCE), 
who was perhaps previously a member of the Academy too, Persaeus of Citium (307/6–
243 BCE), Stoic and pupil of Zeno at Athens, and the cynic Demonax (70-170 CE), mainly 
known from the Life of Demonax, written by his student Lucianus. None of the 
philosophies embodied by these figures had diffusion on the island, nor a real bearing 
on Dissoi Logoi. Even if we agreed on Eudemus having been an Academic, drawing a 
link between him and the passages where Dissoi Logoi gets in touch with Platonic 
dialogues would be far-fetched, both because these are just some of the work’s likely 
sources, and because a vast part of Dissoi Logoi leans towards anti-Platonic positions. In 
a similar way, nothing suggests that the stay of the old Polycrates promoted the 
development of the sophistic profession on the island, nor is it presumable that he 
himself composed Dissoi Logoi on that occasion, as the little we know of this sophist’s 
production is at odds with our work. He, in fact, ‘was famous in antiquity for his 
                                                 
146 Ibid., 94, n. 1. 
147 Hill (1949), 212. 
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speeches on paradoxical and absurd themes’,148 and at Is. 20 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
condemns his style for its ‘overblown verbosity and a tasteless use of too many 
extravagant figures and poeticisms’.149 Furthermore, the likely hypothesis of a 
dependence of our text on Isocrates, would be seriously affected if this author were 
Polycrates. For, firstly, there was no love lost between him and Isocrates, as we can 
argue from Isocrates’ denunciation, in his Busiris, of the shortcomings of Polycrates’ 
Encomium of Busiris and Accusation of Socrates. Secondly, only the deployment of 
Isocrates’ Against the Sophists would have been chronologically possible for Polycrates 
who in 355 BCE, when Aeropagiticus was composed, was not alive anymore.  
Thirdly and lastly, nothing guarantees that the place in which chapter 5 is set is 
the same as that of the other chapters. The chapters may well correspond to speeches 
which our sophist held in various places150 — maybe never where the author lived — or 
may even not be set in any specific place. The same applies to chapter 7, which sketches 
a moderate democracy, devoid of the lot system as method of appointment for public 
officers, but nothing specific emerges as to its identity and relationship to the author.  
Earlier on, we anticipated the exigency of going beyond the dialect to make a good 
guess about the work’s date of composition. However, at the end of this analysis on 
what the author lets us know about Dissoi Logoi‘s place, the results invite us to backtrack. 
For, bona pace the scholars’ hypotheses which have just been discussed, the contents of 
the work do not point to any Hellenic city in particular, whereas the Aegean /Achaean 
Doric κοινή in which the work seems to have been written is the only element 
potentially speaking of a geographical unity of Dissoi Logoi. Granted, as earlier observed, 
it may well also be the product of a later translation of a work originally composed 
somewhere else. Yet, this hypothesis will lose likelihood at the end of the following 
inquiry on the work’s date.  
                                                 
148 Livingstone (2001), 28. 
149 Ibid., 30. 
150 See also Kranz (1937), 225. 
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The latter can be started by recalling that the identification of τὰ νεώτατα in § 1.8 
with the Aegospotami battle, and, hence, of 404 BCE as terminus post quem, was attacked 
by Santo Mazzarino.151 He, interestingly, noticed how on that occasion the balance of 
military power was the opposite of the one described in our text.152 Quoting Thucydides, 
he pointed out how on that occasion we see ‘the destruction of the Athenian empire and 
the capture of the Long Walls and the Peiraeus by the Spartans and their allies’ (Th. 
5.26.1).153 In order to see Sparta defeating the Athenians and their allies (Ἀθηναίοι δὲ 
καὶ οἱ συμμάχοι), Mazzarino suggested, rather, a look back at the battle of Tanagra in 
457, which he deemed the real terminus post quem.154 However, although more consistent 
with the text, this alternative identification too is far from conclusive, as the impact of 
the Tanagra battle on Greek history cannot be compared with that of the Aegospotami 
one, which marked the end of a war which Thucydides himself defined as ‘major […] 
and more momentous than any previous conflict’ (Th. 1.1.1).155 The Aegospotami battle 
is hence less likely to be forgotten than the Tanagra one in our author’s list of crucial 
military conflicts in the Hellenic world. 
SV has thus found a sound terminus post quem in 404 BCE. Nonetheless, it is  worth 
moving on from chapter 1, to see whether we can encounter other elements relevant in 
this respect. As first comes the already quoted passage of § 3.8, dealing with the 
exploitation of temples which are common property of Hellas, to repell an imminent 
Persian menace. Unfortunately, despite the aforementioned effort of Bergk, and others 
too, it is impossible to identify this episode with any known event of Greek history, as I 
will explain in the commentary. In §§ 3.11-12, then, we learn that the author was 
acquainted with Cleobuline and Aeschylus, which too is of little help, as it draws us 
back from 404. But once we get to § 7.5, we find a line of reasoning which, as mentioned 
                                                 
151 Mazzarino (1962), Mazzarino (1966). 
152 Mazzarino (1966), 289-290. 
153 Translation from Hammond (2009), 270. 
154 Mazzarino (1966), 151. 
155 Translation from Hammond (2009), 3. 
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in the earlier paragraph and shown in the commentary, has a close and exclusive 
parallel with Isoc. Areopagiticus 23. I therefore believe that we should take 355 BCE, the 
date of composition usually assigned to this oration, as a more precise terminus post quem 
than 404 for our work. 
As for the terminus ante quem, that the Corinthian war would have been mentioned 
if only it had already started when the author was writing is not surer than the above 
possibility of the Tanagra battle as terminus post quem. On the other hand, as Bergk 
pointed out, what is certain is the lack of any reference to the Macedonian power, 
especially in the list of the most important battles of §§ 1.8-10, which thus makes 338 
BCE, the date of the battle of Chaeronea, a later, maybe loose, but no doubt safer 
terminus ante quem.156  
For the sake of completeness, the search for a terminus ante quem must yet call also 
at the two short arguments of § 6.8, which drew the attention of some. Firstly, Becker 
and Scholz argued that the author’s reference to Anaxagoreans in this paragraph could  
have been possible only before 380 BCE.157 This statement is puzzling, as it is both 
unargued and clearly contrary to the three occurrences of οἱ Ἀναξαγορεῖοι attested 
after that date, according to the TLG. Pl. Cra. 409b6 is one, and maybe the earliest, as 
that dialogue is approximately dated between 388 and 368 BCE; the other two belong to 
the Byzantine Georgius Cedrenus (Compendium historiarum 1.144.13) and Georgius 
Syncellus (Ecloga chronographica 174.25). The author’s next example of the famous 
sculptor Polyclitus teaching his child his own art was used by Mazzarino in support of 
his early dating, seen above.158  Firstly, he pointed out how from Pl. Prt. 328c Polyclitus 
appears to have taught his children, from which Mazzarino argued that Dissoi Logoi 
must have been composed at a time when Polyclitus had already trained only one of 
them. Secondly, considering the time when Polyclitus and his master Ageladas are 
                                                 
156 Bergk (1883), 126. 
157 Becker/Scholz (2004), 16. 
158 Mazzarino (1966), 288. 
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known to have worked,159 SV’s suggested date of composition would appear too late for 
the former to have not yet taught sculpture also to his second child. According to 
Mazzarino, to get things square one needs to adopt the dramatic time of the Protagoras, 
which he questionably saw in 423 BCE,160 as a terminus ante quem to date Dissoi Logoi. In 
reply to this, Untersteiner warned against being too trusting of Plato’s chronology. For 
it cannot be excluded that Plato anachronistically transferred the number of Polyclitus’ 
children when the Protagoras was composed (between 395 and 394 BCE) to the dramatic 
time.161 On the same wavelength was Robinson, who excused the chronological 
inaccuracies on the part of both Plato and our author, saying that what interested them 
was, rather, the widespread τόπος of Polyclitus teaching his children his own art.162 One 
must not also pass over the yet unexplored possibilities that the taught children were 
more than one by 433, as the Protagoras says, but that Dissoi Logoi refers only to one of 
them either because only one was still alive at that time, or because only one actually 
followed his father’s steps in sculpture.163 Finally, Robinson did not favour any of these 
hypotheses in particular, believing that they all demonstrated excessive faith in the 
historical accuracy of both Plato’s and our author’s accounts. For this reason, in none of 
them does he see a true danger for SV’s dating.164 For my part, I share Robinson’s 
scepticism about the historical reliability of what has been written about Polyclitus and 
his children in both works, which cannot hence help us with the terminus ante quem in 
any sense. However, I also observe that one reason why our author’s words were 
historically incorrect could be the length of time separating them from those episodes 
and diminishing their memory. From this point of view, the terminus post quem I argued 
for above may be preferable to Robinson’s one, because it is later.  
                                                 
159Ageladas’ oldest statue is dated 520 BCE, Polyclitus’ one 460 (ibid., 288-289). 
160 Contra the usual 433 (Taylor (1992), 64). 
161 Untersteiner (1967), 470-471. 
162 Robinson (1979), 38-39. 
163 Ibid., 39. 
164 Ibid., 39-41. 
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With that being said about Dissoi Logoi’s date of composition, the conclusion is that 
the assertions made by SV in this regard must be rethought precisely as above it 
happened concerning the place of composition. Rather than 403-395 BCE, the work 
seems to be dated between 355 and 338 BCE, an interval which becomes particularly 
interesting when put in connection with the peculiar dialect of the work, because, as 
touched on above, koineization of Doric is thought to start precisely in ‘the late 4th 
century’.165 Hence, the peculiar language of this work does not only give us clues about 
Achean or Aegean Doric-speaking areas as the most likely provenance of the text, as 
seen above, but it also turns out to be the language in which Dissoi Logoi is most likely 
to have been originally written, rather than just that of a later translation of the text.  
 
§ 3.4 Nature of the work 
SV attributes Dissoi Logoi to a sophist of classical age, and with what I believe to be good 
reason. I will go into the ideas and structure of the work in the sections to follow, but 
that easily appears just by looking at the writer’s swiftly moving from ethics to eristic, 
from education to politics, from ontology to mnemonics, and especially at that 
manifesto of similar competences which is chapter 8, where the arts of speaking and 
philosophy are sophistically intertwined. 
In the relatively short length of each chapter, in its spare prose, and in the seeming 
absence of a unitary line crossing all of them, SV sees the proof that the text is nothing 
more than a collection of lecture-notes which helped the author to prepare himself for 
his declamations, but which may even be wrong to call work, as it was not meant for 
publication. In particular, Robinson observed that ‘the constant use of καττωὐτό 
suggests strongly that we are looking at shorthand versions of arguments that could be 
expanded on the appropriate occasion’.166  
                                                 
165 See supra, 22.  
166 Robinson (1979), 90, n. 69. 
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It is at this point that my views on what the work is start to diverge from SV. 
Firstly, despite their own essentiality and brevity, the nine speeches of Dissoi Logoi are 
yet fully developed, the only few interruptions which affect them being due to lacunae 
in the manuscripts. The structural completeness of the author’s treatment sounds also 
like a reason of pride for him in § 6.13, where he closes the chapter by stressing the 
tripartite structure of ‘a beginning, a conclusion and a middle’ he has given to his 
speech. Secondly, as I will show at the end of this thesis, although the chapters are 
independent in content the one from the other, their topics are not unrelated, both 
because all of them pertain to the sphere of sophistic education, and because subgroups 
of them describe more specific lines of thought. Finally, καττωὐτό actually features as 
part of the bigger stock-phrase καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό, which I have already mentioned, 
and which always appears at the end of an argument as a way to universalize the 
conclusion the author has just inferred from a select few particular cases. If we buy into 
Robinson’s logic, then the only expansion which those arguments can undergo, and 
which the stock-phrase could adumbrate, will consist precisely in the addition of further 
examples instantiating the same general rationale. But why should the sophist have 
risked forgetting such additional unsaid examples, by hiding them under τἆλλα 
καττωὐτό, especially if one agrees with Robinson that Dissoi Logoi is a collection of 
lecture notes, which, as such, are designed to improve the retention of a speech? 
As for the fact that a work of similar contents and form cannot be ready for 
publication, I again have some reservations. In the first place, a fair assessment of both 
its style and thought should consider the expectations and the intellectual level of its 
readership. Alas, the latter is unknown, but considering the Dorian origin of the text, it 
stands to reason that so were their readers, or at least a part of them. If so, then, as 
Rossetti observed, the work’s inadequacy to the standards of the Athenian rhetoric and 
philosophy argues in favour of its suitability to a Dorian cultural environment, less 
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intellectually demanding as emblematically depicted by Plato in Hp.Ma. 285c-d.167 At 
the same time, and this constitutes a second reason for the work’s publication, 
underneath its superficial naivety, Dissoi Logoi also reveals a series of major ancient 
sources which the more learned among its readers would have found it rewarding to 
recognize, and in as big a number as has ever been found among surviving sophistic 
texts.168 Finally, the habit of assessing the author as talentless, which Diels started, has 
always been accompanied by blindness of some valuable aspects of his thought and 
rhetoric, to which I will try to do justice in the next sections of the dissertation.169 Just to 
name some of them, I recall the actual dynamics of contrast between identity and 
difference theses in chapters 1-5, the four rhetorical strategies the author adopted in 
those same chapters, and the identical list of topics covered by the second speeches of 
chapters 1-4. 
As last, it is worth tackling an alternative hypothesis about the nature of the work, 
which emphasizes its didactic character by regarding it as one of those ‘little manuals 
or catechisms of sophistic arguments’ which were ‘in fairly common circulation’ 
according to some reading of Arist. SE 183b36-184a2.170 Recently, Robinson himself 
defended this interpretation, presenting it just as possible as the above hypothesis of the 
work as a sophist’s lecture-notes.171 Yet, it is problematic in more than one respect. In 
the first place, one must clarify what Aristotle means in that passage, which reads thus:  
For the training given by the paid teachers of contentious argument resembled the 
system of Gorgias. For some of them gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches 
                                                 
167 See also Rossetti (1980), 28-29. 
168 Alcidamas testifies that one of sophists’ habits was precisely ‘to marshal the collected writings of past 
sophists and bring together ideas from many sources into the same work’ (Alcid. Soph. 4, translation in 
Muir (2001), 3-5). 
169 Diels (1907), 635.  
170 Robinson (2003), 241. 
171 Ibid., 241, contra Robinson (1979), 89, n. 68, where he expressed his reservation about it. In Dorion 
(2009), 127, one finds the latest support for this hypothesis which firstly appeared in Diels (1907), 635, 
where Dissoi Logoi are considered ‘Niederschrift von Schulvorträgen’. 
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which were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and answers, in which both 
sides thought that the rival arguments were for the most part included.172  
As one can see, the speeches under debate do not perfectly coincide with the genres of 
speech in our work — surely not with the most distinctive one, namely the antilogy of 
chapters 1-6. We may find a correspondence between chapters 7-9 and what Aristotle 
calls ‘rhetorical speeches’ (λόγοι ῥητορικοί). Yet, as far as ‘questions and answers’ are 
concerned, this rhetorical device is employed in just few paragraphs throughout our 
work, whereas none of its nine chapters is a speech consisting in only this device, as 
according to Aristotle’s testimony (λόγοι ἐρωτητικοί). Even more crucially, this passage 
talks just of eristic teachers having their pupils learn some ready-made speeches by 
heart, with no mention whatsoever of any sophistic manual. Granted, the role of a 
physical medium on which to store words to assist their memorization is something 
which I myself leverage to translate § 9.3. Nonetheless, describing the above passage as 
the one where Aristotle ‘tells us of “Manuals of Eristic” put together by fee-taking 
sophists’, as Robinson did, has no grounding on the text.173 And that is all the more 
notable, because Robinson pushed this strained interpretation even further, to the point 
of justifying the heterogeneous quality of Dissoi Logoi’s dialect with it: precisely because 
the work may have been a sophistic manual such as those Aristotle refers to – he argued 
– and hence been ‘used over the years in a “hands on” way’, we can imagine it as open 
to modifications of its contents and language ‘in a way that standard books would not 
have been’.174  
Furthermore, there is no doubt that, albeit short and mutilated, chapter 9 guides 
the reader through mnemonics in a way so detailed to prove that at its initial Greek stage, 
of which it is the only testimony, mnemonics was not as far from the later Roman 
development as usually maintained. On the other hand, in the rest of the text the 
                                                 
172 Translation in Forster/Furley (1955), 155. 
173 Robinson (1979), 56. 
174 Robinson (2003), 244-245.  
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exposition sounds more epideictic than didactic, nothing suggesting that the work was 
composed to be studied in a school rather than to be read by a more general audience. 
On the other hand, the former hypothesis cannot be discarded either, especially 
considering the fact that even Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen and Defence of Palamedes, 
whose style is incomparably higher than our work’s, may have been composed just as 
examples of ‘models to be learnt by heart’ by an apprentice rhetor.175  
To sum up, Dissoi Logoi appears to be a complete work, rather than a collection of 
notes, written by a sophist between 355 and 338 BCE, in a time when Alcidamas was 
still the most relevant figure in the profession and the rhetorical treatise preserved in 
POxy 410 had already been composed. I touch here on the latter because Dissoi Logoi has 
been deemed contemporaneous to it, and sometimes the two have been likened to one 
another on the basis of an allegedly similar rhetorical interest, and of their Doric 
dialect.176 However, a quick look immediately reveals the higher degree of purity of the 
Doric of the POxy 410 treatise compared to our work’s κοινή; and that, in turn, may 
reflect the difference between a text composed at the beginning, and one in the second 
half of the 4th century BCE, as I argue. Also, although literary quotations are frequent in 
both, the didactic intent of the POxy 410 treatise is not as evident in Dissoi Logoi. As I 
will better show later, in fact, the goal of the nine speeches of our work seems not so 
much to form a sophistic manual, but rather to give an essay of the author’s vast culture 
and preparation which ranges from rhetoric to literature, from history to philosophy, in 
a way not belonging to the POxy 410 treatise.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 Guthrie (1971), 270. 
176 On the similarity between the two see Grenfell/Hunt (1903), 26, Christ/Schmid/Stählin (1940), 204.  
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  2. Critical Text and Translation                     
                                   
                           1. Περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ τῶ κακῶ 
(1) δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῶ 
ἀγαθῶ καὶ τῶ κακῶ. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι ὡς ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, 
ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δὲ ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἴη, τοῖς δὲ  
5                 κακόν, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν. (2) ἐγὼ δὲ  
                   καὶ  αὐτὸς  τοῖσδε  ποτιτίθεμαι.  σκέψομαι  δὲ  ἐκ  τῶ  ἀνθρωπίνω  βίω,  ᾧ   
                  ἐπιμελὲς βρώσιός τε καὶ πόσιος καὶ ἀφροδισίων.  ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσθενοῦντι  
                   μὲν κακόν, ὑγιαίνοντι δὲ καὶ δεομένῳ ἀγαθόν. (3) καὶ ἀ κρασία τοίνυν  
                   τούτων   τοῖς   μὲν   ἀκρατέσι  κακόν,  τοῖς   δὲ   πωλεῦντι   ταῦτα   καὶ  
10               μισθαρνέοντι ἀγαθόν. νόσος τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῦντι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ   
ἰατροῖς ἀγαθόν. ὁ τοίνυν θάνατος τοῖς μὲν ἀποθανοῦσι κακόν, τοῖς 
δ’ἐνταφιοπώλαις καὶ τυμβοποιοῖς ἀγαθόν. (4) γεωργία τε καλῶς  
ἐξενείκασα τὼς καρπὼς τοῖς μὲν γεωργοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἐμπόροις 
κακόν. τὰς τοίνυν ὁλκάδας συντρίβεσθαι καὶ παραθραύεσθαι τῷ μὲν  
15       ναυκλήρῳ κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ναυπαγοῖς ἀγαθόν. (5) ἔτι δὲ τὸν σίδαρον 
κατέσθεσθαι καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι καὶ συντρίβεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, 
τῷ δὲ χαλκῇ ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὰν τὸν κέραμον παραθραύεσθαι τοῖς μὲν 
ἄλλοις κακόν, τοῖς δὲ κεραμεῦσιν ἀγαθόν. τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα 
κατατρίβεσθαι καὶ διαρρήγνυσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ σκυτῇ  
20                ἀγαθόν. (6) ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς γυμνικοῖς καὶ τοῖς μωσικοῖς καὶ τοῖς                
                   πολεμικοῖς, αὐτίκα ἐν τῷ γυμνικῷ τῷ σταδιοδρόμῳ, ἁ νίκα τῷ μὲν 
νικῶντι ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσσαμένοις κακόν. (7) καττωὐτὸ δὲ καὶ τοὶ 
παλαισταὶ καὶ πύκται καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες μωσικοί· αὐτίκα ἁ κιθαρωδία 
τῷ μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσσαμένοις κακόν.                                                
 
1 Περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ τῶ κακῶ St.] Περὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ Ro. 
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                            1. On what is good and what is bad 
(1) Contrasting speeches are made in Hellas by those who philosophize 
about what is good and what is bad. For some say that that which is good 
is one thing, that which is bad is another; others say that they are the 
same, and that for some people it is good, for others bad, and for the same 
man sometimes good, sometimes bad. (2) I too agree with the latter. I will 
reflect, then, starting from human life, whose business is food, drinking 
and sexual pleasures. These things, in fact, are bad for those who are sick, 
but good for one who is in health and needs them. (3) And incontinence 
in these things is something bad for the incontinent, but good for those 
who trade in them and earn wages by them. Illness, further, is bad for 
patients, but good for physicians. Death is something bad for those 
dying, but good for undertakers and grave-diggers. (4) When farming 
produces a successful harvest, it is a good thing for farmers, but bad for 
merchants. And the fact that the trading vessels shatter and smash is bad 
for the ship-owners, but good for the ship-builders. (5) Besides, that iron 
corrodes, loses edge and wears out is a bad thing for the others, but good 
for the blacksmith. And that the pottery gets broken is a bad thing for 
others, good for the potters. And the fact that footwear gets worn out and 
broken through is a bad thing for others, good for the cobbler. (6) In 
gymnastic contests, in musical ones and in those of war, for example the 
race at the stadium, victory is a good thing for the winner, but for the 
losers bad. (7) And the same applies to fighters, boxers and all musicians; 
for example, singing to the kithara is a good thing for the winner, but for 
the losers bad. 
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                  (8) ἔν τε τῷ πολέμῳ (καὶ τὰ νεώτατα πρῶτον ἐρῶ) ἁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων 
νίκα ἃν ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίως καὶ τὼς συμμάχως Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν 
ἀγαθόν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις κακόν· ἅ τε νίκα ἃν τοὶ 
Ἕλλανες τὸν Πέρσαν ἐνίκασαν τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλασιν ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ  
5                  βαρβάροις κακόν. (9) ἁ τοίνυν τοῦ Ἰλίου αἵρεσις τοῖς μὲν Ἀχαίοις ἀγαθόν, 
τοῖς δὲ Τρωσὶ κακόν. καδδὲ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τὰ τῶν 
Ἀργείων πάθη. (10) καὶ ἁ τῶν Κενταύρων καὶ Λαπιθᾶν μάχη τοῖς μὲν 
Λαπίθαις ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Κενταύροις κακόν. καὶ μὰν καὶ ἁ τῶν θεῶν 
καὶ Γιγάντων λεγομένα μάχα καὶ νίκα τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ  
10              Γίγασι κακόν. (11) ἄλλος δὲ λόγος λέγεται ὡς ἄλλο μὲν τἀγαθὸν εἴη, 
ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐγὼ    
δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαιρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον. δοκῶ γὰρ οὐδὲ διάδαλον 
ἦμεν ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν, αἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον 
εἴη· καὶ γὰρ θαυμαστόν κ’ εἴη. (12) οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ’ αὐτὸν ἔχεν  
15             ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἴ τις [αὐτὸν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· “εἶπον δή μοι, 
ἤδη τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν;” φαίη κα· “καὶ πολλὰ καὶ 
μεγάλα.” “τὺ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἴπερ 
τωὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ. (13) τί δέ, τὼς συγγενέας ἤδη τι ἀγαθὸν 
ἐποίησας; τὼς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίεις. τί δέ, τὼς ἐχθρὼς ἤδη  
20              κακῶς ἐποίησας; καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μέγιστα ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας. (14) ἄγε 
δή μοι καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ἄλλο τι ἢ τὼς πτωχὼς οἰκτείρεις, ὅτι πολλὰ 
καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ 
πράσσοντι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν;” 
 
 
 
16 τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθόν ἐποίησαν; Schu.] τι τὼς γονέας ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας; Ro.      
21 πολλὰ  καὶ  κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν DK] πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, πάλιν Ro. 
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(8) In war (and I will talk about the most recent events first) the victory 
of the Lacedaemonians over the Athenians and their allies was good for 
the Lacedaemonians, but bad for the Athenians and their allies. And that 
in which the Hellenes prevailed over Persia was a good thing for the 
Hellenes, bad for the barbarians. (9) The taking of Ilium was for the 
Achaeans a good thing, but for the Trojans bad. And in the same way 
went the events of the Thebans and the Argives. (10) And the battle of the 
Centaurs and the Lapiths was a good thing for the Lapiths, bad for the 
Centaurs. Further, the battle between the Gods and the Giants, of which 
we are told, was a good thing for the Gods, bad for the Giants. (11) But 
another speech says that what is good is one thing, what is bad another 
one, differing as much in name as in fact. I myself make a distinction in 
this way. For I believe that one could not recognize what sort is good and 
what sort bad, if the one were the same as the other and not different; and 
in fact that would be surprising. (12) I also think that not even he who 
says these things would be able to answer if thus asked: “Tell me, then, 
have your parents ever done good to you?” He could reply: “Many and 
important ones”. “Therefore, you owe them many and important evils, if 
it is true that what is good is the same as what is bad. (13) And have you 
ever done good to your relatives? This way, you have done evil to them, 
then. Well, have you ever harmed your enemies? This way, then, you 
have brought them benefits many and important. (14) Come on, answer 
me this too: is it not the case that you pity beggars because they have 
many evils, and contrariwise, deem them lucky, since they attain many 
goods, if indeed the same thing is bad and good?” 
  
 
 54 
 
                   (15) τὸν δὲ βασιλῆ τὸν μέγαν οὐδὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τοῖς 
πτωχοῖς. τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ 
μεγάλα ἐστίν, αἴ γα τωὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ 
τῶ παντὸς εἰρήσθω. (16) εἶμι δὲ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶ  
5               ἐσθίεν καὶ πῖνεν καὶ ἀφροδισιάζεν. τωὐτὸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι ταῦτα 
ποιὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, αἴπερ τωὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τοῖς 
νοσέοντι κακόν ἐστι τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν, αἴπερ τωὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
τῷ κακῷ. (17) καδδὲ τόδε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ 
εἴρηται. καὶ οὐ λέγω τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρῶμαι διδάσκειν,  
10               ὡς οὐ τωὐτὸν εἴη κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον. 
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(15) And there is nothing to prevent the Great King from finding himself 
in the same situation as beggars. For his many, important goods are 
many, important evils, if the same thing really is good and bad. And let 
this apply in every subject. (16) But I shall come to them individually as 
well, starting from eating, drinking and having sex. For it is good alike 
for people who are ill to follow these practices, if indeed the same thing 
is good and bad. And ailing is bad and good for the sick, if indeed what 
is good is the same as what is bad. (17) All the other cases mentioned in 
the previous speech are in accordance with this one. And I do not mean 
to say what the good thing is, but this I endeavour to show, that the same 
thing is not good and bad, but the one thing is different from the other. 
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                                              2. Περὶ τῶ καλῶ καὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ 
                     (1) λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ καλῶ καὶ αἰσχρῶ δισσοὶ λόγοι. τοὶ μὲν γάρ 
φαντι ἄλλο μὲν ἦμεν τὸ καλὸν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ 
τὤνυμα οὔτω καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τοὶ δὲ τωὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. (2) κἀγὼ  
5              πειρασεῦμαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐξαγεύμενος. αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδὶ ὠραίῳ 
ἐραστᾷ μὲν χρηστῷ χαρίζεσθαι καλὸν, μὴ ἐραστᾷ δὲ καλῷ αἰσχρόν. (3) 
καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας λοῦσθαι ἔνδοι καλόν, ἐν παλαίστρᾳ δὲ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ 
τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν παλαίστρᾳ καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καλόν. (4) καὶ συνίμεν τῷ 
ἀνδρὶ ἐν ἁσυχίᾳ μὲν καλόν, ὅπου τοίχοις κρυφθήσεται, ἔξω δὲ αἰσχρόν,  
10                  ὅπου τις ὄψεται. (5) καὶ τῷ μὲν αὑτᾶς συνίμεν ἀνδρὶ καλόν, ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ 
αἴσχιστον. καὶ τῷ γε ἀνδρί τᾷ μὲν ἑαυτῶ γυναικὶ συνίμεν καλόν, 
ἀλλοτρίᾳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. (6) καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ χρίεσθαι καὶ 
χρυσία περιάπτεσθαι τῷ μὲν ἀνδρὶ αἰσχρόν, τᾷ δὲ γυναικὶ καλόν. (7) καὶ 
τὼς μὲν φίλως εὖ ποιὲν καλόν, τὼς δὲ ἐχθρὼς αἰσχρόν. καὶ τὼς μὲν  
15                πολεμίως φεύγεν αἰσχρόν, τὼς δὲ ἐν σταδίῳ ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν. (8) καὶ 
τὼς μὲν φίλως καὶ τὼς πολίτας φονεύεν αἰσχρόν, τὼς δὲ πολεμίως 
καλόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ πάντων. (9) εἶμι δ’ ἐφ’ ἃ ταὶ πόλιές τε αἰσχρὰ 
ἅγηνται καὶ τὰ ἔθνεα. αὐτίκα Λακεδαιμονίοις τὰς κόρας γυμνάζεσθαι 
καὶ ἀχειριδώτως καὶ ἀχίτωνας παρέρπεν καλόν, Ἴωσι δὲ αἰσχρόν.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Περὶ τῶ καλῶ καὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ St.] Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ Ro.  
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2. On what is seemly what is shameful  
 (1) Contrasting speeches are made also about what is seemly and what is 
shameful. In fact, some say that what is seemly is one thing, what is 
shameful is another, differing as much in name as in body; other people 
say that the same thing is seemly and shameful. (2) I too shall attempt to 
expound the matter in this way. To begin with, it is seemly for a youngster 
in the prime of life to grant his favours to a worthy lover, but shameful to 
the one who is not seemly. (3) And that women wash is seemly at home, 
shameful in the palaistra, but for men it is seemly in the palaistra and in 
the gymnasion. (4) And for the man having sex in a sheltered place, where 
he will be hidden by the walls, is seemly, whereas outdoors, where 
someone will observe him, is shameful. (5) <For the woman> having 
sexual intercourse with her own husband is seemly, with another 
woman’s one is very shameful. And for the man too having sexual 
intercourse with his own wife is seemly, with another man’s one shameful. 
(6) Adorning oneself, painting oneself with white lead, and covering 
oneself with gold leaves for the man is shameful, but is seemly for the 
woman. (7) Doing good to friends is seemly, to those hostile to us 
shameful. And fleeing from the enemies is shameful, but the competitors 
in the running race seemly. (8) Killing friends and fellow citizens is 
shameful, but enemies seemly. And that applies in everything. (9) I next 
move on to those behaviours which cities and peoples deem shameful. For 
example, to Lacedaemonians that girls practise gymnastic exercises and 
show themselves without sleeves and chiton is seemly, to Ionians 
shameful. 
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                     (10) καὶ <τοῖς μὲν> τὼς παῖδας μὴ μανθάνειν μωσικὰ καὶ γράμματα 
καλόν, Ἴωσι δ’ αἰσχρὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα πάντα. (11) Θεσσαλοῖσι δὲ 
καλὸν τὼς ἵππως ἐκ τᾶς ἀγέλας λαβόντι αὐτῷ δαμάσαι καὶ τὼς ὀρέας, 
βῶν τε λαβόντι αὐτῷ σφάξαι καὶ ἐκδεῖραι καὶ κατακόψαι, ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ  
5                    αἰσχρὸν καὶ δώλων ἔργα. (12) Μακεδόσι δὲ καλόν δοκεῖ ἦμεν τὰς κόρας, 
πρὶν ἀνδρὶ γάμασθαι, ἔρασθαι καὶ ἀνδρὶ συγγίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ δέ κα 
γάμηται, αἰσχρόν· Ἕλλασι δ’ ἄμφω αἰσχρόν. (13) τοῖς δὲ Θραξὶ κόσμος 
τὰς κόρας στίζεσθαι, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις τιμωρία τὰ στίγματα τοῖς ἀδικέοντι. 
τοὶ δὲ Σκύθαι καλὸν νομίζοντι ὃς ἄνδρα κα κατακανὼν ἐκδείρας τὰν  
10                 κεφαλὰν τὸ μὲν κόμιον πρὸ τοῦ ἵππου φορῇ, τὸ δ’ ὀστέον χρυσώσας καὶ 
ἀργυρώσας πίνῃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σπένδῃ τοῖς θεοῖς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλασιν 
οὐδέ κ’ ἐς τὰν αὐτὰν οἰκίαν συνεισελθεῖν βούλοιτό τις τοιαῦτα 
ποιήσαντι. (14) Μασσαγέται δὲ τὼς γονέας κατακόψαντες κατέσθοντι, 
καὶ τάφος κάλλιστος δοκεῖ ἦμεν ἐν τοῖς τέκνοις τέθαφθαι, ἐν δὲ τᾷ  
15                Ἑλλάδι αἴ τις ταῦτα ποιήσαι ἐξελαθεὶς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κακῶς κα ἀποθάνοι 
ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ δεινὰ ποιέων. (15) τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι κοσμεῖσθαί τε ὥσπερ τὰς 
γυναῖκας καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας καλὸν νομίζοντι, καὶ τᾷ θυγατρὶ καὶ τᾷ ματρὶ 
καὶ τᾷ ἀδελφᾷ συνίμεν, τοὶ δὲ Ἕλλανες καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ παράνομα. (16) 
Λυδοῖς τοίνυν τὰς κόρας πορνευθείσας καὶ ἀργύριον ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ  
20              οὕτω γάμασθαι καλὸν δοκεῖ ἦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλασιν οὐδείς κα θέλοι 
γᾶμαι.  
 
 
 
 
                                     
 
1 <τοῖς μὲν> Di.] cum codicibus Ro.       
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(10) And to the former that youngsters do not learn the music and the 
letters is seemly, whereas to Ionians it is shameful not to know all these 
things. (11) To Thessalians it is seemly that he who has captured horses 
from the herd breaks them in by himself, and so it is with mules, and that 
he who has captured an ox slays it, flays it and chops it by himself; on the 
contrary, in Sicily, it is shameful and those are actions of slaves. (12) To 
Macedonians it appears seemly that girls, before finding a husband, love 
and have sexual intercourse with a man, but once <a girl> has been taken 
in marriage, shameful; to Hellenes both the actions appear shameful. (13) 
To Thracians that women get tattooed is orderly, whereas to the other 
peoples tattoos are a punishment for those who do wrong. Scythians 
deem it seemly that he who has killed a man, after having flayed his head, 
carries his scalp about on the forehead of his horse, and having gilded and 
silvered the skull, that he drinks from it and makes libations to the gods. 
Among Hellenes one would not wish even to come together at the same 
house with him who has performed such actions. (14) Massagetae devour 
their parents once having chopped them and to them being buried inside 
their children seems a marvellous burial, whereas in Hellas if one did 
these things, he would die in misery, banished from there, as perpetrator 
of shameful and terrible actions. (15) Persians consider it seemly that, as 
well as women, men too adorn themselves, and have sex with their 
daughter, mother and sister, whereas Hellenes consider these behaviours 
shameful and illegal. (16) To Lydians, then, it appears to be seemly that 
girls by means of prostitution not only make money, but also find a 
husband this way, whereas among Hellenes none would like to take them 
as their wives.  
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                       (17) Αἰγύπτιοί τε οὐ ταὐτὰ νομίζοντι καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις· τῇδε μὲν γὰρ 
γυναῖκας ὑφαίνειν καὶ <ἔρια> ἐργάζεσθαι καλόν, ἀλλὰ τηνεῖ τὼς 
ἄνδρας, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας πράσσεν ἅπερ τῇδε τοὶ ἄνδρες. τὸν παλὸν 
δεύειν ταῖς χερσί, τὸν δὲ σῖτον τοῖς ποσί, τήνοις καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἁμὶν τὸ  
5                       ἐναντίον. (18) οἶμαι δ’, αἴ τις τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐς ἓν κελεύοι συνενεῖκαι πάντας 
ἀνθρώπως ἃ ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀθρόων τούτων τὰ καλὰ 
λαβὲν ἃ ἕκαστοι ἅγηνται, οὐδέν κα λειφθῆμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντας πάντα 
διαλαβέν. οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταὐτὰ νομίζοντι. (19) παρεξοῦμαι δὲ καὶ 
ποίημά τι·  
 
10                    καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὧδε θνητοῖσιν νόμον 
ὄψῃ διαθρῶν· οὐδὲν ἦν πάντῃ καλόν 
οὐδ’ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταὔτ’ ἐποίησεν λαβών                                            
ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά. 
 
                       (20) ὡς δὲ τὸ σύνολον εἶπαι, πάντα καιρῷ μὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίᾳ δ’  
15               αἰσχρά. τί ὦν διεπραξάμην; ἔφαν ἀποδείξειν ταὐτὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ 
ἐόντα, καὶ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι. (21) λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ 
καὶ καλῶ ὡς ἄλλο ἑκάτερον εἴη. ἐπεὶ αἴ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὡς 
τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν, αἴ ποκά τι αὐτοῖς καλὸν 
ἔργασται, αἰσχρὸν ὁμολογησοῦντι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ  
20                    καλόν. (22) καὶ αἴ τινά γα καλὸν οἴδαντι ἄνδρα, τοῦτον καὶ αἴσχρὸν τὸν 
αὐτόν. καὶ αἴ τινά γα λευκόν, καὶ μέλανα τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν.  
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
2 <ἔρια> Va.] cum codicibus Ro.      11 διαθρῶν Va.] διαιρῶν Ro. 
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(17) Egyptians do not regard the same things as seemly as the other 
peoples: for here it is seemly that women weave and work the wool, but 
there that men do it, and that women run the businesses which here men 
do. Kneading the clay with hands and the bread with feet to them is a 
seemly thing, but to us the reverse is. (18) I believe, then, that if someone 
bid all men make a heap of the things which they each deem to be the 
shameful, and conversely, to take those that each considers as the seemly 
ones from these collected, nothing would be left behind, but everyone 
would take everything. For not all have the same opinions. (19) And I will 
offer up also a certain poem: 
 
And, in fact, this you will see, by observing  
the other law of men: nothing is completely seemly  
or shameful, but having got hold of the same things,  
the right moment makes them shameful and seemly, exchanging them. 
 
(20) Generally speaking, all things are seemly at the right moment, 
shameful at the wrong one. What did I then accomplish? I said that I 
would show that the same things are shameful and seemly, and I did it 
through all these arguments. (21) But it is said also about what is 
shameful and what is seemly that they differ from one other. For, if 
someone asked those who say that the same thing is shameful and seemly 
whether anything seemly has ever been done to them, they would 
acknowledge that as shameful, if it is true that what is shameful and what 
is seemly are the same. (22) And if they know some man as seemly, they 
know that this same one is shameful too. And if they know that someone 
is white, they know that this same man is black too.  
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                     καὶ αἰ καλόν γ’ ἐστι τὼς θεὼς σέβεσθαι, καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἄρα τὼς θεὼς 
σέβεσθαι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστι. (23) καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ 
ἁπάντων εἰρήσθω μοι· τρέψομαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ὃν λέγοντι. (24) 
αἰ γὰρ τὰν γυναῖκα καλόν ἐστι κοσμεῖσθαι, τὰν γυναῖκα αἰσχρὸν  
5                 κοσμεῖσθαι, αἴπερ τωὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν· καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τωὐτόν. 
(25) ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστι καλὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, ἐν 
Λακεδαίμονί ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, καὶ τἆλλα οὔτως. 
(26) λέγοντι δὲ ὡς αἴ τινες τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐθνέων πάντοθεν 
συνενείκαιεν, ἔπειτα συγκαλέσαντες κελεύοιεν ἅ τις καλὰ νομίζοι  
10                    λαμβάνεν πάντα κα ἐν καλῷ ἀπενειχθῆμεν. ἐγῶ θαυμάζω αἰ τὰ αἰσχρὰ 
συνενεχθέντα καλὰ ἐσεῖται, καὶ οὐχ οἷάπερ ἦνθεν. (27) αἰ γοῦν ἵππως ἢ 
βῶς ἢ δϊς ἢ ἀνθρώπως ἄγαγον, οὐκ ἄλλο τί κα ἀπᾶγον· ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αἰ 
χρυσὸν ἤνεικαν, χαλχόν <κα> ἀπήνεικαν, οὐδ’ αἰ ἀργύριον ἤνεικαν, 
μόλιβδόν κα ἀπέφερον. (28) ἀντὶ δ’ ἄρα τῶν αἰσχρῶνκαλὰ ἀπάγοντι;  
15              φέρε δή, αἰ ἄρα τις αἰσχρὸν ἄγαγε, τοῦτον αὖ <κα> καλὸν ἀπάγαγε; 
ποιητὰς δὲ μάρτυρας ἐπάγονται, οἳ ποτὶ ἁδονὰν οὐ ποτ’ ἀλάθειαν 
ποιεῦντι. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 κα inserui] χαλχὸν [ἀπήνεικαν] Ro.   
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And if it is seemly to worship the gods, it is also shameful to worship the 
gods, if indeed the same thing is shameful and seemly. (23) And let this 
reasoning of mine apply in every case; but I will turn to the speech of theirs 
which they make. (24) If, in fact, it is seemly that the woman adorns herself, 
it will be shameful that the woman adorns herself, if indeed the same thing 
is shameful and seemly; and all the other cases go this same way. (25) In 
Lacedaemon it is seemly that children exercise, in Lacedaemon it is 
shameful that children exercise, and so it is for all the other cases. (26) They 
also say that if some men gathered the shameful things from the peoples 
of everywhere, and then, following a convocation, they bid each one take 
the things which he considers seemly, all would be taken away as seemly. 
I marvel that the shameful things gathered will be seemly and surely not 
such as they came. (27) No doubt, if they had brought horses, or oxen, or 
sheep, or men, they would not have taken away something different; for 
neither if they had brought gold, would they have taken away bronze, nor 
if they had brought silver, would they have taken away lead. (28) 
Therefore, do they take away seemly things in place of the shameful ones? 
Come on, if then one had brought something shameful, would he have 
carried this off as seemly? After all, they call on poets as witnesses, who 
compose not in the name of truth, but in view of pleasure.  
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                                                         3. Περὶ τῶ δικαίω καὶ τῶ ἀδίκω 
                     (1) δισσοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῶ δικαίω καὶ τῶ ἀδίκω, καὶ τοὶ μὲν 
ἄλλο ἦμεν τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἄδικον, τοὶ δὲ τωὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ 
ἄδικον· καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πειρασοῦμαι τιμωρέν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν  
5                      ψεύδεσθαι ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι λεξῶ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν. τὼς μὲν πολεμίως ταῦτα 
ποιὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ πονηρὸν ἂν ἐξείποιεν· τὼς δὲ φιλτάτως οὔ· αὐτίκα 
τὼς γονέας· αἰ γὰρ δέοι τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὰν ματέρα φάρμακον πιὲν καὶ 
φαγέν, καὶ μὴ θέλοι, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ῥοφήματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποτῷ 
δόμεν καὶ μὴ φάμεν ἐνῆμεν; (3) οὐκῶν ἤδη ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν τὼς  
10                  γονέας καὶ κλέπτεν μὰν τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ βιῆσθαι τὼς φιλτάτως δίκαιον. 
(4) αὐτίκα αἴ τις λυπηθείς τι τῶν οἰκηΐων καὶ ἀχθεσθεὶς μέλλοι αὑτὸν 
διαφθείρεν ἢ ξίφει ἢ σχοινίῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, δίκαιόν ἐστι ταῦτα κλέψαι, αἰ 
δύναιτο, αἰ δὲ ὑστερίξαι καὶ ἔχοντα καταλάβοι, ἀφελέσθαι βίᾳ. (5) 
ἀνδραποδίξασθαι δὲ πῶς οὐ δίκαιον τὼς πολεμίως, αἴ τις δύναιτο ἑλὼν  
15               πόλιν ὅλαν ἀποδόσθαι; τοιχωρυχὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα 
δίκαιον φαίνεται. αἰ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, κατεστασιασμένος ὑπὸ 
τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δεδεμένος εἴη, ἆρα οὐ δίκαιον διορύξαντα κλέψαι καὶ 
σῶσαι τὸν πατέρα; (6) ἐπιορκὲν δέ· αἴ τις ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων λαφθεὶς 
ὑποδέξαιτο ὀμνύων ἦ μὰν ἀφεθεὶς τὰν πόλιν προδώσεν, ἆρα οὗτος  
20                δίκαιά κα ποιήσαι εὐορκήσας; (7) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δοκῶ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 
τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὼς φίλως καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ σώσαι ἂν τὰ πατρώϊα ἐπιορκήσας. 
ἤδη ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν.  καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλέν · 
 
 
 
 
1 Περὶ τῶ δικαίω καὶ τῶ ἀδίκω St.] Περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου Ro.     13 βίᾳ. O] βίᾳ; Ro. 
(sed punctum in translatione)                           
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                           3. On what is just and what is unjust 
(1) Contrasting speeches are made also about what is just and what is 
unjust, and some people <say> that what is just is one thing, what is unjust 
is another; other people say that the same thing is just and unjust. I too 
shall try to defend the latter thesis. (2) And to begin with, I shall say that 
it is just to lie and deceive. People may assert that <it is> ugly and base to 
do these things to one’s enemies, but not to the people dearest to one, for 
instance parents. For if it were necessary for one’s father or mother to drink 
or eat a medication, and they were not willing to do it, would it not be just 
to give it to them in the gruel or in the drink, without saying that it is 
inside? (3) Therefore, <it is> already just to lie to parents and to deceive 
them, and besides to steal the belongings of one’s friends and to use force 
against one’s most beloved people. (4) For example, if someone who is 
grieved and vexed by some private issue were about to kill themselves 
with a sword, or a rope, or something else, it would be just to take these 
away, if possible; and if one happened to arrive late and found him with 
those, it would be just to remove them with force. (5) How could it not 
<be> just to enslave one’s enemies, if one were able to sell a whole city into 
slavery, having seized <it>? It also seems just to break through the walls of 
the buildings which are common possession of the citizens. For if one’s 
father, overpowered by his enemies, had been sentenced to death, would 
it not <be> just, perhaps, to secretly carry him away and save his life, 
having dug through <the walls>? (6) And to break an oath: if a man, 
captured by his enemies, indicated under solemn oath that, once set free, 
he would betray his city, would he act justly by keeping it? (7) For I 
personally do not think so, but rather that he should save his city, his 
friends and the temples of his fathers, by breaking it. It immediately 
follows that <it is> just to break one’s oath too. And also to rob a temple: 
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                     (8) τὰ μὲν ἴδια τῶν πόλεων ἐῶ, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τᾶς Ἑλλάδος, τὰ ἐκ Δελφῶν  
                     καὶ τὰ ἐξ Ὀλυμπίας, μέλλοντος τῶ βαρβάρω τὰν Ἑλλάδα λαβὲν καὶ τᾶς 
σωτηρίας ἐν χρήμασιν ἐούσας, οὐ δίκαιον λαβεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐς τὸν 
πόλεμον; (9) φονεύεν δὲ τὼς φιλτάτως δίκαιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀρέστας καὶ  
5                 Ἀλκμαίων *** καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε δίκαια αὐτὼ ποιῆσαι. (10) ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς 
τέχνας τρέψομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν. ἐν γὰρ τραγωδοποιίᾳ καὶ 
ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος 
ἄριστος. (11) θέλω δὲ καὶ ποιημάτων παλαιοτέρων μαρτύριον 
ἐπαγαγέσθαι. Κλεοβουλίνης · 
      
10                 ἄνδρ’ εἶδον κλέπτοντα καὶ ἐξαπατῶντα βιαίως, 
                     καὶ τὸ βίᾳ ῥέξαι τοῦτο δικαιότατον.     
      
                     (12) ἦν πάλαι ταῦτα· Αἰσχύλου δὲ ταῦτα·  
 
                     ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός · 
                     ψευδῶν δὲ καιρὸν ἔσθ’ ὅπου τιμῇ θεός.         
                      
15                 (13) λέγεται δὲ καὶ τῷδε ἀντίος λόγος ὡς ἄλλο τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικόν  
                     ἐστιν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐπεὶ αἴ τις 
ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον, αἰ ἤδη τι 
δίκαιον περὶ τὼς γονέας ἔπραξαν, ὀμολογησοῦντι. καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα. τὸ 
γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον ὁμολογέοντι ἦμεν. 
 
 
 
 
5 lacunam inter Ἀλκμαίων et καί suspicio] Ἀλκμαίων· καί Ro.  
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(8) I leave out those which are exclusive property of cities, but when the 
barbarian was about to take over Hellas, and its safety lay in money, <was 
it> not just to seize the temples which are common property of Hellas, 
those of Delphi and Olympia, and use them for the purpose of war? (9) 
And <it is> just to kill the people dearest to one, since Orestes and 
Alcmaeon <did it (?)> and the god proclaimed that they had acted justly. 
(10) Now I shall turn to arts and to poets’ activity. In fact, in the 
composition of tragedies and in the art of painting he who deceives the 
most by making works similar to real objects <is> the best. (11) And I want 
to call on the testimony of older poems. These words of Cleobuline,  
 
‘a man I saw stealing and deceiving violently,  
and doing that perforce <was> very just’,  
 
(12) were ancient. These are from Aeschylus:  
 
‘From a just deception, the god does not stand aloof’; 
‘There are cases when the god holds in honour the right moment for lies.’         
 
(13) But also a speech opposite to this one is made, to the effect that what 
is just is one thing, what is unjust is another, differing as much in name as 
in fact. For if one asked those who say that the same thing is unjust and 
just whether they have ever performed a just action towards their parents, 
they will answer in the affirmative. Then, that <will be> unjust too. For 
they admit that the same thing is unjust and just. 
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                     (14) φέρε ἄλλο δέ· αἴ τινα γινώσκεις δίκαιον ἄνδρα, καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα τὸν 
αὐτὸν (καὶ μέγαν τοίνυν καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τωὐτόν). καί τοι πολλὰ 
ἀδικήσας ἀποθανέτω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια  δια>πραξάμενος. (15) καὶ 
περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις. εἶμι δὲ ἐφ’ ἃ λέγοντες ἀξιοῦντι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ δίκαιον  
5                 καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν. (16) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, 
καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύει τοῦτ’ αὐτό, αἴ κ’ ἀληθὴς ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ 
τἆλλα καττωὐτό. (17) τέχνας δὲ ἐπάγονται ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ 
τὸ ἄδικον. καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ οὔτοι ποτ’ ἀλάθειαν ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἁδονὰς 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ποιήματα ποιέοντι. 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 γινώσκεις Di.] γινώσκει Ro.      2 καί τοι πολλὰ O] καίτοι πολλὰ Ro.      3 ἀποθανέτω 
<καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος Di.] ἀποθανέτω <ἅτε θανάτω ἄξια 
δια?>πραξάμενος Ro.      6 ἀποδεικνύει Wi.] ἀποδεικνύεν Ro.  
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 (14) But take another case: if you know someone as a just man, then you 
will know the same person as unjust (and, further, as big and small, on the 
same principle). And, mark you, if he has performed many unjust actions 
let him be put to death also for having carried out many and just actions!  
(15) Now, enough about these cases. I come to the things saying which 
they claim that they show that the same thing <is> just and unjust. (16) For 
if ever their speech <is> true, it shows that robbing one’s enemies <is> just 
and that this same action <is> unjust, and the same applies to the rest. (17) 
They bring in arts, in which what is just and what is unjust have no place. 
And indeed poets compose poems not for the sake of truth, but in view of 
men’s pleasure.  
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                                                       4. Περὶ ἀλαθείας καὶ ψεύδους 
                     (1) λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ ψεύδεος καὶ τᾶς ἀλαθείας δισσοὶ λόγοι, ὧν ὁ 
μέν φατι ἄλλον μὲν τὸν ψεύσταν ἦμεν λόγον, ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ἀλαθῆ· τοὶ 
δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν αὖ. (2) κἀγὼ τόνδε λέγω· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς  
5                  ὀνόμασι λέγονται· ἔπειτα δέ, ὅταν λόγος  ῥηθῇ, ἂν μὲν ὡς λέγηται ὁ 
λόγος οὕτω γένηται, ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος, ἂν δὲ μὴ γένηται, ψευδὴς ὁ αὐτὸς 
λόγος. (3) αὐτίκα κατηγορεῖ ἱεροσυλίαν τω· αἴ γ’ ἐγένετο τὦργον, 
ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος· αἰ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο, ψεύστας. καὶ τῶ ἀπολογουμένω ὥς 
γε ὁ λόγος. καὶ τά γε δικαστήρια τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ψεύσταν καὶ  
10                ἀλαθῆ κρίνοντι. (4) ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἑξῆς καθήμενοι αἰ λέγοιμεν “μύστας 
εἰμί,” τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν πάντες ἐροῦμεν, ἀλαθὴς δὲ μόνος ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί. 
(5) δᾶλον ὦν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας 
ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ παῖς 
καὶ νεανίσκος καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων, ἐστίν. (6) λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς ἄλλος εἴη  
15              ὁ ψεύστας λόγος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἀλαθής, διαφέρων <ὥσπερ καὶ> τὤνυμα 
<οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>.  αἰ γάρ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς 
λόγος εἴη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθὴς ὃν αὐτοὶ λέγοντι, πότερος ἐστιν· αἰ μὲν 
                     “ψεύστας”, δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἴη· αἰ δ’ “ἀλαθὴς” ἀποκρίναιτο, καὶ ψεύστας 
ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος. καἰ ἀλαθές τί ποκα εἶπεν ἢ ἐξεμαρτύρησε, καὶ ψευδῆ ἄρα  
20                 τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. καὶ αἴ τινα ἄνδρα ἀλαθῆ οἶδε, καὶ ψεύσταν τὸν αὐτόν. 
(7) ἐκ δὲ τῶ λόγω λέγοντι ταῦτα, ὅτι γενομένω μὲν τῶ πράγματος ἀλαθῆ 
τὸν λόγον, ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν. οὐκῶν διαφέρει  <ἐρέσθαι> (8) αὖθις 
τὼς δικαστὰς ὅ τι κρίνοντι· οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πράγμασιν. 
 
 
1 ψεύδους O] ψευδέος Ro.      2 ψεύδεος O] ψευδέος Ro.      τᾶς ἀλαθείας P3] τῶ ἀλαθέος 
Ro.      5  ἂν codd.] αἰ Ro.      λέγηται O] <ἂν?> λέγηται Ro.     6 γένηται O bis] <γε>γένηται 
Ro.      ἂν codd.] αἰ Ro.      13 ὥσπερ...ἐστίν intra parentheses posuit Ro.      15 <ὥσπερ 
καὶ> τὤνυμα <οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα> Bl.] τὤνυμα <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα> Ro.                   
19 καἰ Di.] καὶ <αἰ> Ro.      23 κρίνοντι Scha.]  κρίνοιντο  Ro.       
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4. On truth and falsehood 
(1) Also about falsehood and truth contrasting speeches are made, of 
which one asserts that false speech is one thing, and true speech another; 
other people, instead, say that they are the same thing. (2) I too say the 
latter: firstly, because false and true speeches are said with the same 
words; secondly, when a speech is uttered, if what happened is as it is said, 
the speech is true; if not, the same speech is false. (3) For example, accuse 
someone of temple-robbery: if the action has occurred, the speech is true, 
if it has not, false. And so it is for the speech of him who defends himself. 
The Courts too judge the same speech false and true. (4) And indeed, if 
we, when we sit next to one another, should say ‘I am an initiate’, we shall 
all say the same thing, but I shall be the only truthful one, as I also am <an 
initiate>. (5) It is, then, clear that the same speech, when falsehood is 
present to it, is false, but when truth is, is true, just as a man is only one 
thing as a child, a youngster, an adult, and when old. (6) However, it is 
also said that the false speech is one thing, the true another, differing as 
much in name as in fact. For if someone asked those who claim that the 
same speech is false and true which is the one they are saying, and the 
person answered ‘the false one’, then it is clear that the speeches would be 
two; if, instead, he answered ‘the true one’, then this same speech would 
be false too. And if he ever said or testified something true, then these 
same words would be false too. And if he knows some man as truthful, he 
will know the same person as lying too. (7) And according to their speech, 
they maintain the following idea: that if the fact has happened, the speech 
is true, if it has not, false. Therefore, it is important to ask (8) jurors in their 
turn what they judge; for they are not present at the events. 
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(9) ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, ᾧ μὲν τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναμέμεικται, ψεύσταν  
ἦμεν, ᾧ δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθῆ. τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον διαφέρει […] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 post διαφέρει. lacunam susp. No.] lacunam susp. sed not indic. Ro. 
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(9) However, even they themselves acknowledge that the speech with 
which falsehood is mixed is false, whereas the one with which truth is 
mixed is true. But that is wholly different from […] 
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                     5. (1) ταὐτὰ τοὶ μαινόμενοι καὶ τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ καὶ τοὶ 
ἀμαθεῖς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι. (2) καὶ πρᾶτον μὲν ὀνομάζοντι 
ταὐτά, γᾶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἴππον καὶ πῦρ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα. καὶ 
ποιέοντι ταὐτά, κάθηνται καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατάκεινται, καὶ  
5                   τἆλλα καττωὐτό. (3) καὶ μὰν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μέζον καὶ μῇόν 
ἐστι καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον καὶ βαρύτερον καὶ κουφότερον. οὕτω γάρ 
ἐντι ταὐτὰ πάντα. (4) τὸ τάλαντόν ἐστι βαρύτερον τῆς μνᾶς καὶ 
κουφότερον τῶν δύο ταλάντων· τωὐτὸν ἄρα καὶ κουφότερον καὶ 
βαρύτερον. (5) καὶ ζώει ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ ζώει, καὶ ταὐτὰ ἔστι  
10                καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὰ γὰρ τῇδ’ ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Λιβύᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν Λιβύᾳ 
ἐν Κύπρῳ. καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. οὐκῶν καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ 
πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί. (6) τοὶ τῆνα λέγοντες, τὼς μαινομένως <καὶ τὼς 
σωφρονοῦντας> καὶ τὼς σοφὼς καὶ τὼς ἀμαθεῖς τωὐτὰ διαπράσσεσθαι 
καὶ λέγειν, καὶ τἆλλα <τὰ> ἑπόμενα τῷ λόγῳ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. (7) αἰ  
15                γάρ τις αὐτὼς ἐρωτάσαι αἰ διαφέρει μανία σωφροσύνης καὶ σοφίη 
ἀμαθίης, φαντί· “ναί”. (8) εὖ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν πράσσοντι ἐκάτεροι δᾶλοί 
ἐντι ὡς ὁμολογησοῦντι. οὔκων, καὶ ταὐτὰ πράσσοντι, καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ 
μαίνονται καὶ τοὶ μαινόμενοι σοφοὶ καὶ πάντα συνταράσσονται.                        
(9) καὶ ἐπακτέος ὁ λόγος πότερον ἐν δέοντι τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες λέγοντι ἢ 
τοὶ μαινόμενοι. ἀλλὰ γάρ φαντι ὡς ταὐτὰ μὲν λέγοντι, ὅταν τις αὐτὼς 
ἐρωτῇ· ἀλλὰ τοὶ μὲν σοφοὶ ἐν τῷ δέοντι, τοὶ δὲ μαινόμενοι ᾇ οὐ δεῖ. (10) 
καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες δοκοῦντι μικρὸν ποτιθῆναι τὸ ᾇ δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, ὥστε 
μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦμεν. 
 
 
1 “ταὐτὰ… (oratio recta §§ 5.1-5) Ro.       7 τάλαντόν codd.] τάλαυτόν Ro.      12 
μαινομένως <καὶ τὼς σωφρονοῦντας> καὶ Scha.] codd. Ro.      17 καὶ codd.] καὶ <αἰ> 
Ro.       
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5. (1) The insane and the sane, the wise and the ignorant say and do the 
same things. (2) In the first place, they give the same names to things: 
‘earth’, ‘man’, ‘horse’, ‘fire’, and all the rest. And they perform the same 
actions: they sit, eat, drink, lie down, and the same applies to the rest. (3) 
And besides, the same thing is also both bigger and smaller, more and less, 
heavier and lighter. Hence, in this way all things are the same. (4) The 
talent is heavier than the mina and lighter than two talents: the same thing, 
then, is lighter and heavier. (5) The same man both lives and does not live, 
and the same things are and are not; in fact, what is here, is not in Libya, 
nor is what is in Libya in Cyprus. And the same rationale applies to every 
other example. Surely then, things are and are not. (6) Those who maintain 
that, namely that the insane <and the sane>, the wise and the ignorant 
carry out and say the same things, and every other consequence of this 
speech, do not speak correctly. (7) In fact, should one ask them whether 
insanity differs from sanity, and wisdom from ignorance, they say ‘yes’. 
(8) For it is pretty clear that they will grant it, also from what each group 
does. Therefore, it is not true that they do the same things, nor that the 
wise behave insanely, nor that the insane are wise, nor that everything is 
thrown into confusion. (9) So, one must bring up the question whether it 
is the sane or the insane who speak at the proper time. But surely, 
whenever one asks them, they answer that <the two groups> say the same 
things, but the wise at the proper time, the insane when there is no need. 
(10) And by saying that, they seem to have made the small addition of 
‘when there is need’, and ‘when there is no need’, in such a way that <what 
the two groups say> is not the same anymore. 
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                     (11) ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ πράγματος τοσούτω ποτιτεθέντος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δοκῶ τὰ 
πράγματα, ἀλλ’ ἁρμονίας διαλλαγείσας· ὥσπερ “Γλαῦκος” καὶ 
“γλαυκός” καὶ “Ξάνθος” καὶ “ξανθός” καὶ “Ξοῦθος” καὶ “ξουθός”. (12) 
ταῦτα μὲν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀλλάξαντα  διήνεικαν, τὰ δὲ μακρῶς καὶ  
5                    βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα, “Τύρος” καὶ “τυρός”, “σάκος” καὶ “σακός”, ἅτερα 
δὲ γράμματα διαλλάξαντα, “καρτὸς” καὶ “κρατός”, “ὄνος” καὶ “νόος”. 
(13) ἐπεὶ ὦν οὐκ ἀφαιρεθέντος οὐδενὸς τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, τί δή, αἴ τις ἢ 
ποτιτιθεῖ τι ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ; καὶ τοῦτο δείξω οἷόν ἐστιν. (14) αἴ τις ἀπὸ τῶν 
δέκα ἓν ἀφέλοι, οὐκέτι δέκα οὐδὲ ἓν ἂν εἴη, καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό. (15) τὸ  
10              δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἦμεν καὶ μὴ ἦμεν, ἐρωτῶ· “τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα 
ἔστιν;” οὐκῶν αἴ τις μὴ φαίη ἦμεν, ψεύδεται τὰ πάντα εἰπὼν ταῦτα. 
πάντα ὦν πῃ ἔστι.                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 “καρτὸς” καὶ “κρατός” scripsi] “κάρτος” καὶ “κρατός” Ro.      11 τὰ πάντα codd.] “τὰ 
πάντα” Ro.    εἰπών ταῦτα. πάντα scripsi]  εἰπών. ταῦτα πάντα Ro. 
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(11) Personally, I think that things become different not <only> through 
addition of so big an element, but by change of intonation: for example, 
‘Glaucus’ and ‘glaucous’, ‘Xanthus’ and ‘yellow’, ‘Xuthus’ and ‘golden’. 
(12) These things differed by changing their intonation; others by being 
pronounced with a long vowel and with a shorter one, <such as> ‘Tyre’ 
and ‘cheese’, ‘goat-hair cloth’ and ‘fold’; others again by exchanging the 
place of their letters, like ‘shorn smooth’ and ‘of the head’, ‘ass’ and 
‘mind’. (13) Therefore, since it makes such a big difference despite nothing 
has been taken away, what if someone adds or takes away something? 
And that I shall show as it is. (14) If someone should take one from ten, 
there would not be either ten or one anymore, and the same applies to the 
rest. (15) As for the fact that the same man is and is not, I ask: “Is it true in 
some respect or in all respects?” Surely, should one say that the same man 
is not, he speaks falsely if he means that in all respects. For every thing, in 
some way, is. 
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                     6. (1) λέγεται δέ τις λόγος οὔτ’ ἀλαθὴς οὔτε καινὸς ὅτι ἄρα σοφία καὶ 
ἀρετὰ οὔτε διδακτὸν εἴη οὔτε μαθητόν. τοὶ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες ταῖσδε 
ἀποδείξεσι χρῶνται·  (2)   ὡς   οὐχ   οἷόν   τε   εἴη,   αἴ   τι   ἄλλῳ   παραδοίης, 
τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἔτι ἔχειν. μία μὲν δὴ αὕτα. (3) ἄλλα δὲ ὡς, αἰ διδακτὸν ἦν,  
5                   διδάσκαλοί κα ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν, ὡς τᾶς μωσικᾶς. (4) τρίτα δὲ ὡς τοὶ ἐν 
τᾷ Ἑλλάδι γενόμενοι σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τὰ αὑτῶν τέκνα ἂν ἐδίδαξαν καὶ τὼς 
φίλως. (5) τετάρτα δὲ ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς παρὰ σοφιστὰς ἐλθόντες οὐδὲν 
ὠφέληθεν. (6) πέμπτα δὲ ὅτι πολλοὶ οὐ συγγενόμενοι σοφισταῖς ἄξιοι 
λόγω γεγένηνται. (7) ἐγὼ δὲ κάρτα εὐήθη νομίζω τόνδε τὸν λόγον·  
10            γινώσκω γὰρ τὼς διδασκάλως γράμματα διδάσκοντας  ἃ  καὶ  αὐτῶν  
<ἕκαστος>  ἐπιστάμενος τυγχάνει,  καὶ  κιθαριστὰς κιθαρίζεν.   πρὸς  δὲ  
τὰν δευτέραν ἀπόδειξιν, ὡς ἄρα οὐκ ἐντὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεδεγμένοι, τί 
μὰν τοὶ σοφισταὶ διδάσκοντι ἀλλ’ ἢ σοφίαν καὶ ἀρετάν; (8) ἢ τί δὲ 
Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι ἦεν; τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἐδίδαξε Πολύκλειτος  
15                 τὸν υἱὸν ἀνδριάντας ποιεῖν. (9) καὶ ἂν μέν τις μὴ διδάξῃ, οὐ σαμῇον· αἰ 
δ’ εἷς τις ἐδίδαξε, τεκμάριον ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστι διδάξαι. (10) τέταρτον δὲ αἰ 
μὴ τοὶ παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν σοφοὶ γίνονται. καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλοὶ 
οὐκ ἔμαθον μαθόντες. (11) ἔστι δέ τις καὶ φύσις. αἰ δέ τις μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ 
σοφιστᾶν ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο, εὐφυὴς καὶ γενόμενος, ῥᾳδίως συνάρπαξε τὰ  
20                 πολλά, ὀλίγα μαθὼν παρ’ ὧνπερ καὶ τὰ ὀνύματα μανθάνομεν· καὶ 
τούτων τι ἤτοι πλέον ἤτοι ἔλασσον, ὁ μὲν παρὰ πατρός ὁ δὲ παρὰ 
ματρός.   
 
 
 
2 σοφία codd.] σοφίη Ro.      14 καὶ αὐτῶν <ἕκαστος> Or.] καὶ αὐτὸς Rο.      17 σοφίαν 
codd.] σοφίην Ro.      18 ἢ codd.] [ἢ] Ro.      21 δ’ εἷς τις Wi.] δ’ ἔστι Ro.      ἐδίδαξε Wi.] 
διδάξαι Ro.           22 τοί codd.] τοι Ro.     18 φύσις. codd.] φύσις, Ro.     αἰ δέ codd.] ᾇ 
δή Ro.      19 συνάρπαξε Scha.] συναρπάξαι Ro.           
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6. (1) Some thesis neither true nor new is stated: that is to say that wisdom 
and excellence are not something teachable or learnable. Those who say 
this make use of the following proofs: (2) that it would not be possible for 
you, if you handed over something to someone else, to still possess this 
same thing. And that is one proof. (3) Another one is that, if they could be 
taught, there would be proven teachers of them, as in music. (4) A third is 
that those men in Greece who became wise would have taught their own 
children and friends. (5) A fourth proof is that already some who 
frequented the sophists did not derive any benefit. (6) A fifth, that many 
not associated with the sophists have become important. (7) I myself deem 
this thesis extremely silly: for I know that the teachers teach the letters that 
each of them too happens to know, and kithara-players how to play 
kithara. Against the second proof, namely that there are no proven 
teachers, well, what do the sophists teach, if not wisdom and excellence? 
(8) Or what were the Anaxagoreans and the Pythagoreans? As to the third, 
Polyclitus did teach his son to make statues. (9) And should someone not 
teach, that would not be a sign of anything; but if some single man taught, 
there is proof that it is possible to teach. (10) A fourth proof <occurs> if 
those coming from wise sophists do not become wise. And, in fact, many 
did not learn the letters, even though they took lessons. (11) But there is 
also a kind of natural disposition. In fact, if someone became competent 
without learning from the sophists, if he is also naturally gifted, he easily 
grasped a lot having learnt few things from those very persons from 
whom we also learn words; and someone learns a part of these, be it the 
most or the least, from the father, someone else from the mother. 
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                        (12) αἰ δέ τῳ μὴ πιστόν ἐστι τὰ ὀνύματα μανθάνεν ἁμέ, ἀλλ’ 
ἐπισταμένως ἅμα γίνεσθαι, γνώτω ἐκ τῶνδε· αἴ τις εὐθὺς γενόμενον 
παιδίον ἐς Πέρσας ἀποπέμψαι καὶ τηνεῖ τράφοι, κωφὸν Ἑλλάδος 
φωνᾶς, περσίζοι κα· καὶ αἴ τις τηνόθεν τῇδε κομίζοι, ἑλλανίζοι κα.  
5                   οὕτω μανθάνομεν τὰ ὀνύματα, καὶ τὼς διδασκάλως οὐκ ἴσαμες. (13) 
οὕτω λέλεκταί μοι ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἔχεις ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσον· καὶ οὐ 
λέγω ὡς διδακτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆναι ταὶ ἀποδείξιες. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 καί codd.] [καί] Ro.      6 μέσον· Mu.] μέσαν· Ro.  
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(12) And if someone does not believe that we learn words, but believes 
that we are born together with knowledge, let him understand from what 
follows: if a man sent a little child, right after he was born, to Persia and 
he had it brought up there, deaf to the Hellenic language, the child would 
speak Persian. And if a man brought one here from there, it would speak 
Greek. That is how we learn words and we do not know our teachers. (13) 
My argument has been so formulated and you have a beginning, a 
conclusion and a middle. And I am not saying that <wisdom and 
excellence> are something teachable, but that those proofs are not 
sufficient for me. 
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                     7. (1) λέγοντι δέ τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων, ὡς χρὴ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ κλάρω 
γίνεσθαι, οὐ βέλτιστα ταῦτα νομίζοντες. (2) εἰ γάρ τις αὐτὸν ἐρωτῴη τὸν 
ταῦτα λέγοντα, “τί δὴ σὺ τοῖς οἰκέταις οὐκ ἀπὸ κλήρω τὰ ἔργα 
προστάσσεις, ὅπως ὁ μὲν ζευγηλάτας, αἴ κ’ ὀψοποιὸς λάχῃ, ὀψοποιᾷ, ὁ  
5               δὲ ὀψοποιὸς ζευγηλατῇ, καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τοῦτο; (3) καὶ πῶς οὐ καὶ τὼς 
χαλκῆας καὶ τὼς σκυτῆας συναγαγόντες καὶ τέκτονας καὶ χρυσοχόας 
διεκλαρώσαμεν καὶ ἠναγκάσαμεν, ἃν χ’ ἕκαστος  λάχῃ τέχναν 
ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἃν ἐπίσταται;” (4) τωὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀγῶσι τᾶς 
μωσικᾶς διακλαρῶσαι τὼς ἀγωνιστὰς καὶ ὅ τι χ’ ἕκαστος λάχῃ,  
10                 ἀγωνίζεσθαι· αὐλητὰς κιθαρίξει τυχὸν καὶ κιθαρῳδὸς αὐλήσει. καὶ ἐν 
τῷ πολέμῳ τοξότας καὶ ὁπλίτας ἱππασεῖται, ὁ δ’ ἱππεὺς τοξεύσει, ὥστε 
πάντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ δύνανται πραξοῦντι. (5) λέγοντι δὲ καὶ 
ἀγαθὸν ἦμεν καὶ δαμοτικὸν κάρτα· ἐγὼ ἥκιστα νομίζω δαμοτικόν. ἐντὶ 
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι μισόδαμοι ἄνθρωποι, ὧν αἴ κα τύχῃ ὁ κύαμος,  
15                      ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον. (6) ἀλλὰ χρὴ τὸν δᾶμον αὐτὸν ὁρῶντα αἱρεῖσθαι 
πάντας τὼς εὔνως αὐτῷ, καὶ τὼς ἐπιταδείως στραταγέν, ἁτέρως δὲ 
νομοφυλακὲν καὶ τἆλλα <καττωὐτό>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 εἰ codd.] αἰ Ro.      4 ὀψοποιᾷ St.] ὀψοποιῇ Ro.      5 κατὰ τοῦτο codd.] κατὰ τωὐτό 
Ro.     10 κιθαρίξει Di.] κιθαριεῖται Ro.     11 πολέμῳ codd.] πολεμῷ Ro.      14 κύαμος, 
codd.] κύαμος Ro.      17 καττωὐτό add. Scha.] sine supplemento Ro. 
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7. (1) Some of those who address the assembly say that it is necessary that 
the magistrates be selected by lot, without having the best opinion about 
the matter. (2) In fact, suppose someone would ask the one who says this: 
“why, then, do you not assign the tasks to your slaves by lot, in such a 
manner that the teamster, if he is drawn as a head cook, cook a dish, 
whereas the head cook drives a yoke of oxen, and in this way for all the 
other tasks? (3) And how is it the case that we do not gather the 
blacksmiths, the shoemakers, the carpenters and the goldsmiths, draw 
their names and compel them to exercise whatever skill each one is 
assigned by lot and not that which he knows?” (4) And it would be the 
same to assign by lot the competitors in the musical contests and that they 
contend in whatever skill each of them drew: by chance, an aulete will play 
the kithara and a citharode the aulos. And in war an archer and a hoplite 
will be cavalryman, whereas the cavalryman will shoot with the bow, so 
that everyone will do what he does not know and what he cannot do. (5) 
They also say that this system is good and extremely democratic, but I 
personally deem it the least democratic. For in the cities there are some 
men who hate the people and if the bean chances upon them, they will 
lead the people to ruin. (6) In fact, it is necessary that the people, by means 
of a personal observation, elect all those who are well disposed towards 
them, and that suitable persons be generals of the army, that others be 
guardians of the laws and that the same go for all the other positions. 
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                        8. (1) τῶ δ’ αὐτῶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχύ τε 
δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, 
καὶ δικάσασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ’ ἦμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας 
ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἁπάντων ὥς τε ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο,  
5                      διδάσκεν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἁπάντων εἰδὼς πῶς οὐ 
δυνασεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσεν; (3) ἔτι δὲ ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν 
λόγων εἰδὼς ἐπιστασεῖται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγεν. (4) δεῖ γὰρ 
τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγεν περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται περὶ τούτων λέγεν. περὶ 
πάντων δὲ ἐπιστασεῖται· (5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας  
10                   ἐπίσταται, τοὶ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐόντων ἐντί. (6) δεῖ δὲ 
ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγεν περὶ ὅτων κα λέγῃ *** <τὸν δὲ 
δαμαγορεῖν ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ> καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκεν τὴν 
πόλιν πράσσεν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὼς κωλύειν. (7) εἰδὼς δὲ γε ταῦτα εἰδήσει 
καὶ τὰ ἅτερα τούτων· πάντα γὰρ ἐπιστασεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν  
15                 πάντων, τῆνα δὲ ποτὶ τωὐτὸν τὰ δέοντα παρέξεται, αἰ χρή. (8) κἂν μὴ 
ἐπίσταται αὐλέν, ἀὶ δυνασεῖται αὐλέν, αἴ κα δέῃ τοῦτο πράσσεν. (9) τὸν 
δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς·                    
περὶ γὰρ τούτω ταὶ δίκαι. εἰδὼς δὲ τοῦτο εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον 
αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἅτερα. (10) δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τὼς νόμως ἐπίστασθαι  
20                   πάντας· αἰ τοίνυν τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπιστασεῖται, οὐδὲ τὼς νόμως. 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
9 δὲ Roh.] γ’ ἄρ’ Ro.       11 κα λέγῃ  Bl.] καὶ λέγοι Ro.       <τὸν δὲ δαμαγορεῖν 
ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ> tentavi      16 ἐπίσταται codd.] ἐπιστᾶται Ro.      19 πάντα τὰ ἅτερα 
Wi.] τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῶ? ἑ>τεροῖα Ro.        
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8. (1) I believe that it belongs to the same man and to the same art to be 
able to converse in short questions and answers, to know the truth of 
things, to be able to plead one’s case in the right way and to address the 
assembly, to know the techniques of speeches, and to teach the nature of 
all things, both how they are and how they came into being. (2) And, to 
begin, how is it possible that he who has knowledge of the nature of all 
things will not also be able to act correctly in relation to all of them? (3) 
Furthermore, he who has knowledge of the techniques of speeches will 
also know how to speak in the correct way about everything. (4) Ιn fact, he 
who desires to speak correctly must speak of the things he knows. But he 
will know about all things: (5) for he knows the techniques of all speeches 
and, at the same time, all speeches are about all the existing things. (6) 
Also, he who desires to speak correctly must know whatever things he 
speaks about. *** <He who knows how to address the assembly, then, 
must> also teach in the right way the city to do good actions and to prevent 
evil ones. (7) By having knowledge of these things, he will also have 
knowledge of those different from them. He will know, in fact, everything: 
for these are among all things, whereas the others, in a similar way, will 
be provided by the need, if necessary. (8) Even if he does not know how 
to play the aulos, he will always be able to do it, if necessitated to do it. (9) 
He who knows how to plead one’s case, then, must correctly know what 
is just; that, in fact, is what lawsuits are about. But by having knowledge 
of that he will have knowledge also of both its contrary and all the things 
which differ from it. (10) That man needs also to know all the laws; again, 
if he does not know the legal issues, he will not know the laws either. 
                    
 
 
 86 
 
              (11) τὸν γὰρ ἐν μωσικᾷ νόμον τις ἐπίσταται, ὅσπερ καὶ μωσικάν· ὃς δὲ 
μὴ μωσικάν, οὐδὲ τὸν νόμον. (12) ὅς γα τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἐπίσταται, εὐπετὴς ὁ λόγος ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται. (13) ὃς δὲ κατὰ βραχὺ 
διαλέγεσθαι δύναται, δεῖ νιν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ πάντων·  
5                     οὐκῶν δεῖ νιν πάντ’ ἐπίστασθαι. 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
1 τις Fa.]  τίς Ro.      ἐπίσταται, codd.] ἐπίσταται; Ro.       2 γα codd.] γα <μάν> Ro.       
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(11) For he who knows the ‘law’ in music knows also music; whoever does 
not know music will not know its ‘law’ either. (12) It is easy to say that the 
very person who knows the truth of things knows everything. (13) And he 
who can converse in short questions and answers must answer on every 
subject, when asked; he surely must know everything. 
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                        9. (1) μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὕρηται ἐς τὸν βίον, μνάμα, 
καὶ ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν. (2) ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, 
ἐὰν προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν· διὰ τούτω γὰρ ἐλθοῦσα ἁ γνώμα μᾶλλον 
αἰσθησεῖται σύνολον ὃ ἔμαθες. (3) δεύτερον, δεῖ μελετᾶν ἅ κα ἀκούσῃς·  
5                  τῷ γὰρ πολλάκις ταὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἶπαι ἐς μνάμαν παρεγένετο. (4) 
τρίτον ἅ κα ἀκούσῃς, ἐπὶ τὰ οἶδας καταθέσθαι, οἷον τόδε· δεῖ 
μεμνᾶσθαι Χρύσιππον; κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ τὸν ἵππον. (5) 
ἄλλο, Πυριλάμπη· κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν. τάδε μὲν περὶ 
τῶν ὀνυμάτων. (6) τὰ δὲ πράγματα οὕτως· περὶ ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρη  
10                    καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλῆα, περὶ χαλκείας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, περὶ δειλίας ἐπὶ 
τὸν Ἐπειόν*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 μνάμα, codd.] μνάμα Ro.      4 μελετᾶν scripsi] μελετᾶν Ro.      ἅ κα Bl.] αἴ κα Ro.      
6 ἅ κα Bl.] αἴ κα Ro.       
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9. (1) A very mighty and noble invention has been found, memory, useful 
for life and for every activity, both for philosophy and for wisdom. (2) And 
this is the case, whenever you focus your attention; for by going through 
this process, your mind will better perceive what you learn as a whole. (3) 
Secondly, you must go over what you read; for by frequently listening to 
and repeating aloud the same words, these come to your memory. (4) In 
the third place, you must associate what you hear with what you know, 
such as in the following: does one need to call to mind ‘Chrysippus’? One 
must associate it with ‘gold’ (chrys-) and ‘horse’ (hippus). (5) Another case 
is that of ‘Pyrilampes’; one must associate it with ‘fire’ (pyr-) and ‘to shine’ 
(lampein). So much about names. (6) To things, instead, the following 
applies: concerning manliness, one must associate it with Ares and 
Achilles; concerning the smith’s work, with Hephaestus; concerning 
cowardice, with Epeius ***      
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3. Commentary 
 
Chapter 1 
Title 
Περὶ…κακῶ] The titles of chapters 1-3 have been handed down in a questionable form 
both from a linguistic and a grammatical point of view. Except P1 and P2, which lack 
them, all the other codices read Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, and 
Περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου. In these titles, the Attic-Ionic endings -ου of the singular 
masculine genitive clash with the Doric variant -ω used soon after, in the first sentence 
of each chapter. As we earlier saw, that in itself would not be problematic, as dialectal 
inconsistency is a distinctive feature of the work. Nonetheless, suspicion grows if one 
considers, firstly, that titles are parts of a text more likely than others to be interpolated 
over the textual transmission. Secondly, in ancient Greek, ‘preposition + singular neuter 
adjective’ constructions such as these usually stand for adverbial locutions,177 while for 
an adjective to be nominal, such as in Robinson’s translations ‘on good and bad’, ‘on 
seemly and shameful’, ‘on just and unjust’, it needs to be preceded by an article.178 
Again, that, by contrast, immediately occurs in the opening sentences of the chapters.  
Therefore, I have opted for Stephanus’ Περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ τῶ κακῶ, Περὶ τῶ 
καλῶ καὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ, and Περὶ τῶ δικαίω καὶ τῶ ἀδίκω, differently from Robinson, 
who printed the above non-articulated manuscript forms, but who also surprisingly 
turned chapter 1’s title into the Doric Περὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ — as Fabricius had 
suggested first — without justifying this choice.179 On my translation of this and the 
following occurrences of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν (as well as of the couples τὸ 
                                                 
177 See f.e. LSJ, s.v. περί, V: ‘to denote value, ἡμῖν π. πολλοῦ ἐστι it is of much consequence, worth much, 
to us, Hdt.1. 120, cf. Antipho 6.3’. 
178 By contrast, in English sometimes, but not always, the determiner drops when ‘the singular nominal 
adjective is the complement of a preposition’ (Greenbaum (1996), 138). 
179 Robinson (1979), 98. 
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καλόν/τὸ αἰσχρόν and τὸ δίκαιον/τὸ ἄδικον), as opposed to Robinson’s one, see infra, 
92-94.  
 
§ 1.1 
δισσοὶ λόγοι] The notion of λόγος which is here introduced and which dominates the 
first six chapters of the work has received a few possible translations, namely 
‘opinion’,180 ‘speech’,181 ‘argument’ or ‘argumentation’,182 ‘account’,183 ‘saying’,184 
‘reasoning’,185 ‘view’,186 ‘thesis’.187 My choice of ‘speech’ is grounded on some passages 
throughout the text suggesting some features the author may have wanted this notion 
to have, the first of which is in § 1.11. Here ἄλλος δὲ λόγος expresses the thesis of the 
difference between the good and the bad thing (λέγεται…πρᾶγμα), and, contra 
Robinson and others,188 that is not what we would expect an argument, or a reasoning, 
to do. For the latter are supposed to support, establish, or motivate a thesis or a 
statement, rather than formulating it.189 Not by chance, in chapter 6 each of the 
arguments in favour of the two opposite positions is called ἀπόδειξις (‘argument in 
proof’), and in § 6.13 they are avowedly kept apart from λόγος which cannot therefore 
be synonymous with ἀπόδειξις. Furthermore, in the same paragraph, the second λόγος 
is also described as having had a beginning, an intermediate part, and a conclusion. The 
mention of these three components, then, favours ‘speech’, ‘account’ and ‘saying’ over 
                                                 
180 ‘Sententia’ (North (1671), 48, Meibom (1688), 704, Fabricius (1724), 617, Von Orelli (1821), 211, Mullach 
(1875), 544). 
181 ‘Rede’ (Teichmüller (1884), 205), ‘discour’ (Dupréel (1948), 41), ‘discorso’ (Reale (2008), 1843). 
182 ‘Argument‘ (Guthrie (1971), 316, Sprague (1972), 279, Robinson (1979), 99, Kerferd (1981), 54, 
Waterfield (2000), 287, Dillon/Gergel (2003), 320), ‘argument’ (Dorion (2009), 131), ‘argomentazioni’ 
(Maso/Franco (2000), 179).   
183  ‘Account’ (Graham (2010), 879). 
184  ‘Dit’ (Poirier (1988), 1167). 
185 ‘Ragionamento‘ (Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 213, Untersteiner (1954), 559, Bonazzi (2008), 427), 
‘razionamiento’ (Solana Dueso (1996), 179). 
186  ‘Ansicht’ (Becker/Scholz (2004), 49). 
187  ‘Thèse’ (Dumont (1969), 232). 
188 See above, n. 181. 
189 OED, s.v. ‘argument’, 3a, 4, 5. 
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the remaining possible meanings, namely ‘opinion’, ‘view’, and ‘thesis’, and, within the 
first group, the first one appears thus more fitting than the other two. Ultimately, what 
I consider δισσοί in the first six chapters of this work are the two speeches which each 
time clash and have the form of an initial thesis followed by its supporting case, and, in 
chapters 1-3 and 6 by a conclusion too.  
 
ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων] This clause is absent at the beginning of 
chapters 2-4, but one could take it as understood there too. For on those occasions too 
the author recalls that contrasting speeches are made about a certain pair of 
philosophical opposites, and in so doing he also uses an introductory καί hinting at a 
connection with what has been already stated here.190 
 
τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι…τοτὲ δὲ κακόν] The similarity with the beginnings of chapters 
2-4 goes on, because there too the second sentence displays the enunciates of the two 
rival theses about the couple of opposites: first comes the thesis about the difference 
between them (shortened to ‘DT’), and in this case corresponding to τοὶ μὲν γὰρ 
λέγοντι…ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν; then it is the turn of the thesis about the identity of those 
same opposites, or ‘identity thesis’ (‘IT’), which here is given by τοὶ δὲ ὡς τὸ αὐτό...τοτὲ 
δὲ κακόν.  
But what are these opposites? And in which way do the two theses contrast? These 
questions are interconnected, because the assessment of the logical relation between the 
theses depends on how we understand the two opposites. The traditional approach to 
these issues191 consists in the following four key-points:  
                                                 
190 λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ καλῶ καὶ αἰσχρῶ δισσοὶ λόγοι (§ 2.1); δισσοὶ δέ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ 
τῶ δικαίω καὶ τῶ ἀδίκω (§ 3.1); λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ ψευδέος καὶ τῶ ἀλαθέος δισσοὶ λόγοι (§ 4.1). 
191 Just to quote the most recent reflections on the matter, Robinson (1979), 149-151, Solana Dueso (1996), 
139-144, Waterfield (2000), 333-334, Becker/Scholz (2004), 93-94, 138-139, Dorion (2009), 204, Graham 
(2010), 900-901. 
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(a) The articulated neuter forms of the couple of opposites in chapters 1-3 (chapter 4 
contrasts, firstly, ἀλάθεια and ψεῦδος, then, ἀλαθής λόγος and ψεύστας/ψευδής 
λόγος) are taken as referring ‘to the universal’,192 namely as expressing the property 
shared by all the things of which that adjective is predicated. For example, in this 
chapter τὸ ἀγαθόν stands for ‘the good’, in the sense of ‘goodness’, while τὸ κακόν 
means ‘the bad’, namely ‘badness’;  
(b) DTs exclusively distinguish between these opposite concepts, in other words their 
only aim is to deny the truth of enunciates such as ‘the good is the same as the bad’ 
which we classify as ‘identity-statements’;193  
(c) ITs, instead, by featuring the neuter adjectives without article, come down only to a 
‘predicative statement’,194 that is to ‘the same thing is good under certain circumstances, 
bad under others’;  
(d) Considering (b) and (c), it follows that DTs and ITs do not really conflict, that they 
are not actually δισσοί. Rather, precisely because the good is different from the bad, any 
predicative judgement such as those expressed by ITs is meaningful. 
I find this interpretation not satisfactory for the following three reasons, one for 
each of points (a)-(c), as signalled by the letters (a’)-(c’):  
(a’) As Robinson himself recognizes, the articulated neuter forms of two opposites can 
be also taken with reference ‘to the particular’,195 namely as expressing the single thing 
to which the adjective is referred. For example, in this chapter τὸ ἀγαθόν can stand for 
‘that which is good’,196 namely ‘what is good’, and τὸ κακόν for ‘that which is bad’, 
namely ‘what is bad’;  
                                                 
192 Robinson (1979), 151. 
193 Ibid., 149. 
194 Ibid., 150. 
195 Ibid., 151. 
196 Ibid. 
 94 
 
(b’) Secondly, as for (b), it is not true that identity-statements are the exclusive target of 
DTs, as shown, e.g., in §§ 1.14-16, where DT denies formulations of IT in predicative 
form (αἴπερ τωὐτὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν);  
(c’) ITs are not given exclusively in the form of predicative statements, as emerges from 
[τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν understood] τὸ αὐτό ἐστι of the current passage, which 
Robinson himself recognizes as an identity-statement and explains by appealing to the 
‘ambiguities’ and ‘paradoxical effect’ which would characterize the work.197  
Having said that, I conversely think that by adopting the translation of the 
articulated forms of the neuter adjectives suggested in (a’), a different interpretation of 
DTs and ITs too becomes possible, which also has the advantage of better accounting 
for the description of the two theses as δισσοί, and for the otherwise elusive cases 
mentioned in (b’) and (c’). 
 
τοὶ μέν [...] τοὶ δέ] τοί is the western form of the plural masculine article198 and it 
assumes a pronominal function in both the objects of this μέν…δέ correlation. Although 
λόγοι could be a grammatically sound antecedent, I suspect that here the articles take 
up, and differentiate, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες περί τῶ ἀγαθῶ καί τῶ κακῶ, thus pointing 
more to the participants of the discussion, rather than to their speeches, in analogy with 
the following ἐγώ ποτιτίθεμαι of § 1.2, through which the author in person decides to 
take the floor of the debate.199 The same happens in §§ 2.1 and 3.1, whereas in § 4.1 a 
slightly different construction is the case, as we will see.  
 
§ 1.2 
ἐγώ…ἀγαθόν] Along with § 1.3, the current paragraph casts light on the natural 
aspects of human life (ἀνθρώπινος βίος), the good or bad value of which is said to 
                                                 
197 Ibid., 149-150. 
198 Buck (1973), 100. 
199 The same will be the case at §§ 2.2, 3.1, 4.2. 
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depend on the specific criterion one adopts. Here, in particular, food, drink and sex, 
being introduced as every man’s main objects of care (ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ ἐπιμελές), in 
the end prove to be good for the healthy only and not for the sick. The fact that from the 
two extremes of health condition can spring two opposite judgements concerning 
human life is propounded by Sextus Empiricus too, at P. I.102-103 and M. VIII.53-54. As 
for the human body in general as pivotal for contrasting judgements see, instead, Pl. Prt. 
334b6-c6 and S.E. P. I.79-93. 
 
ἐγώ...ποτιτίθεμαι] The actual degree of the author’s commitment to this stance will 
result only in § 1.11, when, after introducing the statement of DT once again, he will 
similarly comment ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαιρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον. 
 
§ 1.3 
καὶ ἀκρασία…τυμβοποιοῖς ἀγαθόν] Other aspects of human biology are treated 
here, in continuity with those of the former paragraph as they begin from the 
intemperance in the above pleasures; they follow a reverse logic, though, as this time 
the author’s interest is in how what harms human wellness can be evaluated positively, 
provided one adopts a particular criterion. This is the economic one and here it is 
revealed for its sharp antithesis to human life: intemperance, illness and death are bad 
for human beings in general to the same extent to which they are good for those 
individuals who make money out of them, namely dealers, physicians and undertakers. 
Admittedly, a common utilitarian rationale (underscored by the usage of the dative of 
advantage and disadvantage for the individuals for whom the objects are bad or good) 
underlie both the biological and the economic criteria.200 But this just accentuates the 
contrariety between them, enabling the author to say that what is considered as a 
biological harm is nonetheless a source of economic utility. Cf. Pl. Prt. 334a1-c6 for a 
                                                 
200 See also Robinson (1979), 150. 
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similar prospect, but formulated more explicitely by the use of the adjectival pairs 
ὡφέλιμος/ἀνωφελής and ἀρωγός/πάγκακος along with ἀγαθός/κακός.201 A 
relativistic questioning of the preferability of health over illness is also carried out at 
S.E. M. V.47-67.  
 
§ 1.4 
γεωργία…ἀγαθόν] Having been inquired as to its corporeal and private dimension, 
man’s life is now described to a social level, that is as regards some of its public 
manifestations such as economy (§§ 1-4-5), culture (§§ 1.6-7), and war (§§ 1.8-10). What 
emerges confirms the result just obtained about the individual’s sphere, namely that 
every situation considered good by one person is bad to another one. As far as the 
competing occupations here mentioned are concerned, Mazzarino is right in taking the 
paragraph as laying down the premises of an actual fight between professions.202 But 
his identification of the contrast between farmers and traders with the one, fundamental 
for Greek history, between landowners and sailing merchants seems far-fetched.203 For 
γεωργός denotes the worker, not the owner, of a piece of land, and, on the other hand, 
an ἔμπορος does not necessary trade by sea.  
 
§ 1.5 
τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα…τῷ δὲ σκυτῇ ἀγαθόν] Teichmüller quotes this passage among 
those which make him think that the author of Dissoi Logoi is Simon the Athenian, and 
this because of the reference to the same job of cobbler (σκυτεύς), in the first place, and 
for the emphasis on the crafts, in general.204 But we will see throughout the chapter and 
over the dialogue that the range of the author’s examples is anything but restricted to 
                                                 
201 See also ibid. and Solana Dueso (1996), 180, n. 5. 
202 Mazzarino (1966), 287. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Teichmüller (1884), 117. 
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some social categories only, and therefore this passage can hardly be indicative for such 
an attribution. 
 
§ 1.6 
ἐν τοίνυν…ἡσσαμένοις κακόν] Cultural aspects such as arts and sports are discussed 
here and in § 1.7, in compliance with the usual relativistic pattern. The stress on the 
athletic competitions (ἀγώνες γυμνικοί) as chiefly fraught with contrasting fortunes, as 
they are bound to proclaim a winner and a loser, recurs in Greek literature, like, for 
example, at Isoc. Archidamus 95, where the victory in the games is paradigmatically 
presented as a source of admiration, and even envy, for every citizen, or at [Arist.] Pr. 
18.2, where the losers are said to be always in search of a revenge, not standing the scorn 
of the loss. 
 
§ 1.7 
κιθαρωδία] Robinson’s ‘lyre-playing’205 is not appropriate, firstly because it refers to a 
broader kind of instrument, the lyre (λύρα), of which the kithara (κιθάρα) here implied 
represented a specific class, namely the box lyre.206 Secondly, Robinson’s translation fits 
κιθαρίζω rather than κιθαρωδία, as the latter derives from κιθαρῳδέω,207 one 
component of which is the verb ἀείδω, meaning ‘to sing’, and which Robinson ends up 
obscuring. 
 
§ 1.8 
ἔν…βαρβάροις κακόν] The opposite light under which a victory is seen by the victor 
and by those on the losing side is thrown on the stage of war, in a passage spread across 
                                                 
205 Robinson (1979), 101. 
206 West (1992), 50. As a rule, in translating the names of ancient Greek musical instruments and 
instrumentalists, I simply transliterated them in Latin alphabet, in line with West’s admonishment not to 
use the inadequate terminology of modern music (ibid., 1-2). 
207 DELG, s.v. κιθάρα. 
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§§ 1.8-10, and always at the centre of the discussion about the dating of the work. For in 
these three paragraphs the author looks through some crucial military conflicts in the 
history of the Hellenic world, following a reverse chronological order which goes from 
a not specified clash between Athens and Sparta back to the remote time of the mythical 
battle of gods and giants.  
 
§ 1.9 
ἁ…πάθη] Clearly, the author is here referring, firstly, to the Achaean conquest of Troy, 
typified by the deceit of the fatal wooden horse (see especially Verg. A. 2), then, to 
Thebes’ resistance to Argos’ siege, such as narrated in Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes.  
 
§ 1.10 
καὶ ἁ τῶν Κενταύρων…Γίγασι κακόν] At Hom. Il. 1.262-268, 2.738-744 we can read 
about the so-called centauromachy, the battle in which the Lapiths, legendary people of 
Thessaly, defended their land from the assault of the fearful Centaurs. Finally, the last 
battle to be presented, and therefore to be chronologically first, is the gigantomachy, 
namely the battle in which the Olympian gods affirmed their superiority over the 
Giants, as first narrated at Pi. N. I.66-69.     
 
λεγομένα] Mazzarino correctly emphasizes how this attribute is the only element 
hinting at a principle of critical distinction between myth and history within this war 
section. Furthermore, by applying it to the battle of gods and Giants only, the author 
proves to distinguish between this time of legend and the rest of the past, but not 
between the history of heroes (the battle between Lapiths and Centaurs, Argos’ siege of 
Thebes, and War of Troy) and that of humans (Persian Wars and Peloponnesian War).208 
From this angle, Mazzarino argues, the author acts differently from Herodotus, for 
                                                 
208 Mazzarino (1966), 295. 
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whom the progeny of the humans is markedly separated from that of the heroes (see, 
e.g., Hdt. 3.122.2), and from Thucydides, who adopts a critical attitude towards the 
ancient sagas which he does not even mention.209 Untersteiner observes how a similar 
continuity between mythological and historical ages can be traced in the epitaphs, 
instead.210  
 
§ 1.11 
ἄλλος…πρᾶγμα] The second speech comes in and this first sentence reminds the 
reader of DT, through a formulation which does not change noticeably from what seen 
in § 1.1, except for the addition of ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. As noticed 
above, this is a stock phrase of DTs, and it intensifies the idea of difference (διαφέρον) 
between what exemplifies a certain quality and what exemplifies the opposite one. With 
reference to this chapter, the locution points out how the nominal difference between 
what is good and what is bad, namely as far as the predication of the opposite attributes 
‘good’ and ’bad’ (τὤνυμα) is concerned, corresponds to (ὥσπερ…οὕτω…) the 
substantial difference between the states of affairs (τὸ πρᾶγμα) involved. 
Correspondence between the level of words and that of the world is thoroughly 
discussed in Pl. Cra. 436c and Arist. Metaph. Γ 1006b22-34, whereas in the first speech of 
chapter 4 falsity will be represented precisely as a mismatch between these two levels. 
Furthermore, this locution might also conceal a veiled attack on IT. For the author 
may also be alluding at how the second speech makes use of opposite attributes 
(διαφέρον […] τὤνυμα), just as the first speech did, but also at how, unlike the first 
speech, the second one considers two numerically distinct states of affairs (διαφέρον 
[…] τὸ πρᾶγμα). Clearly, if this reading is the case, the DT upholder is here omitting 
the couples of conditions under which IT had the same state of affairs be either good or 
bad. On the contrary, one may regard these conditions as crucial, because they can join 
                                                 
209 Ibid., 296. 
210 Untersteiner (1954), 152. 
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the single state of affairs and form two new ones. However, in the next commentary 
note we will see how the fallacious path taken by the second speech to refute IT turns 
precisely around omission of these relativizing conditions, which hence makes this 
second interpretation of ὥσπερ…πρᾶγμα which I have just been giving perfectly 
aligned with the rationale of the speech. 
 
δοκῶ…κ’ εἴη] This argument in favour of DT illustrates the rationale of the following 
supportive examples (§§ 1.12-16), both in form and in content. For there too the 
conditional clause (here οὐδὲ διάδαλον ἦμεν…αἰ ἑκάτερον εἴη…) features an absurd 
consequence in the apodosis (οὐδὲ διάδαλον ἦμεν ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν), 
and in the protasis an absolute version of the original IT (αἰ [ποῖον understood] τὸ αὐτὸ 
καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον εἴη), where the conditions which then made something either 
good or bad are omitted.  
DT thus proves to operate in two steps. Firstly, it exploits what Aristotle classified 
as the fallacy connected to the absolute or the relative use of the same predicate (Arist. 
SE 166b38-167a21), which is similar, but not identical to the fallacy due to the ignorance 
of the nature of the refutation, also known as ignoratio elenchi (cf. Arist. SE 167a22-36), 
which a tradition starting from Barnes prefers to see here,211 instead. In other words, DT 
does tactically attack ‘a straw man’, as Robinson states;212 but such a fabrication (whose 
form is ‘the same thing is good and bad’) is closer to the original one (‘the same thing is 
good under certain circumstances, bad under others’) than the one Barnes and Robinson 
maintained (‘the good is the same as the bad’). For, if anything, the first two are 
predicate-statements with an identical subject (‘the same thing’) and a predicate (‘is 
good and bad’) which just changes its range (from a relativization ‘under certain 
circumstances’ to an absolute value), whereas the third one is an identity-statement 
connecting two elements (‘the good’ and ‘the bad’) absent in the other two formulations. 
                                                 
211 Barnes (1979), 218.  
212 Robinson (1979), 150. 
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Consequently, both here and in chapters 2-4, the contrast between DT and IT, albeit still 
logically flawed, is nonetheless more rhetorically effective, and these two kinds of λόγοι 
are thus more δισσοί, than what is traditionally said.  
Having identified the thesis which DT really targets, it is easy to recognize the 
second passage of its argumentative strategy in a reductio ad absurdum of that. This 
procedure, which Aristotle calls ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγή and describes at APr. 
41a22-38, is particularly dear to the author who consistently adopts it also for the DTs 
of chapters 2-4 and 3, as well as for the argument of § 6.3.213 
 
§ 1.12 
οἶμαι…κακῷ] Here and in the following two paragraphs the author imagines 
addressing an unnamed supporter of IT, establishing with him a direct speech the 
pretended realism of which aims to emphasize the alleged absurdities derived from his 
position. §§ 1.12-13, in particular, reflect on the relationships with those dear to us. At 
first, here in § 1.12, the author’s questions are put in a prescriptive way and in view of 
the future, inviting the interlocutor to pay back his parents in evil actions for the good 
ones he received from them.  
 
τύ τι…ἐποίησαν;] Robinson prints the manuscript reading τι τὼς γονέας ἀγαθὸν 
ἐποίησας, which he read on P1, P2, P4, P6, and V2 and which differs from that of the 
remaining codices only in the Doric τώς in place of τούς. He rephrased the point of the 
whole imaginary dialogue with these alternative lines: ‘”You already performed acts of 
kindness to your parents? Then you ought to perform a number of acts of unkindness 
toward them, since good and evil are identical”’.214 But that is a non sequitur, and also 
sinks the necessity of paying one’s own debts, conveyed by the verb ὀφείλω in the 
following τὺ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις. For this reason, I 
                                                 
213 For its application in this chapter see also Nestle (1966), 438. 
214 Robinson (1979), 156. 
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found Schulze’s emendation τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθόν ἐποίησαν more fitting, insofar as 
making for a sort of lex talionis when taken in connection with the immediately 
following remark. After all, at R. I 331b-e Plato too presents ‘returning to each one what 
is owed to them’ (τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, at 331e3), that is to say 
‘returning to someone what one has received from them’ (331c3-4), as the core of the 
popular idea of justice, approved by Simonides too, which the character of Socrates then 
proceeds to criticise. In conclusion, the author’s point here is that since what is good is 
identical to what is bad, and since one owes to the others the same acts they did to him 
(implicit premise), then when it comes to the parents, who did good to us, we need to 
repay them with evil deeds.  
 
§ 1.13 
τί δέ, τὼς…ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας] Now the author’s interrogation turns to a descriptive 
modality and a view of the past, through which the upholder of IT is shown that, if his 
thesis is to stand, then he has always damaged his relatives and benefitted his enemies 
every time he acted in the opposite way towards those people. Again, an interesting 
parallel can be drawn with Pl. R. I 332d6, where another similar and popular definition 
of justice, backed by Simonides as well, is given, i.e. ‘benefiting friends and damaging 
enemies’ (τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς), which exactly 
corresponds to what here counts as the right conduct endangered by IT. 
 
§ 1.14 
ἄγε…ἀγαθόν;] By again enlarging the range of his observation from a private to a 
public dimension, in §§ 1.14-15 the author tests the undesirable consequences of IT with 
two individuals which were poles apart in terms of wealth: the beggars (οἱ πτωχοί), in 
this paragraph, and the Great King (ὁ βασιλεύς μέγας), in the following one. Since the 
former would unexpectedly end up being in a condition enviable by everyone, the 
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absurdity of such a scenario is again sufficient to exclude the tenibility of IT, on which 
that is conditional. 
 
πολλὰ…πάλιν] All the manuscripts feature πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι· πάλιν, where, 
however, πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα does not match the following πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ with that 
semantic correspondence we would expect from the parallel patterns οἰκτείρεις, ὅτι... 
and εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὄτι... which host them. Robinson’s πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, πάλιν215 
works better, in this sense, but one still might feel the need of a more fluid connection 
when passing from the first clause, ending with ἔχοντι, to the second one, opening with 
πάλιν. That is why at this point I have preferred to bring back the text to the reading of 
Diels and Kranz, namely πολλὰ  καὶ  κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν.216 Other conjectures — 
Mullach’s πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι  <κακά, τὼς δὲ πλουσίως> πάλιν217 above all — 
force too much the original, as noticed also by Classen.218 
 
§ 1.15 
τὸν…εἰρήσθω] Since he is known to carry on an existence at the opposite extreme of 
wealth to that of the beggars, the example here construed around the Great King too 
goes in the opposite sense to the previous one about the beggars, though sharing the 
same logic. For whereas earlier the evils suffered by the beggars turned out to be 
fortunes, now the King’s fortunes turn out to be evils such as those which the beggars 
are supposed to suffer (ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τοῖς πτωχοῖς).  
                                                 
215 Ibid., 102-104. 
216 Diels-Kranz (1952), 407. 
217 Mullach (1875), 545. The others are πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακὰ> ἔχοντι· πάλιν (De Varis in Robinson 
(1972), 196), πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακὰ> ἔχοντι; ἢ πάλιν (North, who also suspected that πάλιν should 
be deleted: North (1671), 52, n.11), πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακά> ἔχοντι; <…τὼς ἄρα πτωχὼς> πάλιν (Blass 
in Weber (1897), 38)), πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι <κακά;…τὼς ἄρα πτωχὼς> πάλιν (Weber in ibid.), 
πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι; <πῶς οὐ τὼς πτωχὼς> πάλιν (Wilamowitz in Diels (1907), 637), πολλὰ καὶ 
μεγάλα κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν (Becker/Scholz (2004), 52). 
218 Classen (2001), 112. 
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Although hence being on the same wavelength as the reflection of the previous 
paragraph as for content, yet the current one diverges in the form, as it is no longer 
expressed through direct interrogation, but back in a declarative mode. 
 
§ 1.16 
εἶμι…κακῷ] An interesting revision of the supportive examples brought forward in IT 
is here announced. But the intent gets shattered soon after, as this recapitulation stops 
with the second one, about illness. That disappoints Robinson who believes that if the 
author had completed this opposite reading of the same examples of IT, he would have 
then been in the right position to choose between the two sides of the contrast.219  
Nonetheless, this break does not affect the actual value of the paragraph, which 
lies in its offering the reader the possibility of better understanding the usual tactics 
adopted by the second speech against the first, through a comparison between the ways 
the two deal with the same examples. Looking at the first case presented, in fact, it 
clearly emerges that those same pleasures which in § 1.2 had only a negative value when 
assessed with reference to the ill, become also good to those persons, now that the 
second speech has the rival simply say that ‘the same thing is good and bad’ (τωὐτόν 
ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν) and therefore that ‘eating, drinking and having sex’ too are 
good and bad. The ill, that is the reference-subjects to which the first speech originally 
limited its judgements, are now called in just to enhance the paradoxical result to which 
IT is alleged to lead (τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι ταῦτα ποιὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν). The same applies to 
the following case about illness (τὸ νοσεῖν), to be compared with the original one of § 
1.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 Robinson (1979), 158. 
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§ 1.17 
καδδὲ…εἴρηται] By this remark the second speech virtually projects its appropriation 
of the examples of the first one into all the other cases not dealt with in the previous 
paragraph.  
 
καὶ οὐ…ἄλλο ἑκάτερον] This last sentence closes the second speech by clarifying 
what its goal has been. By refraining from defining what is good (οὐ λέγω τί ἐστι τὸ 
ἀγαθόν), and limiting himself to distinguishing it from what is bad (οὐ τωὐτὸν εἴη 
κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον), the author concludes the speech and the 
chapter with a principle of caution which Kranz did not miss and on which he drew a 
fitting parallel with the conclusion of § 6.13.220 He also read this attitude as Socratic, and 
so did Taylor, who appealed to an analogy with the conclusion of Plato’s Theaetetus, 
where ‘we do not know what knowledge is, but we have satisfied ourselves that it is not 
the same as sensation, nor yet as right opinion’.221 Although that may indeed sound 
similar to our text, I find an even higher similarity with a few passages of Sextus 
Empiricus. Firstly, the negative part of our conclusion can be likened to the point made 
by Sextus when criticising Plato for his taking position on the nature of ideas (P. I.222), 
thus blocking the inquiry about these objects (II.11), of which we do not have even 
appearances, as they are non-evident (I.225). Secondly, according to Pl. Euthphr. 6d14-
17 and, broadly speaking, what we have called ‘Socratic fallacy’ since Geach,222 the lack 
of the knowledge of a property should prevent one from predicating it of something. 
However, that is what our author does throughout the chapter, and an operation which 
belongs to the Sceptic too, because, as we read in S.E. P. I.226, in so doing he expresses 
only his appearances, without any belief as to the probability of these. Thirdly and 
lastly, our author’s final assent to the impossibility for the same thing to be good and 
                                                 
220 Kranz (1937), 230. 
221 Taylor (1911), 101. 
222 Geach (1966), 371-372. 
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bad can hardly be taken as his final opinion on the matter, rather it must be considered 
along with IT, which he previously defended, as forming that couple of contrasting 
speeches which are dear to the Pyrrhonian Sceptic too, as we will also better see later. 
 
Chapter 2 
Title 
Περὶ…αἰσχρῶ] See my comment on chapter 1’s title, supra, 90-91. 
 
§ 2.1 
τοὶ μέν…σῶμα] On the recurrent clause ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 
already encountered in § 1.11, and to which the current one is reminiscent, see supra, 
99-100. The substitution of πρᾶγμα with σῶμα could be due, with Kranz, to the couple 
of opposites under discussion in the chapter, καλός and αἰσχρός, whose first meanings 
of ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ inevitably involve the idea of body.223 Nonetheless, I have 
followed Robinson in translating them with two adjectives, such as ‘seemly’ and 
‘shameful’, with a stronger moral connotation, because all the examples examined in 
the chapter will deal with moral conventions and cultural habits.  
 
τοὶ δέ…αἰσχρόν] The statement of IT we have here calls for elucidation, because it 
forgets those relativizing clauses on the basis of which only such an identity can stand, 
in accordance with the supporting examples offered afterwards whose pattern is ‘the 
same thing is seemly under certain circumstances and shameful under others’. This absence 
looks particularly striking if one compares the current statement with the counterpart 
in chapter 1, which features such specifications (καὶ τοῖς…τοτὲ δὲ κακόν, § 1.1). On the 
other hand, since the ITs statements at §§ 3.1 and 4.1 too lack these clauses, I am inclined 
to think that the author so clearly felt them applicable to the following ITs too, that he 
                                                 
223 Kranz (1937), 224. 
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did not deem it useful to repeat them, in the same way as hipothesized about δισσοὶ 
λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων of § 1.1.   
 
§ 2.2 
κἀγὼ…αἰσχρόν] The portion of text from here to § 2.6 is devoted to body care and 
sexuality. The current paragraph recalls, in language and content, some observations 
about love of youths in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus. For at Smp. 178c4, according to 
Phaedrus there is no higher bliss for a person in his early youth (εὐθὺς νέος ὦν) than 
having a worthy suitor (ἐραστὴς χρηστός). Some pages later, Pausanias even draws 
the profiles of the worthy and of the unworthy suitor, starting with the latter, who loves 
the body of the boy more than his soul (181b4-5), which inconveniently leads people to 
deem it shameful to grant favours to suitors like him (αἰσχρὸν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, 
182a4-5). At 184c10-d3, then, he remarks that the boy’s indulgence to the suitor is 
seemly (καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι) only when the love of the 
youngsters and that of philosophy converge, namely when the boy accepts the love of 
the suitor and the latter helps the former to become wiser and better (184d4-e5). 
Likewise, in Phdr. 233e-234a, a youth is spurred to gratify not lovers who are merely 
interested in the bloom of his youth (ἡ ὥρα, cf. also Smp. 217a for this phrase), but those 
who will prove their value ‘once the bloom of his youth has faded’ (παυσαμένου τῆς 
ὥρας 234a), by sharing their goods with him, by remaining steady friends throughout 
their lives, and by being discreet in public about their relationship.  
 
§ 2.3 
καί…καλόν] Women washing in public constituted a contravention of ancient Greek 
morals, as emblematically exemplified in Callimachus’ version of the myth of Artemis 
and Actaeon (Call. Lav. Pall. V.107-116), and as we can infer, for example, from S.E. M. 
II.53, where we read that ‘”a bath” is called ἀνδρεῖον according to common usage from 
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the fact that it washes ἄνδρας (men)’.224 In this connection, one may also recall the taboo 
of women being naked in public, which Herodotus makes famous in his tale of Gyges 
and Candaules (Hdt. 1.8-12), where the prohibition is justified by the fact that ‘with the 
stripping off of her tunic a woman is stripped of the honour due to her’ (1.8).225 
 
§ 2.4 
καὶ…ὄψεται] Plato maintains the same idea both at Phlb. 65e10-66a3, where men are 
said to intentionally hide their most intense pleasures and relegate them to the night, 
far from the sight of the day, and at Lg. 841b, where the Athenian suggests men should 
regard privacy in sexual acts as καλόν, and lack of that as αἰσχρόν (see also Hp.Ma. 
299a). A similar assessment of outdoor sex will be later made by Sextus Empiricus, who 
observes that it is regarded as shameful by most peoples, except some Indians (P. I.148-
149, III.200). This is also the first instance of a notable correspondence of this chapter 
with S.E. P. III.199-234. Some of the behaviours which Sextus proposes there as 
examples of the high variability of the human criteria of beauty and shamefulness 
appear in Dissoi Logoi 2 too. However, whereas Sextus consistently bases an 
intercultural comparison on them, in some passages of our chapter, such as the current 
one, these behaviours are rephrased within the context of a single set of values, which 
the author does not attribute to any particular people. They may stand either for Greek 
morals only (again on the assumption that δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ 
τῶν φιλοσοφούντων of § 1.1 applies to the following chapters as well) or for universal 
ones.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 Translation from Bury (1971), 215. 
225 Translation from Godley (1920), 13. 
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§ 2.5 
καὶ τῷ μέν…αἰσχρόν] Sextus Empiricus examines this issue at P. I.152 and III.209, but 
differentiates the Greeks’ condemnation and punishment of adultery from its 
acceptance among other peoples and some philosophers.   
 
αἴσχιστον…αἰσχρόν] As Solana Dueso too notices, the degree of intensity of the 
adjectives used to censure adultery varies depending on whether the offender is the 
wife (αἴσχιστον), or the husband (αἰσχρόν), which, I add, indicates the author's 
assumption of male superiority.226 
 
§ 2.6 
καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι…καλόν] Male recourse to embellishment is discussed also at S.E. P. 
III.203, where wearing earrings, in particular, is said to be fit for barbarian men, but not 
for the Greek ones. 
 
§ 2.7 
καὶ τὼς μὲν φίλως…ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν] This and the following paragraph are 
concerned with three basic possibilities of human relationship, presented in descending 
order from a peak of human sociability, consisting in doing good (εὖ ποιέν), then to the 
indifference entailed in fleeing (φεύγεν), through which one avoids any form of 
personal contact, finally to the most radical hostility, expressed by killing (φονεύεν). 
These actions are said to be seemly or shameful depending on whom they are directed 
towards, and, more precisely, according to the popular morals of benefitting friends 
and damaging enemies, already seen in § 1.13. Another interesting narrative movement 
in §§ 2.7-8 is that from the generic and private hostility of οἱ ἐχθροί to the warlike and 
public one of οἱ πολέμιοι. This shift provides the perfect link between the first part of 
                                                 
226 Solana Dueso (1996), 183, n. 10. 
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the first speech, ending at § 2.8 and devoted to intracultural relativism, and the second 
part, opening with § 2.9 and concerned with intercultural relativism.227 
 
καὶ τὼς μὲν πολεμίως…ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν] At S.E. P. III.216 too, fleeing one’s 
enemy at war is recalled both as a reprehensible and somewhere even illegal act, and 
as a source of pride if one adopts the same perspective as Archilochus when he throws 
away his shield (Archil. Fr. 5).    
 
§ 2.8 
καὶ τὼς μὲν…πάντων] Likewise, at S.E. P. III.212 killing is deemed a crime, unless it 
occurs in gladiatorial combats, or in athletic contests, where one is even awarded a prize 
for it.  
 
§ 2.9 
εἶμι…αἰσχρόν] In the section starting here and concluding at § 2.17, which constitutes 
the core of the first speech, the author enhances the demonstration of IT by widening 
his focus from just one value system to those of different populations. The issue of the 
author’s sources for this piece has been extensively explored and, like any other matter 
ultimately connected with the authorship of this work, with little profit.228 In 
commenting on these paragraphs, I will thus content myself with highlighting the 
striking affinities which this ethnographic survey has with the alike ones in Herodotus, 
on the one hand, and in Sextus Empiricus, on the other. The similarities with the latter, 
in particular, have been considerably neglected,229 despite the fact that this section gets 
even closer to the above S.E. P. III.199-234, as it does not simply feature the same human 
behaviours as examples, as happened so far, but it too uses them to compare cultures. 
                                                 
227 See also Solana Dueso (1996), 183, n. 11. 
228 Cf. Robinson (1979), 165-166. 
229 The best we can find is Bett’s description of this passage of our work as ‘the closest to parts of the 
writings of Sextus Empiricus’ (Bett (2002), 239). 
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On the other hand, what here is missing compared to Herodotus and Sextus Empiricus 
is any further reflection about the nature or the origin of these customs. For here we 
cannot find anything such as Hdt. 1.8 (‘men have long ago made wise rules for our 
learning’),230 or S.E. P. I.146 (‘a habit or custom […] is the joint adoption of a certain kind 
of action by a number of men, the transgressor of which is not actually punished’).231 
Similarly, nothing here could be used for the 5th century BCE debate about φύσις and 
νόμος, although Hippias, one of its most famous voices (cf. Pl. Prt. 237c), does not act 
differently from our author when, according to Hp.Ma. 294c-d, he observes that among 
men there is more contention about what is believed to be seemly than about anything 
else. Finally, as far as the current paragraph is concerned, at Pl. Smp. 182b-c Ionians are 
similarly said to spurn physical exercise, but as such, without gender qualifications. 
 
§ 2.10 
καὶ <τοῖς μὲν>…πάντα] As a complement to the former comparison between the 
different attitudes of Lacedaemonians and Ionians towards physical exercise, now the 
author adds that when it comes to arts and letters, the former are happy to ignore them, 
the latter ashamed. On this respect, the aforesaid parallel with Pl. Smp. 182b-c ceases 
here, because there Plato has Pausanias say that Ionians, like all barbarians, consider 
training in philosophy to be as shameful as training in sports, whereas our author seems 
here to be paying tribute to the historical Ionian pre-eminence in culture. Solana Dueso 
mentions Sappho and Aspasia as representative figures of Ionian female education of 
whom the author might have thought, but we must not forget Cleobulina of Rhodes 
either, who is quoted at §, 3.11, along with a riddle of hers.232 
    
                                                 
230 Translation from Godley (1920), 13.  
231 Bury (1976), 87. 
232 Solana Dueso (1996), 184, n. 12. 
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<τοῖς μέν>] As Classen observes,233 the supplement of this article with pronominal 
function, as first conjectured by Diels,234 or, alternatively, that of the Doric 
demonstrative pronoun τήνοις, by Wilamowitz,235 is here required, if the correlation 
Λακεδαιμονίοις…Ἴωσι δέ of the previous paragraph is, as it seems, to go on, contra 
Robinson who follows the manuscripts.236   
 
§ 2.11 
Θεσσαλοῖσι…ἔργα] The same farming habits held as seemly among Thessalians are 
considered shameful, and even slavish (δώλων), in a more civilized land like Sicily. 
Many sources reveal the importance of horses in the Thessalian culture, but Taylor is 
right when looking at E. El. 815-817 (‘they say that the Thessalians regard it as a seemly 
accomplishment to butcher a bullock or break a horse‘)237 as the most suitable parallel 
with what we have here.238 
 
§ 2.12 
Μακεδόσι…ἄμφω αἰσχρόν] The author comes back to habits concerning love and 
sex, this time with reference to Macedonians, described as allowing a girl a pre-marital 
sexual life, but also condemning any other extramarital intercourse of hers, once she is 
wed. By contrast, Hellenes are said to be stricter, and censure any sexual relations a girl 
has before marriage, which is consistent with the Greek woman’s fidelity and conjugal 
devotion, in § 2.5.  
 
 
 
                                                 
233 Classen (2001), 115. 
234 Diels (1903), 582. 
235 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in Diels (1907), 638. 
236 Robinson (1979), 108. 
237 Kovacs (1998), 243. 
238 Taylor (1911), 96. 
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§ 2.13 
τοῖς δὲ Θραξί...ἀδικέοντι] That the Thracian woman finds seemly what women from 
other cultures see as a form of punishment represents an overturn of aesthetical and 
social criteria, along the lines of the former comparison between Thessalian and Sicilian 
farming customs in § 2.11. What we read here is backed up by Hdt. 5.6, where in 
Thracian culture ‘to be tattooed is a sign of noble birth, while to bear no such marks is 
for the shamefulr sort’.239 At S.E. P. III.202, also, we find that whereas with Hellenes 
‘tattooing is held to be shameful and degrading’, nonetheless ‘many of the Egyptians 
and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring’.240    
 
τοὶ δὲ Σκύθαι… ποιήσαντι] The whole passage appears to be a summary of what is 
expounded in Hdt. 4.64-66. There, the description opens with the technical procedure 
of flaying an enemy’s head. The scalps obtained from it are said to serve not only as a 
trophy to be fastened to one’s own horse, but in the first place as a hand towel; similarly, 
the enemy’s skin in general and even his nails are said to be used in the manufacture of 
a few items for both the knight’s wear and that of the horse. Herodotus then specifies 
that the tradition of gilding and silvering the skull is observed just by the few who can 
afford it, whereas what everyone does is ‘to cover the outside [scil. ‘of the skull’] with a 
piece of raw hide’ (4.65). Not differently from our text, Pl. Euthd. 299e too reports that 
Scythians are accustomed to drinking from these skulls, and this, according to Hdt. 4.66, 
happens only once a year, when the king gathers the province governors for a drinking-
party where the more skulls one proves to have collected, the more his reputation 
grows. Finally, even though Herodotus does not compare this people with Hellenes, as 
our author does, he nevertheless recalls that when the Scythian king hosts guests, it is 
customary for him to offer a drink from these skulls (4.65). This may help us better 
understand ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλασιν…ποιήσαντι at the end of this paragraph; for the 
                                                 
239 Translation from Godley (1922), 7. 
240 Translation from Bury (1976), 463. 
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concessive force of οὐδέ would seem to suggest that the author oddly considers visiting 
one’s house as an ordinary action, and one not implying any particular degree of 
acquaintance with the host. This final observation would make more sense, if instead 
taken as an implicit rejoinder to that Herodotean anecdote about the Scythian king’s 
hospitality. 
 
καὶ σπένδῃ…ποιήσαντι] Concerning the varied and often contrasting ways in which 
different peoples communicate with the divine, Sextus Empiricus as well points out 
how ‘sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For 
things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy’241 (P. 
III.220). 
 
§ 2.14 
Μασσαγέται…ποιέων] Burial was an issue of the utmost importance for Hellenes, as 
we read, for example, in Pl. Hp.Ma. 291d-e, where Hippias says that among the things 
seemly for a man there is the giving of a seemly funeral to one’s own parents and to 
receive the same from one’s own offspring. The remains of the body, sometimes 
cremated, were always buried, so as to safeguard the dead’s rest and keep the living 
from their impurity. This is clearly a far cry from the Massagetae’s custom here 
narrated, which, however, represents just the last phase of a longer death ritual, 
according to Hdt. 1.216. For there we read also that this people believe that the happiest 
death for an old man is to be killed by his relatives, who then usually boil his flesh and 
feast on it. So much so that if, instead, he happens to die of some illness before reaching 
the old age, ‘they do not eat him, but bury him in the earth, and lament that he did not 
live to be killed’.242 Ultimately, this ritual ends up contrasting not only with that 
                                                 
241 Translation from Bury (1976), 473. 
242 Translation from Godley (1920), 271. 
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belonging to Hellenes, but with the Hellenic condemnation of killing one’s kin, seen in 
§ 2.8, in the first place.  
 
§ 2.15 
τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι…παράνομα] Proceeding from discussing male cosmetics, the extent to 
which incest shocked Hellenes can be seen on the basis of Oedipus’ myth (see S. OT). 
By contrast, Persians judge it favourably, but Herodotus tells us that it was not so before 
their king Cambises married his sister (3.31). Evidence of Persian intercourses with and 
marriages to mother and sister is also in S.E. P. I.152 and III.205, in both of which these 
practices applied also to Egyptians. 
 
§ 2.16 
Λυδοῖς…γᾶμαι] Prostitution as a way for Lydian girls to collect a dowry and find a 
husband is described at Hdt 1.93. In S.E. P. III.201, instead, the usage is attributed to 
Egyptians, but also used to contrast them with Hellenes, for whom prostitution is said 
to be shameful, just as it occurs here. 
 
§ 2.17 
Αἰγύπτιοι...ἐναντίον] By swapping the tasks usually assigned to men and women, the 
Egyptian case shows, in particular, how weaving is not necessarily a female business, 
as typified by the Odyssean Penelope (Hom. Od. 2.82-128). Once again, the same 
observation can be found in Herodotus (2.35) who also confirms that Egyptians ‘knead 
dough with their feet, and gather mud and dung with their hands’243 (2.36), similarly to 
what is said at the end of our paragraph. According to the historian, the peculiarity of 
their customs must also be associated with that of their climate and of the river Nile 
(2.35).  
                                                 
243 Translation from Godley (1920), 319. 
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<ἔρια>] In contrast to Robinson, I accepted this supplement by Valckenaer244 because 
in a passage such as this one, where specific duties are attributed either to women or to 
men, the only ἐργάζεσθαι (‘to work’) would have been too generic. 
 
§ 2.18 
οἶμαι…νομίζοντι] The moral lesson of the ethnological excursus that has just ended, 
namely that the same habit can be highly regarded as well as despised depending on 
cultures, is here defended through a thought experiment, an epistemic device used on 
two other occasions in the work - the first at the end of this chapter (§§ 2.26-28, 6.12) - 
and to which Gera pays special attention. Relying on the common dating of the work, 
she counts these three Dissoi Logoi instances of thought experiment among the earliest 
in Greek literature, the very first being Xenophanes’ famous argument against 
anthropomorphic gods (DK 21B15).245 Of the current experiment she highlights 
especially the pattern, which she sees as typical, as it starts with ‘an initial hypothetical 
situation’ (αἴ τις…ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι), then it introduces ‘a further action which affects 
the original circumstances’ (καὶ πάλιν…ἅγηνται), finally it assesses whether the 
results of this action confirms or denies the ‘original thesis’ (οὐδέν κα…ταὐτὰ 
νομίζοντι).246 Since the thesis was ‘that moral judgments are not absolute’, the results 
are positive, but Gera notices that the reader is not given ‘any means to prove – or 
disprove’ them, and the experiment therefore lacks any ‘control’ and ‘sense of 
rigorousness’.247 Ultimately, in our author’s hands, the thought experiment does not 
have its usual epistemological purpose, but rather gains a rhetorical one, or, in Gera’s 
words, becomes ‘one of the tools of the sophist’s trade’.248 So much so that the second 
thought experiment of this chapter will have ‘an outcome which is the very reverse’ of 
                                                 
244 Valckenaer (1802), 263. 
245 Gera (2000), 40-41. 
246 Ibid., 35. 
247 Ibid., 39. 
248 Ibid., 43. 
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the current one, albeit starting from the same conditions.249 Finally, when looking for 
other similar experiments in ancient sources, one will find them in Hdt. 3.38 and 7.152, 
which, however, insist on a people’s preference for their own customs over those of the 
others, and not on the nature of the things considered seemly and shameful, as here.     
 
§ 2.19 
παρεξοῦμαι…καλά] An unspecified poem (ποίημά τι) offers another case in which 
the attributes of seemly and shameful are swapped (διαλλάξας) with reference to the 
same object, stressing again the variability of such judgements. A tradition starting 
from Meineke has been attributing these verses to Euripides (Fr. TGF adesp. 26), but 
without reporting any evidence to corroborate this ascription, except Craik, who draws 
attention to E. Ph. 469-471, and Hipp. 383-390.250 However, these examples are arguably 
relevant for our case, as they feature καιρός in the sense of ‘proper measure’.251 Surely 
enough, Euripidean plays depict human vicissitudes as challenging the tenability of a 
neat distinction between what is seemly and what is shameful, as well as what is pious 
and impious, just and unjust, etc.; but this applies to the other tragedians too. In 
questioning this Euripidean attribution, I also would like to point out another possible 
source for the poem, Simonides. For he must have been known to our author, as other 
implicit hints to him can be spotted in § 3.10 and chapter 9, and he is held to have agreed 
on the idea that ὁ καιρός determines τὸ καλόν and τὸ αίσχρόν (Fr. PMG 36).252 
 
διαθρῶν] I have picked this conjecture by Valckenaer in place of διαιρῶν in the 
manuscripts, to which Robinson adheres,253 because the idea of distinction conveyed by 
the latter seems at odds with the case for the identity of seemly and shameful deeds 
                                                 
249 Ibid., 39. 
250 See Meineke (1823), 200-201, and Craik (1993), 56-57.  
251 Translation from Kovacs (2002), 259, and Kovacs (1995), 163. 
252 See also Pellizer (1978), 90. 
253 Valckenaer (1802), 268, Robinson (1979), 110. 
 118 
 
made in the poem. The same applies to Nauck’s suggestion διαρθρῶν.254 By contrast, 
the previous observation of the variety of human customs is perfectly reflected in the 
construction διαθρῶν τὸν ἄλλον θνητοῖσιν νόμον.  
 
ὁ καιρός] Whereas so far culture has been the factor on which the judgements of what 
is seemly and what is shameful has depended, here a different and temporal one is 
introduced. As a result, the author seems to say that not only do such judgements 
change between peoples, but also within the same people as the time changes, which in 
a sense brings us back to the intracultural relativism of the first part of the speech. If so, 
however, in this poem I cannot see a trace of the rhetorical καιρός for which Gorgias 
was famous (DK82 A1a, A24, B11a.32, B13), as instead Rostagni maintained, with 
Robinson’s approval.255  
 
§ 2.20 
ὡς…πᾶσι] After a brief summary of the message of the poem, the author concludes 
the first speech by bringing out the rhetorical success that he believes to have obtained 
with it. An alike meta-rhetorical remark, aiming to improve the persuasiveness of what 
has been just said, occurs in § 6.13, where the author concludes his second speech by 
underscoring its even structure. 
 
§ 2.21 
λέγεται…τὸ καλόν] The second speech, in defence of DT, starts here and a connection 
between it and the second speech of chapter 1 is suggested by the καί anticipating and 
modifying περὶ τῶ αἰσχρῶ καὶ καλῶ, which implies the existence of a previous 
discussion about another couple of opposite things which were ἄλλο ἑκάτερόν. 
 
                                                 
254 Nauck (1889), 844. 
255 Rostagni (1922), 172-173, Robinson (1979), 171. 
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ἐπεὶ…τὸ καλόν] Like in chapter 1, the rationale of the second speech, here epitomized, 
consists in a combination of the fallacy about the absolute and relative use of the same 
predicate (the oversimplification of the first speech as just saying that τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα 
αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν), and the reductio ad absurdum (the impossibility of receiving 
a seemly thing which is not shameful either, if the suggested interpretation of the first 
speech is the case; see αἴ ποκά…τὸ καλόν). However, this time the degree of the former 
fallacy seems lesser, as the statement of IT did feature a predicate used in the absolute 
sense, at least at its face value, as previously stated. Nonetheless, the fallacy does occur 
from § 2.23 on, when the author tackles some of the arguments for IT as if they too 
predicated identity in the absolute sense.  
 
§ 2.22 
καὶ αἴ τινά γα καλὸν…καλόν ἐστι] The same argumentative strategy occurs here, 
where, however, it is noteworthy that only the first (καὶ αἴ τινά… αἴσχρὸν τὸν αὐτόν) 
and the last (καὶ αἰ καλόν…καὶ καλόν ἐστι) of the three paradoxical situations 
depicted represent relevant cases for DT. In the second one (καὶ αἴ τινά γα 
λευκόν…τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν), in fact, the author exaggerates the alleged drawbacks of 
accepting IT even more, by moving from the theoretical properties of being seemly and 
being shameful to the empirical ones of being white and being black. The same will 
occur in §§ 3.14, and 5.3-5, and a has a parallel in Pl. Prt. 331d, where Protagoras argues 
that everything resembles any other thing, so that we can say both that justice resembles 
holiness and that white resembles black. As I will better discuss later,256 such a 
standpoint is that of doxophilists, as in Pl. R. V 480a Plato terms those who do not seek 
knowledge of immutable ideas, but content themselves with opining the multitude of 
mutable things in the world.  
 
                                                 
256 See infra, 282-283.  
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§ 2.23 
καὶ…λέγοντι] Similarly to what happened in § 1.16, the second speech announces the 
intention of countering the examples of the former one (τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ὃν λέγοντι) 
by applying the line of reasoning just introduced (τάδε). Yet, this time no promise of 
recapitulating all of them is made, in a more consistent way with the following 
paragraphs, where the author takes up just three of the cases previously encountered, 
along with the recourse to poetry.  
 
§ 2.24 
αἰ…τωὐτόν] This argument counters that of § 2.6 in a way analogous to that by which 
§ 1.16 contrasted §§ 1.2 and 1.3, and which again instantiates the characteristic logic of 
the second speech, presented in § 2.21. 
 
§ 2.25 
ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστι καλὸν…οὔτως] This paragraph too replies to an argument 
used in support of IT against it, though with a slight change from the original version 
in § 2.9, which focussed on girl’s exercise, as opposed to children’s.   
 
§ 2.26 
λέγοντι…ἦνθεν] From here to the end of the chapter the author scrutinizes the 
thought experiment of § 2.18, in order to argue for the untenability of its conclusion. 
Such disbelief of his already appears in this paragraph (ἐγῶ…ἦνθεν), soon after 
recalling the statement of the experiment (λέγοντι…ἀπενειχθῆμεν).  
 
λέγοντι […] ὡς […] ἀπενειχθῆμεν] A contamination occurs between two distinct 
modes in which indirect quotations are usually introduced, namely ὅτι/ὡς with a finite 
verb, and the infinitive (ἀπενειχθῆμεν is the aorist passive infinitive of ἀποφέρω), 
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without affecting the usual way of translating the clause.257 The same phenomenon is 
attested in Th. 8.78.3-6, X. Cyr. II.4.15, and Pl. Lg. 892d.258 
 
§ 2.27 
αἰ γοῦν…ἀπέφερον] The paragraph clarifies what makes the proponent of the second 
speech doubt the results of the example of § 2.18, namely the possibility of a change in 
the nature of things gathered together in a pile. But, as Robinson comments, in the 
former experiment ‘things themselves suffered no transmutation’,259 rather it was the 
judgement of them as seemly or shameful to be overturned by the different opinions of 
different peoples (οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταὐτὰ νομίζοντι, § 2.18). Therefore, in forgetting 
about the importance of cultural diversity in this matter, the author applies the fallacy 
of the relative and absolute use of the same predicate once more. For compared to the 
original version of the experiment, the sentence ‘the shameful things gathered will be 
seemly’ (τὰ αἰσχρὰ συνενεχθέντα καλὰ ἐσεῖται) of § 2.26 lacks two clauses specifying 
which people gathered them as shameful, and who picked them up as seemly, instead. 
However, although misinterpreting its counterpart, the new experiment makes a 
methodological point over that, in presenting to the reader a supposed parallel 
situation, such as the pile of physical objects, on the nature of which different people 
cannot, similarly, hold different opinions, as Socrates points out in Pl. Alc. I 111b-d. For 
this move, besides contributing the argumentative strength of the experiment, also 
counts as an invitation to the reader to check the soundness of the conclusions by 
themselves, which is what the first version of the experiment lacked.  
 
χαλχόν κα ἀπήνεικαν] The manuscripts have χαλχὸν ἀπήνεικαν, which seemingly 
functions as the apodosis of a conditional sentence having αἰ χρυσὸν ἤνεικαν as 
                                                 
257 Goodwin (1898), 315. 
258 Kühner/Gerth (1904), 357, Humbert (1972), 183. 
259 Robinson (1979), 174. 
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protasis, and therefore containing a present supposition implying nothing as to the 
fulfilment of the condition. However, this conditional sentence is between two others 
containing a past supposition implying that the condition is not fulfilled, and thus 
featuring a κα before the verb of their apodoses. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, 
I have integrated κα here as well, along the same line as Mullach,260 whose ἄν seems 
yet formally at odds with the other two κα, and as Trieber,261 whose κά is yet wrongly 
tonic. Similarly, the accent of ἀπήνεικαν does not need to move forward, as instead 
Blass262 (applying the Doric accentuation) does with his χαλχόν κα ἀπηνείκαν, 
especially considering the analogue ἤνεικαν immediately before. Finally, Wilamowitz 
opts for an excision rather than for a supplement, deleting ἀπήνεικαν and reading the 
sole χαλχόν.263 But this solution too, followed by Robinson,264 is puzzling, when one 
compares this apodosis with those of the two nearby conditional sentences, neither of 
which leaves its own verb implicit.  
 
§ 2.28 
ἀντί…ἀπάγαγε;] In line with the start of the thought experiment (ἐγῶ 
θαυμάζω…ἦνθεν, § 2.26), here, at its end, the author confirms his disbelief in the 
outcomes of the first version of the test through two questions worth analysing, namely 
ἀντί…ἀπάγοντι; and αἰ…ἀπάγαγε;. For they conclude a reasoning whose premises 
are (i) the result of the original version of the thought experiment (αἰ τά…ἦνθεν, in § 
2.26), and (ii) the impossibility of changing the nature of things simply by making a 
heap of them (§ 2.27). More precisely, the first question is just a reminder of (i), whereas 
the second represents the impossible conclusion following from (i) and (ii), or, in other 
words, the conclusion which we are bound to accept if we assume (i) despite the 
                                                 
260 Mullach (1875), 547. 
261 Trieber (1892), 229, n. 2. 
262 Blass in Weber (1897), 42. 
263 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 628. 
264 Robinson (1979), 114. 
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admonishment of (ii). Thus, in leading the rival opinion to an impossible result, the 
author turns out to resort to a reductio ad absurdum yet again.  
 
ποιητάς...ποιεῦντι] This final thrust to the upholders of IT undermines the credibility 
of the poetic testimony which those adduced in § 2.19, on the basis of a more general 
reflection about the aim of poetry. That poetry aims at pleasure and not truth is pointed 
out by Plato too at Grg. 501e-502a and R. X 607c. That true philosophers do not make 
use of poetry, because poets sing whatever they please with no concern whatsoever for 
truth is reported at S.E. M. I.280-281. Then, at 297, Sextus distinguishes between prose-
writers and poets in a rather similar way to what we have here, saying that ‘the former 
aim at the truth, but the latter seek by every means to attract the soul, and the false 
attracts more than the true’.265 
 
ποιητὰς…ἐπάγονται] This is a stock phrase used by a few authors, among whom, 
especially, Plato. According to LSJ, s.v. ἐπάγω, II 3, μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγεσθαι 
features, in fact, at Ly. 215c, Prt. 347e, R. II 364c, and Lg. 823a. 
 
Chapter 3 
Title 
Περὶ… ἀδίκω] See my comment on chapter 1’s title, supra, 90-91. 
 
§ 3.1  
καὶ τοὶ μέν…τοὶ δέ…] This μέν…δέ... correlation of two plural masculine articles used 
in a pronominal function implies that the third plural person of some verb of saying is 
understood. Blass hypothesized λέγοντι, which I too deem as the most likely one, in 
the light of the close previous occurrence of λέγω at the very beginning of the sentence 
                                                 
265 Bury (1971), 171. 
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(λέγονται). Its echo may thus extend to this coordinate clause, albeit in a different form 
and taking a different subject.266 
 
τοὶ δὲ…ἄδικον] Similarly to what we saw in chapter 2, here IT is phrased in absolute 
terms, despite the arguments in support of it taking the opposite attributes of justice 
and injustice relatively. The contention of the first speech will be, in fact, that the same 
action holds the opposite values of justice and injustice depending on the circumstances 
under which it is performed. ‘Circumstance’ stands for a state of affairs, namely a 
hypothetical scenario of beings and events which can take place in the world, and is 
reminiscent of the notion of καιρός featuring in the first speech of chapter 2; in this 
connection, ‘state of affairs’ is one of the possible meaning of καιρός when it occurs in 
the plural (LSJ, s.v. καιρός III 4). From this perspective, a parallel can be drawn with 
[Pl.] Just. 375a2-6 where things are said to be just ἐν μὲν τῷ δέοντι καὶ τῷ καιρῷ and 
unjust ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ δέοντι. This dialogue will then introduce knowledge as the 
necessary means to distinguish between these two opposite conditions, which never 
occurs in our text, though.  
There is another difference in the criterion of circumstance of the ITs of chapters 2 
and 3. For in the IT of the former, the author always clarifies the two circumstances 
under which a certain object is either beautiful or ugly, whereas here his focus is only 
on the exceptional conditions under which an object usually deemed as unjust is just, 
and which always consist in some major issue to which our everyday conception of 
what is unjust is bound to yield, by a logic of ubi maior minor cessat.  
 
§ 3.2 
καὶ πρῶτον…ἐνῆμεν;] The first speech of this chapter (§§ 3.2-12), in defence of IT, 
starts by announcing the intention of considering lies and deception (καὶ πρῶτον…καὶ 
                                                 
266 Blass in Weber (1897), 42. 
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ἐξαπατᾶν), although the example it brings here (αἰ…ἐνῆμεν;) addresses only the 
latter. Before expounding this case, the author distinguishes between the possible 
recipients of the action, namely between enemies, whose deception seems generally 
condemned (τὼς μὲν πολεμίως…ἐξείποιεν), and those dearest to us, whose deception 
is allowed in some specific cases (τὼς δὲ φιλτάτως…ἐνῆμεν;). Such a treatment of 
enemies seems counterintuitive, and opposed to its counterparts in analogous 
discussions from other ancient sources (Pl. R. II 382c-d, [Pl.] Just. 374c, X. Mem. IV.2.15-
16), where enemies are the only ones whom it is always just to lie to and to deceive. 
Hence Diels opts for two corrections of the text, by adding καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, τὼς δὲ 
φίλως between ταῦτα ποιέν and αἰσχρόν, then πῶς δὲ τὼς πολεμίως immediately 
before τὼς δὲ φιλτάτως οὔ, soon after the colon.267 This results in a translation such as 
Sprague’s ‘my opponents would declare that it is <right and just> to do these things to 
one’s enemies but disgraceful and wicked to do so <to one’s friend>. <But how is it just 
to do so to one’s enemies> and not to one’s dearest friends?’268 However, besides being 
very speculative, these emendations also cause the final question to cast doubt on the 
possibility of an ethics favouring friends over enemies, though that is precisely what 
we read in Plato and Xenophon as cited above, for example. Alternatively, Robinson 
assumes ‘the holders of the difference thesis’ as the understood subject of ἐξείποιεν, 
and paraphrases everything as follows: ‘even if (per impossibile) they (i.e., “the holders 
of the difference thesis”) thought that it was αἰσχρόν and πονηρόν to lie to and deceive 
one’s enemies, they would never deny that it is, in certain circumstances, proper to lie 
to and deceive one’s φίλτατοι’.269 However, in the first place, when the author needs to 
refer to the supporters of either thesis, he regularly does so expressly, in a way which 
enhances the antilogic character of the work (see e.g. τὼς λέγοντας ὡς τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν 
ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον, in § 3.13). Secondly, the sole ἂν ἐξείποιεν expresses a possibility, 
                                                 
267 Diels (1903), 583. 
268 Sprague (1972), 285. 
269 Robinson (1979), 179. 
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and not the hypothesis of a conditional sentence such as the one Robinson recognizes 
in τὼς μὲν πολεμίως…ἐξείποιεν. In conclusion, the most compelling way I see to 
understand this passage is to suppose that the people maintaining this view (ἂν 
ἐξείποιεν) adhere to a heroic ethics similar to that expressed in §§ 2.7-8, which 
condemns fleeing from the enemy and praises killing him, and on the basis of which 
lies and deception could therefore be considered acts of cowardice.  
Coming to the example of the child giving medicine to either of his reluctant 
parents (αὐτίκα…ἐνῆμεν;), in it the reader may recognize a reversal of the usual 
dynamics in which the parent cares for the child as he grows up, if necessary also with 
the aid of lies or deceptions. For example, in the similar X. Mem. IV.2.17 it is the father 
who gives the medicine to the child by pretending that it is food. Here, our author turns 
this logic upside down, maybe to test his thesis against a more probative case, under 
the assumption that it is more shocking to think of children lying to parents than the 
other way around. The point of the example is that an action otherwise unjust is just if 
directed towards a person (in our case, the parent) who is not doing what is necessary 
for their own wellbeing (taking medicines to recover from some illness), because of 
some form of mental impairment of theirs (caused perhaps by that illness itself). As 
Zembaty observes, the next example, which will involve a depressed friend, will be 
based on the same rationale (§ 3.4).270  
 
§ 3.3  
οὐκῶν…δίκαιον] Lying and deceiving of § 3.2 are now placed alongside stealing 
(κλέπτεν) and using force against someone (βιῆσθαι) of § 3.4, in a connection which 
sums up the two kinds of objects taken in examination throughout the first speech, 
namely words and actions.  
 
                                                 
270 Zembaty (1988), 524-525. 
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§ 3.4  
αὐτίκα…βίᾳ] Again on the ubi maior minor cessat principle, when a friend’s life is 
threatened by the possibility of his own misuse of some object, the respect of the 
ownership of that object takes second place, and one must do all possible to remove it 
from him, even by means of force. A similar reflection appears at Pl. R. I 328c-d, whereas 
331c-d offers the analogous example of returning a weapon to a friend gone mad during 
the time of the loan. Even closer is the crosstalk between Socrates and Euthydemus at 
the already quoted X. Mem. IV.2.17: ‘”and again, suppose one has a friend suffering 
from depression and for fear that he may make away with himself he takes away his 
sword or something of the sort, under which heading will we put that now?” “That too 
goes under justice, of course.”’271  
Many scholars have drawn on these moments of the two texts to establish some 
dependence between the second speech of this chapter and X. Mem. IV.2.2-18. Trieber, 
in particular, argued for the higher degree of elaborateness of our author’s exposition, 
pointing to cases absent in Xenophon such as perjury, temple robbing and killing one’s 
own kin, in order to conclude that it was our author who inspired Xenophon.272 
However, by saying so, Trieber passes over examples such as those of stealing, of 
plundering an enemy’s goods, and of a general lying to encourage his army, which 
appear in Xenophon (IV.2.15,17), but not in our text. Furthermore, precisely by 
assuming, with Trieber, that when one text depends on another, the latter is more 
elaborate than the former, our chapter cannot be the source for Xenophon’s passage. 
For here the author just limits himself to providing as many examples in favour of IT 
as possible, whereas Xenophon sets them in a more articulate dialectical structure, 
which is necessary to attain a higher epistemic goal, namely the definition of a criterion 
to discern what is just and what is unjust. By contrast, the only generalization which 
our author touches upon, that deceiving the enemies is unjust (§ 3.2), goes against the 
                                                 
271 Translation from Marchant/Todd (2013), 295. 
272 Trieber (1892), 218-219. 
 128 
 
counterpart formulated by Xenophon at IV.2.15, where this behaviour is said to be just. 
In conclusion, while it is never easy to determine influences, in either sense, between 
this work and other ancient sources, yet in this case a close examination of the two texts 
clearly excludes the possibility that Xenophon is indebted to our author. 
 
βίᾳ.] Some editors starting from North have turned the full stop which one reads in the 
codices into a question mark, probably in analogy with the following direct questions 
over §§ 3.5-8. At the same time, they translated the resulting clause δίκαιόν…βίᾳ; as a 
rhetorical question expecting an affirmative answer; see e.g. North’s ‘annon justum est 
hoc clanculum subripere si quis posset, aut si tardior adveniens jam in manibus 
habentem deprehenderit, per vim auferre?’273 But if that was the author’s intended 
meaning, the Greek would have a οὐ before δίκαιον, which, in fact, Untersteiner added 
along with the quotation mark.274 Unlike him, Robinson thought that there is no point 
in changing the text, and that this sentence has rather its parallel in the affirmative 
φονεύεν…ποιῆσαι of § 3.9. He, in fact, translates ‘it is just to steal these implements, 
should one be able to, or, should one arrive late on the scene and come upon him with 
the implement in his hand, to take it away from him by force’.275 However, this 
translation does not match his Greek text, which has the combination δίκαιόν […] βίᾳ; 
probably mistakenly taken on from Diels and Kranz’s edition of the text, the last one 
before his own.276 Therefore, in my rendition of the text I have restored the original full 
stop in place of the question mark.    
 
§ 3.5   
ἀνδραποδίξασθαι...πατέρα;] Similarly to what is seen in the transitions from §§ 1.2-
3 to §§ 1.4-10, and from §§ 2.2-8 to §§ 2.9-17, the author switches from the private 
                                                 
273 North (1671), 62. 
274 Untersteiner (1954), 164. 
275 Robinson (1979), 117. 
276 Cf. Diels/Kranz (1952), 410. 
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dimension of the affections for parents and friends of §§ 3.2-4, to a public one, about 
conflicts both internal and external to a community, in §§ 3.5-8. Over the history of 
Greek legislations, it is frequent to find the actions analysed in these new paragraphs 
— enslavement (ἀνδραποδίξασθαι, § 3.5), burglary (τοιχωρυχέν, § 3.5), false swearing 
(ἐπιορκέν, § 3.6), and robbing a temple (ἱεροσυλέν, § 3.6) — featuring in the same list 
of crimes, as a large corpus of textual evidence from Xenophon to Constantine 
Harmenopoulos’ Hexabiblos. In particular, at Pl. R. I 344b the character Thrasymachus 
recalls how among Athenians these offences are condemned and punished, while X. 
Mem. I.2.62 and Ap. 25 specify that the punishment was the death penalty. However, 
by pointing out how in some exceptional cases these crimes need to be allowed for the 
sake of justice itself, §§ 3.5-8 undermine the belief of a simple and coherent corpus of 
moral norms; an operation with a clear sophistic flavour.277 Though with a specific 
reference to laws, Aristotle too offers a similar reflection at EN 5.10.3-8 and Rh. I.13.13-
17, also explaining these exceptions as due to the fact that whereas norms are endowed 
with a regular form, ‘the material of conduct is essentially irregular’ (EN 5.10.4-5) and 
cannot therefore fit the former.278 
 
ἀνδραποδίξασθαι…ἀποδόσθαι;] In a strikingly similar way, at X. Mem. IV.2.14 
Socrates and Euthydemus describe enslavement as an unjust act, but soon after, at 
IV.2.15, they add that a military general who enslaves his enemies’ city acts justly. As 
Gaca recalls,279 at Cyr. VII.5.73 Xenophon also adds that: ‘it is a law established for all 
time among all men that when a city is taken in war, the persons and the property of 
the inhabitants thereof belong to the captors’.280 Once again, a maior concern, i.e. the 
hostility between cities, gets the better of one preceived as minor, i.e. the badness of the 
action as such. This principle applies to other cases, as Socrates and Euthydemus 
                                                 
277 Similarly, Barnes (1979), 219, Mureddu (2014), 21, contra Hoffman (1997), 349. 
278 Translation from Rackham (1926), 315. 
279 Gaca (2010), 119, n. 6. 
280 Translation from Miller (1914), 293. 
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conclude at Mem. IV.2.16, where they realize that all the actions they previously recalled 
as unjust are actually so if directed against a friend, but just if directed against an enemy. 
 
τοιχωρυχέν…πατέρα;] A former ruler of a city has been overpowered, imprisoned 
and sent to death by his opponents. In this case, his son may exceptionally act with 
justice if he breaks into the prison — in this I recognise the ‘one’s own city’s builiding’ 
(τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα) the author has just been mentioning in the 
formulation of the general rule (τοιχωρυχὲν…φαίνεται) which underlies this example 
— and free him. 
 
§ 3.6  
ἐπιορκέν...εὐορκήσας;] If we recall the two categories of objects with which the first 
speech is concerned, words and actions, we can see how the current example involves 
both of them on their specific levels. Forswearing an oath taken with enemies (§ 3.6) for 
the defence of one’s city (§ 3.7), in fact, implies to act in a way which contravenes the 
words uttered in the oath.281 From this point  of view,  to quote Chrysippus’ reflection 
at Fr. Log. 197, only once we have kept the oath (εὐορκέω) or broken it (ἐπιορκέω), can 
we retrospectively say whether our oath was a true or a false one.   
Furthermore, a particularity of this example, if compared with the other ones in 
the chapter, is that in bringing forth the case of forswearing an oath contracted with the 
enemies, it takes for granted another controversial case, namely that someone can 
connive with the enemies for his own freedom. On the other hand, at §§ 3.5 and 3.8 two 
other actions harming the community (τοιχωρυχὲν […] τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ 
οἰκήματα and τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τᾶς Ἑλλάδος…λαβεῖν καὶ χρῆσθα) are considered just 
nonetheless. In particular, the former is said so for the sake of the individual’s safety, 
                                                 
281 A similar coming apart between actions and words will also underpin the first speech of chapter 4 (§§ 
4.2-5). 
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similarly to the current case, which the author would thus not seem to be in trouble to 
justify either, if required.  
 
§ 3.7  
ἐγὼ...ἱεροσυλέν] After answering the question concluding § 3.6 in the negative, by 
appealing to the ubi maior of the city’s salvation, the paragraph introduces a new case, 
expounded in § 3.8, which will again interweave the themes of national security and 
sacredness (ἱεροσυλέν). A religious component is, in fact, already implied in the actions 
of the verbs εὐορκέω and ἐπιορκέω of the last two paragraphs, as they derive from 
ὅρκος, a sacralizing object by which a Greek swore.282  
 
§ 3.8 
τὰ μὲν…πόλεμον;] It is not clear whether the author is presenting this event as 
something that really occurred or ‘is trying to universalize a moral point’, by using the 
genitive absolute μέλλοντος τῶ βαρβάρω as ‘the protasis of a general condition’, as 
Robinson believes.283 Nonetheless, I would lean, rather, to the former case, as all the 
conditional sentences we have encountered so far, and which have underpinned all the 
examples of the first speech, featured an explicit protasis introduced by αἰ (see §§ 
3.2,4,5,6). A similar exploitation of the wealth of the temples of Delphi and Olympia in 
defence against a looming Persian menace seems, however, to be missing from the 
ancient Greek history.284 
 
§ 3.9  
φονεύεν…ποιῆσαι] The search for exceptional situations in which actions usually held 
to be unjust are justified ends here, with this last example about the murder of one’s kin. 
                                                 
282 DELG, s.v. ὅρκος. 
283 Robinson (1979), 183. 
284 See also supra, 39. 
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By resorting to the myth of Orestes and Alcmaeon, the author shows that these deeds 
are justified if undertaken to avenge the loss of other kin. More precisely, Orestes’ and 
Alcmaeon’s mothers are guilty of murdering their fathers respectively, acts that 
prompted the two sons to kill their mothers in retribution. As for Orestes, the story has 
it that he is one of the sons of the king of Mycenae, Agamemnon, and of the Spartan 
princess Clytaemnestra. During the famous Greek expedition to Troy, Clytaemnestra 
falls in love with Aegisthus and the two plot to kill Agamemnon on his return (cf. Hom. 
Il. 3,266-71, A. A. 1577-1673). Some time after the murder, Orestes, with the aid of the 
sister Electra, avenges his father, by slaying the murderous couple (E. El. 1165-1232). 
The story of Alcmaeon proceeds in similar fashion, thee most extensive treatment of 
which was given by Apollodorus, and is set in Argos (Apollod. Bibliotheca 3.6-7). It 
begins with the death of Amphiaraus, a seer who foresaw the tragic end of the 
expedition that Argos was preparing against Thebes. Amphiaraus is nonetheless 
compelled to join it, being persuaded by his wife, Eriphyle, who was bribed to do so by 
the Theban Polynices, in return for the necklace of the goddess Harmonia. But before 
leaving to war, Amphiaraus, aware of this machination and of his tragic destiny, tells 
everything to his sons Alcmaeon and Amphilochus, so that they will be able to avenge 
him when they have heard of his death.  
An interesting testimony of the reception of this myth, is that of the Latin poet 
Ovid, who sketched it thus in his Metamorphoses: 
  
His own son, dutiful to him, shall be  both just and unjust in a single deed [‘facto pius et 
sceleratus eodem’];  for he, in vengeance for his father's death, shall slay his mother, and 
confounded lose both home and reason, persecuted both  by the grim Furies and the awful 
ghost of his own murdered mother.285 (Ov. Met. 9.407-410) 
 
                                                 
285 Translation from More (1922). 
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What Ovid insists on is the twofold character of Alcmaeon’s murder, which, by force of 
analogy, also applies to Orestes’. In the first place, Ovid deems this sort of crime just 
and unjust at the same time, which fits the rationale of the IT of this chapter (ἄλλο 
δὲ…ἄδικον, § 3.1). In second place, new divine characters are recalled, namely the 
Furies, who start to torment Alcmaeon as punishment for their extreme acts of revenge, 
just as they do to Orestes, in his story. At the same time, another god, Apollo, plays an 
important part in the two heroes’ stories. Of him Ovid does not speak, whereas our 
paragraph refers to a certain god’s oracle (καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε) about the justice of 
Orestes’ and Alcmaeon’s deeds. Some versions of the myths, by contrast, go even 
further than that, representing Apollo bidding the two main characters to commit their 
crime (cf. e.g. E. El. 1301-1304, Apollod. Bibliotheca 3.7.5). At any rate, what here we have 
is thus a balance between a divine support and a divine opposition towards the 
matricide, with Apollo championing the memory of the dead fathers, and the Furies 
that of the mothers.286 The painful and hard dilemma before which the two characters 
are put (Aristotle will describe it as the one between two evils: Po. 13, EN 3.1) represents 
a perfect case for the IT of this chapter. 
 
φονεύεν δὲ τὼς φιλτάτως] It is worth noticing that after the author’s display, in the 
previous paragraphs, of ubi maior causes for the sake of which what is usually deemed 
as unjust becomes just, we here reach a point where even the fundamental idea to which 
all those causes boil down, namely the defence of the people dear to us (see especially 
§§ 3.2,5,7), is put into question, making the relativism of this chapter, according to 
Barnes, ‘the most interesting and the most dangerous of the Sophistic relativisms’.287     
 
                                                 
286 As far as Orestes’ story is concerned, Aeschylus’ Eumenides depicts this opposition in the guise of a trial 
before Athena and a jury of Athenian citizens. On the one hand, Apollo, acting as advocate for Orestes, 
recalls the greatness of the dead Agamemnon (625-637), on the other, the Furies speak on behalf of the 
dead Clytaemnestra. This balance of opposing forces is further reflected in the result of the jurors’ voting, 
which is a tie (but which is sufficient to acquit Orestes of his mother’s murder).  
287 Barnes (1979), 220. 
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ἐπεὶ…ποιῆσαι] A causal clause introduced by ἐπεί and justifying φονεύεν δὲ τὼς 
φιλτάτως δίκαιον would be here expected, but the verb which the nominatives 
Ὀρέστας and Ἀλκμαίων should take is missing. Like the previous translators, 
Robinson rendered the clause as ’since both Orestes and Alcmaeon did’,288 assuming 
that a verb of doing is here understood, in a way which is rather uncommon, though. 
Furthermore, the reason why ‘it is just to kill one’s most loved people’ can hardly be 
simply that two characters of the Greek myth have done it. More relevant, instead, is 
the fact that according to the myth, the god approved what those characters did, as it is 
said in the following clause (καὶ ὁ…ποιῆσαι). Hence, I believe that originally 
ἐπεί…Ἀλκμαίων was indeed completed by a verb of doing, and I also suspect that such 
a verb took the place of the raised dot which now separates Ἀλκμαίων from the 
following καί. For only in this way, the explicatory power of the coordinate clause can 
be successfully transmitted to the ἐπεί clause preceding it, and the murder of one’s 
loved people can be efficiently justified. 
  
§ 3.10 
ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας…ἄριστος] That arts, and poetry in particular, consist in the 
production of objects similar to real ones, in a form of deception, is a well-known theory 
in ancient Greek literature. It can be traced back to the proverb ‘poets tell many lies’ 
(πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, [Pl.] Just. 374a, Arist. Metaph. A 983a3-4), which scholars 
attributed to Solon (Fr. 29), and it receives its first substantial philosophical treatment 
in Pl. R. I 595a-608b. Here the stress is especially on tragedy (τραγῳδία) which is 
coupled precisely with painting (γραφική), as exemplary of arts whose products are 
imitations of appearances. For this reason, Plato considers them as three time removed 
from the truth (598e-599a), and thus a form of deception (598d, where ἐξαπατάω occurs 
too). As far as the deceitful character of painting (ζωγραφία in our text) is concerned, 
                                                 
288 Robinson (1979), 119. 
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the following contest between the painters Zeuxis (c. 435/25-390 BCE) and Parrhasius 
(active c. 440-380 BCE) has become particularly famous: 
 
Zeuxis […] produced a picture of grapes so successfully represented that birds flew up to 
the stage-buildings; whereupon Parrhasius himself produced such a realistic picture of a 
curtain that Zeuxis, proud of the verdict of the birds, requested that the curtain should 
now be drawn and the picture displayed; and when he realized his mistake, with a 
modesty that did him honour he yielded up the prize, saying that whereas he had 
deceived birds Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist.289 (Plin. Nat. 35.65-66) 
 
Our author himself already warned us of the risk of relying on what poets say, pointing 
out their preference for pleasure over the truth (§ 2.28).  
However, what differentiates the current passage from these is that here the 
artistic deception is connected with the notion of justice, owing to the argumentative 
function of this paragraph within the first speech. Despite the fact that the author 
declares him who deceives the most (ὅστις πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ) to be the best (ἄριστος) 
and not the most just, the latter qualification is clearly the one he really has in mind, as 
also expressed in the poetic examples of the next two paragraphs. From this 
perspective, then the authors most likely to have influenced the passage are other two.  
As first comes Simonides, who, like our author, recognises the intellectual value 
of poetical deception, but focussing on the audience rather than on the poet, 
highlighting the necessity of a certain degree of education on their part for this effect to 
work (Plut. aud. poet. 15c). Furthermore, our author’s reference to the resemblance of 
artistic products to real objects (ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων) can be read in parallel 
with Simonides’ saying that the word is the image of the thing (ὁ λόγος τῶν 
πραγμάτων εἰκών ἐστιν, Mich. Psell. π. ἐνεργ. δαιμ. (P.G. CXXII 821)). The 
importance which Simonides attaches to the visual component of poetry can be best 
                                                 
289 Translation from Rackham (1952), 309-311. 
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grasped by referring to his famous descriptions of painting (ζωγραφία, like in our 
passage) as silent poetry (ποίησις) and of poetry as speaking painting, as reported in 
Plut. de glor. Ath. 3.346f5-7.  
As a second influential author one must name Gorgias, who some pages later in 
the latter Plutarchan work is described as propounding a very similar message (3.348c1-
8), but in connection with τραγῳδία, the other art mentioned in our paragraph. Besides 
it too associating the fact that a spectator can be deceived by tragedies to his 
understanding and sensibility (ὁ δ᾿ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος), this 
passage finally introduces the category of justice within this aesthetical reflection, by 
saying that ‘he who deceives is more just than he who does not deceive’ (ὅ τ᾿ ἀπατήσας 
δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος). For only the tragedian who deceives proves to be 
doing what he promised to (ὅτι τοῦθ᾿ ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν), which is as much as 
to say that tragedy is a declared deception. Hence, the justice Gorgias implies here 
reflects an idea of consistency with what one has committed to do, which, as Falkner 
notices, can count as a particular instance of a more general definition of justice as 
‘giving back what one owes’.290 The latter already came up in connection with § 1.12 
and is introduced as typical of Simonides rather than of Gorgias at Pl. R. I 331e. That is 
not problematic, rather it proves the similarity between the ideas of these two figures, 
both echoed in a few passages of our work. 
 
§ 3.11  
θέλω…δικαιότατον] As already seen in § 2.19, in order to corroborate and solemnly 
conclude his first speech the author uses a poetical quote which, in this circumstance, 
serves also to enter into poetry, a topic generally introduced in § 3.10. However, here 
the attention is not as much on the artistic deception of Cleobuline’s words as, instead, 
on the character she describes, which, in line with the previous examples, is just despite 
                                                 
290 Falkner (1998), 44.  
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performing actions seemingly antithetical to justice, such as stealing (κλέπτοντα) and 
deceiving (ἐξαπατῶντα). Yet, seemingly this composition is far from being 
argumentatively effective, not telling who the man is whom the poetess has seen (ἄνδρ’ 
εἶδον) and of whom such description is true. This is in fact a riddle, a poetic form in 
which Cleobuline (6th century BCE) excelled, and which she inherited from her father 
Cleobulus, tyrant of Lindus, according to D.L. I.89. 
A few solutions have been proposed for these lines, from Wilamowitz’s ‘the 
wrestler’, followed by Robinson, to Romagnoli’s ‘the artist’, up to Matelli’s most recent 
‘the warrior’.291 All of them, however, follow the traditional translation of both βιαίως 
and βίᾳ with something like ‘by force’. Such rendering is required by the former word, 
but not by the latter, of which another possible translation is ‘perforce’ (see LSJ, s.v. βία, 
II 2). The advantage of taking βίᾳ in this second way, as I have done, is that the variation 
between the two adverbial forms is no longer due to merely stylistic reasons, but to 
more substantial ones of meaning. As a result, the man who is described in the riddle 
emerges more clearly as Matelli’s warrior: a soldier at war acts violently by stealing and 
deceiving (ἄνδρ’…βιαίως), but since he is compelled to do so by the state for which he 
fights, he behaves in the most just way (καὶ τὸ …δικαιότατον).  
 
§ 3.12  
ἦν…τιμῇ θεός] Two other poetic verses, this time from Aeschylus, are given here. 
Although dealing with closely related subjects such as deception and lies (our author 
too coupled them in § 3.2), they do not seem to be parts of the same reasoning, as first 
noticed by North.292 In the first the god is directly responsible (ἀποστατεῖ) for an act of 
deception, whereas in the second he just praises (τιμῇ) someone else’s, and hence some 
human, lies. For this reason, they now figure as two separate unattributed fragments of 
                                                 
291 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1933), 97, n. 179, Robinson (1979), 185, Romagnoli (1932), 270, Matelli 
(1997), 19. 
292 North (1671), 64, n. 9. 
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Aeschylus, namely ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός as Fr. 301, and ψευδῶν δὲ 
καιρὸν ἔσθ’ ὅπου τιμῇ θεός as Fr. 302. 
 
ἀπάτης…ἀποστατεῖ θεός] That Aeschylus was known for representing the divinity 
as deceptive is something that appears also in the following fragment, handed down in 
Pl. R. II 383a-b, and which has been ascribed to The Weighing of Souls by Stanley, and to 
The Award of the Arms by Lachmann:293  
 
Thetis: <And> he [scil. ‘Apollo’] dwelt on the excellent offspring I would have, which 
would have length of life and never know sickness, and after completing these words he 
struck up a holy paean-song about my good fortune in being loved by the gods, which 
delighted my heart. And I supposed that the divine voice of Phoebus, pregnant with 
prophetic skill, was incapable of falsehood. But he who himself sang that song, who 
himself attended that feast, who himself spoke those words, he himself it is who has killed 
my son!294 (A. Fr. 350) 
  
As for our Fr. 301, it has been usually variously attributed ‘to Danaids, Aiguptioi, 
Prometheus Pyrkaeus, Thalamopoioi, or Philoktetes’.295 In contrast, Griffith thinks of the lost 
satyric drama Proteus, assuming that the latter did not represent, as usually maintained, 
the events told in Hom. Od. 4, namely Menelaus’ landing at the island of Pharos, home 
of Proteus. Rather, Griffith looks to the events described in Stesichoros’ Palinode of 
Helen, according to which Proteus brings Helen to Egypt leaving Paris with just a 
phantom of her over which the war of Troy was fought. This substitution would thus 
be the deception (ἀπάτη) which our passage attributes to a god (θεός), such as Proteus. 
Furthermore, it is also just (δίκαια), because it is done ‘for the good of Helen (and 
Menelaus too) and for the good of the institution of marriage —as well as for the 
                                                 
293 Sommerstein (2009), 308. 
294 Translation from ibid., 309-311. 
295 Griffith (2002), 250, n. 176. 
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reputation of the Olympian gods, who otherwise must bear the responsibility for the 
Judgment of Paris and resultant sack of Troy’.296 
 
ψευδῶν…τιμῇ θεός] Robinson’s translation ‘there are occasions when god respects an 
opportune moment for lies’,297 weakens the value of τιμῇ, which indicates not mere 
respect, but esteem, which I have hence rendered with ‘holds in honour’.298 The whole 
translation I so obtained and which I proposed, namely ‘there are cases when god holds 
in honour the right moment for lies’, keeps the poetic diction to the detriment of its 
perspicuity, though. It is, in fact, worth observing that what the god is likely to be 
interested in, and to honour, are the lies told at the right moment, rather than ‘the right 
moment’ in which these are said, as Teichmüller first clarified with his semantic 
translation of ψευδῶν καιρὸν with ‘eine lüge zur rechten Zeit’.299 
 
§ 3.13  
ἀντίος λόγος] The adjective which is used here characterizes the new speech for its 
contrast with the former one more emphatically than the still similar ἄλλος δὲ λόγος 
of § 1.11. A closer parallel can be drawn with Protagoras’ and Sextus Empiricus’ λόγοι 
ἀντικείμενοι (‘counter-balancing arguments’), for which see supra, 25 and infra, 287. 
 
§ 3.14  
γινώσκεις] The manuscripts have the 3rd singular person forms γινώσκη, γινώσκῃ, 
and γινώσκει. The last one, preserved in L and firstly chosen by Blass,300 is that which 
Robinson too prints. He then translates the conditional clause αἴ γινώσκει as ‘if 
somebody knows’.301 However, no τις is present either in the current sentence nor in 
                                                 
296 Ibid., 250. 
297 Robinson (1979), 119. 
298 Most translations are of this kind and date back to North’s ‘laudat’ (North (1671), 64). 
299 Teichmüller (1884), 213. 
300 Blass in Weber (1897), 44. 
301 Robinson (1979), 121. 
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that before and one must go back to ἐπεὶ αἴ τις ἐρωτάσαι of § 3.13 to find one; it seems 
to me too far for the author to keep it understood here. In the absence of a suitable 
subject in general, I have preferred to depart from Robinson’s γινώσκει, and, instead, 
to accept Diels’ emendation γινώσκεις,302 which also fits the 2nd singular person φέρε 
few words before.  
 
καὶ μέγαν…τωὐτόν] The reasoning shifts from theoretical properties (δίκαιον and 
ἄδικον) to empirical ones (μέγαν and μικρόν), in the same controversial way as in § 
2.22 (καὶ αἴ τινά…τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν). See also supra, 119.  
 
καί τοι πολλά] This is the reading of the manuscripts and it was kept by the editors 
until Diels, who proposed καί τοι <ὁ> πολλὰ,303 through which the next ἀδικήσας 
becomes an articulated participle, subject of the imperative 3rd singular person 
ἀποθανέτω. Although producing a sound meaning, namely ‘let him who has 
performed many unjust actions be put to death’, this supplement is not necessary, 
because ἀποθανέτω can already find an adequate implicit subject in ἄνδρα of the 
former sentence. In accordance with this reading, ἀδικήσας may become a 
circumstantial participle representing a conditional clause (‘if he performs many unjust 
actions’).304 Likewise, there is no need of an even more substantial supplement such as 
Friedländer and Kranz’s καὶ <αἰ λέγοιτο> ‘πολλὰ.305 Nor does it seem that the overall 
state of corruption of the passage (see the following lemma, below) and the author’s 
rare habit of starting a sentence with a καί followed by particles do justify Classen’s 
                                                 
302 Diels (1903), 584. 
303 Diels (1912), 340. 
304 One might see this interpretation as inconsistent with § 3.8, to comment on which I relied on the 
author’s preference for explicit conditional clauses. However, in this case an explicit conditional clause 
has just been adopted in the former sentence, which therefore may have pushed the author to vary its 
phrasing here, where he needs to introduce a further assumption logically dependent on the former.  
305 Diels/Kranz (1952), 411. 
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expunction of τοι in Diels’ conjecture, and, as a result, the reading καί <ὁ> πολλὰ.306 On 
the contrary, the emphasis brought in by this particle ‘implying a real or imaginary 
audience’307 (‘mark you’) perfectly matches with the φέρε starting the paragraph, as it 
continues the direct speech opened by it. Finally, Robinson’s καίτοι in place of καί τοι 
and its translation with ‘but’308 would turn what follows into an objection to what is 
said before,309 which seems quite counterintuitive, and which in fact makes sense only 
by accepting his questionable next intervention on the text as well (see the following 
lemma, below).  
 
ἀποθανέτω...διαπραξάμενος] Here most manuscripts have ἀποθανέτω 
πραξάμενος, three have ἀποθανέτω ἀποθανέτω πραξάμενος  (C, P6, and V2), and 
two ἀποθανέτω. ἀποθανέτω πραξάμενος (Y1, Y2). Clearly, none of these solution 
returns a meaningful text when joined to the first part of the sentence (καί τοι πολλὰ 
ἀδικήσας). Many conjectures have been brought forward, and all of them are extremely 
speculative and integrate many and various words. I, instead, have looked for the most 
measured supplement, both regarding number of words and content, and I have 
reckoned it likely that here the author keeps on pinpointing the paradoxes that 
originate from treating an object as just and unjust at the same time. Under these 
conditions, I have refused Blass’ ἀποθανέτω, ἀποθανέτω <πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια 
δια>πραξάμενος,310 in which the coordination of the two ἀποθανέτω by mere comma 
is too abrupt to express the passage from the right death sentence to the wrong one. On 
the other hand, this proposal has the merit of fostering the logic of paradox, by using a 
phrase such as πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια which produces a perfect mirroring of πολλὰ 
ἀδικήσας in the first part of the sentence. This is also reminiscent of τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ 
                                                 
306 Classen (2001), 124. 
307 LSJ, s.v. τοι. 
308 Robinson (1979), 121. 
309 LSJ, s.v. καί τοι, II. 
310 Blass in Weber (1897), 44. 
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μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστίν in § 1.15, a paragraph which we 
saw having the same function as this one. For this reason, my choice has gone to Diels’ 
ἀποθανέτω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος,311 which takes up again πολλὰ 
καὶ δίκαια and also adds a καί before this adjectival couple, which underscores the 
addition of unwanted properties, similarly to καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα τὸν αὐτὸν of the 
previous sentence. Conversely, Becker and Scholz have printed the same solution, but 
devoid of this καί.312  
Coming to other conjectures which have been propounded, Schanz’ ἀποθανέτω 
<καὶ πάλιν πολλὰ δίκαια ἐργασά>μενος and Wilamowitz’s ἀποθανέτω <ὁ πολλὰ 
καὶ δίκαια τὸν πατέρα ἐργα>ξάμενος include ideas such as those expressed by πάλιν 
and τὸν πατέρα which are neither necessary for the reconstruction of the sentence, nor 
suggested by the context.313 Diels and Kranz’s ἀποθανέτω,” ἀποθανέτω <καὶ πολλὰ 
καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος314 depends, instead, on Friedländer and Kranz’s 
excessively speculative insertion of αἰ λέγοιτο, discussed above. Robinson’s 
ἀποθανέτω <ἅτε θανάτω ἄξια δια?>πραξάμενος omits πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια and, what 
is more, causes the whole argument of the paragraph to proceed as follows: ‘if 
somebody knows that some man is just, he in that case knows that the same man is 
unjust […] but if a man has been very unjust in his actions he ought to be executed! For 
he has brought about a situation that warrants death’.315 However, the fallacious move 
from being unjust (‘the same man is unjust’) to being very unjust (‘a man has been very 
unjust’) on which this line of reasoning turns is too big for our author to use it to make 
his case here. Finally, Classen’s ἀποθανέτω, ἀποθανέτω ὡς δίκαια <δια>πραξάμενος 
repeats the above awkward coordination ἀποθανέτω, ἀποθανέτω as Blass, and leaves 
out the useful πολλά.316 
                                                 
311 Diels (1912), 340. 
312 Becker/Scholz (2004), 68. 
313 Schanz (1884), 380, Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 629. 
314 Diels/Kranz (1952), 411. 
315 Robinson (1979), 120-121. 
316 Classen (2001), 124. 
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§§ 3.15-17 
καὶ περὶ… ποιέοντι] These last three paragraphs show the author’s intent of replying 
more closely to the arguments adduced by the first speech, as already seen in §§ 1.16-
17 and 2.23-28. Once again, the arguments which have been used by the rival speech do 
not receive the promised reply. The only case mentioned as representative of all the 
others, that of robbing one’s enemies (κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων), follows the spirit 
but not the letter of the first speech. 
 
ἀποδεικνύει] The manuscripts read ἀποδεικνύεν, the Doric form of the infinitive 
ἀποδεικνύειν, which, if assumed, would leave the whole sentence without a finite verb, 
and hence without a main clause governed by that. Teichmüller supposed a 
dependence of the whole sentence on the ἀξιοῦντι of the former one, which already 
governed ἀποδεικνύεν. He thus worked out a translation such as ‘for they <mean to> 
prove that stealing the goods of the enemies is as just as unjust, if their words are true, 
and the rest as well’.317 However, the condition ‘if their words are true’ seems redundant 
here, because the fact that one merely thinks that he is proving something does not 
depend on the truth of the demonstration he actually performs; the same second speech 
is devoted to show precisely how the first one has failed in such ambitions.  
Many ways to obviate this textual difficulty have been explored. Stephanus318 
altered the punctuation and broke down the sentence, obtaining the following: τὸ γὰρ 
κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν. τοῦτ’ αὐτό. αἴ κ’ 
ἀληθὴς ὁ τήνων λόγος καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὠυτό.319 On the one hand, by placing 
ἀποδεικνύεν and αἴ…λόγος in two different sentences, this formulation would allow 
the dependence of the former on the ἀξιοῦντι of the previous sentence. On the other 
                                                 
317 ‘Denn (sie wollen) das Stehlen des feindlichen Eigenthums als gerecht und wieder als ungerecht 
erweisen, wenn jene Rede wahr sei, und das übrige ebenso‘ (Teichmüller (1884), 214). 
318 Stephanus (1570), 476-477. 
319 Where I read καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό, with Robinson (Robinson (1979), 120) and the codices.  
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hand, we would then struggle to make sense of the newly originated sentences which 
follow, especially of τοῦτ’ αὐτό, which looks even more elliptic than what precedes it. 
Robinson, then, refrains from altering the punctuation and tries to obviate the 
difficulty, by assuming the sentence to be an abridged version, and full of understood 
elements, of either of these: (a) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον <εἶναι 
ἀποδεικνύεν> καὶ ἄδικον <ἐστιν> ἀποδεικνύεν τοῦτ’αὐτὸ <εἶναι>, αἴ κ’ ἀληθὴς ὁ 
τήνων λόγος. (‘For make no mistake about it: <to demonstrate> the fact that stealing 
the enemy’s possessions is just is eo ipso to demonstrate the truth of the antithetical 
position as well, if their reasoning is sound’); (b) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων 
δίκαιον <εἶναι > καὶ ἄδικον <ἐστιν> ἀποδεικνύεν τοῦτ’αὐτὸ <εἶναι>, αἴ κ’ ἀληθὴς ὁ 
τήνων λόγος. (‘For make no mistake about it: the fact that stealing the enemy’s 
possessions is just is eo ipso a demonstration of the truth of the antithetical position as 
well, if their reasoning is sound’).320 Both would be suitable for the point the author 
means to make here, but unfortunately neither would be compatible with the author’s 
usually plain style which nowhere else presents such a syntactical tour de force.  
It has thus seemed clear to the rest of the scholars that some interventions in the 
text are required. As first, North observed that ‘deest verbum forsan ῥᾴδιον aut 
hujusmodi’,321 and although printing the original text, he inserted a ‘licet’ in the 
translation, which then inspired Mullach’s supplement ἄδικον <ἔξεστιν> 
ἀποδεικνύεν.322 Alternatively, Blass decided to expunge ἀποδεικνύεν.323 Both these 
solutions allows a finally intelligible text, presenting just two innocuous occurrences of 
understood εἶναι: ‘it is possible to show that stealing the enemies’ goods <is> just and 
that this same action <is> unjust, if their speech is true…’ and ‘stealing the enemies’ 
goods <is> just and this same action <is> unjust’. However, a similarly successful result 
can be achieved by a minor, and thus preferable, intervention, that is Wilamowitz’s 
                                                 
320 Robinson (1979), 189. 
321 North (1671), 65, n. 11. 
322 Ibid., 65, Mullach (1875), 548. 
323 Blass in Weber (1897), 44. 
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correction of ἀποδεικνύεν in ἀποδεικνύει.324 For this 3rd singular person verb can easily 
be taken by the following ὁ τήνων λόγος, which thus becomes the subject both of the 
protasis and of the apodosis of a conditional sentence containing a general present 
supposition implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition.325 
 
τέχνας…ποιέοντι] In rather similar words to the ones used to part from the reader at 
§ 2.28, the author reminds the upholders of IT that the poets’ testimony they adduced 
in the first speech (§ 3.11-12) does not have value, as poetry aims to please and not to 
tell the truth (καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ…ποιέοντι). As seen above, §§ 3.11-12 featured 
Cleobuline’s and Aeschylus’ representations of an unjust divinity in a way comparable 
with Aeschylus’ Fr. 350. Likewise, the author’s current attack on the programmatic 
carelessness for truth of poetry can be put in parallel with R. II 383a and c, where Plato 
criticizes the poetical misrepresentation of a deceiving and murdering Phaebus in that 
Aeschylean fragment. 
 
Chapter 4 
Title 
ψεύδους] This reading is shared by all codices, including F1 and F2, which have been 
wrongly believed to transmit ψεύδεος by Weber onwards.326 The two forms are 
equivalent, both being the genitive singular of the noun ψεῦδος, but whereas ψεύδους, 
the Attic uncontracted one, has been printed only by Fabricius,327 ψεύδεος, the Doric 
contracted one, has been picked by all the other editors. Robinson represents a seeming 
                                                 
324 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 629. 
325 Later, Wilamowitz proposed the following new emendation, which gets at a very similar result in terms 
of meaning, but is less preferable because more corrective: τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, 
καὶ ἄδικον <κ’> ἀπεδείκνυεν τοῦτο τωὐτό, αἴ κ’ ἀληθὴς <ἦς> ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό 
(Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in Diels (1907), 642).  
326 Weber (1897), 45. I come to this revisionary conclusion after a personal inspection of the two codices. 
Robinson seems to have gone in the same direction, but he referred ψεύδεος to F2 only (Robinson (1979), 
122). 
327 Fabricius (1724), 627. 
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exception among the latter, as in his text we read ψευδέος, genitive of the adjective 
ψευδής;328 but this is nothing more than a misprint as one can ascertain in his 
commentary ad locum, where he defends ψεύδεος, instead.329 
  
§ 4.1 
λέγονται…αὖ] The beginning of the previous three chapters were characterized by a 
consistent use of the articulated neuter singular adjectives to indicate the two things 
exemplifying the opposites in question. Here, instead, the author opts for a twofold 
solution, by referring both to the opposite concepts, through their proper nouns (τῶ 
ψεύδεος, τᾶς ἀλαθείας), and to the objects exemplifying either property, through the 
medium of the term λόγος (τὸν ψεύσταν λόγον, τὸν [λόγον] ἀλαθῆ). Given the 
overall similarity between the first four chapters of the work,330 this new phrasing may 
surprise, but on closer inspection it, rather, turns out to be wholly consistent with how 
chapters 1-3 fared. First of all, one may observe how it is the predication of truth and 
falsehood of speeches, and not the two concepts themselves, that is the matter at issue 
in the chapter. Truth and falsehood appear just here, and in §§ 4.5 and 9, where, 
furthermore, they are considered exclusively for the relation between them and the 
objects of which they are predicated.  
It is not by chance that these objects — and this is the second point to notice — are 
qualified as speeches and not referred to generically, in articulated neuter singular 
adjectives, like in chapters 1-3. For if, as it is the case in this chapter, truth and falsehood 
are taken in an epistemic sense, these apply chiefly to propositional objects, such as 
speeches. One may then proceed to predicate these concepts of the individuals who 
make true or false assertions (cf. § 4.4, 6, where ἀλαθής and ψεύστας are attributed to 
people), but what he cannot do is to use a phrase like ‘a true/false thing’ without either 
                                                 
328 Robinson (1979), 122. 
329 Ibid., 190. 
330 See also infra, 279-286. 
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sounding sloppy — if ‘true’ and ‘false’ are still taken in an epistemic sense —or ending 
up to convey something like ‘an authentic/inauthentic thing’, and hence a different, 
non-epistemic sense of truth and falsity. 
As a marginal note, the overall analogy between chapters 1-4 combined with the 
unusual use of concepts in this chapter makes it not far-fetched to think that if in 
chapters 1-3 too the author had wanted to mean concepts and not things of which those 
concepts were predicated, he would have resorted to proper nouns — such as 
ἀγαθότης/κακία, κάλλος/αἰσχρότης, δικαιοσύνη/ἀδικία — there as well, which, 
conversely, confirms my translation of the articulated neuter singular adjectives there. 
 
ψεύδεος] In this case all manuscripts and editors agree on this reading, except for 
Robinson, who again chooses ψευδέος, but now intentionally, as one can conclude from 
his translation of it as ‘what is false’.331  
 
τᾶς ἀλαθείας] Most manuscripts read τῶ ἀληθείας, P3 reads τᾶς ἀλαθείας, and P4 
τῶ ἀλαθείας. As Classen too observes, for the sake of the agreement in gender the 
second solution is the most likely to have been meant, along with Stephanus’ proposal 
τᾶς ἀληθείας, which, however, oddly combines a Doric form (τᾶς) with an Attic one 
(ἀληθείας).332 There is, hence, no need of any emendations, such as Matthaeus De Varis’ 
Ionic τῆς ἀλαθείης, or Diels’ τῶ ἀλαθέος which Robinson picked up, instead.333 
 
ὁ μέν […] τοὶ δέ] The two articles in pronominal function in this μέν...δέ… correlation 
oddly differ in number. Robinson takes both of them to denote speeches, presumably on 
the basis of the partitive genitive ὧν which introduces the former, and which refers to 
the previous λόγοι. On this reading, the shift from the singular ὁ (which Robinson 
                                                 
331 Robinson (1979), 123. 
332 Classen (2001), 125, Stephanus (1570), 477. 
333 De Varis in Robinson (1972), 197, Diels (1907), 643, Robinson (1979), 122. 
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translates as ‘one view’) to the plural τοί (‘the other group’), would not be particularly 
significant, as much as in § 4.6 the IT defenders are first addressed in the plural (τὼς 
λέγοντας), then referred to in the singular (ἀποκρίναιτο) in the space of two consecutive 
sentences, without particular import. However, we have seen how at the beginnings of 
chapters 1-3 the statements of DT and IT are formulated within a τοὶ μέν...τοὶ δέ… 
structure, the plural articles of which are likely to distinguish two opposite groups 
among οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι of § 1.1. Therefore, I am inclined to think that in 
the current passage a fusion has occurred between a new rhetorical construct, in which 
ὁ μέν takes part, and aiming to contrast two speeches, and the usual one where two 
groups of people committed to philosophy bring forward opposing theses, and here 
signalled by τοὶ δέ. For this reason, I have rendered the couple as ‘one [scil. 
‘speech’]…other people…’, as done by Waterfield and Graham alone,334 whereas all the 
other editors have translated similarly to Robinson, except for Sprague and 
Dillon/Gergel who read both articles as referring to people, despite the previous ὧν 
preventing ὁ μέν from doing so, as noted above.335 
 
§ 4.2 
πρῶτον…λέγονται] Formulated as such, this first statement in support of IT is 
somewhat obscure, and the reader is left to assume some understood premise or to 
understand some dropped word, in order for the text to communicate meaning. A 
possibility could be that the sameness of the words mentioned here (τοῖς αὐτοῖς 
ὀνόμασι) is actually very loose and weak, consisting only in the fact that they belong 
to the same language. Alternatively, we can suspect that the sentence originally 
featured some relativizing clause able to restrict its absolute value in some way, for 
example by saying that only ‘sometimes’ the two speeches share the same words. One 
such exceptional case is that of ‘I am an initiate’, in § 4.4. For this utterance remains the 
                                                 
334 Waterfield (2000), 294, Graham (2010), 889. 
335 Sprague (1972), 287, Dillon/Gergel (2003), 327.  
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same, despite changing its truth value, depending on the person who speaks it. 
Alternatively, one could think of a true sentence such as ‘all cats are animals’ whose 
words can produce another and false one such as ‘all animals are cats’, just by being 
reshuffled. 
 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι] In his attempt to inquire into the nature of these words 
(ὀνόματα), Bailey comes to a standstill between two alternatives. Either they are 
perceptible, but not meaningful parts of a speech (λόγος) which, as a consequence, is 
purely phonetic and devoid of semantic properties, namely ‘a mere token’,336 
corresponding to the Stoic φωνή;337 or they are incorporeal and semantic objects, also 
known as ‘names’, comprising a speech which can be also called ‘proposition’, or, in 
Stoic terminology, λεκτόν.338 This dichotomic interpretation, however, fails to account 
precisely for what the author here requires, namely cases where the same words make 
up both a true and a false sentence. For it contrasts both with the above example of ‘I 
am an initiate’, as we will see in § 4.4, and also with that of words being reshuffled: the 
words of the true ‘all cats are animals’ and of the false ‘all animals are cats’ are indeed 
the same from a phonetic point of view, but in order to produce sentences bearing some 
truth value, they clearly must be involved in some relation of meaning with the objects 
of the world too.  
 
ἔπειτα…αὐτὸς λόγος] This second argument for IT works as a generalization of the 
point made by the examples in §§ 4.3-4. In doing so, the author is also providing a 
criterion of truth and falsehood according to which a speech will be true if the state of 
affairs (a notion which we already saw in the first speech of chapter 3) which it describes 
occurs, or false otherwise. One can see it more perspicuously in the second formulation 
                                                 
336 Bailey (2008), 253. 
337 Ibid., 251. He draws this terminology from Martha Kneale, who about § 4.4 comments thus: ‘we may 
have […] the origin of the Stoic distinction between φωνή and λεκτόν’ (Kneale/Kneale (1962), 16). 
338 Bailey (2008), 251-253. 
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of this principle, in § 4.7, where the state of affairs is in fact explicated through the word 
πρᾶγμα (γενομένω μὲν τῶ πράγματος ἀλαθῆ τὸν λόγον, ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν).339 
In other words, truth lies in the agreement between what a speech says and how things 
stand in the world, as we also find, for example, in Pl. Cra. 385b2-10, Sph. 263b2-11, 
Arist. Metaph. Γ 1011b26-29, S.E. M. II.9 (reporting Epicurus’ view), and 323. From a 
syntactic point of view, we see a construction of the verb γίγνομαι equivalent to one of 
εἰμί, which Kahn has defined as ‘veridical’: ‘a clause with εἰμί […] joined to a clause 
with a verb of saying […] in a comparative structure which has the general form 
“Things are as you say”’,340 and which typically features locutions such as the 
οὕτω…ὡς…which we have here.341 Here ‘things’ stands for descriptive linguistic 
content which a speaker ‘poses or affirms as present in the world’,342 and Kahn likens it 
to what in Wittgenstein’s picture theory is known as ‘Sinn’ (‘sense’), namely ‘an alleged 
or possible state of affairs as pictured in or specified by a sentence’.343 The parallel with 
Wittgenstein becomes all the more interesting for the current passage, as he makes it 
clear that the sense of a proposition is independent both of facts (Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus 4.061), and of its truth value; the latter, in particular, is assessed only as a 
result of a comparison between the sense of a proposition and facts (4.03, 2.221, 2.222). 
In other words, one may well understand a proposition without knowing whether the 
latter is true (4.024). The same seems to be said by our author here, who deems the 
situation which a speech describes as logically prior to the assessment of its occurrence 
in the world (ἂν μὲν…ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος).  
 
ἂν μὲν…αὐτὸς λόγος] This is what we read in most manuscripts and seems to make 
perfect sense grammatically, presenting two conditional sentences (ἂν μὲν… ἀλαθὴς 
                                                 
339 Cf. LSJ, s.v. πρᾶγμα II.1. Dorion was the first to identify the content of a speech such as this one with 
an ‘état de choses’ (Dorion (2009), 210). 
340 Kahn (2003), 331.  
341 Ibid., 337. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
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ὁ λόγος, and ἂν δὲ μὴ…αὐτὸς λόγος) containing a present general supposition (ἄν 
[…] γένηται, and ἄν […] μὴ γένηται) which fits well with the idea of ‘general truth’344 
implied in the statement of a criterion, such as this one.  
But Weber prints αἰ (Doric of εἰ and transmitted only by P3) in place of ἄν 
(contracted form of ἐάν), and γεγένηται in place of γένηται, an emendation by Blass, 
but already annotated on the margins of P4.345 The following editors, including 
Robinson, did the same, but only with the result of affecting the generality of the alethic 
principle stated here. For with the failure of ἄν the general supposition too fails, and 
by abandoning the aorist tense in favour of the perfect, the idea of an unlimited and 
unqualified past is inconveniently narrowed down to that of an action finished in the 
present.346   
 
λέγηται] The manuscripts show this seemingly odd use of ὡς followed by the 
subjunctive λέγηται, which can be explained as a case of attraction to the mood of 
γένηται, the verb on which the ὡς clause depends. Therefore, there is no need to change 
the verbal mood into indicative, like Mullach’s λέγεται,347 or to force the value of the 
verb by inserting an ἂν before it, as Robinson hypothesized and Blass had already 
suggested, though with the Doric equivalent κα.348 
 
§ 4.3 
αὐτίκα…κρίνοντι] The trial represents an excellent example of the criterion of truth 
introduced in § 4.2. For the plaintiff’s speech, as well as the defendant’s one, does not 
manifest  a definite truth value in itself, but it receives one which varies according to 
whether the asserted action (τὦργον) occurred or not (αἴ γ’ ἐγένετο […] αἰ δὲ μὴ 
                                                 
344 Goodwin (1898), 297. 
345 Weber (1897), 45. 
346 Goodwin (1898), 268, 270. 
347 Mullach (1875), 549.  
348 Robinson (1979), 122, Blass in Weber (1897), 45. 
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ἐγένετο). Such a decision rests with the courts, which are supposed to ascertain, to the 
best of their ability, whether facts correspond to what speech describes, as we will 
gather from § 4.8 where the actual feasibility of this comparison is questioned. This 
should not be surprising, as the last sentence of this paragraph (καὶ τά…κρίνοντι) itself 
hints at some issue with this procedure, observing how the courts (τὰ δικαστήρια) 
judge the truth of the same speech differently. As Becker and Scholz point out, this 
variance could be meant as internal to each one of the courts, and therefore among the 
judgements of jurors belonging to the same court, or external to it, and thus consisting 
in different courts (hence from different trials) coming up with different collegial 
agreements.349 The former reading seems to me the more likely, as North first suggested 
by unpacking the collective τὰ δικαστήρια into the plural ‘judices’ in his translation.350 
For it is hard to think of the same speech being given at more than one trial, particularly 
if we keep the ancient Greek legal system as a benchmark, in which appeals against the 
sentence were not allowed. 
 
§ 4.4 
ἐπεί…εἰμί] This mental experiment in support of IT spells out the double nature, 
phonetic and semantic, of the speech which the author conceives in this chapter, for 
which I argued earlier. On the one hand, ‘I am an initiate’ (μύστας εἰμί) is certainly the 
same string of sounds which many people pronounce (ἑξῆς…ἐροῦμεν). On the other 
hand, it cannot be just that, because a mere sound, such as those which animals too 
produce, could not render anyone truthful (ἀλαθὴς…ἐγώ), or false either. Inside the 
speech, there must, hence, be something further, which allows us to say whether that is 
true or false, on the basis of how things stand in reality (ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί).  
                                                 
349 Becker/Scholz (2004), 96, n. 2. 
350 North (1671), 66. 
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By contrast, Bailey finds in this paragraph ‘the strongest evidence’351 to 
understand the speech described in this chapter as a merely phonetic object, observing 
that in the current sentence ‘only the sounds […] are the same’ and that, conversely, 
‘once those sounds are understood as having semantic properties, then there is a sense 
in which they [scil. ‘the present ones’] do not all say the same thing’, because each of the 
uttered ‘I am’ (εἰμί) refers to the person who says it and to no one else.352 However, 
hardly would the author have used this argument in support of IT, if it both asserted 
and denied the identity of a speech. Surely a phrase such as ‘I am’ gives the impression 
of multiplying the sentence which features it by as many speakers as pronounce it; no 
doubt this represents a possible side to take about the philosophical problem of 
indexicals, of which this chapter does represent a first evidence, as Goldin notes.353 But 
besides oddly countering IT, this is not the only possible way to interpret this sentence 
and the problem of indexicals in general. For it can be observed that when pronouncing 
‘I am an initiate’, each speaker also attributes the same properties which define an 
initiate, and hence the same mental image of this definition, to himself. It is only when 
compared with reality that this attribution, identical for every one of the speakers, 
becomes true (in the case of our author, who really is an initiate) or false (in the case of 
the others). Bailey himself, quoting McGinn,354 acknowledges the possibility of this 
alternative reading, but not its being the only one which the author can reasonably 
adhere to, if this paragraph is really to bring any support to IT.355 
  
ἑξῆς καθήμενοι] For the first and only time in the work, a hint may be given as to the 
setting in which the voice of the author rings. He refers to a situation in which he is 
seated in a gathering with an audience, and this has been advanced to support the 
                                                 
351 Bailey (2008), 254. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Goldin (2002), 247. 
354 Mc Ginn (1983), 58. 
355 Bailey (2008), 254. 
 154 
 
didactic nature of the text, perhaps a collection of the transcripts of a teacher’s 
lectures.356 Unfortunately, no other internal or external element supports the actuality 
of this scenario, which may well be imaginary.      
 
μύστας] Knowing into which mysteries the author is an initiated could have helped 
locate him in place and time, but unfortunately no information is given about them. 
Rostagni’s certainty about Pythagoreanism,357 as well as Waterfield and Becker and 
Scholz’s conviction about the Eleusinian mysteries358 are grounded on the similarly 
speculative contentions of the Pythagoreanism of the work, and of the author’s stay in 
Athens respectively. 
 
§ 4.5 
δᾶλον…γέρων, ἐστίν] In this new argument a speech is again presented as not 
possessing a truth value of its own, but this time it is said to be affected by the presence 
(παρῇ) of the false (τὸ ψεῦδος) and of the true (τὸ ἀλαθές). In temporally benefitting 
of them, and hence in passing from being true to being false, or vice versa, the speech 
remains nonetheless the same, in the same way as a man who ages (ὥσπερ…ἐστίν). 
Despite leading to a similar point as to the identity of a speech, and although being 
thought of as in logical continuity with what precedes, as suggested by the inferential 
adverb ὦν (Doric for οὖν),359 one cannot fail to see that this paragraph offers a criterion 
of truth and falsehood rather different from that of §§ 4.2-4. For not only is any idea of 
comparison of words with facts missing here, but more generally the author presents 
the concepts of truth and falsehood as directly relating to speech, without any apparent 
contribution of the world.  
                                                 
356 Rostagni (1922), 175, Robinson (1979), 89, n. 68, 192.  
357 Rostagni (1922), 175. 
358 Waterfield (2000), 334, Becker/Scholz (2004), 14, and, less assertively, Dillon/Gergel (2003), 408. 
359 See also Goldin (2002), 237. 
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Rightly, a few commentators have regarded the passage as drawing on the 
Platonic theory of παρουσία, according to which, quoting from Taylor, ‘if “I am hot”, 
that is because of the existence of a relation between me and the entity τὸ θερμόν, which 
may be expressed either by saying “I partake of τὸ θερμόν”, or conversely “τὸ θερμόν 
is present to me”’360 (Taylor mentions Pl. Phd. 100d, but see also, e.g., Ly. 217b-e, Sph. 
247a-b). What is more, as if in order to stress his Platonic debt, here the author 
substitutes ἡ άλάθεια (used in the title and in § 4.1) with τὸ ἀλαθές which in Plato 
typically features precisely in tandem with τὸ ψεῦδος, to indicate the ideas of truth and 
falsehood (Grg. 505e, R. II 382d, cf. also LSJ s.v. ψεῦδος ΙΙΙ).  
This passage, thus, further testifies the author’s habit of reusing material drawn 
from other sources without concern as to how it fits within the new context. Moreover, 
precisely in light of the author’s tendency to appropriation, the above leap from the 
previous criterion of truth to the current one can be somehow eased, since we have seen 
that Plato is the first philosophical source of the former criterion too (Pl. Cra. 385b2-10, 
see supra, 150). After all, the main respect in which the two theories differ, namely that 
one pertains to knowledge and language only, whereas the other is concerned with the 
metaphysical ‘participation of a particular in a characteristic or Form’,361 make them 
potentially compatible. 
 
ὅταν μέν..ἀλαθής] Again on the Platonic import of this argument, if some scholars 
agree with Kranz that a reflection of this kind ‘niemals ohne sokratisch-frühplatonische 
Gedankenarbeit möglich wäre’,362 others, instead, such as Taylor, preferred to adduce 
this passage to show how ‘the fundamental notion of the “Ideal Theory”, together with 
a characteristic piece of its technical terminology, was familiar possibly before the death 
of Socrates, and, hence, ‘how contrary to fact is the popular notion that Plato invented 
                                                 
360 Taylor (1911), 109-110. 
361 Goldin (2002), 237, n. 19.  
362 Kranz (1937), 231.  
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ex nihilo the doctrine of εἴδη or the technical terms in which it is expressed’.363 On my 
views about Dissoi Logoi‘s relation with ancient authorities which present similar ideas, 
see supra, 25-35.  
  
ὥσπερ…ἐστίν] This example depicts the case for IT made in the first part of the 
paragraph. A man keeps his identity (τὸ αὐτό […] ἐστίν) despite the changes he 
undergoes throughout the different stages of his life, in the same way that a speech 
remains the same although its truth value changes. The same simile appears in Pl. Smp. 
207d-e, but the point made there is contrary to ours, with the man’s identity remaining 
the same on a purely conventional level. What better suits its rationale is, instead, Arist. 
Cat. 4a22-b16, where we read that although statements can turn from true to false, when 
this happens, it is due to a change not in them, but in the facts which they describe. In 
short, an alteration in the world can cause one in the truth value of a sentence, but not 
in the sentence itself, in the same way as aging causes changes in the forms which a 
human being takes on, but not in their personal identity. 
If, then, the simile between this image and the argument of the first part of the 
paragraph holds true in a broad sense, it does not with regard to a detail which was 
pivotal there, namely the notion of παρουσία. On the other hand, the comparative 
ὥσπερ is supposed to require a full correspondence between the two terms of the 
simile. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that each of the four secondary predicates 
indicating the stages of a man’s life (παῖς, νεανίσκος, ἀνὴρ, γέρων) is meant as an 
effect of παρουσία as well: that is to say, for example, that ‘as a child’ (παῖς) is a 
shortened form for ‘when childhood is present to him and hence he is a child’. Perhaps 
also because of not seeing this implicit passage, Wilamowitz decided to move 
ὥσπερ...ἐστίν to § 5.4,364 a place where it does not seem to better suit either, whereas 
                                                 
363 Taylor (1911), 110.  
364 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in Diels (1903), 584. 
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Diels and the editors after him, including Robinson, limited themselves to bracketing 
the clause, leaving it in its place.365  
 
§ 4.6 
λέγεται…αὐτόν] Like in chapters 1-3, the second speech starts with a reminder of the 
statement of DT (ὁ ψεύστας…πρᾶγμα)366 and then offers a few reductiones ad absurdum 
following the same sequence of rhetorical topics. As far as this paragraph is concerned, 
firstly (αἰ γάρ…ταῦτα) the IT supporters are shown the extreme consequences of an 
absolute version of their thesis (‘the same speech is false and true’), not corresponding 
to the one which they argued for in the first speech (‘the same speech is true under a 
certain circumstance, false under another one’). We already saw this in §§ 1.12-13, 2.21 
(ἐπεί…τὸ καλόν) and 3.13 (ἐπεί…ἦμεν), and in an almost identical fashion (the 
starting phrase αἰ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὡς features in §§ 2.21 and 3.13 too). Then 
(καὶ αἴ…αὐτόν), the focus shifts to the absurd way in which the IT supporters are 
alleged to regard other people as a result of their own tenet, like in § 1.14, and especially 
2.22 (καὶ αἴ τινά…τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν) and 3.14, where the arguments also issue from 
phrases similar to the current αἴ τινα ἄνδρα ἀλαθῆ οἶδε.367  
 
ὥσπερ…πρᾶγμα] The manuscripts agree on διαφέρων τὤνυμα as the closing words 
of the sentence. Despite the fact that Schanz deletes them,368 they aptly state a point in 
which DT and the second speech in general are likely to be interested, as the first speech 
appealed precisely to the identity of words to support IT (§ 4.2). Furthermore, a 
supplement of πρᾶγμα, as some scholars proposed, seems opportune here, considering 
both the frequency with which the stock phrase ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ 
πρᾶγμα features in the work (§§ 1.11, 3.13, and 2.1 where πρᾶγμα is replaced by σῶμα, 
                                                 
365 Diels (1903), 584, Robinson (1979), 122-124. 
366 Cf. ἄλλος…πρᾶγμα (§ 1.11), λέγεται…εἴη (§ 2.21), λέγεται…πρᾶγμα (§  3.13). 
367 αἴ τινά γα καλὸν οἴδαντι ἄνδρα (§ 2.22), αἴ τινα γινώσκεις δίκαιον ἄνδρα (§ 3.14). 
368 Schanz (1884), 382. 
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though), and the author’s belief in speech as an object not only phonetic, but also 
semantic (§§ 4.2-4), and, hence, in connection with the things it describes. However, for 
reasons of consistency, in my text I followed Blass in adopting the same stock phrase, 
rather than Diels’ τὤνυμα <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>,369 which Robinson printed,370 
North’s τὤνυμα <οὕτω καὶ πρᾶγμα>,371 Mullach’s τὤνυμα <καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>,372 or 
Wilamowitz’s διαφέρων <τὸ πρᾶγμα ὥσπερ καὶ> τὤνυμα.373  
 
αἰ γάρ…οὗτος] Besides the similarities already shown, this very first reductio ad 
absurdum strays from those of chapters 1-3 as here the objects possessing the properties 
which IT discusses, namely speeches, are also of the same kind as IT itself. That makes 
this passage one of the most ancient testimonies of self-refutation arguments, as 
Castagnoli points out.374 
The author starts with imagining asking the IT supporters whether their speech, 
namely ‘the same speech is false and true’ (ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος εἴη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθὴς) is 
true or false (ὃν…ἐστιν). The ‘dilemmatic form’ of this question is another distinctive 
feature of self-refutation arguments, and, at the same time, a point of divergence from 
the parallel interrogations of chapters 1-3,375 where only the hypotheses of IT being true 
were developed, in compliance with the logic of a reductio ad absurdum. Here, instead, 
the reductio comes after an inquiry into the opposite scenario, that of IT being false (αἰ 
μὲν “ψεύστας”), which leads the author to conclude that the false speech and the true 
one are two (δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἴη), which is another way to phrase DT. But a logical 
difficulty then rises, because on the one hand, in doing so the supporter of IT aims to 
                                                 
369 Diels (1903), 584. 
370 Robinson (1979), 124. 
371 North (1671), 66. 
372 Mullach (1875), 549. 
373 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in Diels (1907), 643. 
374 Castagnoli (2010), 24. 
375 §§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13; see also supra, 157. 
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concede ‘the contradictory of his IT (as long as he endorses the platitude Fp p)’,376 to 
quote Castagnoli.377 On the other hand, contra Castagnoli, ‘the false speech and the true 
speech are two different things’ is actually not the contradictory of ‘the same speech is 
false and true’, but its contrary, as its logical contradictory would be ‘some speech is 
either true or false’. This can be better seen moving from the formalization proposed by 
Castagnoli himself.378 He paraphrases the absolute version of IT as ‘any λόγος 
whatsoever is (unqualifiedly) both false and true’ which he formalizes in first-order logic 
as: 
      (p) (Tp  Fp), 
with ‘p’ being a speech, and ‘Tp’ standing for the predicate ‘p is true’, and ‘Fp’ for ‘p is 
false’. If that is the case, then F(IT), namely ‘it is not true that any λόγος whatsoever is 
both false and true’, would be of the form: 
                 (p) (Tp  Fp), 
which is equivalent to ‘there is at least one speech which is not both true and false’: 
                (p)  (Tp  Fp), 
or, by the negation of conjunction rule, to ‘there is at least one speech which is either 
true or false’: 
                (p) (Tp  Fp). 
This one is clearly different from ‘the false speech and the true speech are two different 
things’ (the two are subalterns) which the author here unduly concludes, though, and 
which can be formalized as: 
                (p) (Tp  Fp). 
As a result, one can notice how in this first horn of the dilemma the author strains logic 
in order to obtain what he is really interested in, namely rhetorical support for DT.  
                                                 
376 With ‘p’ being a speech, and ‘Fp’ standing for the predicate ‘p is false’. 
377 Castagnoli (2010), 27-28. 
378 Ibid., 25-26. 
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As for the second horn, we finally encounter the self-refutation argument proper, 
analysing  the possibility of IT being true (αἰ δ’ “ἀλαθὴς” ἀποκρίναιτο) and the 
paradoxical consequence to which this assumption leads, namely that IT, being a 
speech itself, must then be false too (καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος). Recalling the 
formalization of IT as ‘(p) (Tp  Fp)’, the first passage the author presents here can be 
expressed as:  
T(IT). 
Then, he understands two steps: firstly, if IT is true, then IT is the case (semantic 
descent), namely that ‘the same speech is false and true’: 
T(IT)  (IT).       
Secondly, since IT is a speech, by self-application and hence substitution of the variable 
p in IT, namely in (p) (Tp  Fp), we obtain:  
          T(IT)  F(IT). 
This conjunction is what the author expressly concludes through καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς 
οὗτος, where the καί is fundamental in indicating that T(IT) too, although left 
understood, comes along with F(IT) as the outcome of this second branch of the 
reasoning. Furthermore, a conclusion as such represents the simplest and clearest case 
of contradiction, boiling down to the form ‘p   p’. But if so, then the author has proven 
that the assumption of T(IT) entails a contradiction, which is tantamount to saying that 
he has refuted IT by reductio ad absurdum. Therefore, albeit not openly stating so, the 
conclusion at which he has arrived is F(IT) and the path to get it can be contracted in:  
 T(IT)  F (IT).       
As a result, this whole dilemmatic construal is not to be viewed, as Castagnoli argues, 
just as a ‘dialectical silencer’379 of IT, with the aim of pointing out the ‘dialectical 
defeats’380 which the thesis inevitably encounters ‘as soon as it is posed under 
                                                 
379 Ibid., 35. 
380 Ibid., 28. 
 161 
 
scrutiny’.381 In its second horn it, instead, displays an effective logical proof that IT is 
not the case, namely that it is false. After all, the second horn simply gives relevance to 
a feature of IT which has been clear since IT’s first appearance, namely that its 
propositional form is the contradiction ‘p   p’, with p standing for ‘all speeches are 
true’ and under the reasonable assumption, on which Castagnoli agrees, that the author 
accepts the principle of bivalence, namely that a speech is either true or false.382 But if 
that is the case, pace Castagnoli who excludes that this argument means ‘to prove the 
necessary falsehood’383 of IT, and who keeps self-refutation and self-contradiction 
separate,384 here the author reveals that IT is bound to fall into self-refutation precisely 
for its being a self-contradiction, and hence a ‘necessary falsehood[s]’, to quote  
Castagnoli himself.385 
Finally, as the scholar highlights, self-refutation arguments must be assessed also 
in consideration of their rhetorical aims.386 From this perspective, it is then possible to 
spot a single plan underlying our dilemma and indicate a way to reconcile the latter. 
First of all, we must recall that the second speech, in which this dilemmatic argument 
lies, is devoted to support DT. Secondly, T(DT) is exactly the result at which the first 
branch of the argument has led to, moving, though invalidly, from F(IT). Thirdly, it is 
reasonable to think that precisely in order to conclude in support of DT the author sets 
up the first horn of the dilemma: for this, if taken in itself, would otherwise be odd, for 
not having a parallel in the DTs of chapters 1-3, and, especially, for its moving from, 
and not towards, the falsity of IT, contrary to what one would expect a credible attack 
on a thesis to do. As a result of these three premises, it is reasonable to think, contra 
                                                 
381 Ibid., 29. 
382 Cf.  ibid., 26, n. 14: ‘nothing in our text suggests that the author of the Dissoi Logoi envisaged the 
possibility of truth-value gaps’. This is confirmed by analogy with the two contrasting attributes of each 
of chapters 1-3 too, between which no intermediate value is ever given, and which are, hence, to be 
conceived as opposites rather than as contraries.  
383 Ibid., 28. 
384 Ibid., 5. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid., 16, et passim. 
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Castagnoli, that at the height of the second horn of the dilemma the author is highly 
interested in demonstrating the falsity of IT,387 because that has just been proven to be 
a secure way to get T(DT) too. But if that is the case, then it would not be hazardous to 
think that the tacit F(IT) with which the second horn concludes is the key for a last, 
additional, and again understood, logical step, by which to connect the two horns of 
the whole dilemma, so far kept apart. In formal terms, we would, in fact, have: 
(1) F(IT)  T(DT)                          First horn; 
(2) T(IT)  F(IT)                            Second horn; 
(3) T(IT)  T(DT)                          From (2) and (1), by concatenation.  
Granted, this reconstruction is speculative and does not autonomously emerge from 
the text. Nonetheless, by showing how the truth of IT entails not only its self-refutation, 
but also that of the rival DT, this reading would justify the presence, unique in the work, 
of this whole self-refutation construct with the goal of the second speech itself, namely 
T(DT).  
To conclude, despite not having any really close parallel among the other 
testimonies of ancient self-refutation, the second branch of this argument can be 
compared with Pl. Euthd. 287e2-288a4, Tht. 171a6-c4, S.E. M. VII.389-390, and D.L. IX.76. 
Things stand differently with the Liar paradox, a long debated one, whose ancient 
origins go back to Eubulides of Miletus (D.L. II.108) and whose first formulation we 
have in Arist. SE 180b2-7. Castagnoli’s denial of the similarity between the two, on the 
grounds that our argument is not equally conceived to prove the truth-value of the 
thesis at stake388 should be revised, as such intention does seem to belong to our author 
too, as just seen. The difference between them may be found, rather, in the fact that at 
the end of our argument the sentence in question receives a precise truth-value, 
differently from the Liar, which is a paradox precisely for this reason. For, on the one 
                                                 
387 Castagnoli excludes it both here (ibid., 28) and in any other ancient self-refutation argument in general, 
as they ‘did not aim at establishing the truth value of a certain proposition’ (ibid., 15-16). 
388 Ibid., 15-16, 28-29 (esp. n. 19). 
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hand, the truth-value of a sentence such as ‘this sentence is false’ cannot be decided on 
the basis of the principle of bivalence, because if it is assumed to be false, then it turns 
out to be true, and vice versa. On the other hand, IT proves to be nothing but false, 
because F(IT) follows from T(IT) itself, and the converse is not the case. This asymmetry 
is crucial to draw a line between our argument and the Liar, as the latter is characterised 
precisely by double truth-value reversal, whereas our author is so far from concluding 
T(IT) by force of F(IT), that he, rather, chooses to go in the contrary direction, irregularly 
deriving T(DT).    
 
καἰ ἀλαθές…ταῦτα αὐτόν] The truth-value of the IT supporter’s words is now 
inquired to a larger extent, abandoning self-refutation. Yet reductio ad absurdum is still 
operative and subverts the truth of his speeches, and particularly of his testimonies 
(another hint at trials, where speaking the truth is a duty), in the same way as this 
mechanism inconveniently turned the acts done and received by the IT supporters of 
chapters 1-3 from good to bad, from beautiful to ugly, and from just to unjust, or vice 
versa (§§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13).  
 
καἰ] This crasis of καί and αἰ (Doric for εἰ) in place of the manuscripts’ καί has been 
suggested by Diels,389 to make the sentence fit among the conditional ones which make 
up the rhetorical pattern of the paragraph. Blass’ supplement καὶ <αἰ>, taken by 
Robinson, is hence avoidable.390 
 
§§ 4.7-8 
ἐκ…πράγμασιν] Resuming and criticizing the arguments deployed in the first speech 
is what happened at the end of the second speeches of chapters 1-3 (cf. §§ 1.16-17, 2.23-
28, 3.15-16). Likewise, in these two paragraphs firstly the author takes up the criterion 
                                                 
389 Diels (1907), 643. 
390 Blass in Weber (1897), 46, Robinson (1979), 124. 
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of truth produced in support of IT in § 4.2 (ἐκ…ψεύσταν); then, he attacks IT through 
an example (οὐκῶν…πράγμασιν) which, in parallel with that of § 4.3, is drawn from 
courts. 
 
οὐκῶν…πράγμασιν] Rightly, Taylor points out that, just ‘as in the previous cases’, 
this argument too is ‘apagogic’, as it contends that if the criterion of truth as agreement 
of words and facts were the case, then one should seriously doubt something usually 
taken for granted such as the soundness of jurors’ judgement of the speeches they listen 
to.391 This line of reasoning distinguishes the passage from the similar Pl. Tht. 201a-c, 
Antisth. Aj. 1, and Isoc. Antidosis 52-54,392 where the fact that jurors assess speeches in 
that way is acknowledged and triggers the criticism of the trial system, in which 
persuasion has the better of knowledge. 
 
κρίνοντι] The manuscripts read κρίνοιντο, which Robinson prints, but  the middle 
diathesis of this form is not compatible with the meaning ‘to judge’ (LSJ, s.v. κρίνω, II 
2.a.b) expected here.393 Schanz’s correction with the active κρίνοντι is, hence, preferable, 
as Classen too observes.394 
 
οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πράγμασιν] In this γάρ clause lies the justification of the 
argumentative point made in these two paragraphs. Hence, reasonably the manuscripts 
connect it with the previous sentence through a semicolon and do not bracket it, as is 
done by Diels, whom Robinson follows.395 
 
 
                                                 
391 Taylor (1911), 108. 
392 See also Burnyeat in Burnyeat/Barnes (1980), 173-191. 
393 Robinson (1979), 124. 
394 Schanz (1884), 383, Classen (2001), 127. 
395 Diels (1907), 644, Robinson (1979), 124. 
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§ 4.9 
ὁμολογέοντι…διαφέρει] Having come to the end, the author counters the first speech 
for the last time and in two ways. In line with what the second speech has already been 
doing, he targets a particular argument of the first speech, highlighting its intrinsic 
flaws (ὁμολογέοντι…ἀλαθῆ). At the same time, he also attempts to show how that 
argument seems to conflict with another one used by the IT supporters 
(τοῦτο…διαφέρει).   
 
ὁμολογέοντι…ἀλαθῆ] In the first place, the sentence is a reminder of § 4.5, where the 
first speech expounded its second criterion of truth and falsehood as presence of these 
concepts to speech. That this is the author’s target now we can infer especially by 
considering firstly the use of the same Platonic phrases τὸ ψεῦδος and τὸ ἀλαθές to 
indicate the couple of opposites; secondly, the immediacy which characterizes the 
relation of mixture (ἀναμέμεικται) involving these concepts and speech, and which 
was proper to the criterion of truth as presence too. However, this time the author uses 
Platonic metaphysics even more freely than in § 4.5, as Plato never resorts to a 
vocabulary of mixing to explain why an attribute can be predicated of some subject, i.e. 
to expound his doctrine of παρουσία; in Plato, mixture is chiefly a relation between 
general kinds, instead (see especially Philebus and Sophist). Nonetheless, recalling 
Taylor’s observation that ‘παρουσία is […] the logical converse of μέθεξις’,396 one may 
think that the latter has been the middle term on which the author tacitly pivoted, in 
order to shift from the criterion of truth as presence to that of mixture. For, firstly, both 
in Platonic participation and according to the idea of mixture here sketched, an object 
(a speech), is in so deep a connection with a theoretical entity (truth or falsehood), that 
the boundaries between these two relata partially fade, and they end up resembling 
each other (cf., e.g. Pl. Prm. 132d). Secondly, we may observe that in Plato participation 
                                                 
396 Taylor (1911), 109. 
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is precisely halfway between presence and mixture, being a relation sometimes 
between things and ideas, like presence, sometimes between general kinds, like 
mixture. Indicative of this double characterization of its are Phd. 100c-d, where it occurs 
along with, and with the same meaning as, presence, and Sph. 259a, where the same is 
true of participation and mixture. 
But this remark also has the dialectical function of showing how the criterion of 
truth as presence actually belongs to DT, rather than to IT. We may see it, by reflecting 
on phrases such as καὶ αὐτοί and the correlation ᾧ μὲν…ᾧ δέ, both testifying to an 
appropriation, by the current speech, of this criterion. For καὶ αὐτοί implies that the IT 
upholders do not act differently from others and, as far as the dispute of this chapter is 
concerned, from their rivals of DT. Secondly, as Robinson observes, the correlation ᾧ 
μὲν…ᾧ δέ indicates two distinct objects, in accordance with DT, and in contrast with § 
4.5 where the argument spoke of one and the same speech.397 Such a contrast emerges 
even more in my translation, where, reasoning by analogy with the author’s habit of 
attributing truth and falsehood chiefly to speeches, I have read the two dative relatives 
ᾧ as masculine and as referring to λόγος of § 4.7 — as Mullach first did398 — rather than 
as generic neuters like in Robinson’s ‘that with which’ — first appeared in North.399  
 
τοῦτο…διαφέρει] These last words laconically warn the reader about some unwanted, 
but not specified difference involving what has just been said (τοῦτο). Since the first 
speech offered two different criteria of truth, one may legitimately think that this 
duality of positions is what is hinted at here. All the more so because the δέ of the initial 
ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί presents the following paragraph as in contrast with what 
was discussed immediately before, namely precisely the criterion of truth as agreement 
of words and facts. If that is the case, then it seems reasonable to assume that originally 
                                                 
397 Robinson (1979), 197. 
398 He translated it as ‘sermonem cui’ (Mullach (1875), 549). 
399 He translated it as ‘cui’ (North (1671), 67). 
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other words followed διαφέρει, and that they made the case for that contrast. I therefore 
believe, with North and others, that a lacuna, not signalled in the manuscripts, follows 
διαφέρει, and not as small as deemed by Robinson who conjectures the loss of as short 
a phrase as ’from their original thesis’, and who also forgets to flag it in the Greek text.400 
After all, such an abrupt and elusive ending would also break the structural similarity 
usually shared by chapters 1-4, as all the former three conclude with clearer and fully 
developed reflections (§§ 1.17, 2.28, 3.17). 
 
Chapter 5 
§ 5.1 
ταὐτὰ...πράσσοντι] Because of the lack of an opening phrase of the kind of the usual 
δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται, North believed that originally the chapter was not disjoined 
from the previous one, as in fact manuscripts transmit, but also that it had a rather 
different shape than the one it has now.401  He suggested to move §§ 5.1-5 between §§ 
4.5 and 4.6, and to put §§ 5.6-15 after the interrupted ending of chapter 4. Alternatively, 
in order to fill that same suspected lacuna (end of § 4.9), Blass supplemented the start of 
this chapter with <λέγοντι δέ τινες, ὡς> before ταὐτὰ.402 Finally, Diels put §§ 5.1-5 
between direct speech quotes, which many scholars after him, including Robinson, 
decided to do.403 However, none of these three emendations is really necessary for the 
chapter to make sense. This, in fact, consists in another contrast between an IT which 
asserts that a life lived according to reason and knowledge is the same as one not so 
lived (defended in §§ 5.1-5), and a DT which maintains the difference between the two 
ways of life (defended in §§ 5.6-15).  Hence, contra North, splitting these two parts and 
relocating them into two different chapters affects this clear-cut antithesis. Blass’ 
supplement, then, seems pleonastic, as it just takes arriving at § 5.6 to see the author 
                                                 
400 Robinson (1979), 124-125. 
401 North (1671), 67, n. 6.  
402 Blass in Weber (1897), 46. 
403 Diels (1903), 585, Robinson (1979), 124-126. 
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himself attributing IT to people other than him (τοὶ τῆνα λέγοντες). Similarly, the 
demonstrative τῆνα there used will be sufficient to mark the boundary of the first 
speech just concluded, with no oratio recta to be introduced, contra Diels. 
For the first time in the work, then, the opening paragraph only shows the 
statement of IT and not of both theses. It also describes a seemingly new kind of identity 
of opposites, which is no longer related to objects possessing opposite qualities, but to 
properties (actions and words) of such objects (the insane and the sane, the wise and the 
ignorant). However, in §§ 5.7-9, the actions and words of the insane, sane, wise and 
ignorant are said to be sufficient to distinguish between insanity and sanity, and 
between wisdom and ignorance (αἰ γάρ τις….ὁμολογησοῦντι). If so, then it implicitly 
follows that on the basis of actions and words one can also distinguish between the 
individuals who are characterized by those opposite qualities. As a result, objects 
exemplifying opposites are at issue in this chapter too, though indirectly. 
The debate portrayed in this chapter is hinted to at Pl. Cra. 386b-c, and better 
expounded in Pl. Alc. 2 138d-139c, 140d-e, and S.E. M. XI.197-209. In the last one, in 
particular, we read that ‘there is no work peculiar to the wise man, whereby he shall 
differ from the not wise’,404 which allows Sextus to conclude that wisdom is not an art 
of life. This is all the more interesting if we think that in his following chapter, Sextus 
tackles the question of whether such an art of life would be teachable, if it ever existed 
(S.E. M. XI.216-257). This perfectly aligns with the next topic of our text too, as Dissoi 
Logoi 6 discusses the teachability of that wisdom which is here under scrutiny, and pairs 
this concept with excellence. This correspondence holds also from a lexical point of 
view, as the two authors use highly similar terms. In fact, Sextus identifies this art of life 
(ἡ περὶ τὸν βιὸν τέχνη), which should be characteristic of the wise (φρόνιμος, but few 
times also σοφός) and virtuous (σπουδαῖος) man, with excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom 
(φρόνησις). Our author, in turn, uses both σοφός and σωφρονῶν (very close to 
                                                 
404 Translation from Bury (1968), 483. 
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φρόνιμος) in this chapter, as well as ἀρετή and σοφία (instead of φρόνησις) in the 
following one.  
 
τοὶ μαινόμενοι…ἀμαθεῖς] The two couples of opposites, sane/insane and 
wise/ignorant are kept distinct from here to § 5.8. There they intersect and we are told 
about the wise behaving insanely (τοὶ σοφοὶ μαίνονται) and the insane being wise (τοὶ 
μαινόμενοι σοφοὶ). Finally, in § 5.9 they merge and σοφοὶ features as a perfect synonym 
of the σωφρονοῦντες of some line before, so as to avoid a repetition. Furthermore, the 
author never conceives an argument which applies to either couple, but not the other. 
Hence, no numerical diversity is meant by these two distinctions, rather they just depict 
two forms of one more general contrast with which the author is really concerned in this 
chapter, namely that between an intelligent life, led with rationality and advised by 
knowledge, and one straying from the guide of the intellect, insofar as proceeding 
irrationally and in ignorance. From now on I will hence appeal to this latter more 
fundamental distinction, for economy of words. Finally, the possibility of this 
simplification constitutes a further point of contact with Plato’s aforementioned 
passages, as both the Cratylus and the Alcibiades II present just one opposition, between 
σωφροσύνη and ἀφροσύνη; and, to an even higher degree, with Sextus’ above text, 
where φρόνιμος and σοφός are used interchangeably. 
 
§ 5.2 
καὶ πρᾶτον…καττωὐτό] The IT which has just been stated is now clarified, and the 
underlying assumption which made such a seemingly counterintuitive thesis possible 
can thus emerge. This consists in lowering the requirements of saying and doing the 
same things (ταὐτὰ […] λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι (§ 5.1)) to the more easily achievable 
level of giving the same name to things (ὀνομάζοντι ταὐτά) and performing the same 
actions (ποιέοντι ταὐτά). Giving the same names somehow recalls the obscure 
argument of § 4.2, which drew the identity of the true and the false speeches from that 
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of their words. More precisely, it fits the scenario of words belonging to one same 
vocabulary, which was entailed by the weakest reading of the identity between the 
words of the true and the false speeches there. As for the performance of the same 
actions, now the author is bound to look merely at the basic biological ones (κάθηνται 
καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατάκεινται) which unsurprisingly both those living 
according to the intellect and those straying from it carry out, insofar as all humans do.  
 
καὶ πρᾶτον…ὀνομάζοντι ταὐτά] The passage can be compared with Cra. 392c2-5, 
where, however, Plato has Socrates and Hermogenes agree that the wise give names 
more correctly than the unwise.  
 
§ 5.3 
καὶ μάν…πάντα] IT is now defended through an argument which for the first time in 
the work goes from the general to the specific, and not the other way around. In fact, it 
subsumes IT under the more general statement that every thing is identical to the other 
(οὕτω…πάντα), as no attribute can differentiate it, because that thing possesses also the 
attribute opposite to that one (καὶ μὰν…κουφότερον). But if there is no way to 
distinguish a thing from the other, then – the author implies – neither will there be one 
by which to differentiate between the words and the actions belonging to a life guided 
by the intellect and those of a life straying from it.  
The necessity of knowing the distinctive features of an object in order to know it 
is said to have been stressed by Speusippus, at Arist. APo. 97a6-22 (=Fr. 5 Isnardi 
Parente), whereas the thesis of the indiscernibility of all things is attributed to Pyrrho 
according to D.L. IX.61,405 and according to Aristocles in Eus. PE 14.18.3.406 
 
 
                                                 
405 ‘Each thing is no more this than this’: translation from Long/Sedley (1987), 13. 
406 ‘Things are equally indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable’: translation from ibid., 15. 
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§ 5.4 
τὸ…βαρύτερον] A first example of the identity of all things, claimed in § 5.3, is given 
here, with particular reference to the opposites of lightness and heaviness possessed by 
the same object. This time the argument goes back to moving from the specific to the 
general, namely from a comparison between the weight of some coins (τὸ…ταλάντων) 
to the conclusion that every thing is lighter (κουφότερον) and heavier (βαρύτερον).  
The initial observation, τὸ δύο…ταλάντων, exemplifies the intuitive fact that a 
scalar property such as weight, is possessed by an object to a higher degree than by a 
second one, but also to a lower degree than by a third, the only two exceptions being the 
extremes of the sequence, if one admits them. However, in moving to the conclusive 
τωὐτόν…καὶ βαρύτερον the author removes the terms of comparison, which makes it 
seem that the comparative forms of the two opposites can be predicated absolutely as 
well, and that an object is lighter and heavier at the same time, under the same respect, 
i.e. as compared to another implicit and same object, against the Aristotelian Principle of 
Non-Contradiction (Arist. Met. Γ 1005b19–20). The illegitimacy of this new procedure is 
clear and no wonder from Plato it emerges that ‘more and less’ puzzles like this were 
dear to sophists like Protagoras (Pl. Tht. 154b-c).  Both the necessary gradualness of some 
physical properties and the conclusion of an object having opposite properties against 
the Principle of Non-Contradiction, although these properties not being in a comparative 
modality in this case, can be found in Anaxagoras’ fragment DK 59B3. 
 
τάλαντον] Robinson misprints it as τάλαυτον.407 
 
§ 5.5  
καὶ ζώει…οὐκ ἐντί] The first speech ends with this paragraph, where the author raises 
the stakes of his defence of IT, showing how that thesis actually instantiates an even more 
general principle than that of the sameness of all things, stated in § 5.3. For a life guided 
                                                 
407 Robinson (1979), 126. 
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by the intellect is the same as one straying from it not just because each thing is identical 
to the other; but especially because no thing is identical to itself, each one being and not 
being (ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι and καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί). Now, this latter 
position, no more of mere indiscernibility, but of ontological indeterminateness is one 
which Aristotle ascribes to Heraclitus (Metaph. Γ 1005b24-25),408 and which he means to 
counter through his law of contradiction (b19-20).409 It also features among the 
statements which Pyrrho admits ‘concerning each individual thing’, namely ‘that it no 
more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not’410 (Aristocles in Eus. 
PE 14.18.4). The latter sentence is particularly interesting for us as, firstly, it comes in 
conclusion to the aforementioned 14.18.3. Secondly, the ‘cognitive incompetence’ it 
describes ‘is not attributed […] to a weakness in our faculties as such, but to “how things 
are by nature”’411 (14.18.2), which Pyrrho deems as something which ‘whoever wants to 
be happy must consider’ (ibid.), and the importance of which with regard to a man’s 
conduct will be praised also in Dissoi Logoi 8.1-2. 
It is worth noting that a lot of the dialectical efficacy of this argument hinges on 
different values of the verb εἰμί, which, unlike the modern reader, an ancient Greek 
speaker could perceive. For in ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι — which comes straight after καὶ 
ζώει…οὐ ζώει, and is therefore likely to maintain something of its coordinate clause — 
one finds the existential value of εἰμί, namely that expressing ‘being alive in contrast to 
being dead’,412 and it would hence seem fitting to translate it in the sense of ‘live’. On the 
other hand, the generic plural neuter ταὐτά advises against this move, because it would 
narrow the range of the subject to living beings only. I therefore preferred keeping the 
basic form ‘be’, although I believe that in virtue of the above vital nuance, the passage 
                                                 
408 ‘For it is impossible for anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, as some imagine that 
Heraclitus says’: translation from Tredennick (1933), 163. See also fragment DK22 B49a. 
409 ‘It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the 
same relation’ (translation from ibid., 161). 
410 Translation from Long/Sedley (1987), 15. 
411 Long/Sedley (1987), 16. 
412 Kahn (2003), 233. 
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from ‘the same man both lives and does not live’ to ‘the same things are and are not’ 
sounded more smooth to the ancient Greek ears than to ours.  
 
5.6 
τοὶ…λέγοντι] DT is here formulated in open contrast with what the first speech has 
argued so far. Its dialectical, and slightly polemical, tone is particularly clear from a 
phrase such as τοὶ τῆνα λέγοντες […] οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι, and is then confirmed by the 
zeal with which the second speech starting here tackles the single points made by the 
first speech. Such accuracy does not have a parallel in chapters 1-4, but, rather, in the 
give-and-take between the two speeches of chapter 6.    
 
<καὶ τὼς σωφρονοῦντας>] Robinson sticks to the codices and does not accept this 
supplement by Schanz,413 with the result being that the sequence of human groups which 
the author here recalls would oddly be composed of three terms only (‘the demented 
and the wise and the ignorant’),414 leaving out the opposite of τὼς μαινομένως. As has 
been said above, in §§ 5.8-9 the author will attempt to reduce the two couples of 
opposites into one; yet, only here he mentions three classes of individuals. Furthermore, 
as Schanz himself notices, immediately in the next paragraph, μανία will be openly 
contrasted with σωφροσύνη in the same way as σοφίη with ἀμαθίη.415  Finally, as 
Classen points out, the transmission of this passage has been very uncertain, as 
suggested by a note in the margins of B,416 which proposes the reading τεμνομένως, 
which according to Diels and Kranz is a corruption of τε μαινομένως, a possible variant 
of τὼς μαινομένως.417 Things thus standing, it is hence opportune to intervene in the 
                                                 
413 Schanz (1884), 381. 
414 Robinson (1979), 127. 
415 Schanz (1884), 381. 
416 Classen (2004), 104. 
417 Diels/Kranz (1922), 341. 
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text with Schanz’s supplement, with no need, as usual, of its Doric accentuation 
σωφρονούντας, proposed by Blass.418 
 
§ 5.7 
αἰ…“ναί”] This is the start of an argument for DT which covers §§ 5.7-9 and which 
targets the statement of IT itself, in § 5.1, and its explanation, in § 5.2. As he has done on 
previous occasions, the author imagines a direct interrogation of the upholders of IT (cf. 
§§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13, 4.6), but this time he does not need any reductio ad absurdum to make 
them contradict themselves. In fact, they deliberately retract their former position by 
answering ‘yes’ (φαντί· “ναί”) to the question ‘whether insanity differs from sanity, and 
wisdom from ignorance’, which is tantamount to asking ‘whether the actions and words 
of the insane differs from those of the sane, and those of the wise from those of the 
ignorant’, as §§ 5.8-9 make clear.419 
 
§ 5.8 
εὖ…συνταράσσονται] The IT supporters are said to acknowledge a difference in the 
actions of the opposing groups, and by so doing they overturn part of what was said in 
§§ 5.1-2 (see ταὐτὰ […] πράσσοντι and ποιέοντι ταὐτά). 
 
οὔκων, καὶ ταὐτὰ πράσσοντι] Robinson added αἰ after καί and translated this as ‘so 
even if they do the same things’.420 However, the initial concessive clause he thus 
proposes seems to mistrust the results of the just-mentioned examination of the 
opposing groups’ actions (εὖ…ὁμολογησοῦντι), and effectively prove DT 
(εὖ…ὁμολογησοῦντι).  If, instead, we keep the sole καί of the codices, ταὐτὰ 
πράσσοντι more suitably becomes the first of a series of possibilities (καὶ 
                                                 
418 Blass in Weber (1897), 46. 
419 On this equivalence, already discussed, see supra, 169. 
420 Robinson (1979), 128. 
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ταὐτὰ…συνταράσσονται) which must be excluded precisely on the basis of that 
previous examination (οὔκων). 
 
§ 5.9 
καὶ…δεῖ] The author deals with the second element on which IT insisted, namely what 
the people living according to the intellect, and those straying from it, say. In this case, 
the IT upholders are imagined not to withdraw their position as easily as before. On the 
contrary, they offer an answer which appeals to the identity of the two groups’ words, 
through the same relativistic pattern as the arguments of the first speeches of chapters 
1-4 (‘the same act, x, is done at the proper time, a, by the wise, and at the wrong one, a, 
by the insane’). Their answer also exploits a criterion of ‘proper time’ which is 
reminiscent of the notion of καιρός, already seen in §§ 2.19 and 3.12. In this regard, it is 
interesting to compare the current passage with [Pl.] Just. 375a2-6, where in a similar 
vocabulary, things are said to be just if they are done at the due and right time (ἐν μὲν 
τῷ δέοντι καὶ τῷ καιρῷ) and unjust when the time is not appropriate (ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ 
δέοντι). What is more, at 375b4-5 the author then explains that only he who possesses 
knowledge can act in the former way, whereas the ignorant man is bound to the latter, 
which is the point of the author’s final observation ἀλλὰ τοὶ…δεῖ.421 
 
§ 5.10 
καὶ τοῦτο…ἦμεν] Now the author strikes back at the first speech’s arguments, 
following the same order in which they appeared. He shifts from distinguishing a life 
lived according to the intellect from one straying from it (§§ 5.6-9), to tackling the broader 
issue of what makes a thing in general differ from the other (§§ 5.10-14). This counters 
the parallel, but opposed in meaning, transition from §§ 5.1-2 (about the identity of the 
opposite groups’ words and actions) to 5.3-5 (about the impossibility to distinguish a 
                                                 
421 On a comparison between the two passages and on a hypothesis of the relationships between the two 
works see Gomperz (1912), 153-154, 166-167. 
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thing from the other). Furthermore, the linguistic focus on words and clauses which we 
now see in §§ 5.10-12 already characterized § 5.2. 
Here, the author argues that the specific addition of the relativizing temporal 
clauses ᾇ δεῖ and ᾇ μὴ δεῖ changes the nature of what the two groups say, because, 
generally speaking, any addition alters the subject which undergoes it, as clarified later 
in § 5.14. Consequently, the author abandons the rhetorical strategy used in the second 
speeches of chapters 1-4, just as we saw him doing with the usual strategy of the first 
speeches. For so far in the work, the second speeches, firstly, used to drop the relativizing 
conditions under which the first ones had predicated opposite attributes of the same 
object; then they performed reductio ad absurdum on the absolute versions of ITs, so 
obtained. Here, instead, the author points the finger at those conditions, presenting them 
not merely as circumstantial, but as integral parts of the objects to which they are 
referred. In other words, if in § 5.9 the IT upholders argued that the sane and the insane 
say the same things, and that what changes is just the time when they do so, here the DT 
supporters no longer reply by accusing them of equating the two classes without 
restriction. Rather, they stress the importance of the relativizing clauses of that identity 
so much as to fit in them in the definition of the objects over discussion, by  retorting that 
the time in which a thing is said contributes to its identity.  
 
§ 5.11 
ἐγὼ…ξουθός] Here starts a series of four paragraphs, §§ 5.11-14, through which the 
author justifies the statement in § 5.10, that the addition of the clauses ‘when there is 
need’ and ‘when there is no need’ changes what the sane and the insane say (for the 
logic of this justification, see the commentary on § 5.13). §§ 5.11-14 stand out for their 
points of contact with Plato’s Cratylus, which, yet, scholars have just partially 
pinpointed, focussing only on those scattered passages of the dialogue which feature 
morphological changes similar to those grouped in this section. An example of this, with 
reference to the current paragraph where change of intonation (ἁρμονίας 
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διαλλαγείσας) is introduced, is Pl. Cra. 399a7-b5, where ‘change of accents’ (τὰς 
ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλειν) appears. However, the proximity between the two texts 
actually proves more systematic and philosophically meaningful, as soon as one focuses 
on 431e9-432b1, which commentators have generally neglected,422 but which runs thus:  
 
Cratylus: That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign 
these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, if we take away or add or transpose 
any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at 
all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it. 
Socrates: Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way. 
Cratylus: Why not? 
Socrates: It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily 
consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you 
like, if you add or subtract anything is immediately another number.423  
 
The first thing to notice in this exchange is the similarity with §§ 5.11-14, as far as the 
trains of thought of the two texts are concerned. For, firstly, Cratylus reflects on how 
morphological changes turn a word into a different one, similarly to §§ 5.11-12; then, 
Socrates assimilates this observation to an example of addition and subtraction from 
ten, which is reminiscent of § 5.14.  
Some differences emerge in the details, though. In the first place, Cratylus says 
that in presence of these morphological changes, a word becomes a different one (τὸ 
ὄνομα […] εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ), whereas precisely in the current 
paragraph of our text, the author says that it is things themselves which undergo an 
alteration in those cases (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι […] τὰ πράγματα). However, the two passages 
can be reconciled under the assumption that here our author may have understood 
some premises which Plato puts in Cratylus’ mouth elsewhere in the dialogue. In order 
                                                 
422 An exception is Horky (2013), 162, n. 153. 
423 Translation from Fowler (1926), 163. 
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to see which these are, let us look at Cratylus’ initial views about the relation between 
language and world, before they start to capitulate under the blows of Socrates’ dialectic 
at 432d. Cratylus originally claimed that a name is correct insofar as it reveals the nature 
of the thing it means (428e), and that all names have been correctly given (429b). Then, 
at 430a-b, Cratylus agrees with Socrates that the process through which names reveal 
the nature of things is an imitative one, but unlike Socrates, he believes that such 
imitation does not allow imperfections and on occasion of the slightest departure from 
its standard form, a word is not simply miswritten and yet still recognizable as the same 
one; it becomes a wholly different one (432a, quoted above). But the new and different 
word so generated must also indicate a wholly different thing, if each word reveals the 
nature of a thing, as just recalled. As a result, according to Cratylus, the most minimal 
change in a word reflects one in the nature of the object denoted by it. That perfectly 
tallies both with Heraclitus’ fluxism and with what our author too here says on the topic, 
the two sharing the same ontological views about pronouncing the same word with 
different accent (cf. this paragraph and DK22 B48 and 51).   
As a second difference between the two texts, removal (ἀφέλωμεν), addition 
(προσθῶμεν), and transposition (μεταθῶμέν) of letters, which Plato mentions, are just 
three out of the five morphological changes named over §§ 5.11-14, namely the 
aforementioned change of intonation, pronunciation with long or short vowel (τὰ δὲ 
μακρῶς καὶ βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα, § 5.12), transposition of letters (γράμματα 
διαλλάξαντα, § 5.12), addition and removal of some element (τις ἢ ποτιτιθεῖ τι ἢ 
ἀφαιρεῖ, § 5.13). On the other hand, albeit not here, all of these five mutations sparsely 
appear in the Cratylus too, and the proximity between the two texts is hence less 
compromised than it may appear.  
Desbordes interestingly points out how these five morphological changes actually 
boil down to four linguistic phenomena known to ancient Greek and Roman 
grammarians, namely addition (πρόσθεσις, or adiectio), subtraction (ἀφαίρεσις, or 
detractio), mutation (ἀλλοίωσις, or inmutatio), and metathesis (μετάθεσις, or 
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transmutatio); 424 on this reading, changes in intonation and in vowel length are, of 
course, both cases of mutation. Basing himself on the testimony of Var. L. 7.2, Barwick 
locates the origin of this quadripartite scheme among Stoics, with Chrysippos as its 
probable first promoter, and, again, the Cratylus as their source for it.425 The both 
linguistic and ontological nature of these four phenomena, then, made Desbordes also 
connect them to the three Aristotelian categories of quantity (in case of addition and 
subtraction), quality (mutation), and place (metathesis). It is not my business here to 
assess Desbordes’ hypothesis that the Aristotelian physics has a debt to the Cratylus’ 
‘modèle des manipulations qui sont possibles sur l''écriture’.426 A passage such as Arist. 
Ph. I 7.190b6-11, which she does not quote, seems to articulate this notion, but the one I 
prefer to dwell on for the sake of my analysis is, rather, Ph. De aeternitate mundi 113, 
which she too mentions, and in which the author attacks the Peripatetic account of 
destruction as follows:   
 
Some of those who consider that the world is everlasting carry their ingenuity still farther 
and employ an argument of the following kind to establish their view. We find, they say, 
four principal ways in which destruction occurs, addition, subtraction, transposition, 
transmutation. Thus two is destroyed and becomes three by the addition of one and 
similarly four by subtraction of one becomes three.427 
 
Just as in the above Cratylus passage and in our §§ 5.11-14, here the different kinds of 
mutation are compared with cases of numeric addition and subtraction. On the other 
hand, whereas here and in our text such an example is reported simply as belonging to 
some thinkers (i.e., Peripatetics and the IT upholders), in Plato it has a contrastive 
function, as Socrates uses it to show how, contrarily to what Cratylus seemed to suggest, 
                                                 
424 Desbordes (1987), 41, Desbordes (1983), 23. 
425 Barwick (1957), 78. See also D.L. VII.44. 
426 Desbordes (1983), 28. 
427 Translation from Colson (1941), 263-265. 
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names are not affected by alterations in the same highly sensitive way as numbers are. 
As a result, interpreters like Taylor and Solana Dueso are wrong when reading the 
second speech of our chapter as providing a Socratic or essentialist answer to the 
Heraclitean tenet that ‘things are and are not’ of § 5.5. For over §§ 5.10-14 too our author 
adopts ideas about language which in the Cratylus are associated to the Heraclitean 
Cratylus and are opposed by Socrates. 
In conclusion, unless we agree to add these paragraphs to the list of those Dissoi 
Logoi passages which may have inspired Plato, and in this case an even longer tradition 
after him, Robinson’s belief that Dissoi Logoi 5 antedates the Cratylus must be 
overturned, and, one must acknowledge our author’s original use of that source in this 
section.428 
Expertise in correctness of names and morphology has been associated with 
sophists too, with a particular preference for Hippias (cf. Pl. Cra. 391b, Hp.Ma. 285d, 
Hp.Mi. 368d).429 With specific reference to the eristic deployment of change of accent in 
the words pronounced, I would also point out Arist. SE 166b1-9. Sextus Empiricus’ 
Against the Grammarians, namely M. I.41-320, is, then, a relevant criticism of the effective 
value of the art of letters (ἡ γραμματική), which is concerned, among other things, with 
morphological notions similar to those exemplified here.  
 
οὐ πράγματος] If one takes ἐγώ…διαλλαγείσας at its face value, and translates it in a 
way such as that of most translators, for example like Robinson’s ‘I myself do not think 
that things are altered by the addition of such qualifications’,430 a contradiction arises 
with what comes both immediately before and two paragraphs later.431 For in § 5.10 the 
author maintains that by adding words, a thing is no longer the same (μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ 
                                                 
428 Cf. Robinson (1979), 207. 
429 See also ibid., 205-206. 
430 Ibid., 129. 
431 This kind of translation is also in North (1671), 69, Fabricius (1724), 630, Von Orelli (1821), 227, Mullach 
(1875), 550, Untersteiner (1954), 177, Dumont (1969), 243, Sprague (1972), 289, Poirier (1988), 1175, Solana 
Dueso (1996), 193, Waterfield (2000), 295, Dorion (2009), 142.   
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ἦμεν), and in § 5.13 that addition, as well as subtraction, of words makes things different 
to a higher extent than any other change in a word can do (τοσοῦτον…ἀφαιρεῖ;). I, 
rather, agree with the fewer translators who spot the omission of a μόνον after οὐ in 
this passage, a phenomenon attested also at Th. 4.92, E. Hipp. 359 and Ph. 1480 (LSJ, s.v. 
μόνος B II 2).432 For if one understands it, the οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ… correlation thus 
resulting smooths the problematic denial of addition of words (πράγματος τοσούτω 
ποτιτεθέντος) being a sufficient cause for things to become different (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰ 
πράγματα). On this reconstruction, that morphological change, in fact, will become one 
of the many possible ways, starting from change in intonation (ἁρμονίας 
διαλλαγείσας), through which things change their nature. Such a reading, one can 
finally notice, also paves the way for the emergence of the a fortiori logic of the whole 
argument, revealed in § 5.13. To conclude, Dillon and Gergel propose ‘I do not think 
that the situation is altered so much by the addition of an element, as by an alteration, 
as it were, of tone’,433 which, as is clear, does not require the expression of μόνον. 
However, this solution cannot stand up for reasons both of grammar, as in a 
comparative sentence with τοσοῦτος the conjunction employed should be ὡς and not 
the coordinating ἀλλά, and of content, as it means that alteration changes a thing more 
than how addition can do, which is the exact opposite of what is then argued in § 5.13.  
 
γλαυκός] Rather than Robinson’s unqualified ‘green’, I preferred the linguistic coinage 
‘glaucous’, although scarcely used nowadays, as its definition of ‘dull or pale green 
colour passing into greyish blue’ (OED, s.v. ‘glaucous’, a) is closer to the bluish green or 
grey indicated by the original Greek adjective (LSJ, s.v. γλαυκός). 
 
                                                 
432 Teichmüller (1884), 217, Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 223, Maso/Franco (2000), 195, Becker/Scholz (2004), 
77, Bonazzi (2008), 445, Reale (2008), 1857.  
433 Dillon/Gergel (2003), 329, and similarly Graham (2010), 893. 
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“Γλαῦκος”…“ξουθός”] With the couples of objects exemplifying these morphological 
alterations the author confronts names of person (Γλαῦκος, Ξάνθος, Ξοῦθος) and 
colours (γλαυκός, ξανθός, ξουθός), but the import of this association is inscrutable. 
 
§ 5.12 
ταῦτα…“νόος”] Variation in the length of a vowel (τὰ δέ…“σακός”) and the swap of 
the place of letters within the same word (ἅτερα δὲ…”νόος”) are the morphological 
changes presented here. As far as variation in vowel length is concerned, the author 
seems not to have picked the most perspicuous examples, since in both the chosen 
couples, namely Τύρος (ῠ)/τυρός (ῡ) and σάκος (ᾰ)/σακός (ᾱ), the accent also shifts from 
the first onto the last syllable; a phonetic phenomenon already discussed in § 5.11. A 
reflection on the variety of vowels is also in Pl. Cra. 424c, and S.E. M. I.111-116,121-130, 
whereas for metathesis of letters cf. Pl. Cra. 394b and the already seen 432a.  
 
“καρτὸς” καὶ “κρατός”] κάρτος καὶ κράτος is the reading of the codices, which yet 
have the inconvenience of being two dialectal versions of the same word, the first form 
being Doric, Ionic and Epic, the latter Attic only (LSJ, s.vv. κάρτος, and κράτος, I 1). As 
they both mean either ‘strength’ or ‘power’, they do not seem to constitute a fitting 
example of things becoming different by a change in the words denoting them, and any 
translation such as Blass’ ‘robur et regnum’ cannot be but arbitrary.434 Since Diels’ 
edition of 1903, all editors, Robinson included, have been printing Wilamowitz’s 
conjecture κάρτος καὶ κρατός, which, yet, features another inconvenient accent slide 
like the one seen in Τύρος/τυρός and σάκος/σακός.435 The solution I propose here averts 
this problem, by making both the original paroxytone words oxytone.   
 
                                                 
434 Blass in Weber (1897), 47. 
435 Wilamowitz in Diels (1903), 585, Robinson (1979), 128. 
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“ὄνος” καὶ “νόος”] This inversion of the first two letters of the word ὄνος is the 
morphological change with the most drastic ontological consequences among those the 
authors mention and both Aristophanes (Nu. 1273) and Plato (Lg. 701d) played on it.  
 
§ 5.13 
ἐπεὶ…ἐστιν] This paragraph finally clarifies the point the author seems to have been 
driving at since § 5.11, namely to show that subtraction and addition, contrarily to what 
IT supporters are reported to say in § 5.10, actually change words, and, consequently, 
the things denoted by them, more substantially than modifications such as those of §§ 
5.11-12.  
One may wonder why a change in the length of a vowel, for example, should 
compromise the nature of a word less than the addition or the subtraction of a letter. I 
believe that the interpretive paradigm to adopt in order to answer this question is again 
the one of language as imitation appearing in the Cratylus, and which now seems 
particularly useful for its featuring the idea of artistic imitation (cf. Pl. Cra. 423d-e). In 
fact, for the likeness of an artistic reproduction the presence of all and only the distinctive 
characteristics of an object is more important than how the latter are rendered, provided, 
of course, that their rendering is not so poor as to compromise their recognisability. In 
the same way, a word, or a sentence, becomes less recognizable when some letters, or 
words, are added or subtracted, rather than when the latter components are just in 
different shapes or places. How the identity of a sentence is interwoven with the presence 
or the absence of its parts is discussed, with higher subtleness, in S.E. M. I.131-141 too. 
That this a fortiori argument moves from the little changes concerning accent, vowel 
length and collocation to the bigger ones of addition and subtraction further proves that 
the second speech of this chapter does not express a Socratic position. For both in Pl. Cra. 
394b and 432e Socrates ranks all these changes as equally innocuous for the nature of a 
word, and, hence, of the thing denoted by it. 
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§ 5.14 
αἴ τις…καττωὐτό] Just as §§ 5.10-13 take up the reflection on words of § 5.2, the use of 
numbers in the current example recalls the idea of measurement which characterized 
the following §§ 5.3-4.   
Commentators have usually stressed the sophistic nature of this argument, 
grouping it among the puzzles about addition and subtraction which sophists fancied, 
according to Pl. Phd. 101c and, especially, Arist. SE 178a30-35, where we read: 
 
Has a man lost what he had and afterwards has not? For he who has lost one die only will 
no longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens that he has lost something which he 
had before but no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost the whole amount or 
number which he no longer has? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with that which 
he has, in the conclusion with the total number; for the number was ten.436 
 
Aristotle classifies this argument among those ‘that turn on the identical expression of 
things which are not identical’437 (178a5-7). As Aristotle’s final explanation in this 
passage suggests, the clause ‘he […] will no longer have ten dice’ takes on the phrase 
‘to have something’ in a different way from that of ‘what he had and afterwards has 
not’ of the previous question, although one may be led to take it thus. Actually, this 
clause is no more than a synthetic form of the more proper ‘the dice which he will have 
will no longer be ten’, the stress of the negation being put on the number and not on the 
existence of the dice.  
Robinson sees this same logic in our argument, which he in fact sums up as ‘I no 
longer have all ten, so apparently I have lost all ten’.438 Furthermore, he equates the two 
passages to the Cratylus one analysed above. But here some problems arise, as this 
triangulation is anything but certain. First of all, precisely since our argument is close to 
                                                 
436 Translation from Forster (1955), 111-113. 
437 Translation from ibid., 109. 
438 Robinson (1979), 207. 
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one found in Cratylus, as I too argued earlier, it is also far from the sophistic fallacy told 
by Aristotle. For in that Platonic passage, Socrates was surely not sophistic in showing 
that Cratylus’ ideas on the nature of words led to a true disappearance of a word, such 
as that of two numbers involved in a calculation, when a new one, the result, replaces 
them. Aristotle’s fallacy, instead, turned on physical objects such as dice, whose 
disappearance after subtraction is just apparent, and which are hence optimal for 
making a sophism about them. Bearing this distinction between Robinson’s advocated 
parallels in mind, if we go back to our text, we immediately notice that differently from 
Sophistical Refutations, but similarly to the Cratylus, the numerals used here (δέκα and 
ἔν) are no further qualified, which has made all translators, including Robinson, read 
them as numbers rather than enumerated objects.439 As I just said about the Cratylus, by 
making such a choice, one also takes the argument seriously, not as a sophistic trick, 
and that perfectly tallies with the end of § 5.13 (καὶ τοῦτο δείξω οἷόν ἐστιν) which 
announces a serious explanation about how subtraction and addiction affect objects.  
If, in conclusion, the Cratylus is confirmed as our author’s benchmark at this height 
of the text, and in this paragraph in particular, it is also worth recalling how the first 
instance of a reasoning such as the current one is the so-called Growing Argument of 
Epicharmus of Kos, at DK23 B2. Although it describes a subtraction of physical tokens 
such as pebbles, its concern is unambiguously on the change of numbers, like the 
Cratylus, for which, in fact, Horky suggested it worked as a source.440 Finally, alternative 
formulations of our argument are attested in a few places of Sextus Empiricus, namely 
P. II.215, III.109, M. IV.25, X.323, and his interest for subjects such as, more generally, 
the relation between whole and parts (P. II.215-218), subtraction and addition (P. III.85-
96, M. IV.23-34, IX.303-330), becoming and perishing (P. III.109-114) is high. All this 
                                                 
439 For although in the commentary Robinson argued that the author is playing on the ambiguity of these 
two possible referents (Robinson (1979), 207), he too translated the passage as ‘if a man were to take away 
one from ten, there would no longer be ten or even one’ (ibid., 131). 
440 Horky (2013), 125-166. On how the argument of this paragraph echoes Epicharmus’ one, see also Menn 
(2010), 43–50.  
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made Robinson think of this paragraph as one of the most responsible for this work’s 
collocation at the end of Sextus’ codices.441  
 
§ 5.15 
τό…ἔστι] This final paragraph is one of the most controversial and there have hardly 
been two similar translations of it. I myself will propose a new one, which strays from 
Robinson’s, partially as regards the Greek text chosen too. The first two sure points from 
which I move are the initial mention of ‘the same man’ (τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον), who 
reappears for the first time after § 5.5, and the correspondence which we have just 
verified both between §§ 5.2 and 5.10-13, and between §§ 5.3-4 and 5.14. Taking them 
together, it is therefore likely that here the author completes his counter to the first 
speech by coming to contrast the idea that ‘the same man both lives and does not live’ 
(ζώει […] καὶ οὐ ζώει) of § 5.5. One may suspect the passage from that original 
formulation to ‘is and is not’ (τὸ...ἦμεν), but one must not overlook the possible 
contribution of the same vital value of εἰμί to it, as I earlier pointed out in the case of καὶ 
ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι of § 5.5 too.442  
Moving on, then, the author asks for clarification about the relative or absolute 
value which the opponents gave to their statement. Thus I interpret “τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα 
ἔστιν;”, in a way just seemingly identical to Robinson’s ‘does he exist in some particular 
respect or in every respect?’.443 For the latter is actually an incomplete request for 
clarification, as the previous clause involved not only the same man’s being, but also his 
not being (καὶ ἦμεν καὶ μὴ ἦμεν). Rather than the sole previous ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, I 
follow Freeman and Dillon and Gergel444 in assuming that the subject of ἔστιν is the 
                                                 
441 Robinson (1979), 208. 
442 See supra, 172-173. 
443 Robinson (1979), 131. 
444 ‘As for the argument that the same man both is and is not: the question to ask is, does this relate to the 
part or the whole?’ (Freeman (1946), 421), ‘Do we mean in some respect or in all respects?’ (Dillon/Gergel 
(2003), 429). 
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whole articulate infinitive clause τὸ…μὴ ἦμεν. On this interpretation, I hence read ἔστιν 
as exploiting the veridical use of εἰμί, namely as ‘be true’.445 
The fact that τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα applies to both ἦμεν and μὴ ἦμεν is also immediately 
confirmed in what follows, where, rather than on the same man’s being, the author 
prefers to focus on the idea that that man is not, and in an absolute way (οὐκῶν…ταῦτα). 
He, in fact, explains that this cannot be the case, because ‘every thing, in some way, is’ 
(πάντα…ἔστι). In the latter concluding remark, I see an epitome of the whole second 
speech, which, by showing how new entities can originate from the slightest change in 
pre-existent ones, has set the stage for a multiplication of the objects which are, as is said 
here. 
To sum up, this concluding paragraph elucidates the opposition between the non-
discriminatory ontology of the first speech, where all things were said to be and not to 
be (καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί, § 5.5) and hence identical the one to the other 
and not distinguishable from it, and a new opposed scenario where all things are, no 
matter how significantly distinguished (πάντα ὦν πῃ ἔστι, § 5.15). As touched on before 
in connection with the Cratylus too, it is noteworthy that both these ontologies can be 
drawn on Heraclitus, both being aspects of his same fluxism. For precisely because an 
object does not have a definite identity and can be said to be and not to be, it also 
undergoes innumerable changes which produce as many wholly new natures out of it. 
 
τὰ πάντα…ἔστι] In Robinson’s text the end reads ταῦτα πάντα ὦν πῃ ἔστι, with the 
period placed between εἰπών and ταῦτα, more similarly to the manuscripts which read 
εἰπόντες. ταῦτα πάντα (εἰπόντες was rightly emended in εἰπών by Mullach for the 
sake of concordance with the singular τις).446 The translation which then springs from 
this text is ‘all these things exist in some way’, which is a bit obscure, as the author has 
just been talking exclusively about the specific case of a man who is and is not. I, 
                                                 
445 Kahn (2003), 355-362, 368-370. 
446 Robinson (1979), 130, Mullach (1875), 550. 
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therefore, agree with Diels on moving the period one word forward, but without turning 
ταῦτα into ταὐτά, as he did.447 For ταῦτα perfectly takes up the initial proposition τὸ 
δὲ…μὴ ἦμεν which, when connected with τὰ πάντα through the circumstantial 
participle εἰπών, constitutes a conditional clause bearing a fitting answer to the question 
‘τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;’ Finally, precisely in order to exploit the predicative construction 
τὰ πάντα εἰπών ταῦτα (‘if he means that in all respects’), I removed the double 
quotations of direct speech which Robinson introduced between τὰ πάντα and which 
make sense only with the punctuation he gave to his text.448 
 
πῃ] Many translators treated this particle as a synonym of τι and hence as hinting at a 
specific nature as opposed to the general one of τὰ πάντα, as we can see from the 
question “τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;” This choice has been defended especially on the grounds 
of the Aristotelian distinction between being either something (τι) or in some way (παρὰ 
τό πῃ), and being absolutely (ἁπλῶς), appearing in Arist. SE 166b37-167a20.449 However, 
one may wonder why if the author really wanted to repeat the same idea as before, he 
did not similarly use τι in the last sentence, as he had done immediately before with τὰ 
πάντα. Furthermore, unlike in Aristotle, here πῃ is not accompanied by any preposition 
and in this simple form it does not usually mean anything more than ‘in some way’ (see 
LSJ, s.v. πῃ, I).  
I do not, therefore, agree with Kranz that the final sentence which features this 
expression makes the Socratic point that everything is connected with a specific 
quality.450 That, again, would have been more likely in case of a second occurrence of 
τι, and we must also remember the anti-Socratic, and, instead, Cratylean, spirit which 
the second speech has had so far; an abrupt inversion of its would be hardly excusable 
                                                 
447 Diels (1903), 585. 
448 Robinson (1979), 130, the whole sentence being translated as ‘thus, if anyone denies that the man in 
question exists, he is making the mistake of asserting “in every respect”’ (ibid., 131). 
449 Robinson (1979), 209, Fait (2007), 118. 
450 Kranz (1937), 231. 
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at its very end. Finally, Socrates believes that the human delimitation of the essences is 
the task of the art of dialectic, and that it therefore requires a knowledge and precision 
which do not seem to fit this πῃ (see, for example, Pl. Phdr. 277b-c). 
 
Chapter 6 
§ 6.1  
οὔτ’ ἀληθής, οὔτε καινός] This expression seems to suggest a ‘strong proclivity on 
the author’s part’, as Robinson put it, but the antilogic nature of the chapter which will 
fully emerge at the end of it, must refrain one from quick conclusions on the author’s 
preference for either side of the dispute.451 Robinson is, instead, right when spotting  a 
similiarity with ‘Gorgian rhetorical mannerism’452 of DK82 B11a, where ‘both the terms 
καινός and ἀληθής are used and in a remarkably similar fashion to here: εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
ἀνοήτους, καινὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθής’.453 That the unteachability thesis was not 
new is proved by sources prior to the sophists’ educational revolution in the 5th century 
BCE (cf. Thgn. 434-439, P. O. 2.86, 9.28, P. 8.44, N. 3.38-42),454 and probably even by a 
sophist like Gorgias, who at Pl. Men. 95c is said to laugh at people who promise to teach 
excellence, claiming to instruct only in the skill of speaking. 
 
σοφία] In agreement with Classen,455 I selected the reading σοφία, prevalent in the 
manuscripts, instead the Ionic σοφίη of the P3, followed by Robinson.456  
 
σοφία…μαθητόν] Both here and in § 6.7 the author prefers the pairing σοφία καὶ 
ἀρετά to its single components. This is also confirmed by the collective reference to 
                                                 
451  Robinson (1979), 210. On the author‘s actual commitment to the speeches he displayed chapters 1-5, 
see infra, 281-282. 
452 Robinson (1979), 92, n. 85. 
453 Ibid. 
454 See Jaeger (1989), 364-418. 
455 Classen (2004), 109.   
456 Robinson (1979), 130. 
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them through the singular neuter διδακτὸν εἴη οὔτε μαθητόν 457 in place of the possible 
plural feminine,458 which has motivated my use of the pronoun ‘something’ in the 
translation, as a medium between the nouns and the adjectives. The morphological 
connection between σοφία and ἀρετά hints at their conceptual kinship, which it is 
crucial to convey in the translation. σοφία and ἀρετά, in fact, were what sophists 
particularly boasted to teach to their pupils, as will also emerge in §§ 6.5-6.459 The most 
famous of them was Protagoras, as described in the eponymous Platonic dialogue, 
which now is particularly useful to the translation of these two terms.  
At Prt. 318e-319a, Protagoras’ teaching (μάθημα) is defined as ‘the political 
technique’ (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη); then, moving to 319e, we see Socrates contrasting the 
possibility that such a technique could provide that kind of excellence (ἀρετή) in public 
life that Protagoras promised to the young Hippocrates (at 322b,e, 323b,e ἀρετή too is 
qualified as πολιτική). I suggest that the translation of ἀρετά that best fits the 
arguments which our text too proposes is precisely that in terms of excellence, meant as 
one’s value in a sociopolitical context, measurable according to its public 
acknowledgement (cf. § 6.6 and ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, 316c).460 On the other 
hand, translating σοφία according to the Protagorean definition of his μάθημα entails 
some difficulties. In fact, if we looked for something close to τέχνη and translated it as 
‘knowledge’, ‘expertise’ or ‘skill’ (LSJ, s.v. σοφία 1), this would be inadequate for some 
examples proposed later in the chapter, as I will show, and we would fail to account for 
part of the meaning of σοφιστής too.  
                                                 
457 See also §§ 6.3, 6.13 for other two occurrences of διδακτόν.  
458 Likewise, in the openings of two other works of the Platonic corpus which are close in contents to ours, 
namely at Pl. Men. 70a1-4 and [Pl.] Virt. 376a, the same neuter adjectives are referred to ἀρετή and one 
must also assume that σοφία is just implicit and not absent, given the belief in a tight connection between 
σοφία and ἀρετά that these dialogues share with our chapter. 
459 Yet, such a claim was far from being commonly accepted and people from different backgrounds 
strongly opposed it, in a way that again perfectly fits the contrasting nature of our text (Pl. Prt. 316c-d, 
Men. 91c-92d, R.VI 492a-d). 
460 As Kerferd put it, ἀρετή indicated ‘those qualities in a man which made for success in Greek society 
and which could confidently be expected to secure the admiration of a man’s fellow-citizens, followed in 
many cases by substantial material rewards’ (Kerferd (1981), 131). 
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The term originally denoted ‘tout homme qui excelle dans un art, devin, chanteur, 
poète, orateur, sage […]’;461 only from the mid-5th century it ‘désigne un professeur 
d’éloquence, et se trouve pris en mauvaise part, par ex., chez Ar. et Pl. “sophiste, 
charlatan”, etc.’462 However, that the former connotation still echoed in the latter is 
proved in some places, especially in Plato’s Protagoras again. Firstly, at Pl. Prt. 316d-
317b, Protagoras declares that he practises the ancient sophistic art (ἡ σοφιστικὴ τέχνη 
[…] παλαιά), just as in the ancient times did poets like Homer, Hesiods and Simonides, 
legendary and magical figures like Orphaeus and Musaeus, gymnasts like Iccus of 
Tarentum and Herodicus of Selymbria, musicians like Agathocles and Pythoclides of 
Ceos, whο all aimed at educating men (παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους). The only difference was 
that they hid and masked their art under the name of specialised arts. As Kerferd 
suggested, here Protagoras deems his ancient precursors σοφισταί ‘not in virtue of 
techniques or special skills, but in virtue of the content of their thinking and teaching, 
their wisdom or Sophia’.463 In the same way, some pages before, at 311e-312b, 
Hippocrates’ difficulty in defining the kind of σοφία peculiar to the sophist proves that 
the outlines of this concept were more blurred than those of any other technique. Soon 
after, at 312c, his attempt at defining σοφιστής as ‘the man who knows wise things’. 
through an incorrect etymology shows that he still bears in mind the earlier meaning of 
the term.464 Finally, at 318e-319a, the political art is described as ‘sound judgement’ 
(εὐβουλία) in private and public matters, confirming that Protagoras’ pupils would 
                                                 
461 DELG, s.v. σοφιστής. Likewise, the etymological definition of σοφία presents the term as true ‘aussi 
du poète, du savant, de la sagesse pratique, de la sagesse en general’ (DELG, s.v. σοφία). Similarly, 
Kerferd made a thorough classification of ‘the earlier uses of σοφιστής according to the type of person to 
whom it is applied’ (Kerferd (1950), 8). This list is grounded on numerous sources starting from Pi. I. V 
28, and shows how the word firstly indicated ‘poets, including Homer and Hesiod […] musicians and 
rhapsodes […] diviners and seers […] the seven wise men […] similar early wise men […] presocratic 
philosophers […] contrivers, often with suggestions on mysterious powers’ (Kerferd (1950), 8).  
462 DELG, s.v. σοφιστής. 
463 Kerferd (1976), 28. 
464 See also Kerferd (1950), 9. 
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have acquired not just some knowledge — as Waterfield translated465 — but also a form 
of wisdom, although in practical matters, by learning his technique.  
In conclusion, in the σοφία professed by Protagoras and sketched in chapter 6, 
there is still a trace of the wisdom of ‘those who in one way or another function as the 
Sages, the exponents of knowledges in early communities’;466 and that hence justifies the 
almost unanimous translation of this word as ‘wisdom’.  
But even though that is the meaning our author gives to σοφία throughout chapter 
6, he presents two different views on how this concept stands with that of technique 
(τέχνη). In fact, the first thesis claims that wisdom has nothing to do with techniques, 
whereas the second position will describe wisdom as one of them. This is testified by 
the logic of the examples involving techniques, that are put forward in support of both 
positions; in the first case, their aim is contrastive (§ 6.3), whereas in the second it is 
assimilative (§§ 6.7, 8, 10). Precisely as a consequence of this first disagreement between 
the two positions, it will then follow that the first one declares it impossible to teach and 
learn wisdom, as Socrates and Anytus maintain in the Protagoras and the Meno, whereas 
the second position defends such a possibility in virtue of the technical status of the 
subject, as done by Protagoras in the Protagoras too.  
 
§ 6.2 
ὡς...ἔχειν] This first proof has been wrongly compared by many scholars to Gorgias’ 
demonstration of the incommunicability of what we comprehend in the Περὶ τοῦ μὴ 
ὄντος, at DK82 B3,83-86. In particular, Untersteiner regarded the loss of knowledge467 
which here the author envisages for the teacher as the simple appearance of a new 
wisdom in the learner, different from the teachers’ one, which does not vanish.468 
                                                 
465 Waterfield (2000), 296.  
466 Kerferd (1950), 8. 
467 Untersteiner read σοφία as ‘sapienza’ in the translation, but as ‘conoscenza’ in the commentary note. 
(Untersteiner (1954), 179-180).  
468 See ibid. Solana Dueso supported this comparison (Solana Dueso (1996), 162). 
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Dupréel, instead, first recognised that in this case we are before a sophism based on the 
truism that we cannot hand something to someone and still retain it. Then, he explored 
the possibility of a Gorgianic source of the passage, but this time in the spirit of the 
demonstration of the unknowability and inconceivability of being at DK82 B3,77-82. By 
a general consideration concerning something happening to all the existing things, the 
author would have implicitly stressed the fact that since we do not lose our wisdom 
when we transmit it to another person, ‘le connaître est tout autre chose que l’être et […] 
la virtue, en particulier, n’est pas une chose, mais un simple rapport occasionel’.469  
I agree with Robinson470 that both interpretations miss the sense of the text. As for 
Untersteiner’s comparison, it misinterprets the idea conveyed by the author, which is 
clearly about the loss of wisdom on one’s part in favour of the acquisition of it by 
another. A more similar image is given, instead, at Pl. Smp. 175d, where the transmission 
of wisdom (σοφία) from a wiser to a less wise man is depicted as water flowing through 
wool from a fuller to an emptier cup. Dupréel’s mistake, instead, consists in extending 
Gorgias’ negation of the possibility of knowledge to our text, where just the teachability 
of wisdom is in question. The only similarity I can see between Gorgias’ and our 
author’s arguments is that they are expressed through conditional sentences.471  
Finally, the possibility that the teachers of wisdom and excellence turn out not to 
be expert themselves seems to be reminiscent of Pl. Men. 96a-b, where Socrates says that 
excellence is the only subject in which its alleged masters are actually inexpert.  
 
§ 6.3 
ἄλλα… ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν] That the absence of proven teachers represents a proof of 
the unteachability of wisdom and excellence is an idea which, too, appears in Plato’s 
                                                 
469 Dupréel (1948), 94. 
470 Robinson (1979), 212. 
471 Provided we assume the beginnings of Gorgias’ argumentations κἂν ᾖ τι, τοῦτο ἀγνωστόν τε καὶ 
ἀνεπινόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ and εἰ καταλαμβανοίτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἑτέρῳ as representative of the 
entire arguments at DK82 B3,77-82, 83-87. 
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Protagoras and Meno. At Prt. 319b-d, Socrates reflects on the fact that when Athenians 
need advice on arts (τέχναι)472 like architecture or shipbuilding, they turn to their 
architects and shipbuilders,473 whereas when they have to decide about the 
administration of the city, everyone, no matter what his job is, feels that he is able to 
contribute with his own opinion. His conclusion is that Athenians do not consider this 
matter a teachable one. As for Men. 89d-e, the likeness to our paragraph is even stronger. 
Firstly, Meno agrees with Socrates that if something is teachable, then there must exist 
teachers (διδάσκαλοι) and learners of it. Then, in a sort of modus tollendo tollens, they 
infer that if there are no teachers of a certain subject, then that subject is not teachable. 
And this is the case of political excellence, whose teachers Socrates says he is not able to 
find.474 
 
ὡς τᾶς μωσικᾶς] We have already seen that τέχνη is the term used for teachable 
disciplines for which there are proven teachers. The same noun is implicit after μουσική, 
a discipline with which now the author contrasts wisdom and excellence. Since music 
is here mentioned for its being a technique, the argument works only if the other term 
of the contrast, σοφία καὶ ἀρετά, was not seen as being technically taught as well. This 
is a textual grounding to prefer a translation of σοφία as ‘wisdom’ instead of ‘expertise’ 
or ‘skill’, as discussed above.  
 
§ 6.4 
τρίτα…φίλως] From the usage of a present supposition implying that the condition is 
not fulfilled, the author seems again to suggest that reality declares one of the 
consequences of the teachability thesis — namely that wise men have taught wisdom 
                                                 
472 Pl. Prt. 319c.  
473 A similar exemplification is given also at Pl. Men. 90b-e and [Pl.] Virt. 376b-c. 
474 The same concept is repeated at Pl. Men. 96a-d and seems to emerge from the conclusion of Thucydides’ 
example at [Pl.] Virt. 378c, too. 
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and excellence to their acquaintances — impossible and, hence, that the thesis itself must 
be false. 
Such an impossibility is exemplarily shown by Plato too, through some major 
figures in the history of Athenian democracy. At Pl. Prt. 319e-320b, Socrates attacks the 
teachability of the political art with the specific case of Pericles: ‘about the subject about 
which he himself is wise, neither he personally taught it [to his children], nor did he 
entrust it to someone else’s care’. In fact, he let his children search for the political 
excellence by themselves, like sacred animals at pasture.  
Then, at Pl. Men. 93a-94e Socrates draws on this same theme in his discussion with 
Anytus, calling his attention to the fact that although many were and are the men who 
are good at politics (ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά), none of them has ever been a good teacher 
of his own excellence (διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ […] τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς). On this occasion, 
Socrates quotes some examples too, starting with Themistocles who taught his child 
Cleophantus how to be a good rider and to perform numerous exercises on the horse, 
these activities being again described as ‘what pertained to good teachers’ (ὅσα 
διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο). Unfortunately, he did not manage to make of him ‘a man 
excellent and wise in the matters in which his father was so’. The same could be said of 
Lysimachus and his son Aristides, of Pericles with Paralus and Xanthippus, and of 
Thucydides and his sons Melesias and Stephanus (cf. also [Pl.] Virt. 377a-378c, Pl. La. 179a-
d, 180b, Alc. I 118c-119a).  
 
§ 6.5 
τετάρτα…ὠφέληθεν] Finally the sophists appear on the scene, confirming my initial 
supposition that it is within their doctrines and teaching that one must look for the 
wisdom and the excellence here debated. Moreover, for the first time the reductio ad 
adsurdum makes room for a new mode of argumentation, consisting in the falsification 
by counterexample of what is taken as a common belief, namely that sophists are the 
masters of wisdom and excellence. From a logical point of view, we can appreciate how 
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the author attacks the implication ‘(x) (Sx → Ix)’ (with men as domain of ‘x’, ‘Sx’ 
meaning ‘x goes to the sophists’, and ‘Ix’ meaning ‘x improves’), by producing a case 
which contradicts this rule, ‘(x) (Sx   Ix)’, which is a form equivalent to ‘ (x) (Sx 
→ Ix)’. In conclusion, the fact that sometimes even sophists fail seems here to be used as 
a new proof for the non-existence of acknowledged teachers of wisdom and excellence. 
Its function to conclude that these cannot be taught at all has already been argued for. 
Mistrust in the results of the sophistic teaching is reported, with much more 
emphasis, also at Pl. Men. 91c, where Anytus mounts a strong accusation against 
sophists, saying that ‘these are a clear ruin and calamity for those who associate with 
them’.  
 
§ 6.6  
πέμπτα…γεγένηνται] Here again, we are before a real life case, meant to contrast the 
connection between frequenting the sophists and the acquisition of wisdom and 
excellence. This time, however, the target of the argument is slightly different: in fact, it 
excludes the necessity, for one who ‘became important’ (ἄξιοι λόγω γεγένηνται) of 
having gone to the sophists: ‘(x) (Ix   Sx)’ is equivalent to ‘ (x) (Ix → Sx)’. On a 
first level, the claim of this argument seems to be that sophists’ formal teaching of 
wisdom and excellence is not a  necessary condition for one to learn those. However, 
given the reference —  implicit in § 6.5, explicit in § 6.7 — to sophists as the 
acknowledged teachers of these subjects, and recalling the wider scope of the 
teachability thesis, a further point is that the teaching of wisdom and excellence as such 
is not necessary for these to be learnt. For the first time, teachability and learnability are 
hence separated. 
Once again, Plato too, in the Laches, shows the case of people who improved 
without the aid of any teacher in general. Firstly, at 185e Laches reminds Socrates that 
in some arts (τέχναι) there are persons who have even surpassed the masters, without 
taking lessons from them. In his reply, at 186c, Socrates agrees and quotes his own 
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experience as a self-taught man in the discipline of education, because of the 
unaffordable costs of taking lessons from the sophists, the only ones who promise to 
make someone good and excellent (καλός τε κἀγαθός). These attributes go together 
with the one used in our paragraph, ἄξιοι λόγω, according to the ideology of ἀρετή of 
that time. A more fitting example of how excellence could not be disjointed from social 
recognition is the one, already mentioned, of Prt. 316c. Finally, at Isoc. Oratio Contra 
Sophistas 14, some people are said, in very similar words, to have become impressive in 
speaking and dealing with public affairs even though they have never frequented a 
sophist. The same argument pattern occurs, in a medical context, at Hp. de Arte 5: ‘there 
are sick people who recover health without going to the physician’.   
 
§ 6.7  
ἐγὼ…ἀρετάν;] Here starts the second speech of the chapter which replies to the 
‘teachability thesis’475 which has been discussed so far with what it seems more proper 
to define as unteachability position, than ‘thesis’. For it consists only in a severe 
statement against the first thesis, followed by a cluster of counterarguments against its 
five proofs, and as Becker and Scholz remarked, only in the final sentence the author 
hinted at the existence of a second thesis (λόγος, § 6.13).476   
Commenting on this paragraph, Robinson put forward the hypothesis that ‘the 
author would perhaps be willing to accept a “qualified” version of the thesis of 6.1-6’.477 
He argued this on the basis of the final sentence of the chapter and due to the fact that 
as the first thesis has been defended through arguments which presented it in an 
absolute sense, the author might now be rejecting only this unqualified reading of it. 
For the moment, I will respond only to the second point, leaving the first for my 
commentary on § 6.13. There is no doubt that the five arguments seen so far interpret 
                                                 
475 Robinson (1979), 213. 
476 Becker/Scholz (2004), 100. 
477 Robinson (1979), 213. 
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the unteachability thesis in an absolute sense. But at  this stage of the text, it is just the 
thesis (τόνδε τὸν λόγον) that the author now calls ‘silly’, saying nothing about its proofs 
(ταὶ ἀποδείξιες), criticized later in § 6.13. Furthermore, Robinson added that ‘in similar 
fashion, he [scil. ‘the author’] never actively attacks the ‘qualified version’ of the 
identity-thesis in chapters 1-4 […] and probably 5 also’.478 But that is just a part of the 
story. In fact, whereas in chapter 6 and, pace Robinson, chapter 5 the terms of the first 
theses present predications with absolute value,  in chapters 1-4 the first theses do have 
a qualified nature, according to their initial statement, which roughly states that the 
same object has two opposite properties under different conditions.479 It follows that not 
attacking the qualified version of the first theses, and, rather, targeting the absolute one, 
represents a rhetorical means in the first four chapters, but an act of intellectual honesty 
in the following two.  
 
γινώσκω…κιθαρίζεν] Analysing the author’s new rhetorical strategy, we see how he 
now wants to demolish the previous proofs, one by one, ‘by the production of counter-
cases’.480 The first, directed towards the argument in § 6.2, involves the professional 
categories of grammar teachers and kithara-players, who are shown not to lose their 
specific knowledge after having taught it, as claimed in the reductio ad absurdum of the 
first thesis. A strikingly similar reflection is put forward by Socrates at Pl. Alc. I 118c-d, 
where the teachers of letters, citharists and gymnasts, are cited as example of how 
someone who has wisdom in a certain field is also able to transmit it to other people (cf. 
also Prt. 312b, 325d-326c).  
This reply also enables the same twofold interpretation as the rival argument did. 
From a general point of view, the two disciplines mentioned by the author prove that 
teaching does not have such paradoxical consequences. At the same time, the counter-
                                                 
478 Ibid.  
479 See also infra, 279.   
480 Robinson (1979), 213. 
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argument replies to the implicit allusion to the particular teaching of wisdom and 
excellence made by the first speech, proposing two disciplines considered to be 
teachable. Once again, the notion of τέχνη as something teachable turns out to be central 
and just as in § 6.3 the argument relied on the idea, peculiar to the first speech, that 
wisdom and excellence are not arts, the current argument is grounded on the opposite 
assumption.  
 
καὶ αὐτῶν <ἕκαστος>] This solution is one of two conjectures by Orelli.481 καὶ αὐτός, 
Robinson’s reading of the codices,482 would, in fact, abruptly introduce a new 
unspecified male individual in the discourse. 
 
πρὸς…ἀρετάν;] With regard to this second reply, addressed against § 6.3 and split 
between this and the following paragraph, Pl. Euthd. 278d, 283a and Men. 91a-e too 
present wisdom and excellence as the objects of teaching which make sophists famous 
and rich. So, even though Robinson was right when he considered this example ‘hardly 
an answer to 6.3’,483 because it fails to justify ‘the acceptability of certain sophists’ 
claims’,484 we must remember that, according to many people, they were indeed the 
teachers of wisdom and excellence, and, so, the response has some rhetorical strength.485 
From this point of view, unlike in § 6.5, here ἀποδεδεγμένοι may have conveyed to the 
ancient Greek reader not just the idea of epistemic validity (‘proven’), but also that of 
the sophists’ reputation (‘acknowledged’).486 
                                                 
481 Von Orelli (1821), 652. 
482 Robinson (1979), 132.  
483 Ibid., 214. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Interestingly, Roochnick observed: ‘what matters is that the author, in shoring up the positive side of 
the argument, simply points to what he takes to be an observable fact: there are teachers of virtue out 
there. A contemporary parallel might well be to members of the clergy. They exist. Some claim to teach 
virtue. Some perhaps, only a very few, are even “acknowledged” to do so’ (Roochnick (1997), 7). 
486 Robinson’s choice of ‘acknowledged’ in both cases also goes paradoxically against his stance that this 
argument does not reply to § 6.3 (Robinson (1979), 214).   
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σοφίαν] The choice of most codices’ reading instead of Robinson’s487 σοφίην follows 
what I earlier said about σοφία of § 6.1. 
 
§ 6.8 
ἤ] It is not necessary to delete the introductory ἤ, as done by Wilamowitz488 and agreed 
on, among the others, by Robinson.489 Here this disjunctive conjunction just introduces 
a new case undergoing the same logic of the previous one about sophists, so the 
translation to ‘or’ is fitting, as firstly shown by North, who translated ‘aut’.490 
  
ἤ…ἦεν;] Again with the aim of contrasting the idea that there cannot be teachers of 
excellence, now the author gives the counter-example of philosophers such as those of 
Anaxagoras and Pythagoras’ schools, which confirms the necessity of a translation of 
σοφία as ‘wisdom’ rather than ‘knowledge’ or ‘expertise’.  
Robinson thought that ‘such references suggest that the author is using the term 
σοφιστής in an extremely broad sense’,491 comprehending both sophists and 
philosophers, whereas Kranz492 and Untersteiner493 took this new example just as that of 
other possible individuals concerned with the problem of wisdom and excellence. There 
is some truth in both positions, because, on the one hand, the author presents this case 
as a new one, including it in a separate question, distinct from that about the sophists, 
this term meaning the new class of professional teachers. On the other hand, he is likely 
to have exploited the earlier and broader sense of the word, according to which 
Anaxagoras and Pythagoras too were considered σοφισταί, as reported respectively at 
Isoc. Antidosis 235 and Hdt. 4.95. 
                                                 
487 Ibid., 132. 
488 Diels (1903), 586; Diels (1907), 646. 
489 Robinson (1979), 132. 
490 North (1671), 71. 
491 Robinson (1979), 214. 
492 Kranz (1937), 228. 
493 Untersteiner (1954), 180. 
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τὸ…ποιεῖν] This short paragraph ends with the story of Polyclitus, reminiscent of Prt. 
328c, as we saw earlier on. In reply to the argument in § 6.4, that considers it impossible 
for wise people to teach their acquaintances, the author parallels wisdom to sculpture, 
and, once again, such a comparison is possible only on the basis of the technical nature 
which he assumes the two subjects have.  
It also confirms that in our text ἀρετή does not have a moral value, as I initially 
underlined. In fact, once Roochnick, who thought so, came to this point, he found the 
counter-argument ‘puzzling’,494 ‘a non sequitur’,495 and he thought that if ‘the negative 
[scil. ‘the first’] thesis depends upon the disanalogy between techne and virtue […] then 
Polyclitus teaching his son an art is irrelevant’.496 But in saying this, he fell into two 
misunderstandings. The slighter was to assume that the author is compelled to accept 
the opposition between τέχνη and ἀρετή, characteristic of § 6.3, in the second position 
too, despite the fact that in § 6.7 he has already proved to radically change his mind 
about from it. The more important one was the belief in a disconnect not only between 
art and excellence, but implicitly also between wisdom and excellence, whereas the two 
concepts have been presented as interconnected since § 6.1. Only by taking Polyclitus’ 
wisdom in his field as the object of his teaching to his son the passage appears not only 
a coherent reply, but also a fitting one to the first thesis’ proof. In fact, Polyclitus is 
known to be not only a sculptor, but a good one, and, so, in teaching his wisdom he 
cannot but also teach his excellence.  
 
§ 6.9  
καὶ…διδάξαι] By Polyclitus’ example, the author has replied to the proof of § 6.4 and 
now he seems to use the same case to get to a different and more general conclusion: 
that not only is it possible to teach wisdom and excellence to people familiar to us, but 
                                                 
494 Roochnick (1997), 8. 
495 Ibid. 
496 Ibid. 
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that it is possible to teach in general. This is what in § 6.2 the first thesis excluded and, 
so, for the first and only time, the second position exploits the consequences of an 
example addressed to a certain proof, to attack another one too.   
 
δ’ εἷς τις ἐδίδαξε] This is Wilamowitz’s conjecture in place of δ’ ἔστι διδάξαι in the 
codices497 and it leads to a particular present supposition implying nothing as to the 
fulfilment of the condition. If the reading of the codices were correct, in fact, there would 
be the tautology “if it is possible to teach, there is a proof that teaching is possible”. 
Robinson followed it and tried to solve the difficulty by assuming that an αὐτῷ was left 
out498 and, so, translating the conditional sentence as ‘if he is able to teach it, there is 
your proof that it is possible to do so’.499 But here the author recalls Polyclitus’ case not 
just as that in which the possibility of teaching is shown (ἔστι διδάξαι), but as the one 
of a single man (εἷς τις) who actually taught (ἐδίδαξε). It is with this individual 
empirical evidence that the observation of the first sentence about a generic man (τις) 
who does not teach (μὴ διδάξῃ) can be best paired and contrasted, in order to conclude 
that it is possible to teach. Dupréel was, thus, right in saying that this exploitation of the 
case of a single individual to draw a broader conclusion on ‘la possibilité’500 of 
communicating wisdom testifies ‘une belle concision de logicien’501 on the author’s part: 
a single negative case (the fact that a single man does not teach) is not sufficient either 
to affirm a thesis (i.e. to say that teaching is possible) or to discard it (to say that teaching 
is not possible). 
 
 
 
                                                 
497 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 8, n. 1. 
498 Robinson (1979), 214. 
499 Ibid., 133. 
500 Dupréel (1948), 212. 
501 Ibid. 
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§ 6.10  
τέταρτον…μαθόντες] The first sentence reintroduces the proof of § 6.5, emphasising 
it a little, if we consider that it talks about ‘the people’ (τοί) and not just about ‘some’ 
(τινες), and that the sophists mentioned are now described also as wise (σοφοί). The 
second sentence, then, presents the real counter-argument, it too relying on the  
technical nature of wisdom. It, in fact, uses the case of letters to show how a possible 
failure in learning a discipline is not sufficient to prove its unteachability; the learner’s 
skill may not be up to the contents taught.  
 
τοί…παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν] I followed Weber’s preference for the transmitted 
reading τοί and not the broadly accepted τοι, first adopted in Stephanus’ edition.502 The 
main reason for this is that in some dialects, including the Doric, the enclitic form stands 
just for the dative singular of the personal pronoun σύ503 and not for the indefinite 
pronoun τινες, as it was taken in their translations by North, Untersteiner and 
Sprague.504 Robinson too chose τοι,505 but, unlike the former translators, he read it as 
‘those in question’, leaving the following παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν without any other 
suitable element to depend on and working out a sophisticated construction to solve the 
problem.506 Moreover, this value of demonstrative pronoun ironically coincides with 
one of the three possible for the codices reading τοί.507 The other two are that of a relative 
pronoun,508 and that of a determinative article,509 which is the one I have preferred, since 
                                                 
502 Stephanus (1570), 480, Weber (1897), 48. 
503 Buck (1973), 98. 
504 North (1671), 71 Untersteiner (1954), 181, Sprague (1972), 290. For this point see also Robinson (1979), 
215.  
505 Ibid., 132. 
506 ‘The fourth point <is valid only> if those in question do not become wise after associating with skilled 
sophists’ (ibid., 133). τοι is endorsed also by Classen, but without any justification (Classen (2004), 111). 
507 Buck (1973), 100. 
508 Ibid., 101. 
509 Ibid., 100. 
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it manages to incorporate παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν into the restrictive adjective clause 
‘the people coming from wise sophists’. 
 
§ 6.11 
ἔστι δέ τις καὶ φύσις.] In contrast to Robinson,510 who followed Diels,511 I have kept 
the codices’ period after φύσις, which logically separates this proposition from its 
following explanation.  
This sentence seems both to support the reply to § 6.5, already started in § 6.10, 
and to address § 6.6, since both proofs entailed the fundamental importance of natural 
skills in any activity; the former by showing how a lack of skills can prevent the 
learning, the latter how natural talent sometimes makes the formal instruction 
unnecessary.  
 
αἰ δέ] Once again, I have stuck to the codices and kept αἰ δέ, instead of Diels’ ᾇ δή,512 
adopted by Robinson.513 Therefore, I have taken δέ according to its possible function of 
copulative particle in explanatory clause514 and traslated it with ‘in fact’, as Mullach did 
first.515  
 
αἰ… γενόμενος] The passage is reminiscent of Pl. Prt. 327b-c, in which Protagoras 
outlines the contribution of talent in any field in general, to prove its contribution in 
excellence in particular, without denying the necessity of teaching as well, which 
perfectly agrees with the author’s view. It is also worth highlighting a closeness in the 
                                                 
510 Robinson (1979), 132. 
511 Diels (1903), 586. 
512 Diels (1903), 586. 
513 Robinson (1979), 132.  On the outcomes of this choice see also infra, 206, n. 523. 
514 LSJ, s.v. δέ, II 2 a. See also Deniston (2002), 169-171. 
515 ‘Enim’ (Mullach (1875), 551).  
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use of the adjectives ἀφυής (‘without natural talent’), used by Plato and opposite to 
our εὐφυής, and ἱκανός (‘competent’), present in both texts.516  
 
ῥᾳδίως…μητρός] The path to wisdom followed by talented persons consists in taking 
their cue from their parents’ conduct, in the same way as they learn from them how to 
speak their mother tongue without being taught. So, again, the author is saying 
something reminiscent of Pl. Prt. 320a, where the wise Pericles is said to have let his 
sons ‘graze alone like sacred animals, with the hope that they meet excellence by 
themselves’. Rightly, Solana Dueso drew attention to τὸ αὐτόματον, a phrase that 
Socrates uses in this sentence and also at Pl. Prt. 323c, Men. 92e, Alc. I 118c (cf. also  Hp. 
de Arte 6), to describe the same learning without teaching that our author too 
imagines.517 Dupréel, then, saw this autodidactic process as a direct learning of the 
things themselves without them passing through words, ‘tandis que les professeurs 
enseignent inséparablement les choses et les mots’.518    
Rightly Robinson underlines how ‘the ‘reply’ embodied in 6.11 turns out to be 
more of an explanation of the point made at 6.6 than a denial of it’.519 For here the author 
specifies what enables someone to learn wisdom and excellence without receiving 
sophistic education — which was the point of § 6.6 — namely his being one of few (τις) 
naturally endowed (εὐφυής) individuals. 
 
συνάρπαξε] This is Schanz’s correction of the codices’ συναρπάξαι,520 kept by 
Robinson.521 Once again, this change from the infinitive aorist to the third singular 
                                                 
516 See also Kranz (1937), 228 and Solana Dueso (1996), 161. Solana Dueso recalled how in Hp. de Arte 11 
the human nature is said to influence medical activity. 
517 Ibid., 161-162. 
518 Dupréel (1948), 212. 
519 Robinson (1979), 216-217. 
520 Schanz (1884), 384. 
521 Robinson (1979), 132. 
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person of the indicative aorist522 turns out to be fundamental, since it provides the long 
string of words εὐφυὴς…μαθὼν with a verb with a definite mood and, so, the entire 
conditional sentence with an apodosis, otherwise absent.523 In terms of content, this 
usage of the verb συναρπάζω (‘to grasp’), which does not occur elsewhere in the 
chapter, in place of the usual μανθάνω (‘to learn’), can be considered the author’s way 
of expressing the kind of autonomous and spontaneous learning that we have seen to 
be suggested by Plato’s phrase τὸ αὐτόματον.  
 
§ 6.12 
αἰ δέ… ἴσαμες] The paragraph is devoted to a new interesting thought experiment, this 
time about language learning. Gera observed how it showcases some typical traits of 
this kind of epistemological device. Firstly, the author addresses this experiment to a 
precise audience, that is ‘a hypothetical doubter’ (αἰ…γίνεσθαι), through a clause, 
γνώτω ἐκ τῶνδε, that is reminiscent of the one used by Hyppocrates in his account of 
an experiment on freezing water at Hp. Aër. 8, γνοίης δ’ ἄν ὧδε, due to its invitation to 
the reader ‘to try things for himself’.524 Then, as regards its first part (αἴ τις 
                                                 
522 Devoid of the augment, as usual in Doric with the ‘Augment der Praeterita von Verben, deren Stamm 
mit α anfängt’ (Weber (1898), 73).   
523 Those who did not adopt this correction tended to commit grammar infractions, like North who 
translated συναρπάξαι with ‘arripuerat’ (North (1671), 72), or Fabricius and Orelli, who had it governed 
by the former εὐφυής and, so, were compelled to turn the participle γενόμενος into the indicative perfect 
‘natus fuit’ (Fabricius (1724), 631; Von Orelli (1821), 229). Finally, Mullach wrongly found in γενόμενος 
and the infinitive συναρπάξαι the same construction as the Latin ‘natus’ + ad + either gerund or 
gerundive, and he translated ‘natusque ad plurima prope sine litterarum studiis facile arripienda’ 
(Mullach (1875), 551). In this solution, it also remains unclear whether the verb governing what follows 
εὐφυής is still ἐγένετο or, in a repetition of Fabricius and Orelli’s grammar mistakes, γενόμενος, by 
taking ‘natus’ as ‘natus fuit’. The only grammatically acceptable alternatives are those following Diels’ 
option for ᾇ instead of αἰ of the codices (Diels (1903), 586) and among which is Robinson’s (see supra, 204). 
For they do not require a second verb with definite mood after ἐγένετο, and συναρπάξαι can be taken 
as governed by ἱκανός. I have preferred keeping αἰ, as done only by Poirier who, though — keeping also 
συναρπάξαι and its correlate syntactical problems — was compelled to unfaithfully translate: ‘si 
quelqu’un, sans avoir étudié auprès des sophists, finit par se montrer capable, c’est qu’il est naturellment 
doué, qu’il saisit facilement beaucoup de choses après avoir un peu appris de ceux qui nous apprennet à 
parler’ (Poirier (1988), 1176). 
524 Gera (2000), 34. 
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εὐθύς…περσίζοι κα), our mental experiment exhibits the classical pattern of ‘an initial 
thesis’ (linguistic nativism), ‘a hypothetical situation’ (having a Greek baby raised in 
Persia), ‘a control for the experiment’ (his being deaf to Greek) and, finally, ‘the test’ of 
the initial hypothesis whose result contradicts it (his speaking Persian).525 The second 
part (καὶ αἰ τις τηνόθεν τῆδε κομίζοι, ἑλλανίζοι κα) is seen by Gera as ‘an additional 
control: a second experiment precisely parallel and complementary to the first’.526 
Furthermore, it gets support from the former and either of them ‘acts as a check for the 
other’, confirming a negative result for the initial nativist thesis.527 Two other 
noteworthy features are its ‘randomness and repeatability’, provided by the choice of a 
generic τις as performer of it, and its syntactical construction, ‘a less vivid future 
condition, with εἰ and the optative in the protasis, and the optative and κα (the Doric 
ἄν) in the apodosis’. 528 
Gera believed that the author was influenced by other authors of that time: we 
have already cited Hyppocrates’ experiment, but one could also add Plato, at R. II 359b-
362c in particular, where Glaucon proposes a personal thought experiment involving 
the famous Gyges’ ring, and Xenophon, at Mem. II.1.1-7 where Socrates presents ‘an 
armchair experiment’529 concerning just education. The fundamental parallel with our 
passage must be drawn, however, from Hdt. 2.2. Here the Egyptian king Psammetichus 
is said to have segregated two infants in a hut for two years, just to hear what kind of 
language they would speak after this time of isolation; this turned out to be the Phrygian 
and that led the Egyptians to think that the Phrygians were the oldest people of all, 
under the supposition that language is innate. According to Gera, such a nativist 
attitude could not certainly meet our author’s approval, and his experiment ‘seems to 
be a reaction’530 to it. Her final judgement on the value of the two narrations was that 
                                                 
525 Ibid., 23. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid., 31.  
530 Ibid., 26. 
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‘our author’s thought experiment is the more satisfying of the two trials’,531 even though 
it is purely mental, whereas the other is presented as something which actually 
occurred. In the first place, its results are more likely and, secondly, it looks ‘more 
elegant and more humane, precisely because it does not have to be executed in reality’.532  
Dumont underlined that the author here sees wisdom as an ‘enseignement 
mutuel et que chacun l'apprend de chacun, comme il apprend sa langue maternelle’533 
and that is what Desbordes and Gera too thought. The former argued from this passage 
that the author denies both that language comes from the things around us and that it 
is ethnically determined at our birth. In a way that confirms what was said in the 
previous paragraph, then, the author would maintain that language is learnt ‘par 
imitation de l’entourage’534 and, therefore, it consists in ‘une proprieté diffuse de toute 
une communauté […] indépendant des choses, mais indépendant aussi de la personne 
qui l’émet et qui n’en est qu’un support temporaire’.535 For her part, Gera pointed out 
that it is precisely in the conclusion that ‘language […] is imparted by the surrounding 
community as a whole’ that the author’s example has not simply a destructive purpose, 
but ‘leads to constructive results as well’.536  
In my opinion, this last digression has the function of clarifying the nature of that 
particular kind of learning to which I referred as τὸ αὐτόματον or ‘grasping’, 
commenting on § 6.11. It does so by analysing how we learn language, a skill the 
teaching of which was said to pertain to those from whom we grasp wisdom and 
excellence too and, so, something which itself is usually learnt in this alternative way. 
Now those persons are seen in the peoples of Persia and Greece, conversation with 
whom enables the two children to grasp the knowledge of a foreign language without 
taking any formal lesson.  
                                                 
531 Ibid. 
532 Ibid., 26-27. 
533 Dupréel (1921), 38. 
534 Desbordes (1987), 36. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Gera (2000), 24. 
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καὶ (II)] Placed at the beginning of the sentence, this καί serves to introduce the second 
part of the experiment as a logical complement of the first and so, is not to be deleted 
as done, unintentionally according to Classen, by Diels and Kranz537 whom Robinson 
then followed in this respect.538 
 
καὶ τὼς διδασκάλως οὐκ ἴσαμες] I take this final statement about our ignorance as 
to who our language teachers are as a logical consequence of the fact that they do not 
exist, according to a definition of διδάσκαλος as the professional in a certain art who 
gives lessons of it, that the author has assumed so far (cf. §§ 6.3, 7). This entails that he 
does not consider the persons from whom we sometimes grasp our knowledge (§ 6.11) 
as teachers either.539 At Pl. Prt. 327e-328a, Protagoras says very similar things, namely 
that a master of the Greek language cannot be found, nor he who has taught the 
craftmen’s children to practice their fathers’ arts at the same level. This last example 
supports also the mention of parents as typical individuals from whom we learn by 
grasping, in § 6.11. 
 
§ 6.13 
οὕτω…μέσον] It is not easy to identify the three parts of the author’s speech to which 
he alludes here. Rohde took the reference to a τέλος as indicating a possible original 
end of the entire work at this point; a conclusion through a chapter dealing with the 
teachability of wisdom and excellence would have been a logical one for a sophistic 
teacher as the author was.540 Another option could be, instead, that the λόγος is the 
whole chapter and, as Becker and Scholz said, ‘demnach wäre unter ἀρχή die 
                                                 
537 Diels/Kranz (1952), 414. Actually, Classen had this change date back to Kranz (1937), but no trace of 
this is there, which may also explain why he does not provide the page number of this reference (Classen 
(2004), 113). 
538 Robinson (1979), 134. 
539 Similarly, Solana Dueso quoted this proposition to exemplify what he calls ‘el modelo social’ of 
education (Solana Dueso (1996), 163.  
540 Rohde (1884), 25, and ibid., n. 3. In this way, also Maso/Franco (2000), 289. 
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Exposition einer These, μέσα [scl. our μέσον] die Darstellung der Argumente für diese 
These und τέλος die Konklusion, hier die Widerlegung der These, zu verstehen’.541 
From this perspective, within the didactical context of the work which Becker and 
Scholz maintained, chapter 6 is meant to offer a ‘Modell für eine Argumentation’.542   
I think, rather, that here the author wants to draw the reader’s attention to the 
complete and regular shape of the second speech he has just been making. The ἀρχή 
can be seen in the counterarguments addressed to the first thesis (§§ 6.7-11), the μεσόν 
in the excursus on the origin of language (§ 6.12),  and the τέλος in this paragraph itself 
(§ 6.13), which sums up what has just been said. A proof of this interpretation is given 
by the following and last sentence which starts with a καί that indicates a logical 
continuity with what precedes, and which presents a verb, λέγω, having the epexegetic 
function of explicating the content of the λόγος just mentioned. This is a declaration of 
the insufficiency of the proofs presented in the first speech (οὐκ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆναι 
ταὶ ἀποδείξιες) which finally substantiates the initial criticism of that as ‘silly’ (§ 6.7).  
 
μέσον] The last word of the sentence proposed by most codices, μέσην, needs to be 
revised, because it is not elsewhere attested as ‘the intermediate part’, as the editors who 
have kept it have translated it, and as it needs to mean for the sake of the reasoning. The 
same applies to μέσαν, that Robinson selected from P3.543 Mullach’s μέσον,544 backed 
also by Weber,545 fits best in this sense, pace Classen’s preference for the plural μέσα 
conjectured by Diels.546  
 
καὶ οὐ...ἀποδείξιες] The two denials contained in this sentence have been widely 
analysed by scholars to clarify our author’s ultimate position on the theme of the 
                                                 
541 Becker/Scholz (2004), 101. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Robinson (1979), 134. 
544 Mullach (1875), 551, 552. 
545 Weber (1897), 49. 
546 Diels (1903), 586. 
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chapter. For he steps back from the teachability position and remarks his dialectical 
victory over the arguments of the unteachability thesis at once.  
Firstly, Kranz considered the passage as even ‘Sokrates würdig’,547 thinking of the 
opinion on the teachability of excellence that Plato has him express in Protagoras. He did 
not quote a particular passage of the dialogue, but the most likely must be Pl. Prt. 320b, 
where Socrates says that from the examples until then considered he cannot infer the 
teachability of political excellence. I, again, recognise a similarity between our chapter 
and this dialogue, but I would not go so far as to talk of a ‘sokratische Haltung’,548 as 
Kranz did, also in reference to a similarly aporetic end of chapter 1.549 For a glance at the 
work is sufficient to realize the number of passages clearly anti-Socratic and, especially 
in chapters 1-4, relativistic.550  
Alternatively, Robinson believes that οὐ λέγω ὡς διδακτόν ἐστιν is a caveat against 
the conclusion that the author completely refuses the unteachability thesis, as he, in fact, 
has contrasted only the absolute version of it which emerges from the five arguments of 
§§ 6.1-6.551 This reinforces Robinson’s above idea that the author implicitly sides with a 
qualified version of the first thesis, just as he did in chapters 1-5. While I have already 
discussed the weaknesses of this parallel, now it is worth wondering what such a 
qualified version of the unteachability thesis could be like. The most likely hypothesis 
would be that of a statement which is softer than the original σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ οὔτε 
διδακτὸν εἴη οὔτε μαθητόν (§ 6.1), allowing the possibility of divergent cases. This is 
in fact the way in which the author conceived the identity-theses of the first four 
                                                 
547 Kranz (1937), 230.  
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid. 
550 See also Levi (1940), 302, n. 51, Robinson (1979), 217. 
551 ‘The author, in rejecting the λόγος of 6.1-6, is in fact rejecting only the argument currently used to 
bolster it’. (Robinson (1979), 217). Similarly, Barnes considered this passage as the first clear statement of 
the ‘distinction between rejecting an argument for a conclusion and rejecting the conclusion itself’, an 
acquisition ‘crucial’ for the development of ‘the art of criticism’ (Barnes (1979), 51). Theodor Gomperz 
had already written something similar: ‘er unterscheidet [...] mit einer im Altertum nahezu unerhörten 
Strenge zwischen der objektiven Unwahrheit einer Behauptung und der Unzulänglichkeit der bisher zu 
ihren Gunsten vorgebrachten Argumente’ (Gomperz, T. (1912), 281). 
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chapters, which, as Robinson himself deems,552 have a qualified nature. Such a version 
would therefore be something like ‘wisdom and excellence are not something teachable 
or learnable, except in some cases’. But that would not represent the unteachability view 
anymore, since, as in § 6.9 the author’s himself says, a single case of someone who 
managed to teach is sufficient proof to conclude that teaching is possible. Therefore, one 
must observe that the concept of possibility conveyed by the verbal adjectives διδακτόν 
and μαθητόν requires the unteachability thesis have the maximum of strength, since a 
single counter-case can falsify it and, conversely, prove the truth of the teachability-
thesis. 
In conclusion, firstly, Robinson’s distinction between qualified and absolute 
versions of the author’s theses has once more proved not to help, but to impede, the 
understanding of this chapter. Secondly, the best a reader can make of this ending seems 
to register the author’s withdrawal from both the sides of the question, in the same way 
as at the end of chapters 1-5 they could simply take note of the support which the author 
has given to both the opposite theses. In neither case the author’s own position can be 
concluded. 
 
Chapter 7 
§ 7.1 
τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων] With reference to the key-case of the 5th-4th-century 
Athenian democracy, Hansen divided Athenian citizens into four groups, according to 
their political involvement, the most part of which was attested precisely by their habit 
of speaking at the assembly (δημηρορεῖν).553  The first group was made of passive 
citizens not involved in the public life of the city. The second consisted in those who 
attended the assembly just to listen and vote, without addressing it. The third were 
ῥήτορες in legal sense, namely a good number of citizens who occasionally spoke, ‘but 
                                                 
552 Robinson (1979), 213. 
553 Hansen (1983). 
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they avoided any regular or “professional” involvement in politics; they were emphatic 
in stating that they were ἱδιώται and they did not like to be grouped with those ῥήτορες 
who took the platform incessantly’.554 Finally, the fourth group represented ῥήτορες in 
a political sense, namely few citizens ‘who regularly addressed the ἐκκλησία, proposed 
laws and decrees, and frequented the courts as prosecutors or συνήγοροι’.555 
δημηρορεῖν was common to both the third and the fourth group,556 and since there is 
no clue as to what kind of rhetors the δαμαγορῦντες of our text are, whether politically 
or just legally characterised, it seems safer not to translate this expression with nouns 
(‘rhetors’ or ‘public speakers’), as done by Robinson and almost all the previous 
translators, because such solutions lean towards the idea of habitual and publicly 
acknowledged orators, thus excluding the third group. I have, rather, opted for 
rendering the  substantivated present participle with the more inclusive formulation 
‘those who address the assembly’.557  
 
ὡς…γίνεσθαι] The city in which the author gave, or maybe just imagined giving, this 
speech did not appoint public officers by lot yet, if supporters of this practice were 
taking the floor to invoke its introduction. Unfortunately, one cannot conclude much 
from that. For this procedure, which was certainly a characteristic trait of classical 
Athens (see f.e. Hdt. 3.80.6, E. Supp. 403-410, Pl. R. VIII 557a, X. Mem. I.2.9, [X.] Ath. I.2-
3, Arist. Rh. I 8.4, II 20.4, Isoc. Areopagiticus 22-23) and has been regarded as ‘the very 
essence of the democracy’,558 is nonetheless attested also in oligarchies (such as those  of 
the Four Hundred (Th. 8.70), of the Five Thousand (Arist. Ath. 30), of Heraea (Arist. Pol. 
V 1303a13-16.) and of Thebes (Plu. De gen. Socr. 597a) and in cities both within the 
                                                 
554 Ibid., 45. 
555 Ibid., 46. 
556 An example of the verb used with reference to the orators of the third group is at Lys. For Mantitheus 
20; with reference to the fourth group ones see D. On the false Embassy 251-52.   
557 In this way, similarly to Solana Dueso’s ‘los que hablan en el ágora’ (Solana Dueso (1996), 195) and 
Bonazzi’s ‘quanti parlano nell’assemblea popolare’ (Bonazzi (2008), 449).  
558 Headlam-Morley (1891), 17, n. 1. 
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Athenian sphere (Sinope, Thasos, Styra, or Naxos in Sicily)559 and within that of Sparta 
(Heraea in Arcadia, Syracuse, Kamarina in Sicily, Tarentum, Pontecagnano and Reggio 
in Magna Graecia).560 
 
§ 7.2 
εἰ] In agreement with Classen,561 I have chosen this reading, given in most codices, in 
place of αἰ. The only exception to this reading is in P3, selected by Robinson. 
 
εἰ…προστάσσεις] Trieber recognized in this passage562 a strong similarity to αἴ τις 
[αὐτὸν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα·...τὺ ἄρα...τί δέ...τί δέ...563 in §§ 1.12-13, which also 
supports the thesis of the text having a single author. The parallel is suggestive, because 
just as in chapter 1 the conditional clause formed with the protasis οὐδὲ κ’ αὐτὸν ἔχεν 
ἀποκρίνασθαι564 a conditional sentence expressing a less vividly imagined case in the 
future, here an elliptical apodosis565 of the same kind seems to implicitly join εἰ γάρ τις 
αὐτὸν ἐρωτῴη in the same grammatical construction. The examples subsequently 
shown aim to highlight the indisputable absurdities to which the rival’s thesis would 
lead, if ever put into practice, which too occurs in chapter 1. 
 
“τί… τοῦτο;] From this point to the end of § 7.4 the author gives his reasons to condemn 
the use of lot through some examples invoking the superiority of expertise and ability 
to chance on which lot is founded. A similar praising of competence occurred in the 
previous chapter, and in particular in §§ 6.3, 7, 8, 10, where the experts were presented 
                                                 
559 See Kroll (1972), 270-277, Cordano (1988), Masson (1992), Alfieri Tonini (2001), 115-117, Cordano (2001) 
84-86. 
560 See Cordano (1992), 39-40, Lazzarini (1995), Cordano (2001), 84, 86-89. 
561 Classen (2004), 114. 
562 Trieber (1892), 224. 
563 He read αἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα·...τὺ ἄρα...τί δὴ...τί δή... (ibid.). 
564 Which is, in turn, dependent on the previous οἶμαι. 
565 Goodwin (1912), 179. 
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as the primary source from which knowledge could be obtained in a certain discipline. 
From a political point of view, then, we have testimonies of how such arguments 
belonged to aristocrats, or at least, to critics of democracy (Hdt. 3.81, Isoc. Areopagiticus 
22) such as, in particular, Socrates (X. Mem. I.2.9, Arist. Rh. II 20.4.1393b4-9).566 But this 
is not sufficient either to render the author a supporter of aristocratic ideology, thus 
overlooking the two last paragraphs pervaded by democratic spirit, or to think, with 
Rossetti, that these Socratic arguments are presented as ‘fragili’567 and unworthy of 
being investigated, since their point will be advanced again in § 7.6.   
Rightly, Robinson568 introduced inverted commas at the beginning of this passage 
and at the end of § 7.3 to delimitate the portion of text where the questions asked 
through ἐρωτῴη are expressed, as Diels had already done for the exchange in direct 
speech in §§ 1.12-14. These direct questions asked of the interlocutor shows him the 
awkward consequences of a choice by lot in other fields, through reductio ad absurdum. 
The first question is directly addressed to the interlocutor by the second singular person 
προστάσσεις and reveals how lot might end up swapping the tasks of who will cook a 
dish (ὀψοποιᾷ) and of who will drive the cart (ζευγηλατῇ).  
 
ὀψοποιᾷ] Most codices have ὀψοποιᾶ and Robinson569 corrected this with De Varis’570 
conjecture ὀψοποιῇ, third singular person of the active present subjunctive. I, with 
Classen,571 have preferred the equivalent ὀψοποιᾷ, first seen in Stephanus, for its being 
closer to the codices’ reading. That a verb ending in –εω can follow the pattern of those 
ending in –αω is a phenomenon registred in Doric.572  
                                                 
566 As Ober observed, in not accepting ‘that ordinary citizens were capable of making important decisions’ 
Socrates criticised one ‘of the underlying assumptions of the democratic culture of Athens’ (Ober (2011), 
142). 
567 Rossetti (1980), 42. 
568 Robinson (1979), 134, 136. 
569 Ibid., 134. 
570 Robinson (1972), 195. 
571 Classen (2004), 115. 
572 Buck (1973), 125-126. 
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κατὰ τοῦτο] All the codices have this reading, the meaning of which is perfectly fitting 
and does not require any correction, such as Robinson’s κατὰ τωὐτό, firstly conjectured 
by Koen.573 
 
§ 7.3 
καί…ἐπίσταται;”] The Socratic spirit of the passage reminds us of Pl. Cra. 388c-e where 
carpenters, blacksmiths and other craftsmen are defined as being such for nothing else 
than their specific technical knowledge.  
 
§ 7.4 
τωὐτόν…πραξοῦντι] The same strategy seen in § 7.2 and consisting in a reductio ad 
absurdum of the exchange of some tasks is repeated here with the case of musicians 
(αὐλητάς and κιθαρῳδός) and warriors (τοξότας, ὁπλίτας and ἱππεύς). Playing the 
kithara (κιθαρίζειν) appeared in § 6.7, while singing to the kithara (κιθαρῳδία) in § 1.7. 
Here we have a mixed solution, with κιθαρίζειν applied to κιθαρῳδός, and not to 
κιθαριστής (appeared in § 6.7 as well), and, more importantly, a swap between two 
musical performances and performers regarded in opposite way by ancient Greek 
culture. For, as Wilson wrote, in Athens the status of kithara, and stringed instruments 
in general, was ‘much more elevated’,574 as confirmed by ‘the foundational role that 
“learning one’s strings from an early age” played in the formation of the élite citizen’.575 
Conversely, among auletes we observe ‘an overwhelming predominance of foreigners, 
females, slaves’.576 Likewise, in dramas auloi were played by the choir of Dionysus, 
whereas stringed instruments like lyre or chitara were associated with heroic 
characters.577 As for musical contests, like those here mentioned, if we think of the 
                                                 
573 Koen in Schaefer (1811), 234, n. 26. 
574 Wilson (2002), 42. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Wilson (1999), 74. 
577 Wilson (2002), 42. 
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Panathenaic competitions between the 5th and 4th century BCE, there ‘it was the 
citharodes who got the largest prizes’.578 For the auletes, instead, ‘the prizes were fewer, 
and almost certainly lower in value and there was only one all-inclusive age-category’.579 
Considering such variation in esteem for each of these instruments and players, the 
swap of tasks here imagined appears even more drastic than what emerges from a 
merely musical assessment. 
 
αὐλητὰς κιθαρίξει] Whereas Robinson translated ‘a flute-player will […] be playing 
the harp’,580 here I have abided by the aforementioned rule of transliterating ancient 
Greek music terms.581 Likewise, Mullach proposed citharoedus, citharam pulsare, tibicen 
and tibia canere;582 as the Roman tibia ‘seems to represent essentially the same 
instrumental resource’ as αὐλός.583  
 
κιθαρίξει] The imperative κιθαριζέτω of the manuscripts does not match with the 
following indicative futures coordinated with it, so many scholars felt the need to 
emend it in the same way. Diels’ conjecture, κιθαρίξει,584 has the advantage of 
reproducing the author’s use of the sigmatic future for the two other active verbs in the 
third singular person in this paragraph, αὐλήσει and τοξεύσει. Wilamowitz’s Doric 
future κιθαριξεῖ,585 by contrast, is analogous only to the passive third singular person 
ἱππασεῖται and to the active third plural person πραξοῦντι. The Attic future of 
Robinson’s κιθαριεῖται586 has no parallel here and a usage of the middle diathesis of 
κιθαρίζω is also nowhere else attested.  
                                                 
578 West (1992), 368. 
579 Wilson (1999), 78. 
580 Robinson (1979), 137. 
581 See supra, 97, n. 206. 
582 Mullach (1875), 551. 
583 Wilson (2002), 42.     
584 Diels (1903), 586. 
585 Diels (1907), 647. 
586 Robinson (1979), 136. 
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πολέμῳ] Robinson wrongly printed πολεμῷ.587 
 
§ 7.5 
λέγοντι…νομίζω δαμοτικόν] With this paragraph the author presents his position on 
the non-democratic nature of lot. In doing that, he also seems to offer some clues 
regarding his personal political views. He starts by condemning the lot for being the 
least (ἥκιστα) democratic, in opposition to the above-mentioned speakers who 
considered it democratic at the highest level (κάρτα). A question immediately arises: 
why, if the author did not support democracy, did he not use his rivals’ statement that 
lot is extremely democratic (δαμοτικὸν κάρτα) as proof of its negativity, rather than 
arguing for its non-democratic nature? In my opinion, the most convincing answer is 
that he was indeed a democrat, although of a particular kind, better described in the 
next paragraph.588  
Rossetti considered this first statement as proof that the author was not Dorian, 
but just an Attic addressing a ‘Doric-speaking audience’589 in Doric. He thought, in fact, 
that there cannot be any other strong reason to justify the exposition of such democratic 
concerns in front of an audience of Dorians, people politically akin to Sparta and, so, 
used to perceiving democracy as a danger. But this overlooks the fact that the political 
situation in the Doric-speaking world was not the same everywhere, which democratic 
cities like Tarentum demonstrate.590 On the contrary, I believe that assuming the 
                                                 
587 Ibid. 
588 From the reading of this chapter commentators have come to four different interpretations of the 
author’s political views. Some did not find it difficult to deem him a democrat (see, f.e., Untersteiner 
(1954), 184; Dillon/Gergel (2003); 410, Graham (2010), 903); others, with whom I agree, preferred thinking 
of a moderate democrat (Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 626; Mazzarino (1966); 294, Robinson 
(1979), 53); a group suggested he was actually an aristocrat (Rostagni (1922), 175-176; Solana Dueso (1996), 
169-171; Bordes (1987), 150, n. 7); a last one chose not to take position on the matter (Nestle (1966), 446; 
Hoffmann (1997), 348-349; Becker/Scholz (2004), 101).  
589 Rossetti drew this phrase from Robinson, who first proposed an analogous intepretation. (Rossetti 
(1980), 46-47; Robinson (1979), 51). 
590 Tarentum was founded by Spartans and western Doric dialect was spoken there. It lived according to 
Sparta’s aristocratic regime until 473 BCE, when it ‘adopted a quasi-democratic political system’ 
(Robinson (1979), 53). See Arist. Pol. V 1303a, VI 1320b9-16.   
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historical reality of this speech, only an equally democratic sentiment in the audience 
may have enabled the author to feel comfortable in publicly stressing the political 
centrality of the people which we see here and in the following paragraph. 
 
ἐντί…δᾶμον] To prove that lot is not democratic at all, the author argues in a very 
peculiar way that has a parallel only in Isoc. Areopagiticus 23. In fact, he shows his 
concern that those who hate the people (μισόδαμοι ἄνθρωποι), called ‘the partisans of 
oligarchy’ (οἰ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντες) by Isocrates, could be picked by lot and use 
their power against the people (τὸν δᾶμον). From this Solana Dueso concluded that the 
author shared the same aristocratic views as Isocrates, since any attack on lot could not 
be but an attack on democracy.591 As a reply to this position, false in itself for relying on 
the fallacy that every criticism of democracy is necessarily anti-democratic,592 two 
elements are to be shown: firstly, and once more, lot was not necessarily a democratic 
electoral instrument nor the only one that ancient democracies knew; secondly, the 
proximity to Isocrates’ political ideas confirms our author’s adhesion to democracy 
rather than to aristocracy. In fact, at Panathenaicus 131 Isocrates openly professes his 
preference for what he calls ‘the democracy under the rule of the best’ (δημοκρατία 
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δὲ χρωμένη),593 which he sees in the democracy in its original form, as 
opposed to that ruling at random (ἠ εἰκῇ πολιτευομένη) that he witnessed in his times. 
As Bordes stressed, the choice for the term ‘democracy’ is not casual, because soon 
afterwards, at 132, Isocrates himself points out the categorical distinction between 
oligarchy (ὀλιγαρχία), democracy (δημοκρατία), and monarchy (μοναρχία).594 In the 
next paragraph we will see how our author thematises a similar idea. 
                                                 
591 Solana Dueso (1996), 169-171. 
592 Cf. Harris (2005), referred to the exemplary case of the Athenian democracy. 
593 In fact, here ἀριστοκρατία ‘is not a regime, but an attitude’ and ‘this would seem to say that aristocrats 
could consistently be democrats’ (Bloom (1955), 43). Similarly, Bordes took this democracy as that which 
‘fait appel aux meilleurs’ (Bordes (1982), 256). 
594 ‘C’est bien une démocracie qui prône Isocrate, et non un quelconque régime intermédiaire entre 
l’oligarchie et la démocratie’ (Bordes (1982), 257). See also Isoc. Areopagiticus 57 and 70, where Isocrates 
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Some scholars595 played down the author’s worry observing that, if we make 
reference to the Athenian democracy as a paradigm, there, after the sortition, a scrutiny 
of the elected, called δοκιμασία, was held to make it sure that the person was 
compatible with the democratic system which he was about to enter. Such a method 
would have, therefore, prevented the recruitment of the enemies of the people, warding 
off all of the author’s concerns. Rossetti, in particular, said that since he could not be 
unaware of the institute of δοκιμασία, his argument proves to be as ‘pretestuoso’ as 
those of Socrates,596 but that he was, nonetheless, a democrat.  
However, that δοκιμασία could really prevent the city from appointing anti-
democratic people is not so obvious. In fact, according to the description given at Arist. 
Ath. 55.3-4, the interview was meant to inquire into aspects of the elected persons’s life, 
such as who his relatives were, whether he used to observe the cults of the city, or 
whether he performed his civic duties, like the payment of taxes or the military service, 
leaving aside any question regarding his political views.597 Surely, if in the past the man 
had committed offences against the people or even taken a public office under an 
oligarchic regime like, for example, that of Thirty, as hypothesised at Lys. On the 
Scrutiny of Evandros 10, the emergence of such facts was sufficient to have him excluded 
from the democratic offices. But at least from Aristotle’s account on Athens, as 
Headlam-Morley observed, ‘no one was excluded because of his opinions, only because 
he had committed certain actions’,598 and so our author’s fears were not so ungrounded. 
                                                 
highlights his distance from the oligarchical ideas.  However, Bordes, relying on the general observation 
that ‘le tirage au sort n'est jamais critiqué en Grèce par les véritables partisans de la démocratie’, suspected 
that behind this professed idea both Isocrates and our author shared an actual aristocratic attitude. 
(Bordes (1987), 150, n. 7 and, similarly, Brock (1991), 169; contra Vlastos (1973), 186-188). Bearzot, instead, 
argued for Isocrates’ adhesion to to the kind of democratism that had distinguished Theramenes’ 
moderates (Bearzot (1980), 116, 131).  
595 Rossetti (1980), 43-46, Bordes (1987), 150, n. 7, Solana Dueso (1996), 170.  
596 Rossetti (1980), 46.  
597 This is reminiscent of the description of the δοκιμασία of magistrates which is given at Din. Against 
Aristogeiton II.17, which Feyel summed up thus: ‘dire comment on se comporte en privé; dire si l’on agit 
bien envers ses parents; dire si l’on a participé aux campagnes militaires menées au nom de la cité; dire 
si l’on a des tombeaux ancestraux; dire si l’on s’acquitte de ses impôts’ (Feyel (2009), 205). 
598 Headlam-Morley (1891), 101.  
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Moreover, at Ath. 55.2 Aristotle tells us that all the magistrates, no matter whether 
elected by lot or election, undergo this exam, and this could probably be the reason why 
our author did not consider it in his treatment of sortition. He could easily have taken 
it for granted and, nonetheless, deemed lot a more effective way than election for 
oligarchs to obtain power, such a procedure excluding the popular choice. Finally, Feyel 
commented that differently from Athens, the rest of the Greeks tended not to practice 
the δοκιμασία of the magistrates, with the exception of some big cities like Rhodes, 
Ephesus and Susa.599 The vast majority, in fact, was made up of cities of a small size for 
which δοκιμασία must have been felt superfluous, because ‘les citoyens devaient donc 
bien s’y connaître’.600 Obviously, for this to work, election and not lot must have been 
the system of selection employed, otherwise the advantage of this familiarity would 
have been neutralized. But if this is true, the many testimonies of the political use of lot 
outside Athens seen before compel us to again take the author’s concern for the 
oligarchic dangers entailed by the sortition of the magistrates seriously. 
 
ὧν αἴ κα τύχῃ ὁ κύαμος] Regarding the author as a Pythagorean, Rostagni interpreted 
his condemnation of the bean through the lens of a 4th-century BCE tradition (Lucianus 
Vit.Auct. 6, Iamb. VP 260, and D.L. VIII.34) which explains the famous Pythagorean 
precept of the abstinence from eating beans as a refusal of democracy, that in the 
drawing of the bean was so well symbolised. From this Rostagni argued for the author’s 
aristocratic ideology.601 However, that does not explain, again, why he did not attack 
the lot for this very reason, instead of for precisely the opposite one, namely that it is 
not democratic. 
 
                                                 
599 Feyel (2009), 351-374. 
600 Ibid., 376. 
601 Rostagni (1922), 175-176. Τhis reading did not convince Minar, who observed that ‘the real reason for 
the taboo on beans was doubtless shrouded in the mists of legend, and the mystical meanings attached 
to it in Pythagorean teaching were supposedly secret’ (Minar (1979), 64). 
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κύαμος, ἀπολοῦντι] Robinson was the only one to delete the comma carried by the 
manuscripts,602 but this has the function of marking a correct pause between the 
protasis, αἴ…κύαμος, and the apodosis, ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον, of a conditional 
sentence of the future.  
 
§ 7.6 
χρή…<καττωὐτό>] The author’s solution, described as the people’s choice by means 
of a personal observation (τὸν δᾶμον αὐτὸν ὁρῶντα αἱρεῖσθαι), consists in election by 
ballot which in the Athenian democracy was held to appoint officers requiring 
particular abilities, like the στρατεγός mentioned here. It is no surprise, then, that this 
reason is part of the improvement that the author thinks this electoral procedure could 
bring. For by ballot it is possible to choose persons suitable for the offices (τὼς 
ἐπιτηδείως) and favourable (τὼς εὔνως) to the people, solving in this way both the 
problem of incompetency and the risk of oligarchy for which lot was blamed before.  
Such a solution is as akin to our modern idea of democratic elections as it is 
different from that effective in ancient Athens and, therefore, one could even deem the 
author an aristocrat, in the same way as has been done with Isocrates. However, the 
view that people can elect the best is something that an opponent of democracy would 
undoubtedly reject. From this point of view, we can also appreciate the distance 
between our author and Socrates. The latter attacks the advice of the many, on which 
the voting system is based, at Pl. Alc. I 110e, while at Pl. R. VI 493e-494a he says that in 
no way can the majority be philosophical. At Pl. Cri. 44c-d, then, Socrates interestingly 
equates their irrational conduct with that of chance, and this is proof of his belief that 
lot and election are two very similar practices. For him, what the many do in politics is 
just repeating the powerful people’s opinion (Pl. Prt. 317a) and because of their large 
number, it is even impossible to discuss with them (Pl. Grg. 474a-b). Finally, they bring 
                                                 
602 Robinson (1979), 136. 
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into their assembly the banausic way of thinking to which their practical jobs have 
accustomed them (X. Mem. III.7.6). Also, at Pl. Plt. 292d-293a Plato has the Visitor say 
that the art of kingship does not belong to the many. Then, at ivi, 303a-b, the same 
character criticises the government of the many for its weakness, due to its distributing 
offices in small portions among a large number of people. By contrast, our author’s trust 
in the people’s political judgement is reminiscent of Protagoras’, who at Pl. Prt. 322d-
323c gives two demonstrations that all the people share political excellence, which is 
perfectly consistent with the historically close links between democracy and the 
sophistic movement.603  
Furthermore, the Athenian model already had the most important offices elected 
through popular vote and, rather ironically, what in effect our author here suggests is 
just to extend this practice to the minor ones. This peculiar democratic attitude of his 
could also be due to the fact that he, as a Dorian, did not have Athenian politics as his 
benchmark and this would have a parallel in Aristotle’s detached attitude at Pol. IV 
1300a8-b12. There, in fact, during his theoretical classification of all the possible 
constitutional forms according to their electoral systems, he defines any constitution 
where all citizens can be appointed by all by vote as democratic.604 On the other hand, 
one could point out how the election by ballot privileged those who could afford the 
cost of a good education by which to gain skills and fame, such as the one sophists 
provided.605 But it is also reasonable to suppose that our author’s angle on this matter 
was chiefly the utilitarian one of him who was able to sell precisely this kind of 
education.  
 
                                                 
603 See Guthrie (1971), 19-20, 179. Similarly thinks Athenagoras at Th. 6.39, who defines the many as those 
able to take the best decisions for the life of a democracy.  
604 Arist. Pol. IV 1300a32-33. Nor can Aristotle either be considered an aristocrat, given his views about 
the preferability of the advice of the many over that of the few, at III 1281a42-1282a.  
605 It is the same Protagoras who admits that those are the students who can receive a political education 
(Pl. Prt. 326c). Bearzot saw Isocrates’ ἰσότης founded on merit as implying this same social disparity 
(Bearzot (1980), 126 et passim).  
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στραταγέν […] νομοφυλακέν] Leading the army was the task of the στρατηγός, the 
general well attested in Athens, differently from the guardian of the laws, known as 
νομοφύλαξ whose presence in the Athenian democracy became stable not earlier than 
the 3rd century BCE.606 A reason for this could be that this was an aristocratic office, as 
hinted by the crucial role of the νομοφύλακες in Pl. Lg. 754d-755b and as seen in Arist. 
Pol. VII 1323a8. On the other hand, as Franco Sartori suggested, both offices had a 
particular importance in Tarentum,607 where, to be more precise, the task of preserving 
the laws (νομοφυλακέν) was performed by the ῥητροφύλαξ,608 and where the 
στρατεγός is thought to have appeared with the new democratic constitution.609 The 
latter seems to be endowed with a particular power, being allowed to disregard the 
decision taken by the assembly (Plu. Quaes. Gr. XLII 301c). The current passage, 
therefore, makes of this ‘democrazia sui generis’610 a good candidate for the place which 
the author had in mind when composing this speech, as Mazzarino suggested,611 
although no certainty can be reached about this point.  
  
καὶ τἆλλα <καττωὐτό>] Αll manuscripts present a short lacuna after καὶ τἆλλα, 
except L, V1, Z. Robinson too had the chapter end here, but not in accordance with these 
codices, which he considered of small or no value;612 we will see him placing a little 
insertion at the beginning of the following chapter. However, whereas no other instance 
of καὶ τἆλλα ending a sentence appears in the work, there are many examples if it 
followed by adverbial locutions like the καττωὐτό here conjectured by Schanz.613 I have 
                                                 
606 Untersteiner (1954), 185. Gaetano De Sanctis, in particularly, thought that the office was established by 
Ephialtes, abolished either by Pericles or during the restored democracy of 403 BCE and, then, re-
established either by Phocion or Demades (De Sanctis (1913), 3-4).  
607 Sartori (1953), 86-88. 
608 Ibid., 88. 
609 Ibid., 86.  
610 Sartori (1953), 87. 
611 Mazzarino (1966), 293.  
612 Robinson (1979), 22. 
613 The same closing phrase appears in §§ 3.16 and 5.2, but others similar are καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τωὐτόν (§ 
2.24), καὶ τἆλλα οὔτως (§ 2.25), καὶ τἆλλα πάντα (§ 5.2), καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (§ 5.5), καὶ 
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therefore opted for this insertion, preferring it to Blass’ ἐπιστατέν.614 This verb seems, 
in fact, to bring to an unclear ‘and that they [scil. ‘the people’] attend/follow all the others 
offices’, in accordance with the usual meaning of ἐπιστατεῖν with the accusative. If, 
instead, Blass intended ‘and that they exercise all the other offices’, then the genitive 
would have been expected.615 
 
Chapter 8 
§ 8.1 
τῶ…αὐτᾶς τέχνας] The way the author introduces this art could draw on a 
phraseology already in use to show the multiple benefits for those who embarked on 
the study of the art of speaking. For in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, at DK82 B11.2, the 
skills ‘both of speaking the needful rightly and of refuting the unrightfully spoken’616 
are said to be proper of the ‘same man’, through a possessive genitive (τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ 
ἀνδρός) recalling our τῶ δ’ αὐτῶ ἀνδρός. At Pl. Euthd. 274e, then, Socrates asks the 
sophist brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodurus whether it is the function of the same 
art (τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον) to persuade both that excellence can be taught and that 
they are the ones from whom it can be best learnt. At Phdr. 261e, then, Plato speaks of 
‘one single art of all kinds of speaking’ (περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη) 
through which a man makes things resemble one another and through which he exposes 
anyone who does the same. Finally, at Sph. 233d (cf. also 234b), the Visitor presents the 
self-proclaimed omniscience of the sophist as that of a person who promises to do 
anything by the means of a sole art (ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μίᾳ τέχνῃ συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι 
πράγματα).  
 
                                                 
τἆλλα καττοῦτο (§ 5.14, but I reported it as corrected by Mullach in καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό) and καὶ τἆλλα 
κατὰ τοῦτο (§ 7.2). 
614 Blass (1881), 740.  
615 LSJ, s.v. ἐπιστατέω: ‘c. gen., to be in charge of, have the care of […] rarely c. acc., attend, follow’. 
616 Sprague (1972), 50. 
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τῶ…ἀνδρὸς] We will soon know the six skills that this man can possess through the 
mastery of one particular art. In light of them and the following ones described in the 
remainder of the chapter, interpreters have come to different hypotheses as to this man’s 
identity. Taylor thought of the Socratic ‘διαλεκτικός’,617 who would also be ‘the true 
philosopher’ and therefore ‘the true statesman and ῥήτωρ’.618 Then, Solana Dueso 
observed how this man fits ‘el ideal del sabio en aquel tiempo’, versed in the knowledge 
both of nature and of discourse,619 whereas Becker and Scholz preferred to speak, more 
generically, of a democratic citizen, without clarifying whether an aspiring sophistic 
teacher or a political speaker, or both.620 
I support this last open option, because the chapter will precisely pinpoint the 
common source of all those abilities, rather than considering each one in itself. Surely, 
one can think of this man as focussing more on one than another, in accordance with his 
professional aims. So, for example, a political speaker may have been primarily 
interested in how to instruct the city as to the best policy to adopt, whereas a reflection 
on the nature of things may have suited better whoever took part in private 
conversations (cf. Pl. Sph. 232c). As for Taylor’s appeal to the Socratic paradigm, it is true 
that our man is depicted as a διαλεκτικός, a φιλόσοφος and a ῥήτωρ at the same time. 
But if in a part of the chapter the Socratic assumption of the priority of knowledge seems 
to hold, things dramatically change with the Euthydemean arguments of §§ 8.3-5, 7.   
 
τᾶς…αὐτᾶς τέχνας] This particular art is introduced in a rather indirect way, by listing 
the six main skills it provides, which, along with the following eight, correspond to 
those taught on the courses of those 5th-4th-century private teachers whom historians of 
ancient philosophy label ‘sophists’. No sophist  is said to have delivered all these 
teachings together, but many of these can be found in the outline of the philosophical 
                                                 
617 Taylor (1911), 127. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Solana Dueso (1996), 172-173. 
620 Becker/Scholz (2004), 104-105. 
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rhetoric sketched by Socrates throughout Plato’s Phaedrus, and in Alcidamas’ Against 
the Sophists too.  
Also, since the abilities usually associated with sophists varied according to each 
one’s inclinations,621 those which are here presented can be regarded as forming the 
particular repertoire of skills the author offered to his customers, by teaching them ‘only 
one art’ (ἠ αὐτὴ τέχνη). If so, this chapter could represent a sort of menu of the skills 
the sophist author taught to his pupils: firstly, just six of them are brought in, then, by 
reviewing them one by one and in the reverse order, the author either clarifies their 
content or shows how they imply eight new ones. This way, the manifold potential of 
the art initially announced would be not only demonstrated, but also enhanced, since 
in the end the total number of the acquirable skills reaches fourteen.  
 
κατά…διαλέγεσθαι] Brachilogy is a rhetorical feature we find attributed to sophists, 
philosophers and rhetors. As for the first category, a source is Plato’s Gorgias, where 
Gorgias says he is perfectly happy with Socrates’ request that he answer κατὰ βραχύ 
(449b), as one of the sources of his own pride is just to speak ἐν βραχυτέροις 
(449c=DK82 A20).622 Then, the excessive brevity of Socrates’ dialectics, and so of a 
philosophical method, is also censored by Hippias at Pl. Prt. 338a (=DK86 C1). Finally, 
the rhetor Alcidamas praises the speaker’s capacity to shorten long parts of a speech, as 
well as to lenghten the short (Alcid. Soph. 23).623  
However, here the verb used, διαλέγομαι, indicates a more precise form of 
speaking, namely conversation, which implies the interaction of two speakers. 
Therefore, at this stage, the sophistic and the philosophical statement seem more likely 
                                                 
621 See Schiappa (1991), 5-8). 
622 Similarly, see also Pl. Phdr. 267a-b and DK85 A12. Other sophists said to possess this skill are Protagoras 
(DK80 A7), Thrasymachus (DK85 A12), Critias (DK88 A1), without forgetting Euthydemus and 
Dionisodorus of Plato’s Euthydemus, whose eristic consisted in a fast and close questioning of their 
interlocutor.  
623 Also, according to Pl. Phdr. 267b, it was common belief that Prodicus and Hippias could make speeches 
of the correct length, and at 272a Socrates’ good rhetor is said to opportunely use short speaking.  
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to be referred to than the rhetorical one;624 for rhetors’ art does not concern discussion, 
but display and their eloquence entails an audience and not an interlocutor, which also 
typically leads to the opposite of brevity.625  
 
τάν…ἐπίστασθαι] The author does not give any information to qualify this ἀλάθεια 
τῶν πραγμάτων (‘truth of things’), and Robinson626 and Scholz627 generically attributed 
the phrase to the sophists’ jargon. However, an inquiry into their texts and testimonies 
rejects that proposal, highlighting only one occurrence of it, in Antipho Soph. On the 
Murder of Herodes 3. Scholz is, instead, right in saying that a similar pursuit for 
‘grundsätzliche “Wahrheiten”’628 was, in any case, a hot issue in the author’s 
contemporaneous Greek culture, where an authentic ‘Rationalitätskult’629 took place. 
The phrase is, in fact, traceable also in rhetoric, with Isoc. To Nicocles 46 and To Philip 4, 
and, as one would expect, in philosophy, in Pl. Sph. 234c, where the concept is contrasted 
with the void images produced by the sophistic art of speaking (similarly, Pl. Phdr. 259e, 
277b where τὸ ἀληθές is used). 
 
καὶ δικάσασθαι…ἦμεν] The translation of δαμαγορεῖν with ‘to address the assembly’ 
repeats in § 7.1, stressing the political value of the verb, similarly to North and others,630 
but differently from translators like Robinson, inclined to more neutral solutions such 
                                                 
624 Not by chance, when the verb denotes rhetors’ practice, it loses this meaning in favour of the more 
generic one of ‘to say’, as if it were a simple λέγω (Cf. Isoc. Against Euthynus 5 and LSJ, s.v. διαλέγομαι).  
625 Emblematic of that are Pl. Phdr. 235a, where Socrates points out Lysias’ prolixity and Pl. Prt. 328e-329b, 
where Protagoras is compared with political rhetors for the same feature. Schiappa and Timmerman, 
instead, quoted the current passage among those attesting an early form of dialectics, before Plato’s 
theorization of it (Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 23-24).  
626 Robinson (1979), 236. 
627 Becker/Scholz (2004), 35. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 
630 ‘Concionari’ (North (1671), 74; Meibom (1688), 729; Fabricius (1724), 633); ‘advise the people (das Volk 
beraten)’ (Teichmüller (1884), 222); ‘arringare il popolo’ (Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 226); ‘fare discorsi 
politici’ (Untersteiner (1954), 187); ‘hablar anta la asamblea’ (Solana Dueso (1996), 197); ‘to speak in public 
assemblies’ (Graham (2010), 897).  
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as ‘to speak in public’.631 Although both these translations are possible for the verb,632 
that its political vein must here be stressed seems suggested by the description of this 
ability given in § 8.6 (καὶ...κωλύειν) and by its conceptual kinship with the other 
infinitive δικάσασθαι. For the two, which are also syntactically joined through two καί 
and depend on the same οἷον, are usually employed to represent the essential factors of 
the citizen’s success in public life, namely pleading one’s case at the lawcourt and 
addressing people at the assembly. Although Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the first work to 
technically analyse this proximity (1354b, 1358b, 1377b, 1399b), it was the 5th-century 
sophists who first spread their joint teaching.633 For example, according to Gorgias’ 
recipe for ruling others in a city, at Pl. Grg. 452d-e, a man needs to know how to 
‘persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and 
assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place’.634  
 
λόγων…ἐπίστασθαι] Similarly to Robinson,635 Schiappa translated λόγων τέχναι as 
‘argument-skills’,636 but he did not distinguish the phrase from λόγων τέχνη,637 which 
he also took as a teaching of discourse broader than rhetoric and implying philosophy 
too, in a period, between the late 5th and early 4th century, when rhetoric was not yet an 
independent and recognised discipline.638 But three controversies shall follow. First, as 
Pendrick convincingly showed, there is not enough evidence to support the idea of a 
                                                 
631 Robinson (1979), 137. Others are ‘concionem’ (Von Orelli (1821), 231); ‘verba ad populum facere’ 
(Mullach (1875), 552); ‘parler en public’ (Dupréel (1948), 192; Dumont (1969), 245); ‘to make public 
speeches’ (Sprague (1972), 291); ‘s’adresser au peuple’ (Poirier (1988), 1177); ‘parlare in pubblico’ 
(Maso/Franco (2000), 201; Bonazzi (2008), 451); ‘to deliver public speeches’ (Waterfield (2000), 297); 
‘making public speeches’ (Dillon/Gergel (2003), 332); ‘vor dem Volk zu sprechen’ (Becker/Scholz (2004), 
87); ‘tenere discorsi pubblici’ (Reale (2008), 1861); ‘parler devant le peuple’ (Dorion (2009), 145). 
632 See LSJ s.v. δημηγορέω: ‘practise speaking in the assembly’, ‘make popular speeches’.  
633 Cf. Wilcox (1942), 135-136.  
634 Zeyl in Cooper (1997), 798. Similarly, see also Pl. Grg. 454b, 485d, 486a; Phdr. 261a-b (where the couple 
δίκαι-δημηγορίαι is considered), 261d-e (δικαστήρια and δημηγορία); DK87 A2 (λόγοι φονικοί and 
λόγοι δημηγορικοί); Alcid. Soph. 9 (δημηγοροῦντες and δικαζομένοι).  
635 Robinson (1979), 137. 
636 Schiappa (1992), 4-5, or ‘the skills involved in argument’ (Schiappa (1990), 459-460). 
637 Schiappa (1992), 4-5. 
638 Ibid. 
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λόγων τέχνη earlier and broader than ῥητορική.639 Secondly, since ‘argument-skills’ 
only ‘underscores the sophist’s dialectical ability in argument’,640 Schiappa’s translation 
does not fit his own idea of an art embedded with philosophy. In third place, the use of 
the plural τέχναι as ‘skills’ is attested to just in poetry (LSJ, s.v. τέχνη, I 1). A safer 
possibility is, instead, to take λόγων τέχναι as meaning ‘techniques of speeches’, in 
order to convey the idea of a plurality of rhetorical rules not necessarily making up a 
unitarian theoretical entity, otherwise expressed through the singular τέχνη (‘art’), 
which is also reflected in Adams’ ‘tricks of speech’ for the same phrase in Aeschin. 
Against Timarchus 117.641  
 
περὶ…διδάσκεν] The Presocratic interest in how everything in the world (as here said, 
τὰ πάντα), undergoes material mutations (ὡς ἐγένετο), but also, and primarily, exists 
and has a specific identity (ὥς ἔχει) was shared by the sophists too. We know, for 
example, that Gorgias wrote a book on nature (DK82 A10), and Antiphon’s reflections 
on nature and essence have been handed down to us (DK87 B15). At Pl. Prt. 337d (=DK86 
C1), then, during his harangue to the quarelling Socrates and Protagoras, Hippias recalls 
the prestige of the sophists there gathered, for their knowing ἡ φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων, 
whereas at 340b (=DK84 A14) we have Socrates playing the part of a sophist and 
challenging Prodicus to answer whether being (τὸ εἶναι) and becoming (τὸ γενέσθαι) 
are the same things or different. But even more interesting is Sph. 232c where sophists 
are described as being used to successfully disputing about the origin and the nature of 
things in general (γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων).642 Therefore, Heidel’s 
interpretation, according to which here φύσις τῶν ἁπάντων is equivalent to τὰ 
                                                 
639 Pendrick (1998), 20. On the contrary, other late-5th and early-4th century places where this ‘art of 
speeches’ already indicated ‘rhetoric’ are Pl. Phdr. 266c, 266d, 267d (referred to Prodicus), X. Mem. I.2.31 
(referred to Critias).  
640 Robinson (1979), 227. 
641 Adams (1919). The phrase appears with the same sense also in Alcid. Soph. 15. 
642 Less surprisingly, at Pl. Phdr. 270e, Socrates says that those who want to deliver speeches with art must 
highlight the essential nature (ἡ οὐσία τῆς φύσεως) of the thing they speak about. 
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φυόμενα insofar as meaning the outward constitution of all the existing things, runs 
the risk of obscuring the philosophical component of the phrase, in favour of a modern 
notion of physics.643  
 
διδάσκεν] For the first time a skill does not consist in a kind of knowledge or ability 
but in teaching something which is supposed to be known. This could be seen as a 
reason to connect this ability with the second one, as the knowledge of the truth of 
things, and hence of their nature, is in fact the prerequisite for teaching it.    
 
§ 8.2  
καί...πράσσεν] The paragraph starts off by highlighting a further and seventh skill 
implied by the sixth one. Taking up Hippias’ mention of ἡ φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων in 
Pl. Prt. 337d, both here and there the knowledge of the nature of all things can properly 
direct the conduct of a man (ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσεν), preventing him from bad behaviours 
worthy of laymen (ὥσπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων) who are not knowledgeble 
about it.644 This way, φύσις τῶν ἁπάντων proves again to be something more than a 
mere naturalistic principle, but a guiding one for man’s life. Dupréel’s reading of the 
passage as hinting at ‘l’application du savoir à la politique’645 overly restricted the value 
of πράσσεν and anticipated, without any apparent reason, the political theme which 
appears in § 8.6.  
Taken in itself, the seventh ability falls within the major sophistic task of making 
the client successful in his life, which meant to wisely deal with one’s private and public 
business, as said in Pl. Prt. 318e-319a. Some sophists’ knowledge is reported to have 
been so wide that their practical abilities went far beyond the ones needed for social 
                                                 
643 Heidel (1910), 111, n. 125.  
644 ‘La physis dell’universo, oggetto della scienza della natura, deve insegnare i criteri direttivi della 
condotta umana’ Levi (1942), 446. 
645 Dupréel (1948), 194. 
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success, like in the case of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ ability in fighting, in Pl. 
Euthd. 271d-272a, 294b, or Hippias’ self-production of clothes, in Hp.Mi. 368b-c.  
 
τῶν ἁπάντων […] περὶ πάντων] Robinson pointed out some ‘basic and interesting 
ambiguities […] in a number of key words’,646 which would give to this chapter ‘a 
dialectical tension that it does not at first sight possess’.647 A similar crafty use of words 
would coincide with the one made by the sophist brothers Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus in Plato’s Euthydemus, who, however, do not seem to have ‘any honest 
propaedeutical purpose in mind’.648 Our author — Robinson maintains, but apparently 
without justifying it — is ‘both clever and serious’, instead. As a result, the author must 
have aimed at exercising and improving ‘the philosophical muscles’ of his advanced 
hearers through his ‘amazing phantasmagoria of non-sequiturs’.649  
As a matter of fact, just one of the ambiguities Robinson pointed out may, but not 
necessarily, occur (ὀρθῶς in § 8.6), and only as a result of his textual assumptions. 
Furthermore, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus use these ambiguities to argue for any 
possible side of a matter so as to trap and dominate their interlocutor (cf. Pl. Euthd. 275e-
276d). Our author would have no reason to prove a further and opposite position to that 
he openly declares, instead, and particularly in this chapter where no mention of 
alternative views on the matters at issue is made. At the same time, although Robinson 
does not see it, an Euthydemean style can indeed be recognised in the eristic means by 
which the author pushes his demonstrations in §§ 8.3-5, 7.  
In any case, the first example of the weakness of Robinson’s interpretation is given 
in these two occurrences of ἅπας and πᾶς, in which he detected ‘the fallacy of Division’, 
namely the one according to which ‘collective and distributive propositions are not such 
                                                 
646 Robinson (1977), 134-135. 
647 Ibid., 135. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid. 
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that the former necessarily entail the latter’.650 Actually, as a quick translational test can 
easily show, the rationale of the argument, namely the passage from knowledge to 
action, is not affected at all by the sense in which ἄπαντα and πάντα can be assumed, 
whether they are both taken distributively, or both collectively, or one distributively 
and the other collectively. 
 
δυνασεῖται] The use of the indicative future has the function of stating things for sure 
and, so, of guaranteeing, here and in the following paragraphs, that by possessing a 
certain ability (here ‘the knowledge of the nature of all things’) a man cannot help 
having another ability too (here ‘to act correctly in relation to all of them’), in an assertive 
tone which could hint at a promotional intent of this chapter.  
 
§ 8.3 
ἔτι...λέγεν] A thesis is here formulated, that the possession of the techniques of 
speeches is sufficient to get the new eighth ability of speaking correctly about 
everything. The path to get to this conclusion will be rather long, covering the two next 
paragraphs, and intricate, especially considering the banality of the stakes: the notion of 
techniques of speeches itself implies the idea of speaking correctly in the largest possible 
number of situations.  
 
περί…λέγεν] An ability which represented reason to boast for sophists and rhetors, 
according to a few testimonies. At Pl. Grg. 457a, Gorgias recalls speaking about any 
matter (πρὸς ἅπαντας [...] καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν) while describing what a rhetor 
does, and the same skill is attested for the historical Gorgias’ at DK80 A26, A1a, and 
A26. Alcidamas highly regards it, in combination with improvisation, at Soph. 3 and 31, 
                                                 
650 Ibid., 129. 
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whereas, as far as ὀρθῶς is concerned, Protagoras is recalled for his ‘correctness of 
diction’ (ὀρθοέπεια) at DK80 A26.651 
 
ὀρθῶς] Robinson claimed that the word can be translated both as ‘nonfallaciously’ and 
‘soundly’, and the author covertly aims to prove ‘that on every topic a man knowing 
the τέχνας τῶν λόγων will produce arguments that are both valid and sound (i.e. truth-
delivering)’, although he can actually reach just the former goal.652 But soon after, the 
first sentence of § 8.4 solves the doubt, by depicting ὀρθῶς λέγεν as conditional (δεῖ) 
on speaking about the known things (περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται περὶ τούτων λέγεν), which 
enables not just a nonfallacious speaking, but a sound one. The fact that this concept 
cannot actually derive from the mere knowledge of the techniques of speeches and the 
fact that the entire argument §§ 8.3-5 is just a plain sophism, then, are different matters.  
 
§ 8.4 
δεῖ…ἐπιστασεῖται] The first step of the demonstration consists in the two propositions 
presented here. Firstly, it is said that any correct speech implies the knowledge of its 
subject, and then, that the man we refer to has a universal knowledge. From these two 
claims it implicitly follows that he will just have to speak about the things he knows, in 
order to speak correctly about everything. However, whereas the first claim is 
supported by a prescriptive δεῖ which has the strength of the common sense,653 the 
second one is not, and needs a justification which will be given in § 8.5. 
 
περί πάντων…ἐπιστασεῖται] Appearing during the demonstration of the eighth skill, 
this ninth one plays a secondary role compared to it. Nonetheless, its sophistic value is 
important, if we think that the fame of many sophists was due precisely to the vastness 
                                                 
651 On sophists as experts of the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names see also Pl. Cra. 391a-b. 
652 Robinson (1977), 130. 
653 But also of Socrates’ consensus, in Pl. Phdr. 259e and 277b (see also infra, 273-276).  
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of their knowledge, described sometimes as wide, like in the cases of Protagoras (DK80 
A4), Prodicus (DK84 A1a.2) or Hippias (DK86 A11, 12, 14), and other times as total, as 
said of Gorgias (DK82 A1a) and of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Pl. Euthd. 271c.  
 
δέ] It is clear that the man’s total knowledge cannot explain what precedes in any way, 
and that γάρ of the manuscripts must therefore be revised, but not deleted, as Diels 
did,654 since a connective between the two parts is nonetheless needed. Robinson’s 
proposal, γ’ ἄρ’,655 has the merit of remaining very close to the original reading, but its 
meaning is too vague656 to express the abrupt introduction of such a new decisive 
element for the sake of the argument as περὶ…ἐπιστασεῖται. Rohde’s657 δέ, instead, 
satisfies precisely this exigency.658 Furthermore, the sense of doubt that Robinson 
conveyed by providing his γ’ ἄρ’ with the meaning of ‘one must at any rate suppose’659 
is something odd both regarding the locution itself,660 and the point of the current 
argument, in which the force of one of its fundamental premises661 would be 
dangerously reduced, were this proposition presented just as a supposition.  
 
§ 8.5 
πάντων...ἐντί] The argument here formulated is as short as it is flawed. It consists of a 
first premise (πάντων…ἐπίσταται), about a man’s knowledge of ‘the techniques of all 
speeches’ (πάντων τῶν λόγων αἱ τέχναι), a formulation slyly rephrased compared to 
                                                 
654 Diels (1903), 586. 
655 Robinson (1979), 138. 
656 It belongs to a series of combinations of ἄρα with other particles, which Denniston describes as mostly 
void of ‘any very particular significance’ (Denniston (2002), 43), as it is also shown by the various ways 
in which they are usually translated. 
657 Rohde (1884), 26, n. 4. 
658 As a connective, δέ can also be used to denote ‘all that lies between’ a connection and a contrast (see 
Denniston (2002), 162). 
659 Robinson (1979), 139. But the first scholar to propose a similar translation was North with ‘suppono’ 
(North (1671), 74). 
660 Of its components, γε is an emphatic particle and ἄρα an inferential one (see LSJ s.vv. γε and ἄρα).  
661 Proposition (II) in the scheme below (infra, 236). 
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the former ’techniques of speeches’ (λόγων τέχναι, in § 8.1) in order to facilitate the 
combination with the second premise (τοὶ…ἐντί) that ‘all speeches’ are about all the 
things that there are (περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐόντων). Finally, a principle is implicitly 
assumed, that he who possesses the techniques of speeches also knows the things these 
speeches are about. This last principle is clearly fallacious, leading from the knowledge 
of words to that of things without any apparent concern for how the two are connected, 
but is also essential for the author to implicitly conclude that he ‘who knows the 
techniques of all speeches knows every thing that there is’, which is equivalent to the 
thesis to be proven, namely ‘he will know all things’ (§ 8.4). 
To sum up, being just a plain sophism, the argument of this paragraph fails to 
prove its conclusion, namely the ninth ability, and this, on its turn, prevents the 
demonstration of the eigth one too. For by reconstructing the entire reasoning of §§ 8.3-
5 in a logically more perspicuous way, we will have the following: 
 
1st assumption (1): ‘He who desires to speak correctly must speak of the things he 
knows’ (§ 8.4); 
2nd assumption (2): The knowledge of the techniques of speeches implies the knowledge 
of the things these speeches are about (implicit); 
3rd assumption (3): ‘Techniques of speeches’ means ‘techniques of all speeches’ 
(implicit); 
4th assumption (4): ‘All speeches are about all the existing things that there are’ (§ 8.5); 
1st inference (I): The speeches taken into account in the techniques of speeches are about 
all the existing things (for (3) and (4)); 
2nd inference (II): ‘But he [scil. ‘who knows the techniques of speeches’] will know all 
things’ (§ 8.4; for (2) and (I)); 
Conclusion: ‘He who has knowledge of the techniques of speeches will also know how 
to speak in the correct way about everything’ (§ 8.3; for (1) and (II)). 
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One might wonder how the author’s reliability in the eyes of his readers cannot be 
damaged by such a poorly grounded reasoning, especially if the chapter was meant to 
have a promotional goal, as I suppose. But on closer examination, he does not actually 
run this risk. First of all, this complex construction stems from the knowledge of the 
techniques of speeches, an ability which naturally encompasses the production of 
seemingly persuasive sophisms. Thererefore, this whole construction must have 
sounded to the ears of the most careful readers as a meta-rhetorical device to show the 
potential of that very skill in action. Furthermore, as initially observed, since the 
simplicity of the thesis does not require the length of the argument used to prove it, 
behind the choice of such an impervious path there could have been also the precise 
intent of lengthening what is concise, in the spirit of Alcid. Soph. 23. The parallel is 
particularly fitting, as in that passage Alcidamas pairs this ability with the opposite one 
of shortening what is long, which resembles the first of the skills recalled by our author. 
If this is true, then this long excursus may improve the sophist’s reputation. Finally, an 
analogous case can be stated for the use of verbal trickery, whose sophistic origin is not 
only well attested, especially in Plato’s Euthydemus and Aristotle’s Sophistic Refutations, 
but also underlies the appearance of the word ‘sophism’ to label it. 
Albeit perfectly satisfactory from a sophistic point of view, the argument of §§ 
8.3-5 completely fails from a philosophical one. The ninth epistemological ability of the 
knowledge of everything thus remains without a valid justification, similarly to what 
happens to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ eristical defense of their alleged 
omniscience, at Pl. Euthd. 293c-295b. 
 
τοὶ…ἐντί] The addition of τὰ ἐόντα662 to what so far was more simply called τὰ πάντα 
endows this sentence663 with an Euthydemean tone. In fact, that all speeches are about 
                                                 
662 Actually, it is due to Orelli’s universally accepted insertion ἐ<όντων ἐντί>, to fill a short lacuna in the 
manuscripts (Von Orelli (1821), 653). 
663 Proposition (4) in the scheme above (supra, 236). 
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all the things that there are is what Euthydemus too claims at Pl. Euthd. 284a,664 at the 
beginning of a sophism concluding that nobody speaks of things that there are not665 
and, hence, nobody lies (284c);666 both here and there the neuter articulated present 
participle of εἰμί is also used. 
Robinson thought that this sentence could be interpreted either ‘in terms of 
argument-form’, therefore claiming that ‘there is nothing […] that falls outside of the 
purview of all argument-forms’, or ‘in terms of argument-content’, meaning that ‘the 
sum total of argument-content (actual and possible?) covers the sum total of what is 
(actually and potentially?) real/the case’.667 Similarly to what happened in § 8.2, he also 
characterized the former paraphrase as exploiting the distributive sense of πάντες, 
whereas the latter, the collective one. However, this distinction is not meaningful, as 
one can legitimately move from the one to the other without their common fundamental 
idea varying in any way whatsoever. In fact, if everything can be communicated in an 
argument-form, in such a way that the number of the possible argument-forms is 
exhausted, then it is clear that the sum of the matters dealt with by all the possible 
arguments coincides with the sum of all the things; and the other way around. 
Moreover, Robinson expressed his preference for the reading based on the collective 
sense of πάντες, considering it necessary, ‘if the section is to succeed in its ostensible 
purpose of explaining the final claim of 8.4, in which πάντων appears to be used 
distributively’.668 But, first, and again, it is obscure and pointless to tell which of the two 
uses πάντες has in § 8.4, and not by chance Robinson does not justify his views about 
the matter. Secondly, he omitted to explain why the collective πάντων of § 8.5 should 
be required by the distributive πάντες of § 8.4, whereas one would expect a 
demonstration to assume the words of its respective thesis in their original sense. 
                                                 
664 οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει; ναί. 
665 οὐκ ἄρα τά γε μὴ ὄντ᾽, ἔφη, λέγει οὐδείς. 
666 οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ λέγει. 
667 Robinson (1977), 131. 
668 Ibid. 
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§ 8.6 
δεῖ δέ…λέγῃ] This proposition is followed by a lacuna between three and five lines 
long669 which interrupts the train of thought. The translation here proposed differs from 
Robinson’s, which took the clause περὶ ὅτων καὶ λέγοι670 to depend on λέγεν, and to 
consist in ’and the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever matter he speaks 
about must know’.671 He also thought that ἐπίστασθαι is completed by ‘an infinitive of 
some sort’,672 concealed in the lacuna, and coordinated with the following one, ‘if the 
subsequent καὶ…διδάσκεν is to make sense’.673 But this reconstruction is problematic in 
two respects. First, it is unlikely that ἐπίστασθαι can still be the verb to which διδάσκεν 
is referred, after such a long gap; and even so, neither politics nor any other specific 
ability among those possibly listed in the lacuna could match the idea of totality 
characterizing a man who aims at a correct speaking ‘on whatever matter he speaks 
about’.674 Also, in his reconstruction, this last clause (περὶ…λέγοι) — and here comes 
the second difficulty — would be redundant, since the sole ὀρθῶς λέγεν would have 
conveyed the same concept, without incurring a repetition of the verb λέγω.675 
By contrast, I have referred περὶ…λέγῃ to ἐπίστασθαι and read this first part of 
the paragraph as stating the same case of δεῖ…λέγεν, in § 8.4, namely the priority of 
knowledge to speaking, though in another fashion: from the necessity of speaking about 
the things one knows to that of knowing the things about which one speaks.676 This 
                                                 
669 Weber (1897), 50. Robinson quantified it in ’40-50 words’ (Robinson (1979), 230). 
670 This λέγοι is alternative to our λέγῃ (see infra, 241). 
671 Robinson (1979), 139. For the problems of this translation see infra, 241, n. 683. 
672 Robinson (1979), 230. 
673 Ibid. 
674 Ibid., 139. 
675 Similar constructions are also in Becker/Scholz (2004), 87; Dorion (2009) 146; Graham (2010), 896.  
676 Similar constructions are also in North (1671), 74, Meibom (1688), 730; Fabricius (1724), 633-634, Von 
Orelli (1821), 231; Teichmüller (1884); 223; Dupréel (1948), 192; Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 226; 
Untersteiner (1954), 189; Dumont (1969), 245; Sprague (1972), 292, Poirier (1988), 1177 189; Solana Dueso 
(1996), 197; Maso/Franco (2000), 201 Dillon/Gergel (2003), 332; Bonazzi (2008), 451; Reale (2008), 1861. 
Waterfield’s translation falls out of both this and Robinson’s construction— ‘and if someone is going to 
speak correctly he must, whatever his topic, know <…>’ (Waterfield (2000), 298) — and he seems to pass 
over κὰ λέγῃ of his reference Greek text (Diels/Kranz (1952), 415).  
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purely rhetorical change could hint at a continuation of the sophistic temper of the 
previous argument of §§ 8.3-5, and if so, one could suppose that the following lacuna 
conceals, in its first part,677 reflections similar to περί...ἐντί of §§ 8.4-5, so that the entire 
justification of the thesis in § 8.3 would have been proposed again, but in a stylistically 
different way.  
 
δεῖ] This verb sounded intentionally ambiguous to Robinson, who believes that 
whereas its ‘natural interpretation’ is ‘in term of duty’, the intended one leads to the 
translation ‘the μέλλων ὀρθῶς λέγεν cannot help knowing’.678 However, although δεῖ 
may theoretically indicate both kinds of necessity, in this specific case, it is clear that the 
man’s mere intention of speaking correctly (ὁ μέλλων ὀρθῶς λέγεν) cannot be 
sufficient for him to possess another skill. Hence, only the former of Robinson’s readings 
proves to fit the text, and, once again, the author’s vocabulary does not seem 
ambiguous.  
 
ὀρθῶς […] ὀρθῶς] Here too,679 Robinson believes that the author eristically plays on  the 
double sense of this adverb, aiming at the highest stakes of contending that the skill of 
speaking in a nonfallacious way (first ὀρθῶς) is sufficient to be able to wisely (second 
ὀρθῶς) advise the city.680 Although this is the most likely among the examples Robinson 
gave in support of his interpretation, it nonetheless depends on his reconstruction of the 
corrupted text of this passage. By contrast, following mine, this relation is not the case 
                                                 
677 As for its second part, see infra, 241-243. Apparently indifferent to the length of the lacuna, Diels filled 
it only with τὰ πράγματα (Diels (1903), 586), which is syntactically unnecessary to connect περὶ ὅτων 
either to ἐπίστασθαι or to λέγῃ, and is due merely to Diel’s chosen construction (see above, nn. 680, 681). 
The choice has been kept in all the following editions (Diels (1907), 647; Diels (1912), 344; Diels (1922), 
344; Diels/Kranz (1952), 415). 
678 Ibid. 
679 See supra, 232. 
680 Robinson (1977), 131. 
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and the latter ability is more straightforwardly associated to the one of addressing the 
assembly. 
 
κα λέγῃ] Most codices have καὶ λέγοι, and so does Robinson,681 whereas F1 and F2 
present καὶ λέγει. The καί of both readings, placed inside a relative clause, would have 
a function of an adverb expressing emphatic assent, with the meaning of ‘even’, ‘also’ 
or ‘just’,682 which cannot fit the sense of the passage, whether we construe it according 
to Robinson’s solution or to the one here chosen.683 Moreover, Robinson himself 
recognises that the optative λέγοι after the pronoun ὅστις does not respect ‘the so-called 
Sequence of tenses’,684 which would require ‘ἄν/κα+subjunctive’.685 The indicative λέγει 
would be more legitimate, but still not common.686 Therefore, it is safer to adopt Blass’ 
conjecture κὰ λέγῃ,687 which also removes the unsuitable καί, and which has been 
followed by all the following editions of Diels’ and Diels/Kranz’s, as well as supported 
by Classen.688 The only other grammatically acceptable conjecture left, Mullach’s δεῖ 
λέγεν, departs too much from the readings of the codices.689   
 
καὶ…κωλύειν] No translator so far seems to have reflected on how unlikely it is that 
this second surviving portion of the paragraph can grammatically depend on the first 
                                                 
681 Robinson (1979), 138. 
682 See LSJ, s.v. καί, Β. 
683 And it is not by chance that, in his translation, Robinson was then compelled to omit it (Robinson 
(1979), 139), otherwise he should have printed ‘and the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever 
matter he even/also/just speaks about must know’. This omission, joined by a silence in the respective 
commentary note too, is particularly eloquent, as, up to this point, he had always emphasised the 
idiosyncratic position of καί (appeared in §§ 6.11 and 8.2) both in the translation (ibid., 133, 139) and in 
the commentary (ibid., 215-216, 226).  
684 Ibid., 230. 
685 Ibid. See also Goodwin (1898), 277 and LSJ, s.v. ὅστις. 
686 Goodwin (1898), 307. 
687 Blass in Weber (1897), 50. 
688 See Classen (2004), 118 and supra, 240, n. 677 for Diels’ and Diels/Kranz’s references. 
689 Translated as ‘praeterea recte dicturum scire convenit, quibus argumentis immorari deceat’ (Mullach 
(1875), 552). 
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one after such a long lacuna.690 Moreover, the subject of this lemma has now clearly 
turned to politics, which corresponds to the fourth of the six abilities initially listed and 
which, according to the reverse order of their treatment, is precisely the one we would 
expect after having dealt with the knowledge of the techniques of speeches. This has 
therefore prompted my tentative conjecture <τὸν δὲ δαμαγορεῖν ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ> for 
the last words of the lacuna which immediately precedes this lemma. This solution 
mirrors τὸν…δεῖ at the beginning of § 8.9, where the third ability, of pleading one’s case, 
is analysed. In this way, I have aimed to keep the third and the fourth ability stylistically 
close, in the same way as it was in § 8.1, where their logical connection was emphasized 
by a common grammatical pattern.  
It is worth noticing how no new skill is presented here, since advising the city as 
to the right policy to adopt sounds like an outline of what addressing the assembly 
(δημηγορεῖν) consisted in. This is, in fact, confirmed by a few other sources which share 
with our text a similar way to indicate political speech, through the nouns βουλή, 
δημηγορία or συμβουλή.691 To begin with, at Pl. Grg. 502e the idea, presented as the one 
commonly accepted, that rhetors really have the best (τὸ βέλτιστον) in view when they 
address the assembly, is challenged by Socrates who suggests that they actually think 
of their own good (τὸ ἴδιον) rather than the common one (τὸ κοινόν).692 Similarly, at Pl. 
Phdr. 260c-d he points out the possible risk of a rhetor who persuades the city to do 
                                                 
690 On Robinson’s and Diels’ treatments of the lacuna see supra, 240. Mullach did not even highlight it 
(Mullach (1875), 552), whereas Graham described it as just ‘4-5 litt.’ long, which is also consistent with his 
option for Diels’ insertion of just τὰ πράγματα to complete it (Graham (2010), 896). Stephanus, North, 
Meibom, Fabricius, Orelli and Weber correctly reported it, but who among them gave also a translation 
proved to believe in a dependence of what follows the lacuna on the initial δεῖ (Stephanus (1570), 481; 
North (1671), 74; Meibom (1688), 730; Fabricius (1724), 633-634; Von Orelli (1821), 230-231; Weber (1897), 
50). Solana Dueso also thought that ‘τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά/τὰ δὲ κακά exige en la laguna la presencia de τὸ 
ἀγαθόν/τὸ κακόν, cuyo conocimiento es la condición para que el orator aconseje correctamente a la 
ciudad’ (Solana Dueso (1996), 197, n. 42). But, firstly, this hypothesis lacks a support in the chapter which 
never presents signs of this essentialism, rather in its philosophical part it moves from the knowledge of 
things to that of the concepts related to them (see infra, 248). Secondly, Solana Dueso seems to forget the 
ability of addressing the assembly, which would be cut out from the recapitulation of all the initial six, if 
the lacuna did not hide it.  
691 They will become terms of art with Aristotle’s Rhetoric: see Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 67-113. 
692 See also 455d. 
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something bad instead of good (πείθω κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ᾽ ἀγαθῶν), whereas 
according to Isoc. On the Peace 5, rhetors should advise what is advantageous for the city 
collectively (τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει συνοίσειν) and not for a single person. The same 
terms and reflections will later appear within Aristotle’s theorization of deliberative 
speech. At Rh. I.3.1358b, e.g., we first read that exhortation (προτροπή) and dissuasion 
(ἀποτροπή) are what those who speak in the assembly (οἱ δημηγοροῦντες) do; then, it 
is added that he ‘who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, whereas he who 
dissuades advises against it as worse’693 (ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον 
συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρονος ἀποτρέπει). Finally, the ‘kind of good or 
bad things the deliberative orator advises’694 (ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων 
συμβουλεύει) is the concern of 1359a. 
 
§ 8.7 
εἰδώς…χρή] For the first time after §§ 8.4-5 the author argues again for the knowledge 
of everything, in a less sophisticated way, but still sophistic, endowing improvisation 
with an exaggerated capacity of filling the gaps in one’s knowledge. As exaggeration 
itself was an early recognised rhetorical device (at Pl. Phdr. 272a is called δείνωσις), the 
author can have purposefully used it, to emphasize both it and improvisation before his 
readers.  
This lemma is joined to what precedes through the pronoun ταῦτα, which, from a 
grammatical point of view, could refer either to the political ability just discussed or to 
all the nine seen so far. However, the latter hypothesis seems stylistically more likely, if 
we rely on the author’s consistency with his use of the singular τοῦτο to denote only 
one skill in § 8.9 — namely τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι. If so, then the digression of the 
current paragraph, along with its supporting example in § 8.8, could be due to a 
                                                 
693 Translation from Freese (1926), 35.  
694 Ibid., 39. 
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rhetorical exigence of variation, interrupting the usual flow of exposition with a 
reflection about the skills illustrated until then, before presenting the following ones.  
The idea that one can know everything by knowing just something is also in Pl. 
Euthd. 294a, though through the sophism on the impossibility of knowing and not 
knowing at the same time, and without any hint at improvisation. 
 
τῆνα…χρή] The need (τὰ δέοντα) of knowing something one ignores, when the 
situation requires it (αἰ χρή) did not worry those rhetors who could perform extempore 
speeches, whom Alcidamas at length praises in his Against the Sophists.695 He too, in 
particular, recalls how this capacity can save speakers ‘in their hour of need’ (τῇ χρείᾳ, 
Alcid. Soph. 10), when their silence would otherwise bring shame on them.696 In this 
respect, Gorgias is recalled to have never been ‘at a loss for words’697 at DK82 A17 and 
his improvisation is reported at DK82 A1 and A1a; the same is said of Antiphon at DK87 
A4. Finally, at SE 174b32 (=DK83 A6), Aristotle gives a piece of advice on how to 
efficiently guide one’s improvisation when out of words, suggesting that one focus on 
something different from what one is asked for, by ‘taking it in a different sense’;698 for 
this was what Lycophron successfully did, when requested to praise the lyre.        
Improvisation can therefore be counted as the tenth skill so far introduced. It 
differs from the others because it derives not from the knowledge of something else, but 
despite its ignorance. By relying on improvisation, the author chooses an easy and, 
again, deceitful way to justify omniscience, not actually aiming at the possession of an 
infinite knowledge, but just at the confidence of always being able to display a 
knowledge which is just apparently so.      
 
 
                                                 
695 αὐτοσχεδιαστικοὶ λόγοι is the word he uses for extempore speeches (see Alcid. Soph. 8). 
696 See also ibid., 3, 8-10, 14-17, 20, 22-24, 26, 28-30, 33-34. 
697 Sprague’s translation of οὐχ ὑπολείπει αύτὸν ὀ λόγος (Sprague (1972), 64). 
698 Sprague’s translation of ἐκεῖνο ἐκλαβόντες (Sprague (1972), 69). 
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§ 8.8 
κἂν…πράσσεν] Playing the aulos is here offered as an example of the extremely 
various kinds of activities one does not know but can improvise, according to what was 
seen in the former paragraph. It must therefore not be counted among the other skills 
implied in the one art that a man should learn, as also confirmed by the fact that among 
sophists only Critias is said to do it, at DK88 A15. Furthermore, in light of the previous 
comparison between § 8.7 and Pl. Euthd. 294a, it is worth noticing that in the latter too 
some usually non-sophistic skills are then immediately proposed to exemplify the 
omniscient man’s polymathy.699  
 
ἐπίσταται] This form, registred in all manuscripts, falls within those present 
subjunctives700 formed by adding the endings ‘directly to the long vowel of the stem’.701 
Therefore, there is no need to emend it, as Mullach first did with ἐπίστηται and then 
Robinson with ἐπιστᾶται, both of which, nonetheless, are grammatically sound 
alternatives.702 Though recognising the possibility of reading it as a subjunctive, Weber 
preferred to take it as an indicative, and at the same time changed κἄν in καὶ αἰ, thus 
turning the future supposition of vivid form into a simple present supposition implying 
nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition. He justified that with his disbelief in the 
author’s preference of ἄν – here contracted with καί in κἄν – to κα, in light of the far 
                                                 
699 Shoemaking and astronomy along with the ironic one of knowing the number of the grains of sand (Pl. 
Euthd. 294b). 
700 See also Weber (1898), 73; Ahrens (1843), 313. 
701 Buck (1973), 120, where the case of ἐπισυνίστᾱται is referred. The phenomenon takes place in verbs 
whose present indicative has, instead, a stem with short vowel, and this is the case of ἐπίστᾰμαι too 
(ibid.). Our formation will therefore be ἐπίστᾱ-ται, where ᾱ does not become η, as usual in non-Attic 
dialects (ibid., 21).  
702 For, the present subjunctive of verbs like ἐπίσταμαι can be construed in further two ways, namely by 
adding the long vowel subjunctive sign η/ω either to the verbal stem ending with the long vowel or to 
the stem ending in consonant (Chantraine (1984), 261). According to the former formation, the third 
singular person used in our passage would thus be ἐπιστᾱ-ηται, then contracted in Robinson’s ἐπιστᾶται 
(Robinson (1979), 138), whereas the latter formation would straightly lead to Mullach’s ἐπίστ-ηται 
(Mullach (1875), 552). However, in most cases the contraction α+η > α occurs in Attic, whereas in Doric it 
results in η (Buck (1973), 37), therefore Robinson’s description of his conjecture as a ‘Doric subjunctive’ 
(Robinson (1979), 233) is improper.  
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higher number of occurrences of the latter in the text, but, above all, of his disputable 
assumption about a consistent Doric dialect throughout the text, that we have already 
seen.  
 
§ 8.9 
τὸν…ἅτερα] The ability of pleading one’s case reveals the eleventh one of knowing τὸ 
δίκαιον, also defined as that about which lawsuits are (περί…δίκαι). The term 
therefore denotes not the concept of justice, but rather the justice produced in lawcourts 
by suits and judgements, and for this reason I have translated it with ‘what is just’ in 
the sense of ‘what is lawful’.703 Not differently, at Pl. Phdr. 260a, Phaedrus recalls the 
common opinion that a rhetor needs to know not the things which are really just (τὰ 
τῷ ὄντι δίκαια), but those which seem just to the multitude who will judge (τὰ δόξαντ᾽ 
ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν),704 whereas at DK87 B44, Antiphon argues for the 
opposition between the administration of the law and real justice.  
Finally comes an observation about the far larger corpus of information to which 
this knowledge can actually give access, and the sentence εἰδὼς…ἅτερα in fact recalls 
the statement of omniscience of § 8.7 (εἰδὼς…ἐπιστασεῖται). However, the absence of 
sophistic trickeries both in this paragraph and in the following, and related two, along 
with the lack of any supporting evidence, seems to exclude any hint at the idea of 
omniscience this time. Rather, here the author may well be saying that by knowing 
what is permitted by the law concerning a certain matter, one cannot but know also its 
                                                 
703 Contrariwse, Solana Dueso took the phrase as denoting the philosophical and essentialist concept of 
‘justice’ in the same way —  he argued — as in chapter 1 τὸ ἀγαθόν means ‘goodness’, in chapter 2 τὸ 
κακόν means ‘beauty’ and τὸ ἀλαθές of chapter 4 means ‘truth’ (Solana Dueso (1996), 175). According 
to him, in fact, as in § 1.11 the distinction between τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν is the necessary condition to 
tell the good things from the bad ones (ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν), so in this chapter the knowledge 
of τὸ δίκαιον, namely, of justice, would be the necessary condition to know τὰ δίκαια, namely just actions 
(ibid., 175-176). However, essentialism seems to go in the opposite epistemological direction of the 
philosophical message of this chapter, as already observed erlier, when commenting another similar 
analysis of his, about § 8.6 (see supra, 242, n. 690). 
704 See also Pl. Phdr. 261c-d and Grg. 455a. 
 247 
 
contrary (τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ), namely what is unlawful, and what is different from 
it (πάντα τὰ ἅτερα), namely he can spot aspects of a certain matter that are irrelevant 
to forensic justice and are, therefore, not ‘what lawsuits are about’. This would match 
with Pl. Grg. 454b, where lawcourts are said to be the place where persuasion is 
practiced about what is lawful and unlawful (δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα), but, above all, with 
Arist. Rh. I 3.5. Here Aristotle starts by saying that ‘the end of the forensic speaker is 
the lawful or the unlawful; […] all other considerations are included as accessory’.705 
That these ‘other considerations’ (τὰ ἄλλα) fit the description I have just suggested for 
our πάντα τὰ ἅτερα can be seen from Aristotle’s subsequent remark that ‘sometimes 
the speakers will not dispute’ about these other considerations, having in view just 
what is lawful and unlawful. This would be proven by the fact that ‘a man on trial does 
not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he 
will never admit that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary’.706 
       
πάντα τὰ ἅτερα] At this point all the best manuscripts have a lacuna of about ten 
letters707 preceding the string τερεια and following either τὼς νόμως, according to P4, 
P6, V2, or τὰ, according to the other codices. The marked distance between these two 
possible starts suggests caution towards Trieber’s preference for one of them, with his 
emendation τὰ <τούτων> ἅτερα.708 The same can be said of Mullach’s τὰ ἑτεροῖα,709 
which is also too short, of Diels’ τὰ ἅτερα <πάντα>,710 which also postpones it, and of 
Robinson’s tentative τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῶ ἑ>τεροῖα,711 which is also too strong.712 I, 
therefore, agree with Classen that Wilamowitz’s πάντα τὰ ἅτερα713 is the best solution 
                                                 
705 Translation from Freese (1926), 35. 
706 Ibid. 
707 Weber (1897), 51. 
708 Trieber in Diels (1907), 648. 
709 Mullach (1875), 552.  
710 Diels (1903), 587. 
711 Robinson (1979), 140. 
712 Of the same opinion is Classen (Classen (2004), 120). 
713 Von Wilamowitz in Diels (1907), 552; Classen (2004), 120. 
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among those proposed, also because it shares τὰ ἅτερα with the above recalled 
εἰδὼς…τούτων of § 8.7. 
 
§ 8.10 
δεῖ…νόμως] Two new skills are here inferred from the eleventh one, according to the 
same rationale which allowed us to derive the eleventh skill from the second in the 
previous paragraph. For if pleading one’s case implied the knowledge of the concept 
one appeals to when performing this rhetorical skill, namely what is lawful, this is now 
said to be acquirable only if one first knows the criterion on the basis of which it is 
defined, that is laws (δεῖ…πάντας). But in order to know laws one must first know the 
legal issues of which laws have been meant as a solution (αἰ…νόμως).  
This movement from speaking to the knowledge of the theoretical framework 
according to which speaking takes place (§ 8.9), then to the constituents of this 
framework and finally to the empirical human situations on which these constituents 
are grounded (§ 8.10) is therefore the main expression of what I will later call the 
philosophical temper of the chapter,714 and reflects Socrates’ views at Pl. Phdr. 259e and 
277b, where he says that a rhetor must know the truth about the things he aims to speak 
about. This idea already appeared in § 8.4, but within the sophistic context of an eristic 
demonstration. 
 
τώς…πάντας] That laws belonged to the subjects taught by sophists appears in Pl. 
Grg. 484d, whereas according to Pl. Sph. 232d sophists just taught how to discuss them. 
That they were of the greatest interest to sophists can also be inferred from the two 
opposing strong attitudes they had towards them. On the one hand, Antiphon 
highlights the unsolvable contrast between laws, which are bad, and nature, which is 
good (DK87 B44B), as argued for also by the character of Callicles at Pl. Grg. 482e-484c. 
                                                 
714 See infra, 272-273. 
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On the other hand, Anonymus Iamblichi praises the contribution of laws in 
guaranteeing justice and, therefore, social and political coexistence between people 
(DK89.3,6,7). And it is also handed down that Protagoras wrote the laws for Thurii 
(DK80 A1), whereas Critias was chosen to revise the old ones of Athens (DK88 B48).  
 
§ 8.11 
τόν…νόμον] The author aims to illustrate how the same search into things necessary 
for a good understanding of the the laws of forensic justice in §§ 8.9-10 is also required 
in the case of the laws in any other field, for example music. Here too, in fact, one must 
first know the object, that is one must listen to a piece of music, in order to get its νόμος. 
Usually, in musical context, this word’s meaning of ‘law’ is narrowed to that of ‘law of 
music’, namely ‘melody’.715 This seems to  be the case here, considering the idea of an 
intimate relation between it and music (μωσική) expressed by the the phrase ὁ ἐν 
μωσικᾷ νόμος. However, since the efficacy of the example relies on the use of the same 
term which appeared in the previous paragraphs, the best translation seems to be the 
one offered by Dillon and Gergel, who by writing ‘law’ between single scare quotes, 
managed not to lose the word identity, and at the same time they signalled that a 
particular kind of law is meant here.716  
 
τις] Neither τὶς of Y2 nor τίς of the other manuscripts and which is followed by 
Robinson respect the rule of accentuation of this pronoun which, since it is indefinite 
and not interrogative, should be enclitic.717 Rightly, therefore, Fabricius read it as τις,718 
whereas Diels’ conjecture <ὡυ>τὸς,719 crasis for ὁ αὐτός, swaps the idea of 
                                                 
715 Cf. LSJ, s.v. νόμος, II, West (1992), 215-217, OED, s.v. ‘melody’, I.3.a. 
716 Dillon/Gergel (2003), 332. 
717 Vendryes (1904), 104. 
718 Fabricius (1724), 634. 
719 Diels (1903), 587. 
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indefiniteness of the original reading with an extraneous one of identity, in order to 
keep the incorrect accent mark. 
 
ἐπίσταται,] The transmitted comma is useful in stressing how τις is proleptic to 
ὅσπερ, so Meibom’s omission of it is not convenient,720 whereas Robinson did not 
justify why he turned it into a question mark,721 nor does a justification for that seem 
possible.  
 
§ 8.12 
ὅς…ἐπίσταται] Omniscience comes up again, this time as a natural consequence 
(εὐπετὴς ὁ λόγος) of the second ability, the knowledge of the truth of things. The lack 
of information about the latter prevents us from understanding this passage which 
appears, in any case, rather odd and probably meant, in the author’s mind, as the 
conclusion of another eristic argumentation, like that of §§ 8.3-5, not given here though.  
 
γα] The emphatic γα of most manuscripts is the most preferable reading, as it is 
logically fitting and there seems to be no lacuna around it. Therefore, there is no need 
to adopt Blass’ insertion of δέ before it,722 though that seems to address the odd absence 
here of this particle which occurs at the beginning of the treatments of all the other 
skills. Alternatively, γάρ of L has no parallel in any of them and must therefore be 
discarded, although it would stress the logical kinship that the paragraph has with 
what precedes, and in light of which one must also exclude Wilamowitz’s γα <μάν> 
(Doric for γε μήν),723 followed also by Robinson,724 and which is mostly adversative.725 
                                                 
720 Meibom (1688), 730. 
721 Robinson (1979), 140. That this is not a mere typo is shown by the translation ‘for who is it knows the 
rules (laws) of music?’ (Robinson (1979), 141). 
722 Blass in Weber (1897), 51. 
723 Von Wilamowitz in Diels (1903), 587. 
724 Robinson (1979), 140. 
725 Denniston (2002), 348. 
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Finally, Meibom’s κα must have been a typo,726 considering the impossibility for this 
particle (=ἄν) to be construed with a present indicative727 and that he translated the 
passage in the same way as North who had γα.728  
 
§ 8.13 
ὃς...ἐπίστασθαι] The symmetric recapitulation of the first six skills comes to its end 
here, where from the conversation by short questions and answers (κατὰ βραχὺ 
διαλέγεσθαι) is derived the fourteenth and last skill of answering any possible question 
(ἐρωτώμενον…πάντων), from which, in turn, another conclusion again concerning the 
man’s omniscience is finally drawn (οὐκῶν…ἐπίστασθαι). 
 
ὃς...πάντων] The rationale of this first step is clear provided we undestand the first 
ability too as valid in any possible case, as here required by περὶ πάντων. But this 
assumption is not legitimate, as the sole κατὰ βραχύ διαλέγεσθαι does not clarify 
whether this conversation consisting in short questions and answers is about any 
possible subject or just specific ones. According to the author, instead, the former case 
is granted, and the new skill turns out to be implicit in the first one: for it is clear that he 
who can converse in short questions and answers about everything is able to answer729 
any asked question too (ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ πάντων).   
Finally, it is worth recalling the sophistic nature of this skill through the examples 
of Pl. Grg. 447c (=DK82 A20), where Gorgias is said to boast about his ability to answer 
any given question (πρὸς ἄπαντα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι),730 and of Hp.Mi. 363c-d, where 
Hippias says he usually performs this ability at the temple of Olympia during the 
games. 
                                                 
726 Meibom (1688), 731. 
727 Goodwin (1898), 277. 
728 North (1671), 75. 
729 The Greek text just reads δεῖ […] ἀποκρίνασθαι, but the prescriptive strength of δεῖ itself implies that 
an effective ἀποκρίνασθαι, namely the ability to do it, is meant here.     
730 Similarly to 458d and Pl. Men. 70c. 
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οὐκῶν…ἐπίστασθαι] With this second inference the sophistic tone of this paragraph 
reaches its peak, as nobody would be keen to derive the knowledge of a subject from 
the mere ability to reply to every question about it. For one could just memorize a series 
of basic notions about a subject and succesfully stand a superficial interview about it, 
without for this very reason knowing it. Or, alternatively, one could satisfy a dull 
interlocutor by answering all their questions through stratagems like that described by 
Aristotle and mentioned before,731 which makes the knowledge of the subject 
unnecessary.    
For the fourth and last time in the chapter,732 omniscience is therefore concluded 
by means of sophistic tricks, and, similarly to proposition (2) of the argument in §§ 8.3-
5, the current fallacy consists in an invalid passage from speaking about everything to 
knowing it. This procedure seems to have been particularly dear to Gorgias, and our 
testimonies stress the connection between it and his boastful behaviour. At DK82 A1a 
it is said that ‘coming into the theatre of the Athenians he had the boldness to say 
“suggest a subject” […] showing apparently that he knew everything’.733 At Pl. Men. 
70b (=DK82 A19), then, he is said to have taught how to ‘answer fearlessly and 
haughtily if someone asks something, as is right for those who know’,734 which is clearly 
the opposite of what we usually expect from a teacher, who is supposed to teach a 
subject to his pupils, so that they can confidently answer as many questions as possible 
about it. 
 
 
                                                 
731 Improvisation is, in fact, a skill logically close to the current one, because in order to answer any 
possible question a successful man should also be prepared to speak about what he does not know, as 
omniscience is necessarily impossible for him. 
732 See 8.3-5, 7, 12. 
733 παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων θέατρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν ‘προβάλλετε’ […] ἐνδεικνύμενος 
δήπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι. 
734 ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας. 
Translation from Sprague (1972), 31. 
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Chapter 9 
§ 9.1  
μέγιστον…μνάμα] At first glance, it would seem surprising to define memory 
(μνάμα) as a invention (ἐξεύρημα), and not as a natural faculty of the human soul or 
mind, as maintained in the other ancient accounts of the phenomenon.735 But when, in 
the following paragraphs, three rules are given to improve the reader’s memory, the 
difficulty disappears as the chapter proves to actually concern not memory, but 
mnemonics. From this perspective, a similarity can be spotted in Auct. ad Herennium 
III.16, where two different, but connected, kinds of memory are said to belong to man 
— one natural and one artificial — with only the latter discussed.736 There too 
mnemonics is described using a word equivalent to the English ‘memory’, the Latin 
memoria, but with the addition of the adjective artificiosa, as opposed to naturalis memoria, 
the natural human faculty.  
 As for the epithet of ‘invention’, the first source to present mnemonics in this way 
is Marm.Par. 55, dated 3rd century BCE, and which also identifies its inventor in 
Simonides of Ceos. We do not have proof that our author too has him in mind here, but 
                                                 
735 The first description of memory in these terms belongs to Aeschylus, who inaugurates the metaphor 
of memory as tablets of the mind (Pr. 788-789), then become more famous through the Platonic block of 
wax of Tht. 191c-e. Among the other manifold and varied Platonic references to memory, it is worth 
recalling first Epin. 976b5-c6, where memory is considered a natural gift (φύσις), which is confirmed in 
R. VI 487a3-4; secondly, Phlb. 38e-39c, where it is described as a painter of the soul. Finally, at Phdr. 275a 
the alphabet, an invention supposed to improve natural memory, is said to even damage it. At Mem. 
449b22-26, Aristotle says, instead, that ‘memory, then, is neither sensation nor conception, but a state of 
having one of these or an affection resulting from one of these, when some time elapses’ (Bloch (2007), 
27); and, again, the place where memory takes place is the human soul. The belief in a purely natural 
status of memory crosses the centuries and is frequently used to mark the difference between memory 
and mnemonics, with various rhetorical ends. For whereas in Cic. de Orat. II.356-357 and Quint. Inst. XI.2.1 
memory’s natural status is consistent with the art aiming at improving it, at Philostr. VS 523 we read: 
‘there is no such thing as an art of memory, nor could there be, for though memory gives us the arts, it 
cannot itself be taught, nor can it be acquired by any method or system, since it is a gift of nature or a part 
of the immortal soul’ (translation in Wright (1921), 91-93).  
736 ‘Sunt igitur duae memoriae: una naturalis, altera artificiosa. Naturalis est ea, quae nostris animis insita 
est et simul cum cogitatione nata; artificiosa est ea, quam confirmat inductio quaedam et ratio 
praeceptionis. Sed qua via in ceteris rebus ingenii bonitas imitatur saepe doctrinam, ars porro naturae 
commoda confirmat et auget, item fit in hac re […] Nunc de artificiosa memoria loquemur’ (Auct. ad 
Herennium III.16). 
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we cannot exclude the possibility, especially considering that he has already been 
shown to be sensitive to the simile between poetry and painting for which Simonides 
was famous,737 and which ‘rests on the supremacy of the visual source’,738 just as 
mnemonics does.739 Since at Ael. NA VI.10, Hippias too is mentioned as one of the 
possible inventors of this art, and since he is the only sophist whom we know to be an 
expert in it, some interpreters have instead used this passage to support the attribution 
of the work to Hippias or to one of his entourage.740 Wisely, however, Blum741 suggested 
caution, stressing that our author’s system cannot reflect the same one that Hippias 
must have used to repeat a series of even fifty names after only one listening, according 
to Pl. Hp.Ma. 285e and DK86 A2. For, as far as the transmitted text goes, the mnemonist 
of chapter 9 lacks a means to check that he was repeating those names in the correct 
order, due to the absence of a spatial arrangement of the mental images.742  
 
βίον, μνάμα, καὶ] Only Robinson743 removed the commas before and after μνάμα 
which, instead, coherently highlight the syntactic, and semantic, centrality of this word 
within the sentence.  
 
ἐς πάντα…σοφίαν] The attribute ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, along with the previous 
μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον, reveals a trait common to the beginnings of the following 
                                                 
737 See supra, 136. 
738 Yates (1966), 28. 
739 Cicero thinks alike in the following passage: ‘vidit enim hoc prudenter sive Simonides sive alius quis 
invenit, ea maxime animis effingi nostri, quae essent a sensu tradita atque impressa; acerrimum autem ex 
omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum videndi; quare facillime animo teneri posse, si ea, quae 
perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur […] et unius 
verbi imagine totius sententiae information, pictoris cuiusdam summi ratione et modo formarum 
varietate locos distinguentis’ (Cic. de Orat. II.357-358).  
740 See in particular Pohlenz (1913), 77, Dupréel (1948), 190-200, Nestle (1966), 437. 
741 Blum (1969), 49-51. 
742 Systems of place as fundamental component of mnemonics for their providing order to the images 
which they host appear at Cic. de Orat. II.351-354,358, Auct. ad Herennium III.16-19, Quint. Inst. XI.2.17-
21 (and at 2.22 Quintilian recalls also Metrodorus of Scepsis for that), Longin. Fr. 201-202. 
743 Robinson (1979), 140. 
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ancient works on mnemonics too, namely the stress on the advantages of having a good 
memory, not only for oratory, but for life in general, or ἐς τὸν βίον, as just said.744 
However, here the main activity which is said to require a good memory is not oratory, 
but the pair φιλοσοφία τε καὶ σοφία, whose interpretation has been a point of 
controversy for scholars.  
Pohlenz believed that the phrase proves the carelessness of the author’s style, as 
the opposition one would have rather expected is ‘bei Studium und Praxis’.745 Robinson 
too found it problematic to give a literal translation and proposed the allegedly safer 
‘for both general education and practical wisdom’,746 which, however, seems to stray 
from the Greek concerning φιλοσοφία, as it nowhere else is attested as a general 
education.747 If, on the one hand, no further element helps to interpret this phrase, on 
the other hand, the relation in which φιλοσοφία stands with σοφία can be inferred from 
what has been seen earlier in the work. At § 1.1, in fact, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες were what 
the participants in disputes about good and bad were called, and these same individuals 
were also likely to be implicitly understood as the people discussing the philosophical 
opposites in chapters 2-4. As for σοφία, chapter 6 presented it as a ‘wisdom’ necessary 
for an excellence (ἀρετά) in the private and public affairs of the 5th-4th century Greek 
πόλις and whose teachers many recognised in the sophists. Finally, in chapter 8 σοφία 
was shown as a variegated system of teachings among which was also a philosophical 
                                                 
744 Cic. de Orat. II.355 (‘qui sit autem oratori memoriae fructus, quanta utilitas, quanta vis, quid me attinet 
dicere?’); Auct. ad Herennium III.16 (‘nunc ad thesaurum inventorum atque ad omnium partium 
rhetoricae custodem, memoriam, transeamus’); Plin. Nat. VII.37 (‘memoria necessarium maxime vitae 
bonum cui precipua fuerit, haut facile dictum est, tam multis eius gloriam adeptis’); Quint. Inst. XI.2.1 (‘et 
totus, de quo diximus adhuc, inanis est labor, nisi ceterae partes hoc velut spiritu continentur. Nam et 
omnis disciplina memoria constat, frustraque docemur, si quidquid audimus praeterfluat; et 
exemplorum, legum, responsorum, dictorum denique factorumque velut quasdam copias, quibus 
abundare quasque in promptu semper habere debet orator, eadem illa vis praesentat. Neque immerito 
thesaurus hic eloquentiae dicitur’). 
745 Pohlenz (1913), 74. 
746 Robinson (1979), 141. 
747 To this meaning παιδεία seems more appropriate : cf. LSJ s.v.v. φιλοσοφία and παιδεία. In a sense of 
the word typical of Isocrates and Alcidamas, φιλοσοφία can, at best, mean ‘the fitting of knowledge to 
the practical needs of the polis’ (Walters (1993), 158). 
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inquiry into the nature and the truth of things; a certain kind of φιλοσοφία hence 
seemed allowed to be a part of the sophistic σοφία the author envisaged. Therefore, 
assuming that in this last chapter the author remains consistent with what he said in 
chapters 1, 6, and 8,748 then we must conclude that in φιλοσοφία τε καὶ σοφία, where 
the two concepts are distinguished, φιλοσοφία indicates ‘philosophy’ in the narrow 
sense of the discipline, as opposed to the broad σοφία of the sophists.749  
The praise of the importance of memory for philosophy does not have any parallel 
in the 5th-4th century literature, rather a denial in Socrates’ irony when he speaks of 
Hippias’ mnemonic art at Pl. Hp.Mi. 368d and Hp.Ma. 285e.750 Things are diametrically 
opposed on the sophistic side, as we can read in these same Platonic passages, or at 
DK86 A2 and A5a, about Hippias’ mnemonics as well. Here, memory is said to play a 
fundamental educational role, and the same can be found in other passages previously 
recalled, among which is DK82 B14, where we read that both the teachers of eristic 
arguments and Gorgias would deliver some prepared speeches that their pupils should 
have learned by heart.  
 
§ 9.2  
ἔστι...ἔμαθες] The first mnemonic rule prescribes concentration (προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν) 
on a given matter so as to make it easier to mentally embrace it in its entirety 
(αἰσθησεῖται σύνολον). The recommendation of concentration is common within the 
ancient production on mnemonics, as we read at Auct. ad Herennium III.24751 and 
                                                 
748 Contra Burkert, who by simply extrapolating the phrase without any interest for the rest of the work, 
concluded that no relevant difference in meaning between the two words could be observed (Burkert 
(1960), 173, n. 4). 
749 On the chronological implications of this distinction, see infra, 276. 
750 Contra Kranz who recalled the current passage for its Socratic spirit (Kranz (1937), 230). At [Pl.] Epin. 
976b-c, instead, the Athenian excludes that a man can be considered wise just for the possess of an efficient 
memory. 
751 ‘Non enim, sicut a ceteris studiis abducimur nonnumquam occupatione, item ab hac re nos potest causa 
deducere aliqua. Numquam est enim, quin aliquid memoriae tradere velimus et tum maxime, cum aliquo 
maiore negotio detinemur’. 
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Quint. Inst. XI.2.10.752 Quintilian recognises also the difficulty of keeping ourselves 
focused on a speech we are trying to learn by heart, and recommends doing it aloud753 
and focussing particularly on the passages of the speech most difficult to remember754 
as props of concentration. Embracing a matter in its entirety, instead, has to do with the 
typically rhetorical necessity of a complete mental storage of a speech, both in its general 
structure and in detail.755 At de Orat. II.355,756 357,757 Cicero will identify it as one of the 
advantages that a good memory brings to oratory, the discipline within which 
mnemonics was conceived in antiquity.758 
 
§ 9.3 
δεύτερον…ἀκούσῃς] As second mnemonic precept, the author highlights the role of 
training (μελετᾶν), which will be largely recognised also later, at Cic. de Orat. II.357,759 
                                                 
752 ‘Necdubium est quin plurimum in hac parte valeat mentis intentio et velut acies luminum a prospectu 
rerum, quas intuetur, non aversa’. 
753 ‘Ediscere tacite (nam idquoque est quaesitum) erat optimum, si non subirent velut otiosum animum 
plerumquae aliae cogitationes; propter quas excitandus est voce, ut duplici motu iuvetur memoria 
dicendi et audiendi’ (Quint. Inst. 11.2.33). Yet, he immediately clarifies that ‘sed haec vox sit modica et 
magis murmur’ (ibid.).  
754 ‘In experiendo teneasne, et maior intention est et nihil supervacui temporis perit, quo etiam quae 
tenemus repeti solent’ (ibid., 11.2.35). 
755 Small (2005), 74.  
756 ‘[‘Quid me attinet dicere’ implied from the previous sentence] tenere quae didiceris in accipienda 
causa; quae ipse cogitaris? Omnis fixas esse in animo sententias? Omnem discriptum verborum 
apparatum?’. 
757 ‘Verum tamen neque tam acri memoria fere quisquam est, ut non dispositis notatisque rebus ordinem 
verborum aut nominum aut sententiarum complectatur’. 
758 Yates (1966), 2, Small (2005), 74.  
759 ‘Neque vero tam hebeti, ut nihil hac consuetudine et exercitatione adiuvetur’. 
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358,760 Auct. ad Herennium 3.21,761 24,762 and Quint. Inst. XI.2. 9,763 36,764 40,765 45,766 and 
through a process which is illustrated in the rest of the paragraph.  
 
μελετᾶν] Rightly, Robinson767 followed North’s768 μελετᾶν in place of μελέταν of the 
codices, as otherwise δεῖ, which Robinson was correct in suggesting is the verb of the 
main clause,769 would lack any infinitive to complete it. However, since the following αἴ 
κα of the codices also needs to be revised into ἅ κα,770 Weber was right to drop the 
comma which separates the new relative clause from the verb on which it depends.771 
Finally, although Mullach too removes the comma, his <διὰ τῶ> μελετᾶν is not 
convincing, since the insertion which it includes is not necessary and is due exclusively 
to a disagreeable conservation of δέ, in place of δεῖ in the sentence.772  
 
ἅ κα] By keeping αἴ κα of the codices, the apodosis (‘it is necessary to exercise’) can be 
joined with the protasis (‘if you hear’) only by assuming an understood object of 
                                                 
760 ‘Quam facultatem et exercitation dabit, ex qua consuetudo gignitur’. 
761 ‘Ut versu posito ipsi nobiscum primum transeamus bis aut ter eum versum’. 
762 ‘Sed cum in omni disciplina infirma est artis praeceptio sine summa adsiduitate exercitationis, tum 
vero in nemonicis minimum valet doctrina, nisi industria, studio labore, diligentia conprobatur’. 
763 ‘Quod et ipsum argumentum est subesse artem aliquam iuvarique ratione naturae, cum idem docti 
facere illud, indocti inexercitatique non possimus’.  
764 ‘Excepta, quae potentissima est, exercitatione’.  
765 ‘Si quis tamen unam maximamque a me artem memoriae quaerat, exercitatio est et labor; multa 
ediscere, multa cogitare, et si fieri potest cotidie, potentissimum est. Nihilaeque vel augetur cura vel 
negligentia intercidit’. 
766 ‘Atque in hanc consuetudinem memoria exercitatione redigenda’.  
767 Robinson (1979), 140. 
768 North (1671), 75. 
769 All manuscripts have δέ, but in this hypothesis, αἴ κα ἀκούσῃς should have been dependent on the 
former ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο and it should have governed μελέταν, or μελετᾶν, which is impossible. 
770 See the next commentary note. 
771 Weber (1897), 51. His change to the Doric μελετῆν however is, as usual, not necessary. 
772 Mullach’s text, which some line before has also τοιοῦτο in place of τοῦτο, is therefore the following: 
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο […] δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τῷ μελετᾶν αἴ κα ἀκούσῃς (Mullach (1875), 552). 
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μελετᾶν and ἀκούσῃς, as done by most translators, Robinson included.773 Rightly, 
therefore, Sprague774 highlighted the importance of picking Blass’775 conjecture ἅ κα.    
 
ἅ κα ἀκούσῃς] This occurrence of ἀκούω has been translated almost unanimously776 
according to the main meaning of the verb, ‘to hear’, which, however, entails a problem: 
what one has simply heard is difficult to remember, especially if composed of many 
elements, like the words of a sentence. As a result, it can be laborious to go over it, as 
the author immediately adds (τῷ…παρεγένετο). Alternatively, if one first keeps a 
written record of the words to be memorised, then they can be read or repeated at any 
future point in time without the risk of being gradually forgotten. A second sense of the 
verb goes precisely in this direction. For, as is often the case in prose, when the objects 
of ἀκούω are words, speeches, or books — all these being expressed in the accusative777 
as ἅ here is — the verb can mean ‘to read’,778 on the tacit assumption that someone hears 
the words of a text while they are being read to them, ‘whether uttered by himself, by 
his slave or by anyone else’.779 The first of these three possibilities seems to be the case 
here, as the paragraph then concludes by requiring that one frequently (πολλάκις)780 
listen (ἀκοῦσαι) and declaim (εἶπαι) the things they want to remember, as also advised 
                                                 
773 ‘You must, whenever you hear anything, go over it carefully’ (Robinson (1979), 141). Only one 
translation consistently omitted the object, in respect of the Greek, namely Fabricius’ ‘si mediteris, assidue 
audiendo’ (Fabricius (1724), 635), whereas in Solana Dueso’s ‘ejecitarse si escuchas algo’ (Solana Dueso 
(1996), 199) at least ἀκούσῃς is given an implicit τι. 
774 Sprague (1972), 293, n. 10. 
775 Blass in Weber (1897), 51. But Blass did not know that De Varis had already made the very similar 
conjecture ‘ἅκε vel ἅκα’ (Robinson (1972), 198). 
776 Contrastingly, Mullach and Dumont translated ἀκούσῃς as ‘intelligas’ (Mullach (1875), 552) and ‘tes 
leçons’ (Dumont (1969), 246), respectively. But the former implies an idea of understanding which misses 
the main theme of memory, whereas the latter unduly confines the author’s precept to only the specific 
case of a lecture. 
777 Schenkeveld (1992), 131, 139. 
778 Schenkeveld listed a good number of these cases, including Pl. Phdr. 268c, 275a, 235b-c, 261b, Alc. I 
112b, Lg. 629b, X. Mem. II.6.11 (Schenkeveld (1992), 141). 
779 Ibid., 135. As Small observes, ‘since there was virtually no silent reading in antiquity, ἀκούω came, by 
obvious extension, to mean “read”’, and ‘works were judged on how well a listener rather than a viewer 
understood them’ (Small (2005), 165). 
780 Similarly to Auct. ad Herennium III.22 and Quint. Inst. XI.2.35, 40.  
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by Quint. Inst. XI.2.33. But the fact that we first recalled this same place from Quintilian 
in connection with concentration781 shows a sense in which we can take the first two 
rules to be in connection: in order to memorize, the mind needs to focus on the chosen 
subject (first rule), and to do so a frequent, loud repetition helps, as it keeps the mind 
busy and alert through constant speaking and listening (second rule).  
 
ταὐτά] The exigency that the memory of something be as accurate as possible is 
particularly felt in oratory, in order to avoid the unpleasant situation of not being able 
to recall a ready-made speech. For when one happens to lack even just one word, they 
will find it hard to figure out a substitute, as observed at Quint. Inst. XI.2.49.782  
Interestingly, when literacy appeared, a change of psychical task occurred, ‘from 
[…] remembering to […] writing and then, later, reading back the information’,783 a 
transition which led to ‘a greater need for memory for words’784 than in preliterate times. 
For as Plato pinpoints in Phdr. 274e-275d, the written text is an entity external to man 
and is, therefore, something over which he has no control. So, when he wishes to repeat 
it, he does not have words of his own to do it, and he is bound to pass through the exact 
ones of which the text consists. But the diffusion of written texts promoted the 
development of a memory verbatim in another sense as well: for, as Small put it, ‘one of 
literacy’s most notable effects is that it feeds upon itself. The more literate you are the 
more words you need to remember’.785 In other words, since literacy stimulated the 
growth of the vocabulary, it has been maintained that by the 5th century BCE, the words 
used in the written communication were already too many to be handled ‘without some 
kind of improved retrieval system’.786  
                                                 
781 See supra, 257, n. 753. 
782 ‘Nam et invitus perdit quisque id quod elegerat verbum, nec facile reponit aliud, dum id, quod 
scripserat quaerit’.  
783 Norman (1993), 78, quoted in Small (2005), 4. 
784 Small (2005), 4. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Ibid., 74. 
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§ 9.4 
τρίτον…ἵππον] As Blum787 pointed out, this third rule, especially in its statement 
ἅ…καταθέσθαι, is on the same wavelength as Longinus’ remark that what is known 
(τὸ γνώριμον) is the starting point for the memory of what is still to be known (τὸ 
γνωστόν, Longin. Fr. 201-202). Small recalled that this method for remembering 
unfamiliar words is also known as ‘keyword mnemotechnics’ among modern 
psychologists, whose tests showed that it helps memorize new words in the short term 
rather than the long term, for which a standard study of the word within its proper 
meaningful context gives better results.788 
Our author then illustrates two different cases to which this rule applies: the 
former involves the so-called memory of words and is exemplified in the current and 
following paragraphs, whereas to the latter, concerning the memory of things, § 9.6 is 
devoted. The distinction between a first moment, where the general rule is given, and a 
second one, in which explanatory examples are offered, betrays the degree of 
development of the technique taught here which confutes the tradition of the 
mnemonics of ancient Greek authors as usually made of just long lists of ready-made 
mental images for the user to use slavishly, with no regard for what could have really 
stimulated their imagination and, hence, their memory (Auct. ad Herennium III.23). 
 
ἅ κα] Similarly to what has been seen earlier, this solution by Blass proves again to be 
fitter than αἴ κα of the codices, which is followed by Robinson, but also than the new αἰ 
<ἅ> κα, which Schanz proposed.789 This conjecture would be worth considering only if 
we did not accept Blass’ emendation of ἔπειτα into ἐπὶ τὰ;790 we would thus obtain the 
plausible τρίτον, αἴ ἅ κα ἀκούσῃς, ἔπειτα οἶδας καταθέσθαι. But, rightly, the editors 
                                                 
787 Blum (1969), 145. 
788 Small (2005), 101. He drew, in particular, on Wang/Thomas (1995) for this. 
789 Schanz (1884), 382. 
790 Blass in Weber (1897), 51. But, similarly to supra, 259, n. 775, De Varis had already conjectured the same 
(Robinson (1972), 198, Robinson (1996), 92). 
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have unanimously preferred ἐπὶ τὰ, because it enhances the relation between this first 
occurrence of κατατίθημι, enunciating the general statement of the third rule, and the 
following ones in the chapter, construed with ἐπί and the accusative and introducing 
sample cases of that rule.  
 
ἀκούσῃς] In all of the examples of the third rule, the objects referred to as new or as 
known will be single elements, like names or things, and not compound ones, like 
sentences or collections of things. After all, creating associations between objects of the 
first group is simpler than doing it with those of the second, which the mind finds 
difficult to visualize in the first place (Auct. ad Herennium III.20-21).791 In light of this 
fact, I have here varied the translation of the verb from what I did previously, opting, 
with most translators, for the primary meaning of ‘to hear’, because in order to 
memorize the objects the author proposes, a single listening is sufficient, and the aid of 
writing is not necessary.  
 
ἐπὶ…καταθέσθαι] The principle underlying this statement is that of association,792 a 
well known (Pl. Phd. 73c-74a, Arist. Mem. 452a8-16, Cic. de Orat. II.357, Quint. Inst. 
XI.2.30-31, Longin. Rh. I.2.201-202) and powerful principle of memory, and because of 
which here, once the connection between the new object and the one already known is 
established, whenever one tries to recollect (μεμνᾶσθαι) the former, the image of the 
latter comes up and guides them to their goal. Although Blum was right in judging the 
author as lacking ‘die Gestaltung von Bildern’,793 since no indication is given concerning 
the aspect that the images should have,794 the conscious use of both the principle of 
association and of different methods to visualise words and things proves that shaping 
                                                 
791 Blum (1969), 54.  
792 Blum (1969), 51, 58. 
793 Ibid., 50. 
794 But see also Yates’ right remark, infra, 265. 
 263 
 
the mental images is nonetheless the heart of the author’s peculiar mnemonic system, 
seemingly without mnemonic places.   
 
δεῖ...ἵππον] Given in this second part of the paragraph is the first of two examples of 
how the rule of association can be applied to τὰ ὀνύματα, namely to names, as later 
explicited at the end of § 9.5. The contrast between τὰ ὀνύματα and τὰ πράγματα, 
which has characterised the treatise so far,795 has a mnemonic version, here and in the 
last paragraph, devoted to the memory of things.796 Thus, another historically known 
mnemonic feature comes up, namely the distinction between memoria verborum and 
memoria rerum.797 The objects with which these two genres of memory operate are both 
expressed by words, but whereas memoria verborum aims to store these words with 
exactness, both as to which they are and in what order they are set (if more than one, 
like in a sentence), memoria rerum is just concerned with keeping their meaning.798 This 
difference has led me to translate the names of memoria verborum between single 
quotation marks, so as to indicate that they are considered under their status as words, 
rather than for what they indicate, as happens to the things of memoria rerum, instead.  
The genre of memoria verborum as illustrated here is, more precisely, etymological799 
and it specifically applies to those proper names, which, taken undividedly, like at 
                                                 
795 §§ 1.11, 2.1 (where τὸ σῶμα takes the place of τὸ πρᾶγμα), 3.13, 4.6. 
796 On this conceptual continuity, see also Kranz (1937), 226. 
797 Blum (1969), 51, n. 99, Desbordes (1987), 36. Other ancient sources are Cic. de Orat. II.359, Auct. ad 
Herennium. III.20.  
798 See also Blum (1969), 13). In light of the rhetorical context of ancient mnemonics, Yates recalled Cicero’s 
distinction between res and verba in oratory (Cic. Inv. I.7.9), to conclude that ‘”things” are thus the subject 
matter of the speech; “words” are the language in which the subject matter is clothed’ (Yates (1966), 9).  
799 ‘Etymologisches Verfahren’ or ‘Sinnverfahren’, according to Blum, who recognizes also a 
‘Stellvertretungsverfahren’ and a ‘Klangverfahren’(or ‘Phonetisches Verfahren’) as other possible classes 
of memoria verborum applied to names (Blum (1969), 19-21). Desbordes did not agree with this label, 
observing how the meanings of the words which are identified as components of the proper name do not 
contribute to reveal the overall meaning of the name (Desbordes (1987), 36). But they dictate how the 
mnemonic images of the name must be, hence the method could be considered etymological at least with 
regard to them. 
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Quint. Inst. XI.2.31,800 or cut into parts, like in this case of Χρύσιππος, recall nouns801 
easier to visualise. An implicit assumption here is that one does not know, directly or 
indirectly, any person having the name to be remembered. Otherwise, firstly, the name 
would not be new to them, and, secondly, an association between the name and the 
mental image of this acquaintance would be more straightforward, and therefore more 
advisable,802 than the one here prescribed. But if so, then it is legitimate to wonder who 
could be genuinely interested in learning the names of people they do not know 
anything about. As Blum noticed, the case of Hippias, who is said to be able to repeat a 
list of fifty names in the correct order after only one listening, reveals that such 
performances were practiced by sophists, either as a personal exercise of  memory 
training,803 or in a public demonstration of his own value. Yates also suggested the 
possibility that Plato’s satire on the sophists’ use of etymology could be partially due 
precisely to the mnemonic application of it, on the basis of his condemnation of the art 
of memory.804  
 
§ 9.5 
ἄλλο…ὀνυμάτων] Here we find the second and last example of etymological memoria 
verborum, in which a proper name (Πυριλάμπη) is easily remembered through the 
visualization of its components (τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν). The final remark on this 
procedure’s restriction to names (τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶν ὀνυμάτων) presents a correlative 
μέν, and it anticipates the opposite τὰ δὲ πράγματα at the beginning of § 9.6.  
 
                                                 
800 The names ‘Aper’, ‘Ursus’, ‘Naso’, ‘Crispus’, ‘Cicero’, ‘Verrius’, ‘Aurelius’ are proposed. 
801 Other kinds of words, like conjunctions, articles, and pronouns, cannot be reduced to images, as also 
observed at Cic. de Orat. II.359.  
802 It would be a case of ‘Stellvertretungsverfahren’ (Blum (1969) 19), as we read at Auct. ad Herennium 
III.18, Quint. Inst. XI.2.30. 
803 Cf. ‘Nec nos hanc verborum memoriam inducimus, <ut versus meminisse possimus,> sed ut hac 
exercitatione illa rerum memoria, quae pertinet ad utilitatem, confirmetur’ (Auct. ad Herennium III.24). 
804 Yates (1966), 37. 
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§ 9.6 
τά…Ἐπειόν] Discussed here is the application of the rule of association to the memory 
of things (τὰ δὲ πράγματα), or memoria rerum, and, in particular, its accomplishment 
through the use of symbolic images.805 This precept too is attested in other ancient 
sources (Cic. de Orat. II.357, Auct. ad Herennium III.20), but only here are the examples 
concerned with the memorization of single things and not of complexes of them.806  
These examples consist in three concepts which need to be connected to the images 
of concrete entities in order to be remembered. Ancient Greek gods and mythical 
characters are therefore brought in to accompany two psychological dispositions 
(ἀνδρεία and δειλία) and a profession (χαλκεία). Correctly, Yates believed that ‘here 
we may perhaps see in an archaically simple form those human figures representing 
“things” which finally developed into the imagines agentes’,807 namely into human 
images ‘arousing emotional affects’808 through their look ‘striking and unusual […] 
beautiful or hideous, comic or obscene’809 and ‘dramatically engaged in some activity’810 
(Cic. de Orat. II.357, Auct. ad Herennium III.21-22). 
As Blum811 recalled, Hephaestus, in particular, is the outcome of a metonymy 
representing what is done through the agent who does it, and is also mentioned at Auct. 
ad Herennium IV.43 and Quint. Inst. VIII.6.23, but just as a rhetorical figure. From this 
                                                 
805 According to Blum’s classification, memoria rerum applied to individual objects can be divided into 
‘Abbilder’ and ‘Sinnbilder’; the latter, in turn, consists of ‘Teilbilder’ and ‘Symbolbilder’ which is the 
category to which these examples belong (Blum (1969), 13-17). 
806 Cf. ‘hoc modo, ut si accusator dixerit ab reo hominem veneno necatum, et hereditatis causa factum 
arguerit, et eius rei multos dixerit testes et conscios esse: si hoc primum, ut ad defendendum nobis 
expeditum <sit,> meminisse volemus, in primo loco rei totius imaginem conformabimus: aegrotum in 
lecto cubantem faciemus ipsum illum, de quo agetur, si formam eius detinebimus; si eum non, at aliquem 
aegrotum <non> de minimo loco sumemus, ut cito in mentem venire possit. Et reum ad lectum eius 
adstituemus, dextera poculum, sinistra tabulas, medico testiculos arietinos tenentem: hoc modo et 
testium et hereditatis et veneno necati memoriam habere poterimus.’ (Auct. ad Herennium III.20). See 
also Blum (1969), 17-18. 
807 Yates (1966), 30. 
808 Ibid., 10. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Blum (1969), 28, nn. 124-125. 
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perspective, the author of Dissoi Logoi can be shown to anticipate the medieval 
awareness of the mnemonic function of this and other rhetorical tropes.812  
 
περὶ δειλίας…Ἐπειόν] Epeius is known not only as the builder of the wooden horse in 
the siege of Troy. His cowardice, reflected by his ineptitude in war, is largely attested 
by another tradition, less famous, as Robinson’s puzzlement about this last example 
indirectly proves,813 and whose first testimony dates back to Cratinus.814 
 
Ἐπειόν***] All manuscripts have a lacuna after the word Ἐπειόν, and with it the text 
of the chapter and of the entire treatise ends. Since we have no hint as to the extent of 
the loss, we can conjecture that it was large enough to contain at least one rule about 
mnemonic places which is fundamental to recalling the order in which images come, 
and is mentioned in all the other later testimonies of ancient mnemonics.815  A more 
speculative theory, though still possible, is that the chapter would have then concluded 
by summing up the author’s view on the matter, a usual feature of the other chapters, 
yet not shared by the eighth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
812 On this medieval discovery, see Blum (1969), 29.  
813 Robinson (1979), 240. 
814 Ἐπειοῦ δειλότερος (Cratin. CAF 460.1); see also Zachos (2013), 16. Contra Dillon and Gergel who 
described his cowardice as becoming proverbial only ‘in later times’ (Dillon/Gergel (2003), 411). 
815 See supra, 254, n. 742. 
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4. The author’s message 
 
§ 1. Two parts, one work: the structural duality and conceptual unity of Dissoi Logoi 
Earlier on, I showed the reasons why I believe that the nine chapters of the work are 
more likely to be complete speeches than notes propaedeutic to write one, and as likely 
to have a didactic use as not.816 Having read, translated, and scrutinized the text, we are 
now in a better position to widen our focus and assess whether the work is just a 
collection of random speeches, or whether it also possesses a specific meaning when 
considered as a whole.  
Without a doubt, a first-time reader’s initial impression of Dissoi Logoi is hardly 
one of unity. Although all dealing with motifs belonging to the sophistic culture, each 
of the nine chapters has an individual and separate theme, and not only do chapters 1-
6 stand out for their antilogic form, as opposed to the demonstrative speeches of 7-9,817 
but structural differences within the former group are also clearly visible. Such 
heterogeneity is, hence, acknowledged by all scholars, who yet divide themselves on 
how to explain it.  
As first, Trieber marked the hiatus in the work one chapter earlier than I do, and 
judged chapters 6-9 to be so distant in contents from 1-5, as even to pose doubts 
regarding their authenticity.818 Farther along this line went Zeller, who suggested that 
the whole work is the product of multiple authors.819 Gomperz maintained that Dissoi 
Logoi was originally meant as antilogic, but due to growing haste the author simplified 
its second part, by putting it down in the form of single speeches.820 Robinson observed 
                                                 
816 See supra, 44-48. 
817 They can be seen as examples of ἐπίδειξις, but provided one assumes the Platonic use of this term, as 
‘public presentation of literature or speech’ (sometimes sarcastically, with reference to his opponents’ 
speeches; cf. Pl. Hp.Mi. 363a-d) (Timmerman (1996), 230), and not the Aristotelian technical one indicating 
the miscellaneous class of encomiastic, funeral and festival speeches (Ibid., 229).  
818 Trieber (1892), 224-225. 
819 Zeller (1920), 1333, n.1. 
820 Gomperz (1912), 186-187. 
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that antilogy is particularly appropriate for the first six chapters, as ‘in such matters 
articulate cases for and against particular propositions have been put forward by 
φιλοσοφοῦντες’,821 and here the author is simply sketching out this debate without 
seriously taking part in it. By contrast, in chapters 7-9 the author’s views ‘start to emerge 
more and more clearly’,822 and the monologic form then becomes more natural.823 
Rossetti supposed a promotional goal for the work, through which the author would 
have advertised a sophistic course of his to an audience, such as the Peloponnesian one, 
more easily captivated by wonder than by persuasion. As a result, the abrupt move from 
the initial antilogic chapters, whose philosophical themes are ideal to attract the 
listeners’ imagination, to the following political and rhetorical dissertations would 
likely have had precisely the possible intentional effect of bewilderment.824 Finally, a 
special case is that of Kranz, who argued for some unifying train of thought to be 
carefully spotted under the apparent inconsistency of the work. He observed how the 
notion of wisdom (σoφία) firstly tackled in chapter 5, as opposed to ignorance 
(ἀμαθία), appears in chapter 6 too, where its teachability is at issue; it is, then, required 
from a good public officer, in chapter 7; it is accurately described for the various forms 
it usually takes when meant as the wisdom of a successful man, in chapter 8; finally, it 
is what needs the support of a well-trained memory, such as that illustrated in chapter 
9.825  
Interesting reflections, hence, emerge here, and yet I do not see them as the most 
salient ones, which I shall soon introduce. Trieber’s and Zeller’s similar ideas that 
different authors are responsible for different parts of the text do not agree, firstly, with 
what has been seen earlier about Dissoi Logoi’s stylistical unity;826 secondly with the 
exhibition of the same rhetorical features throughout the work, such as the exchange 
                                                 
821 Robinson (1979), 79. 
822 Ibid., 81. 
823 Ibid., 79. 
824 Rossetti (1980), 28-29. 
825 Kranz (1937), 226-227. 
826 See supra, 23-24. 
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with an imaginary interlocutor (§§ 1.12-14, 2.21, 3.13, 4.4, 4.6, 5.7-10,15, 7.2-3), rhetorical 
question (§§ 2.28, 3.2,5,6,8, 5.13, 6.7,8, 8.2), and literary reference (§§ 2.19, 3.9,11-12, 6.8, 
9.6). Robinson’s identification of different operations in the two parts of the work, a 
descriptive one in chapters 1-6 and an argumentative one in chapters 7-9, sounds safer 
than both the excessive stress which Rossetti puts on the rhetorical value of the shift 
from antilogy to epideixis, and Gomperz’s mere speculation about the work’s origin as 
fully antilogic. Even the moderate version of the latter (which Robinson himself 
proposed) claiming that some expressions in the text give a ‘dialectical tension’827 to 
chapter 7 and 8, fails to convince, as I showed in the commentary. Although Robinson 
is therefore right in emphasising the disconnect between the structure and goal of Dissoi 
Logoi, I believe that the work finds its unity on a third level, which he did not mention, 
namely that of contents.  
This comes hardly as a surprise, after what I stated at the beginning about the 
sophistic temper of the themes dealt with in Dissoi Logoi. Kranz too went down this line, 
but the notion of σοφία, which he saw as connecting all the speeches together, is 
certainly pivotal in chapters 5-6, but loses its priority in chapters 7-9, being accompanied 
by other relevant ones (sortition, man’s education, and memory above all), without 
mentioning, as in fact he did not do, that it is even absent in chapters 1-4. I believe that 
where to look for the thematical unity of Dissoi Logoi is, rather, chapter 8, which has been 
comparatively neglected by commentators, but which bears special relevance on a few 
levels.  
First and foremost, chapter 8 furnishes the strongest evidence of the sophistic 
nature of the text. For whereas the other chapters cover various subjects potentially 
interesting for either a philosopher (chapters 1-6), or a rhetor (chapters 7 and 9), chapter 
8 outlines a comprehensive omniscience which keeps together abilities belonging to 
                                                 
827 Robinson (1977), 135.   
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both such figures and which easily reflect the kind of culture usually associated with 
sophists.  
Secondly, and what more matters in the current discussion, among these abilities 
one finds those characterizing chapters 1-7. For the antilogies of chapters 1-6 can be 
considered under the heading of λόγων τέχναι (§ 8.1, 13). The one single art (ἡ αὐτὴ 
τέχνη) about which chapter 8 speaks is reminiscent of the wisdom and excellence 
(σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ) the teachability of which is discussed in chapter 6; consider the 
reference to sophists as the acknowledged teachers of these subjects (§ 6.5, 7), and to 
their goal of making a man important (§ 6.6). Finally, advising the city to appoint their 
public magistrates by election rather than sortition, in chapter 7, is an instance of 
δαμαγορεῖν (§ 8.1, 6). This identification process leaves out chapter 9, although one may 
argue that memory, there discussed, is essential in retaining the many objects of 
knowledge mentioned in chapter 8, sometimes even magnified as ‘everything’ 
(πάντα/περὶ πάντων ἐπίστασθαι, in §§ 8.4, 7, 12, 13).  
In light of this network of cross-references, a new unitary reading of Dissoi Logoi 
becomes possible, which lies in chapter 8. For the work can be regarded as the 
compilation of a programmatic sophistic manifesto (chapter 8) preceded by a 
demonstration of some of the skills showcased in that programme (chapters 1-7), and 
followed by an appendix on memory - perhaps on other subjects too, as the surviving 
work ends with a lacuna (chapter 9). On this hypothesis, chapters 1-8 could thus 
constitute a long unit of text with promotional function as it emerges particularly from 
chapter 8.828 For there, in illustrating the plurality of expertises brought by the single art 
(ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη) in question, the author implies that he is the kind of sophist who knows 
and masters the latter, as well as it stands to reason that the man who is repeatedly 
associated with this art (ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνήρ) is the one who the reader will want to become, 
if the speech succeeds in persuading them. If so, then one could think of chapters 8 in 
                                                 
828 Rossetti too agreed that chapter 8 shows this function the most, but included chapter 9 in this unit 
(Rossetti (1980), 29-32).  
 271 
 
the same way as Muir interpreted Alcidamas’ Against the Sophists: ‘a programme of what 
should be taught and arguments for its importance […] designed to attract and 
persuade and to whet the appetite’.829 For any 4th-century ‘skilful, publicity-conscious 
rhetor’ - as Alcidamas and, possibly, our sophist were - would advertise ‘part of his 
wares, giving a kind of public prospectus for a course of instruction’.830 To this end, he 
would certainly address ‘an audience of prospecting students’ in person, ‘but for those 
who could not be there’, he needed to resort to ‘information technology – the written 
word’.831  
The latter scenario seems the one which better suits Alcidamas’ Against the Sophists 
and Dissoi Logoi 1-8, as they both stray from ‘even the simplest conventional […] 
structure’832 of a formal speech designed for a public performance, consisting in an 
introduction, a middle part and a conclusion. They also lack an ‘address to a real or 
imaginary audience’, unless one is content with the quick and flimsy cases of 
‘Alcidamas’ claim to be making an accusation – kategoria – in § 1’833 and our author’s 
mention of a circle of uninitiated people to whom he was talking, at § 4.4. The two texts 
are also almost of the same and short length (Dissoi Logoi 1-8 being slightly longer), 
which befits a possible promotional nature of the work, and, rather than speeches, both 
may be seen as treatises ‘falling in no definite category’.834 The only substantial 
difference between the two is that in chapters 1-7 our sophist also gives demonstrations 
of what he promises to his customer in chapter 8; by contrast, all that Alcidamas’ client 
could find in Against the Sophists is promotion of the ability to make extempore speeches, 
albeit to a higher degree of detail than how the various Dissoi Logoi abilities are 
showcased in chapter 8. 
                                                 
829 Muir (2001), xiii. 
830 Ibid. 
831 Ibid. 
832 Ibid. 
833 Ibid. 
834 Ibid., xvii.  
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If this interpretation of chapters 1-8 is the case, how can we explain chapter 9? One 
can accept that the work starts in medias res with an essay of some sophistic skill, in 
chapters 1-7, and that then it informs the reader of how those are actually parts of a 
broader teaching making a man competent and successful in various fields. Less likely, 
instead, seems the hypothesis that in this same work, after such move from the 
particular to the general, the author wants to go back to a specific skill again, such as 
mnemonics of chapter 9. One may of course suppose that as chapter 8 concludes and 
contextualizes what precedes it, chapter 9 opens up a new section of the work, covering 
various chapters now lost in the lacuna with which the work now ends. However, it 
seems less speculative, and hence preferable, to me to think of chapters 1-8 and chapter 
9 as separate writings gathered together because belonging to the same sophistic author, 
as similarity in language and style suggests, and maybe even forming a bigger corpus 
of texts with other pieces now lost in the lacuna. 
 
§ 2. The author’s sophistic ideology 
Another surprisingly unnoticed aspect of chapter 8 is its contribution to reconstructing 
the author’s personal views on the topics which, as earlier observed, make Dissoi Logoi 
a typically sophistic text. Once again, what emerges in this respect does not just tally 
with, but is also confirmed by, other passages of Dissoi Logoi, proving the author’s 
consistency throughout.  
To begin with, two opposite tempers, a philosophical and a dialectico-rhetorical 
one, coexist in the chapter. The former emerges from the necessity of an in-depth 
knowledge of the things we speak about in §§ 8.9-11 and echoes in the notions of 
ἀλάθεια τῶν πραγμάτων and φύσις τῶν ἀπάντων, in § 8.1, as well as in the discussion 
of the latter of these, in § 8.2. The requirement of such a knowledge is also aligned with 
the exigency of competence, observed in §§ 6.3,7 and, especially, in chapter 7. 
Furthermore, an ontological concern with the nature (φύσις) of things belonged to 
chapter 5 and § 6.8, a paragraph to which I will come back soon. The dialectico-rhetorical 
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thread, on the other hand, runs across the analyses of the λόγων τέχναι in §§ 8.3-6, of 
δαμαγορεῖν in § 8.6, and of the improvised knowledge provided by τὰ δέοντα in §§ 
8.7-8; across the unargued derivation of omniscience from ἀλάθεια τῶν πραγμάτων in 
§ 8.12, up to the treatment of κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι in § 8.13. The difference between 
the two groups of passages and between the strands they represent835 can be grasped 
especially if one compares §§ 8.9-11 with §§ 8.3-5: in the first case, the knowledge of 
things is necessary to be able to describe them in words, in the second one, the 
knowledge of things is shown as deriving merely from the ability of composing 
speeches about them. In its turn, the distinction between a layer of things and one of 
words comes up in a few points of the work, with the stock phrase ὥσπερ καὶ τὤνυμα 
οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα frequently being the rhetorical device used in the DTs to declare 
things not to be, ‘such as the facts are’; a formulation also hinting, by contrast, at the 
theory of truth as correspondence between world and word which has a pivotal part in 
the first speech of chapter 4. 
Here a reflection on the date of the work becomes necessary again. For as far as 
our evidence goes, the idea of an omniscience bridging philosophy and art of speech is 
typical of 5th-century sophists, as Scholz observed.836 For example, in Pl. Sph. 232a-233c 
the Visitor reveals it as a deception, and Socrates does the same throughout the 
Euthydemus. Its alleged philosophical component is what Plato distrusted the most, 
regarding it as a mere application of the art of contradiction to ‘private discussions about 
                                                 
835 Solana Dueso identified two similar groups, but he also argued that the chapter aims to prove that the 
rhetorical skills are subordinated to the philosophical ones, as would be shown simply by the fact that 
ἐπίστασθαι and εἰδέναι are the most used words (Solana Dueso (1996), 172-173, 176). But these verbs 
change their degree of truthfulness according to the context in which they are used: e.g., the same form 
ἐπιστασεῖται introduces a not reliable profession of omniscience in § 8.4, considering the justification for 
this claim then given in § 8.5, whereas in § 8.10 it is used in the sensible observation that the knowledge 
of legal issues precedes that of laws. By not discriminating between similar opposed uses, Solana Dueso 
inevitably fell in the mistake of reading the whole chapter as consistently making the same case as 
Socrates when praising the good rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus. In like manner, simply passing over the 
distinction of the two different classes of skills, Sichirollo too read the chapter as advocating the 
supremacy of philosophy over rhetoric (Sichirollo (1966), 43-48). 
836 Becker/Scholz (2004), 40. 
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being and coming-to-be’837 (Sph. 232c). Upon reflection on Sph. 234b, one can conclude 
that, according to Plato, any declaration of knowing the truth of things of the kind our 
author takes (§ 8.1, 12) would be just the illusory product of a sophistic art, and not the 
solid grounding of a wise rhetoric, as it should be.  
Conversely, separation between these two contrasting tempers of sophistic 
instruction occurred over the 4th century BCE, as one can see in Isocrates’ Against the 
Sophists or Antidosis, and schools of philosophy and rhetoric were then opened for the 
first time in Athens.838 Particularly indicative in this regard is Antidosis, where Isocrates 
claims that there is ‘no place in training of practical statesmen for any but practical 
subjects’,839 and that young men should keep themselves far from any kind of 
philosophical speculations, which in fact he derogatorily qualifies as ‘sophistic’. For 
similar ‘barren subtleties’ can just deviate the learner’s mind from those superior studies 
‘which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the 
commonwealth’840 (Isoc. Antidosis 285).   
Furthermore, Morrison recalled how at 268, Isocrates’ criticism is addressed 
especially to the study of the early philosophers of nature: he openly mentions 
Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus and Gorgias, and again 
disparages them as ‘ancient sophists’.841 This passage sends the reader of Dissoi Logoi 
back to the controversial § 6.8, where Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans too are presented 
as acknowledged teachers of wisdom and excellence. Regardless of whether or not here 
                                                 
837 Translation by Nicholas P. White in Cooper (1997), 235. 
838 Cicero illuminates this transition in classical Greek culture for us in de Orat. III.72-73: ‘the older masters 
down to Socrates used to combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science of 
everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics; it was subsequently, as I have 
explained, that the two groups of students were separated from one another, by Socrates and then 
similarly by all the Socratic schools, and the philosophers looked down on eloquence and the orators on 
wisdom, and never touched anything from the side of the other study except what this group borrowed 
from that one, or that one from this; whereas they would have drawn from the common supply 
indifferently if they had been willing to remain in the partnership of early days’ (translation from 
Rackham (1942), 59). See also Becker/Scholz (2004), 39. 
839 Morrison (1958), 217. 
840 Translation from Norlin (1929), 343. 
841 Morrison (1958), 217. 
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our author too applies the label of sophists to them, what matters is that he proves to be 
perfectly happy with what Isocrates instead explicitly condemns: some private teachers’ 
idea that a successful education passes also through physical studies, such as those 
which in earlier times Pythagoras and Anaxagoras too included in their doctrines. Part 
of the Pythagorean παιδεία was, in fact, taken up by astronomy, and in Arist. Metaph. 
Β 998b Pythagoreans are understood, along with Plato, as those who contemplate the 
nature of beings, treating the first principles of those as genera. In Pl. Phdr. 269e-270c, 
then, Anaxagoras is presented as the teacher who made Pericles ‘the greatest rhetorician 
of all’, precisely by providing him with that ‘ethereal speculation about nature’, which 
is a prerequisite of ‘all the great arts’.842 In the specific case of rhetoric, Plato observes, 
the relevant nature to know is that of the soul, which is why Anaxagoras’ teaching on 
mind helped Pericles so much.  
The temptation of reading the quick reference of our text to Anaxagoreans and 
Pythagoreans as a covert attack on Is. Antidosis 268 is as strong as it is risky. What one 
can more cautiously conclude from this comparison with Isocrates is that Scholz is right 
in associating the weight that philosophy has in our author’s educational programme 
to the old 5th-century sophistic paradigm more than to the 4th-century educational 
system. However, this does not mean that at that time the ideal of universal knowledge 
combining the art of speaking and philosophy was completely ‘überkommenen’,843 let 
alone leading us to prefer the earlier standard dating of between 403 and 395 BCE 
because it is earlier. For the polemical character of the aforementioned Antidosis 
passages indirectly testifies that early philosophical doctrines actually kept on playing 
a role in the programmes of some mid-4th century private teachers too. Further, the sole 
absence of this intellectual trait in the 4th century writings in our possession cannot rule 
out, e silentio, the possibility that a sophist, especially if from a peripheral Greek area, 
could still practice his profession in the traditional manner, offering, maybe still as a 
                                                 
842 Translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Cooper (1997), 546.  
843 Becker/Scholz (2004), 40. 
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travelling teacher, an educational program as wide as possible, and useful also to win 
the day against a philosopher.  
What I see as noteworthy about the author’s claim of omniscience in chapter 8, is, 
rather, the fact that the two opposing trends I mentioned above can be identified with 
the philosophy (φιλοσοφία) and wisdom (σοφία) mentioned in § 9.1; incidentally, that 
also confirms my earlier views about this chapter’s author being the same as the author 
of those before. These two terms, in turn, are striking for their sharp distinction, 
highlighted by the καί which join them together, and, at the same time, for their both 
better performing with the aid of a theoretical tool such as memory. They, in other 
words, are pictured as two separate proper disciplines, and that backs my later dating, 
as only in the 4th century, with Plato’s dialogues, did φιλοσοφία rise to the status of 
discipline as opposed ‘to the many varieties of Sophia or “wisdom” recognized by Plato’s 
predecessors and contemporaries’.844  
Similarly to what has just been said about the lack of 4th-century textual evidence 
of sophistic omniscience, the absence of ῥητορική in § 8.1 cannot prove that this Platonic 
term ‘had not yet entered into common usage’845 when Dissoi Logoi’s author was writing, 
as Schiappa maintained, instead. As he himself acknowledged elsewhere, ‘the word 
rhetoric is not found in the writings of Isocrates – even in the various texts in which 
Isocrates explicitly describes and defends his teachings’.846 By the same logic which 
Schiappa applied to Dissoi Logoi, should one hence question Isocrates’ dating and 
profession merely based on this silence? Once again, I suggest attention should, rather, 
be shifted to another aspect concerning the author’s acquaintance with the art of 
speaking, namely the division in ‘a beginning, a conclusion and a middle’ (§ 6.13) at the 
end of the second speech of chapter 6. And, as above, it is Schiappa himself who 
accredited my suggested dating, when, in revising Kennedy’s authoritative opinion that 
                                                 
844 Nightingale (1995), 14. 
845 Kennedy (1980), 19. 
846 Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 47-48. 
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the 5th-century Syracusan rhetors Corax and Tisias first introduced the division of the 
parts of a speech,847 he pointed out how ‘the codification of this distinction belongs to 
the fourth century BCE rather than the fifth’. 848 
In conclusion, the kind of sophist emerging from Dissoi Logoi is one who offers 
both a philosophical and a dialectico-rhetorical preparation, the two being unified 
under the umbrella of a single art, discussed in chapter 8, which promises to make man 
omniscient, with no regard for the opposition between the ways in which these two 
strands interpret the relationship between knowledge and speech. Although seen as on 
the same level, these philosophical and dialectico-rhetorical trends seem also to coincide 
with two distinct disciplines, namely philosophy and wisdom, mentioned in § 9.1 and 
so support my 4th-century dating of the work. To complete our picture, if it is true that 
Isocrates could have criticized the role of philosophy of nature in this educational 
system, on the other hand, he would have agreed with our author on the two following 
points. Firstly, just like Isocrates in Against the Sophists and Antidosis, Dissoi Logoi’s 
sophist too aims to make a pupil rhetorically skilled (chapter 8) and hence politically 
excellent (chapter 6). Secondly, he takes a characteristic stance against the sortition of 
public officers, but from a democratic standpoint (chapter 7), just as in Isocrates’ 
Areopagiticus. These two factors can be easily read together as claiming that only he who 
has received an adequate teaching of σοφία and ἀρετή can then be meritoriously and 
freely elected by citizens.849 
 
§ 3. Within the first section  
§ 3.1 Chapters 1-6 
As touched on earlier, chapters 1-6 stand out as the true ‘contrasting speeches’, namely 
as antilogies in which two opposing theses are firstly stated and then argued for, 
                                                 
847 Schiappa (1999), 4-6. 
848 Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 170. 
849 On the thematic continuity between chapters 6 and 7, see also Kranz (1937), 226. 
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without the author seeming to genuinely uphold any of them, as opposed to the three 
single speeches making up chapters 7-9, in which the authorial standpoint emerges with 
clarity. From a sophistic perspective, this is also the section which is easier to associate 
with Protagoras, both because antilogy is a distinctive trait of the latter, and because his 
influence can be felt in chapter 6, via Plato’s Protagoras.850  
At the same time, the diversity of forms which antilogy takes in this section has 
led some scholars to wonder whether this structure is actually common to all chapters 
1-6, or, instead, proper δισσοὶ λόγοι are only a subset of those. There surely is mileage 
in this. For on the one hand, Kranz was right in regarding all six of them as displaying 
the conflict of a thesis with an antithesis, and in arguing that the most immediate 
boundary to draw within them is the insubstantial one between the first five chapters, 
in which identity and difference theses are contrasted, and chapter 6, in which this 
contrast does not occur.851 On the other hand, a more minute division within chapters 
1-5 themselves proves to be not only possible, but also necessary to appreciate rhetorical 
and philosophical elements which prima facie the work does not seem to possess. The 
issue is therefore not a banal one, and an indication of that comes from Robinson, who 
in his edition initially claimed that the work’s ‘(supposedly) “antilogical” quality is 
apparently confined to the first four chapters, with perhaps a truncated example in the 
fifth’,852 but shortly after he seems to have changed his mind,853 and in his commentary 
                                                 
850 On these chapters, in particular, Solana Dueso grounds his reading of Dissoi Logoi as a controversy 
between Protagoras’ relativism, represented by the ITs of chapters 1-5 and the teachability thesis of 
chapter 6, on one side, and Socrates’ essentialism characterizing DTs and the unteachability thesis, on the 
other (Solana Dueso (1996), 177). Yet, that simplifies things excessively. For, firstly, some relativistic 
arguments in support of ITs are pronounced by Socrates himself within the Socratic literature (cf. the 
example of taking a sword away from a depressed friend, in § 3.4, and X. Mem. IV.2.17). Secondly, as for 
essentialism, the case of a number which disappears when another one is subtracted from it, is used to 
show that, in the same way, the identity of any object (καὶ τἆλλα καττωὐτό) is compromised by any 
minimal change, in § 5.14; by contrast, at Pl. Cra. 432a-b Socrates points out to Cratylus how things, in 
general, and words, in particular, do not behave in the way as that same arithmetic example shows. 
851 Kranz (1937), 226-227. 
852 Robinson (1979), 77. 
853 Ibid., 79. 
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to chapter 6, he described it too as structured in ‘λόγος (1-6) and counter-λόγος (9-
13)’.854  
Hence, I shall now carefully analyse this block of six antilogies, gradually 
withdrawing the outmost boundary of the section from chapter 6 to chapter 3, and 
bringing to light the different meanings which the text reveals each time this shift 
occurs. 
 
§ 3.2 Chapters 1-5 and 6 
From the point of view of structure, the antilogies of chapters 1-6 share a basic five-step 
pattern which goes essentially as follows: thesis enunciation, thesis arguments, 
antithesis enunciation, antithesis arguments, conclusion (except in chapter 4, the ending 
of which we do not possess and chapter 5 which seems to do without it). Yet, as soon as 
one goes into the contents thus displayed, Kranz’s subdivision, which distinguishes the 
first five chapters, expounding an IT-versus-DT contrast, from the sixth one, which does 
not, gains interest. Something more can be added to that, though, namely the recurrent 
logical patterns which ITs and DTs follow in their opposition. This essentially comes 
down to an IT which states that:  
 
The same x is a under c, a under d 
(with x standing for a subject of various nature (mainly state of affairs), c and d for 
different relativizing factors, and a for an attribute having a as its mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive opposite), 
 
and is argued for inductively with illustrative cases. DT rejoins to it by stating this: 
                                                 
854 Ibid., 210. Finally, he went so far as to recognise the antilogic structure even in chapter 7, provided one 
interprets the author’s position as ‘the counter-λόγος “offices in public and military life should be 
elective”’ (ibid., 218-219). That seems to match Untersteiner’s even more extreme claim that this and the 
two subsequent chapters of the work have a ‘forma antilogica’, despite the lack of a ‘tesi contro tesi’ 
structure (Untersteiner (1954), 183). 
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x is either a or a, 
 
which the author understands as equivalent, by semantic descent, to F(IT) (F(…) 
expresses the predicate ‘…is false’, as opposed to T(…) standing for ‘…is true’). The 
author arrives at the latter as a necessary consequence of the following reductio ad 
absurdum:  
 
T(IT)  The same x is a and a, 
 
obtained by dropping c and d, namely by deploying a fallacy connected to the absolute 
or the relative use of the same predicate.   
Whereas this scheme repeats unvaried in the first four chapters, in the fifth it appears 
only in § 5.9, where an IT of this kind is stated, and partially in § 5.10, where a DT replies 
in a similar, but not identical, way, namely: 
 
T(IT)  (a-under-c  a-under-d), 
 
where, rather than being dropped, the two relativizing factors c and d are now 
emphasized so much as to be embedded by a and to form two new distinct objects the 
identity of which IT is, again, accused to absurdly defend. 
Granted, some arguments fall out of this logical schematisation (along with all the 
other ones in chapter 5, see, for example, the mental experiments of §§ 2.18, 26-28, or the 
poetical excursuses of §§ 2.19 and 3.11-12) which nonetheless applies in most cases. 
Barnes even thought of another rationale for the IT of chapter 3, namely: 
 
‘x is always a/a’ is always false.855  
                                                 
855 Barnes (1979), 217. 
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The underlying idea here is that, unlike in the previous ITs, neither the predicate ‘…is 
a’ or ‘…is a’ is elliptical of some relativizing clause represented as c and d. A fitting 
example of this could be the argument of §§ 3.3-4, where robbing friends and using force 
against the people dearest to us is presented as just, and contextualizing reasons are 
then given for it, but not a single word is added about a possible opposing judgement 
of such conduct as unjust. However, an explanation for this could be that the latter 
opinion is the one conventionally held about such actions in the vast majority of cases, 
and it is therefore left understood. If so, then the whole formulation can be seen as a 
simplification of the ITs scheme identified above rather than a true alternative to it, 
which, in fact, can be easily brought out in such arguments too, by simply expliciting 
the implicit second part of the opposition. Furthermore, in two circumstances, the usual 
pattern turns up in this chapter too, namely in § 3.2, where lying and deceiving are 
condemned when done to enemies, but accepted in certain cases in which they are done 
to those dear to us, and in §§ 3-7-8, where robbing a temple is said to be unjust in case 
of temples which belong to the cities, but just in case of those which are common 
property of Hellas, when national security is threatened. 
If the logical contrast describing the clash between ITs and DTs is the one I have 
just illustrated, then it is immediately striking how these two positions are not 
contrasting, let alone contradictory, but compatible. For nothing prevents us from 
considering, for example, a certain custom beautiful under some condition, ugly under 
another one (IT), and, at the same time, to oppose one custom which we deem beautiful 
to another one which we deem ugly (DT).856 From this angle, both ITs and DTs are 
sensible and the same applies to the particular DT of § 5.10 too, because considering an 
action, such as that of speaking, as essentially dependent on the time in which it takes 
place is a philosophical choice which one may legitimately make. If that is the case, then 
                                                 
856 Earlier in the commentary I also observed how a translation of the articulate form of the neuter 
adjectives in DTs in terms of concepts, such as Robinson’s, makes the two positions even less conflicting; 
and that, by a principle of linguistic charity towards λόγοι presented as δισσοί, strengthens the case for 
a translation such as mine. 
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some scholars’ belief that the author must side only with either of the two positions 
proves unconvincing, also considering how for each thesis for which the author argues, 
he does not refrain from using phrases stating his own agreement with it, in a way 
which makes his actual views inscrutable.857 Another questionable take on this issue is 
Diels’, who even deemed the author so ‘talentlose’858 as not to realize the failure in the 
way ITs and DTs contrast. This does not do justice to the respectable standard of the 
author’s reflection in chapters 7-9, though, or to what we have been seeing about the 
thought-out construction of the antilogic chapters. Furthermore, by the same token, 
criticism may well be advanced against Euthydemus and Dionysodorus too, although 
no one would be ready to question these characters’ intellectual qualities.859 For it is 
patent that the philosophical nonsense with which they flood Plato’s Euthydemus should 
be taken simply for their eristic effect, namely for one of the results sought by a sophist 
such as the two brothers and, presumably, our author. 
The consistency of chapters 1-5, however, does not boil down just to the same logic 
underpinning their different arguments, and the author seems to have worked on at 
least two other levels when producing this cluster of chapters. From a philosophical 
viewpoint, a Platonic passage, R. V.479a-480a, is of particular significance. There, Plato 
describes a kind of people who reject the existence of qualities in themselves, and yet 
do not refrain from predicating them of objects of the world. By doing so, they show 
themselves to have opinions about what they do not actually know, and hence to 
deserve the title of doxophilists, as opposed to philosophers. Going into such opinions, 
                                                 
857 That the author supports DTs has been argued, among the others, in Gomperz (1912), Levi (1940), 
Dupréel (1948), Untersteiner (1954). This view often hinges around flimsy factors such as DTs coming as 
second and its defense always occupying more space (which is even false!), as Robinson underscored 
(Robinson (1979), 73-74). He, instead, saw the author’s preference going to ITs, judging them as 
‘frequently quite acceptable, and easily supportable by evidence’, and their arguments as usually better 
than the others (Robinson (2003), 243). As for the phrases potentially indicating the author’s commitment 
to some view, however, he too acknowledged that what can be made of those is unclear (Robinson (1979), 
74).  
858 Diels (1907), 635. 
859 A defense of our author’s intellectual qualities is, instead, in Rossetti (1980), 27-41. 
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Plato recalls those about things that look beautiful, just, and pious under some 
circumstances, but also ugly, unjust and impious, under others (479a-b); examples 
clearly reminiscent of the ITs of chapters 1-4.860 Then, he broadens the range of such 
judgements showing how not only evaluative predicates, but also empirical ones can be 
included: things can appear both double and half, great and small, light and heavy 
(479b). By only relying on opinion, doxophilists are hence bound to equivocate the 
objects they opine, and they cannot be ‘certain that any of these things exists or does 
not, either as both or neither”861 (479c). As a result, ‘the many notions of most people 
about beauty and the rest are rolling around somewhere between nonexistence and 
pure existence’862 (479d). All of this latter extract of Plato mirrors with extreme accuracy 
§§ 5.3-5, which made me list this parallel among those testifying a second-class influence 
between Dissoi Logoi and ancient Greek authorities. What one can conclude from this 
comparison is that Plato’s doxophilists unequivocally coincide with the IT upholders of 
chapters 1-5, and in a way which brings to light a philosophical connection between the 
ITs of our work, which one would not at first sight suspect. For, granted, chapter 5 
breaks with the previous ones by discussing the identity and the difference of opposites 
which are no longer qualities, but actions by different classes of people. On the other 
hand, we have just seen how it is also deeply integrated in chapters 1-4, by keeping a 
brief sketch of the ontological implications of those chapters’ ITs, as well as of its own. 
Finally, such coincidence can be reasonably explained with our author having been 
inspired by R. V.479a-480a when composing the first speeches of chapters 1-5: as seen 
back in the Introduction, Plato’s Republic is one of the most likely sources of Dissoi Logoi.  
Earlier, we observed that a philosophical and a dialectico-rhetorical temper 
characterize the author’s sophistic ideology. It thus would not come as a surprise if in a 
sample of text which has been proving particularly meaningful in the former respect, 
                                                 
860 The parallel with true/false is missing in Plato, but the point he makes is clear enough to embrace this 
couple, and hence to apply to the IT of chapter 4, as well, just as to any other possible couple of opposites. 
861 Translation from Emlyn-Jones/Preddy (2013), 565. 
862 Ibid. 
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we can now find something associated to the latter too. For chapters 1-5 also exemplify 
four different rhetorical strategies, which the author must have had in mind during their 
composition. 
Firstly comes the one I label relativization, and which concerns the ITs of chapters 
1-4. Here the author shows how an issue puts on opposite tones under different 
circumstances. One can better appreciate the rhetorical efficacy of this strategy if they 
move from the field of philosophical opposites to that of ordinary life. We can thus 
imagine, for example, defending our dog from the accusation of being aggressive, 
highlighting how it barks only at strangers such as the accuser, whereas among the 
family it is tame and plays with children.  
The IT of chapter 5863 shows overgeneralization, namely it makes different issues 
coincide by cutting out the aspects which differentiate them. This time we could think 
of another defence of our dog from the same accusation as before, by pointing out how 
it barks at everyone, passing under silence that it barks joyfully at known people yet 
threateningly to strangers. 
Close to the latter strategy is the one employed by the DT of chapters 1-4, and 
which I call absolutization. It too dispenses with the relativizing clauses which cast 
opposite lights on an issue, but argues that only either of these lights is acceptable. For 
example, to the owner who distinguishes between his dog’s behaviours with known 
and unknown people one can counter that the aggressiveness of the dog with strangers 
should make him seriously worry about leaving it in the company of his family 
members too. 
Lastly, the DT of chapter 5 is based on overspecification, that is it exaggerates the 
importance of some details, ending up multiplying the actual number of matters at 
hand. A parallel would be to excuse our dog to a passer-by at whom it was snarling, by 
                                                 
863 I am here of course excluding § 5.9 which, as said above, leads back to the logical form of chapters 1-4 
IT, and which too can be judged as a relativization from a rhetorical perspective. 
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clarifying that actually the dog was not about to attack him, as he could have thought, 
because usually when it does so it also lifts its tail. 
 
§ 3.3 Chapters 1-4 
We have just had further confirmation of a fact already known, namely that the author 
has familiarity with the art of speaking, regardless of the fact that he does not expressly 
name it. Something else in this sense can emerge if we now narrow down our focus to 
the first four chapters and, more precisely, to their second speeches, in defence of DT. 
What one sees here is the thought-out repetition of the same sequel of rhetorical steps, 
namely: 
1. New enunciation of DT, after the one in the first paragraph of the chapter (§§ 1.11, 
2.21, 3.13, 4.6); 
2. Interrogation of the IT upholder and reductio ad absurdum of his position by putting 
him at odds with his own words and deeds (§§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13, 4.6); 
3. Absurd consequences that the IT would have in the upholder’s judgement about 
some people (§§ 1.14-15, 2.22, 3.14, 4.6);  
4. Review and refutation of some of the IT’s arguments (§§ 1.16-17, 2.23-28, 3.15-16, 4.7-
9)   
5. Conclusion, except in chapter 4 where the final part of the text is missing, and with 
reference to the untruthfulness of art in chapters 2 and 3 (§§ 1.17, 2.28, 3.17). 
It would be excessive to see in (2)-(4) those rhetorical commonplaces (τόποι), namely 
‘ready-made argument<s> usable in a variety of situations’,864 which according to Cic. 
Brut. XII.46-47 and Quint. Inst. III.1.1 Protagoras and Gorgias were the first to treat and 
which soon became a pivotal aspect of ancient rhetoric. On the other hand, the repetition 
of the same thread of general topics shows how the author was aware of the contribution 
of order to the creation and the retention of a speech, which is something already 
                                                 
864 Calboli Montefusco in BNP, s.v. ‘Topics’.  
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discussed in connection with chapter 9, and which, incidentally, explains the historical 
affinity between rhetorical and mnemonic τόποι.865  
 
§ 4. A Pyrrhonian sophist? 
The division of the antilogic chapters into smaller meaningful subsets has not actually 
concluded with the previous paragraph. A last group, chapters 1-3, are, in fact, what 
Barnes calls ‘the first 3 ethical sections’866 of the treatise and, as anticipated in the 
Introduction, they have a special consideration in manuscripts and first editions of Dissoi 
Logoi. I also already mentioned how scholars observed the similarity of these chapters 
to Sextus’ Ethicists, and, as far as chapter 2 is concerned, S.E. P. I and, especially, III 
should be certainly added, as we will better see later. 
That leads me to finally tackle the question, left suspended, about why our work 
has been attached at the end of Sextus Empiricus’ codices; a fact which, as I noted earlier, 
was not perfectly clear to the copyists themselves at some stage of the text’s 
transmission, judging from the comment ζητεῖται δὲ εἰ καὶ τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα 
Σέξτειόν ἐστιν in all manuscripts’ superscription. And, truthfully, at first sight, one 
may sympathize with them, given the author’s sophistic ideology seen in the previous 
paragraph. His clear-cut political stand in chapter 7; his profession of omniscience and 
his promotion both of rhetoric and of an inquiry into the nature of things, in chapter 8; 
finally, his faith in the potentiality of mnemonics, and his instruction of how it works: 
all that is inevitably at odds with Sextus’ suspension of judgement, with his tranquil 
avoidance of inquiring into the reality underlying man’s contrasting appearances, and 
with his suspicion of anyone claiming to have a knowledge to impart. In this connection, 
Fabricius stressed the anti-sceptical character of the text so much as to conjecture the 
                                                 
865 See Blum (1969), 53-54. 
866 Barnes (1979), 217. 
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Stoic Sextus of Chaeronea as its true author, and supposed that a mistake in copying his 
name caused the misplacement of Dissoi Logoi at the end of Sextus Empiricus.867 
On the other hand, a few scholars spotted a sceptical vein in chapters 1-6, almost 
all of them without questioning the sophistic nature of the work either.868 In particular, 
S.E. P. I.12 straightforwardly claims that ‘the main basic principle of the Sceptic system 
is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a 
consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize’.869 Whether one agrees with me 
about the author’s conceiving his contrasting speeches as equipollent, or not, as 
Robinson,870 a compiler, especially if not very knowledgeable about philosophy, ‘could 
be forgiven for seeing an affinity between this view and the doctrine of equipollence 
that so characterises the writings of Sextus’ and for tying the two texts together, as 
Robinson himself acknowledged.871 In this hypothesis, the association would have been 
made simply on the basis of their common practice of arguing on both sides of a given 
issue, and would hence have had a certain degree of fortuitousness. For by the same 
token, the same compiler may well have attached Dissoi Logoi to works from other later 
schools of thought, which shared the same technique, such as the Peripatos (Aristotle 
himself is reported to have introduced it, see Cic. Orat. XIV.46), the Academy (see de 
Orat. III.107-108, Att. II.3.3, Acad. II.7-8; Arcesilas and Carneades stood out in this, see de 
Orat. III.79-80, Acad. I.46, Fin. V.10-11), or the empirical school of medicine (Dionysius 
                                                 
867 Fabricius (1724), 617. 
868 Giacomo Leopardi first detected the pro and contra form of the starting chapters as typical of 
‘esercitazioni scettiche’ (Zibaldone di pensieri, 21 June 1823); later he doubted the authenticity of the work, 
yet (Ibid., 10 March 1829). The sceptical reading can be found also in Bergk (1883), 120, Schanz (1884), 372, 
Teichmüller (1884), 114-115, Weber (1897), 34, Dumont (1969), 232, Robinson (1996), 35-36, Burnyeat 
(1998), Bailey (2008), 261-263.  
869 Bury (1976), 9. 
870 See supra, 282, n. 857.  
871 Robinson (1996), 35. After all, Gregory of Nazianzus himself proves to have made this equation, when 
writing this: ‘ever since the Sextuses and the Pyrrhos and the practice of arguing to opposites have, like 
a vile and malignant disease, infected the churches, babbling has been regarded as culture and — as the 
Book of Acts says of the Athenians — we spend our whole time in speaking or listening to some novelty 
or other. (Oratio 21, caput 12, PG 35, col. 1095)’ (translation from Floridi (2002), 12). A contemporary 
example of such judgement comes from Dumont, who spoke of ‘deux thèses contraires, à la façon de 
Protagoras […] ou des Sceptiques’ (Dumont (1969), 232). 
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of Aegae’s Δικτυακά, see Phot. Bibl. 185,211), had he just found himself with their texts 
instead of those of Sextus. 
However, other Dissoi Logoi features took on a considerable significance over the 
long arc of Pyrrhonism, whose Sextus Empiricus is famously our main source. The 
contrast in Greece among those who philosophize (των φιλοσοφοῦντων...τοὶ μέν...τοὶ 
δέ...), with which the work starts off in § 1.1 and which involves the ITs and the DTs of 
chapters 1-4, recalls the notion of διαφωνία (‘disagreement’) to which the first Mode of 
Agrippa is devoted (S.E. P. I.178).872 Both chapters 1 and 6 end with what Sextus calls 
ἐποχή (‘suspension of judgement’, P. I.5 et passim), the former underscoring the author’s 
silence on the nature of the good thing, the latter refraining from concluding in favour 
of the teachability of wisdom and excellence, although all the arguments in support of 
their unteachability have been refuted. Finally, that it is essential for a man’s success to 
know the nature of things (§ 8.1-2) and that indeterminateness is their nature (§ 5.5) 
were two of Pyrrho’s tenets too. More broadly, the possibility that sophists ‘provided 
the materials exploited most conspicuously but by no means exclusively by the later 
Skeptics’873 has been illustrated by Striker. Exemplary of that is the case of the 
Anonymous author of MXG who, according to Jaap Mansfeld, was a Neo-Pyrrhonist 
already acquainted with Agrippa’s thought and reasonably interested in Gorgias’ On 
What is Not.874    
Furthermore, looking back at the list of parallels between Dissoi Logoi and ancient 
authorities,875 in five out of the eight cases involving Sextus Empiricus’ works, no other 
author is included, and in two of these five, the influences are of second class (chapter 
5 and S.E. M. XI.197-209; § 5.14 and S.E. P. II.215, III.109, M. IV.25, X.323).876 Hence, albeit 
                                                 
872 Similarly, Gisela Striker examined MXG 979al4-21 and observed that ‘by playing out one philosopher's 
arguments against those of another, Gorgias produced what the later Pyrrhonist skeptics would call a 
διαφωνία: a set of conflicting theses each backed by argument’ (Striker (1996), 12). 
873 Striker (1996), 20. On the links between sophistic and scepticism see also Pullman (1994). 
874 Mansfeld (1988). 
875 See supra, 27-29. 
876 On the definition of the two classes, see supra, 27. 
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the possibility of a lost common source cannot be excluded, there is a good chance that 
an intellectual borrowing occurred between Sextus and our author, which comparison 
of their chronologies also shows to have gone from the latter to the former and not the 
other way around, like in all other cases of influence examined. If that is the case, then 
the fact that the text of Dissoi Logoi remained close to Sextus’ corpus up to its manuscript 
transmission can be explained, more than with the questionable choice of a later 
compiler, with the fact that Sextus used, and hence accessed, our work. After all, he may 
have not been the first Pyrrhonist to be interested in this text, as I shall now show. 
We already saw that D.L. IX.106 informs us of a writing Περὶ διττῶν λόγων 
composed by a sceptic called Zeuxis, and how this testimony counted as textual 
grounds for Weber to introduce ‘Dissoi Logoi’ as the new title of our work. It is now 
opportune to supplement that with the further information which Diogenes adds about 
Zeuxis, but which neither Weber nor Burnyeat, who more recently flagged up Zeuxis in 
connection with Dissoi Logoi, fully observed.877 In the same Diogenes Laertius passage, 
in fact, Zeuxis is said also to be a friend of Aenesidemus and, just like him, to ‘hold to 
phenomena alone’.878 At IX.116, then, both Aenesidemus and Zeuxis appear within the 
legacy of Timon’s pupils. More precisely we read that ‘Aenesidemus of Cnossus, the 
compiler of eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses […] was the instructor of Zeuxippus 
his fellow-citizen, he of Zeuxis of the angular foot’.879 Hence, Zeuxis and Aenesidemus’ 
above philosophical agreement is explained here with the indirect transmission of the 
latter’s teachings to the former via Zeuxippus. 
What this kind of teaching was like is another element of knowledge within our 
reach. As Bett put it, Aenesidemus was the starter ‘of anything we could call a 
Pyrrhonian tradition’ around three centuries after Pyrrho.880 His brand of Pyrrhonism 
was yet different both from that of the origins and, especially, from the late one of Sextus 
                                                 
877 Cf. Weber (1897), 34, n. 1, Burnyeat (1998), 107. 
878 Hicks (1925), 517. 
879 Ibid., 527. 
880 Bett (2000), 191. 
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Empiricus who, nonetheless, provides us with precious reconstructions of his thought. 
Our most conspicuous source for Aenesidemus is, however, Phot. Bibl. 169b18-170b35 
which furnishes an account of how the Pyrrhonist behaves, which boils down to two 
fundamental points. Firstly, he ‘determines absolutely nothing, not even this very claim 
that nothing is determined’881 (170a11-12). Secondly, though he is ‘free of all doctrine’882 
(169b41), Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonist can nonetheless hold and express views on certain 
issues, unlike Sextus Empiricus’ one. An example of this is given at 170a1-3, where 
Pyrrhonists are said to maintain that things ‘are no more of this kind than of that, or that 
they are sometimes of this kind, sometimes not, or that for one person they are of this 
kind, for another person not of this kind, and for another person not even existent at 
all’.883 In Bett’s words, ‘things are not invariably F’,884 but ‘sometimes F, sometimes not-
F, and F for one person, not-F for another, and non-existent for a third’.885 The same 
stress on ‘the relativity of phenomena, or their variability with circumstances’886 
emerges also from Diogenes Laertius’ account of the ten Modes of suspension of 
judgement (D.L. IX.78-88) which, just as Sextus (P. I.346), he traced back to 
Aenesidemus.  
With this in mind, it is not far-fetched to suppose that if an Aenesidemean 
Pyrrhonist such as Zeuxis had access to the book of Dissoi Logoi, he could find the ITs of 
chapters 1-4 to his liking, as they consist entirely in relativized assertions of that same 
kind.887 It is also worth assessing the possibility, just briefly sketched by Burnyeat, that 
the διττοὶ λόγοι about which Zeuxis seems to have written from his work’s title, were 
those constituting the first six antilogic chapters of our work.888 At first sight, this 
                                                 
881 Translation from Long/Sedley (1987), 469. 
882 Ibid. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Bett (2000), 195. 
885 Ibid., 194 
886 Ibid., 209 
887 Cf. supra, 279. 
888 Burnyeat (1998). 
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identification can sound fanciful, because the exercise of contrasting two opposing 
arguments on the same topic is attested both before Dissoi Logoi’s time, with Protagoras, 
and after it, with the aforementioned Hellenistic philosophers, as well as because one 
cannot rule out that the διττοὶ λόγοι about which Zeuxis wrote were his own. However, 
for what our available literary evidence is worth, the only other occurrence of the phrase 
δισσοὶ λόγοι beside Dissoi Logoi, is a cursory appearance in Fr. TGF 189 from Euripides’ 
Antiope.889 Furthermore, Aenesidemean relativism, based on opposite attributes 
predicated of the same subject under different conditions, which I have just sketched 
can be traced only in Dissoi Logoi’s antilogies and in those of Protagoras (Pl. Prt. 334a-c). 
Yet, one can observe how Dissoi Logoi, especially if we agree on the dating of it for which 
I have been arguing, is far closer in time to Pyrrho than Protagoras, and that could make 
it a more attractive reading for someone who was looking into the figure of Pyrrho. 
Finally, Aenesidemus came from Crete and by being able to speak Aegean Doric κοινή, 
one of the dialects which I previously associated to Dissoi Logoi, he could have a 
facilitated access to our work. If that was the case, it is also possible that he read it, 
deemed it an interesting testimony of ancient relativism for his own reflections on the 
subject,890 and hence introduced it into his philosophical circle where Zeuxis could have 
known it.  
At this point, we have reached two conclusions. The first is that Sextus Empiricus 
is likely to have drawn on Dissoi Logoi, which also explains the latter’s manuscript 
collocation. The second, and more speculative, is that Zeuxis too may have accessed our 
work and made use of it. Granted, these two points are distinct both logically and as far 
as their degree of probability is concerned. Nonetheless, a hypothesis is worth 
exploring, which can coherently account for both of them, and also tell us more about 
those Sextus passages in which the debt to Dissoi Logoi is more visible, and on which I 
just touched when opening this section. 
                                                 
889 ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων / ἀγῶνα θεῖτ’ ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός. 
890 See also Bury (1976), xxxvii. 
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To begin this exploration, we firstly need to recall two facts. In the first place, 
although Sextus is another source for Aenesidemus’ thought, we lost the writings on 
which he based himself to reconstruct the latter. Secondly, it has been observed how the 
places of Sextus’ work in which Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonism seems to emerge more 
decidedly are not as much those in which Aenesidemus is expressly referred to, as other 
implicit ones in which Sextus’ scepticism takes turns so unexpected as to suggest that 
another kind of Pyrrhonism is in action.891 In particular, Sextus’ ethical writings ‘have 
retained much more pervasive signs of Aenesidemean heritage than his writings on 
other subjects’.892 A first example is the treatment of the tenth Mode of suspension of 
judgement, devoted to the variation in the laws and customs of peoples. Usually, in 
Sextus the Modes end by inviting the Pyrrhonist ‘to suspend judgement as to the real 
nature of the objects’ of which appearances are given.893 This occurs with the tenth too 
(P. I.145-163), but with a characteristic additional ‘emphasis on relativity’894 which, in 
fact, enables the Pyrrhonist to opine at least about what belongs to an object ‘in respect 
of this particular rule of conduct, or law, or habit, and so on with each of the rest’ 
(I.163).895  
On the same wavelength is P.III, whose second and ethical part is concerned, 
among the rest, with the question of whether something by nature good or bad exists. 
From a methodological point of view, Bett rightly points out as striking that here the 
author does not opt for contrasting arguments pro and contra ‘the general proposition 
that there exist things that are by nature good or bad’, in his usual oppositional 
fashion.896 He, instead, displays ‘a multitude of conflicting positions concerning what 
things are by nature good or bad’,897 and the immediate conclusion he draws from them 
                                                 
891 Cf. Bett (2000), 207-213, Bett (2010), 182-186.  
892 Ibid., 186. 
893 Bett (2000), 208. 
894 Ibid. 
895 Bury (1976), 93.  
896 Bett (2010), 182. 
897 Ibid. 
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is that there are no such things (cf. 179, 182, 190). That too strays from normal Sextus, in 
two respects. Firstly, it assumes a principle, which Bett called ‘invariability condition’,898 
and which at M. VIII.8 Sextus himself admits comes from Aenesidemus, phrasing it as 
follows.: ‘some of them [sc. ‘things’] appear to all men in common, others to one person 
separately, and of these such as appear to all in common are true, and the other sort 
false’.899 As Bett recalls, ‘except in Against the Ethicists, the book that espouses an 
essentially Aenesidemean outlook, Sextus shows no sign of accepting the invariability 
condition; nor would one expect him to accept it – it would surely look to him like a 
dogmatic philosophical view’.900 Secondly, the conclusion Sextus formulates is clearly a 
negatively dogmatic assertion, which, again, seems as far from him as expectable of 
Aenesidemus, who at Phot. Bibl. 170b3-35 is described as denying the existence of signs, 
causes and ends, as well as the possibility for man to grasp concepts such as those of the 
world, gods, the nature of things, and of their causes.901 Finally, suspicion surrounds the 
logical step which Sextus makes from this negative assertion to the conclusion of P. III 
on this issue, namely that ‘the Sceptic, seeing so great diversity of usages, suspends 
judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad’902 (III.235). Refraining 
again from his usual oppositional method, Sextus does not come to this point by 
contrasting the negative view with its opposite ‘something is by nature good or bad’. 
On the contrary, at 182 he attempts to justify the move with a short line of reasoning, 
which, yet, lacks persuasiveness,903 and seems designed just to tie together assertions 
reflecting two different kinds of Pyrrhonism.904  
If in the case just examined suspension of judgement is grounded on shaky 
premises, in Against the Ethicists (S.E. M. XI), earlier touched on and sketched as the most 
                                                 
898 Bett (2000), 196 et passim. 
899 Bury (1967), 243. 
900 Bett (2000), 216.  
901 Cf. ibid., 197, 233. 
902 Bury (1976), 483. 
903 Bett (2010), 183-184. 
904 Cf. also ibid., 183-185. 
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Aenesidemean of Sextus’ books, it fails altogether. For here the sceptic’s goal of 
ἀταραξία extraordinarily emerges straight from the acceptance of this ‘definitive 
negative conclusion’:905 ’when reasoning has established that none of these things is 
good by nature or evil by nature, we shall have a release from perturbation and there 
will await us a peaceful life’906 (M. XI.130; cf. also 118, 140).907 The same book also 
features acceptance of relativized assertions (114, 118), commitment to the invariability 
condition (69-71), and another unambiguously negative answer at the end of the chapter 
inquiring whether an art of life exists or not (215).908  
In summary, P. I.145-163, P. III, and M. XI reflect Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonism rather 
than that of their author. But what matters more to us is that, looking at the two lists of 
parallels between our work and ancient authorities again, a good five out of the eight 
portions of Dissoi Logoi paralleled with Sextus’ texts (§ 2.5, §§ 2.9-17, chapter 5, § 5.14, 
chapter 6) corresponds to passages belonging to those three Sextus sections, three being 
the cases of first-class influence (§ 2.5, §§ 2.9-17, chapter 6), two being those of second-
class influence (chapter 5, § 5.14). Also, the only three cases where relevant amounts of 
text from both works are paralleled involve precisely those three Sextus sections (§§ 2.9-
17 and P. III.199-234; chapter 5 and M. XI.197-209; chapter 6 and M. XI.216-257). As a 
result, the passages in Sextus where Aenesidemus’ thought stands out the most are also 
the closest ones to Dissoi Logoi.  
Besides strengthening the case, already made, for the interest which an 
Aenesidemean Pyrrhonist like Zeuxis could have had in Dissoi Logoi, these outcomes 
may also suggest that Aenesidemean Pyrrhonism played a part in the relation between 
Dissoi Logoi and Sextus. More precisely, Sextus may have discovered Dissoi Logoi within 
that body of materials on Aenesidemus in which our work could have ended up, due to 
the said interest of Aenesidemean Pyrrhonists for it. Among the other writings of that 
                                                 
905 Bett (2000), 212. 
906 Bury (1968), 449. 
907 Cf. Bett (2000), 212, Bett (2010), 184. 
908 Cf. Bett (2000), 212-213, Bett (2010), 185-186. 
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same collection, all of which now lost, Sextus may have found Zeuxis’ Περὶ διττῶν 
λόγων too. If this work did deal with Dissoi Logoi, on it Sextus could have drawn some 
of the ideas which make his P. I.145-163, P. III, and M. XI an expanded and 
Aenesidemean treatment of what some passages of our work originally said. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
At the end of his entry ‘Dissoi Logoi’ for The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Burnyeat warned that ‘sober readers will suspend judgement on every question about 
the work’.909 I believe that with this thesis the range of this caveat has shrunk, and that 
concerning a few issues related to this work new reconstructions emerge which, 
although they do not meet the criterium of certainty which Burnyeat’s ‘sober reader’ 
might require, should, nonetheless, be welcomed by a scholar in ancient philosophy, as 
they are more grounded than those that the standard view on Dissoi Logoi has 
maintained so far.  
In particular, the idea that the work is to be dated between the 5th and the 4th 
century BCE — to which its presence in Diels and Kranz’s collection of Presocratics 
earlier, and in Laks and Most’s edition of the early Greek philosophers now, is due — 
must be reconsidered. The numerous and strong similarities between Dissoi Logoi and 
the works of Plato and Isocrates suggest that our author was influenced by them. 
Combining the date of Isocrates’ Aeropagiticus with a reference to what the author calls 
‘the most recent’ of the wars in Greek history, in § 1.8, I moved the date of composition 
to 355-338 BCE. 
Fewer indications have surfaced about the geographical provenance of the text. 
But in this case too, the usual preference for Western regions of the Doric-speaking 
world, such as Sicily and Southern Italy, has turned out not to convince on linguistic 
grounds, as careful analysis of this dialect makes think of an Eastern form of Doric 
κοινή.  
The sophistic nature of the author is confirmed, whereas both the idea of the text 
as a collection of lecture-notes and that of a didactic goal conflict with its style and with 
an internal unity which one may easily fail to see on first reading, but which starts to 
                                                 
909 Burnyeat (1998), 107. 
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emerge as soon as one focuses on chapter 8. Here the author showcases a series of 
sophistic abilities which his customers may have been interested to acquire, and 
samples of which may be recognised in the previous seven chapters. Chapters 1-8 hence 
look as a promotional essay followed by an incomplete treatise of mnemonics, chapter 
9. These two writings are likely to belong to the same author, but can hardly have made 
part of the same work. 
Finally, Dissoi Logoi’s collocation at the end of Sextus Empiricus’ manuscripts is 
now strengthened by some new theoretical connections. The aforementioned 
comparison with parallel texts which has revealed our author’s intellectual debts, here 
leads to the conclusion that Dissoi Logoi was read by Sextus, and likely by Zeuxis too: 
for the Aenesidemean kind of Pyrrhonism which seems to have belonged to this 1st-
century BCE figure, to whom the only possible literary testimony of our work may also 
be associated, is the version of Pyrrhonism which suits Dissoi Logoi’s relativism the best. 
To conclude, Dissoi Logoi seems to be the work of a 4th-century sophist imbued with 
a literary and philosophical culture of the past, and who held knowledge, including 
knowledge, in the highest esteem, considering it even as the essential basis of a true 
democracy.  
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